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This thesis attempts to bring about a shift in the perspective of legal theorizing. This shift
is a subtle but significant one, and leads one in directions somewhat different from that of
traditional legal theory. Given that this is the case, it is incumbent upon this introduction to
present, in as clear a manner as possible, an overview of the theoretical landscape so that the
reader is clear about the terrain to be covered.
This thesis focuses on the minimal foundations of law, legal systems, and legal theory.
Legal theories are often content to simply presuppose that certain pre-conditions must be
satisfied if law and legal systems are to be said to exist. These pre-conditions are then
investigated as if they were a simple matter of "(social) fact". The foundations of these pre¬
conditions, however, often remain uninvestigated. This thesis examines one essential pre¬
condition, and studies in some detail what this pre-condition is, how it comes about, and
how it is sustained. To be specific, this thesis focuses on the foundations of conduct
regularity, the existence of which typically enters other legal theories as a matter of "(social)
fact". Such an examination necessitates a shift of perspective in two related directions. First,
there is a move away from the examination of institutional forms, and a move towards the
analysis of their foundations. Second, and associated with this, there is a shift towards
individual-level analysis. Indeed, much of this thesis may be considered to be an
investigation of how a single individual, embedded in a social environment, would attempt
to conduct themselves in a regular way. Connected with both of these shifts in perspective is
the important point that this thesis examines the mechanisms by which "ordinary"
individuals conduct themselves with regularity in their day to day affairs, and does not focus
primarily upon institutional actors playing out institutional roles.
1
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2. Implications of the shift in perspective
This shift in perspective entails a variety of consequences. First, there is a move away
from examining the institutional creation and application of rules, and a move towards the
examination of how regularity comes to exist and is manifested in individual conduct. This
may be contrasted with the positivist approach to the matter. This work argues that
positivism is confused on a number of points, not least in that its starting point for rule-
generation is, crudely speaking, a pre-existing authority. In contrast, the theory laid out in
this work focuses on how authority comes to exist, how rules, in the sense of regularities,1
are generated, and the interaction between these regularities and the positivists' notion of
authority. One might put it this way: the difference between the positivist approach and the
one of this thesis is related to the interest each perspective has in conduct regularity. I shall
argue that while the positivist approach is interested in conduct regularity insofar as it enters
as a factual pre-condition for the existence of law and legal systems, they have little interest
or insight into how this regularity comes to exist or is sustained. The focus of this thesis, on
the other hand, is on the mechanisms which support regularities of conduct, and hence into
the inter-relationship between these mechanisms, conduct regularity, and the existence and
functioning of authority. In other words, the starting point of each approach is different:
what enters into positivist analyses as "givens" (as "social facts" which either do or do not
exist) enters into the analysis of this thesis as questions to be answered about how they come
to exist, and what supports their continued existence.
One consequence of this difference in interests is that the term "rules" has a somewhat
different meaning from traditional positivist usage. This term, as used within this thesis,
refers in many cases to regularities of conduct. In addition, it is not assumed that authority is
a defining property of a "rule". This thesis attempts to shift the emphasis away from
deliberate, institutionalized and authoritative rule creation, and towards less deliberate and
often times unarticulated regularities. This shift is accompanied by a change of emphasis on
the type of reasoning which comes under examination. The focus of this thesis is not upon
reasoning within institutions already assumed to be authoritative, nor is its emphasis on the
deliberate and articulated arguments concerning issues of authority which are held to be of
great importance in such a sphere, but rather is instead upon individual-level reasoning and
1 It is important to keep in mind that in this thesis the term "rule" does not necessarily refer to an
authoritative regularity, nor to an articulated one.
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autonomous conduct governance, and upon "reasoning" which is in some cases neither
deliberate nor articulated.
This leads to a second difference between this study and those with an institutional
emphasis. One question of interest is why regularities of conduct have arisen, and what
properties have come to be associated with them. An emphasis upon rule-generation which
is in many cases neither deliberate nor articulated leads to a stress upon two properties of
rules which are often underemphasized by an institutional perspective: their abstractness
and their negativity (in the sense of being prohibitive). Within the context of this thesis
these properties will be analyzed as evolutionary adaptations to conditions of environmental
complexity. Such properties are of fundamental importance when one turns to issues of
conflict-resolution in complex environments.
The third point of difference from traditional inquiries is that this thesis emphasizes two
inter-related aspects of conflict-resolution. First, there is the problem of resolving conflicts
which individuals have within themselves. This fundamentally difficult problem is often
overlooked in institutional studies of law, yet it is neither trivial nor unrelated to
institutional conflict-resolution. This thesis argues that institutional mechanisms for
conflict-resolution must solve many of the same difficulties faced by individual decision¬
makers when deciding over their own conduct. In an important sense, individuals striving
for regularity put into effect what is typically considered to be a principle applicable only to
social institutions — the principle of the Rule of Law. From this analogy between different
levels of conduct governance flows an argument that conflict-resolution at the individual
level provides, in a sense, the foundations of more institutionalized forms, and that it is
therefore of great importance to understand the relationship between individual-level
governance and more institutional methods. To do this, this thesis argues that one must first
understand how individuals govern themselves.
3. The critical dimension: the contrast with Hartian legal positivism
All of this differs from the approach typically taken by traditional legal theory. This
thesis examines a dominant branch of this tradition, Hartian legal positivism. Haitians are
representative of traditional legal theory in that they leave the foundations of social order
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and legal authority unexamined.2 Hartian theory, as with many others, makes a leap into
institutional detail without an examination or understanding of the foundations upon which
such institutions are grounded. This lack of interest in, and understanding of, the
foundations of legal theory might in part explain their pre-occupation with authority.
Haitians assume a foundation of conduct regularity and authority are necessary conditions
for the existence of law and legal systems. Yet they offer little insight into how such
regularity comes to exist, nor into the requirements for its sustainability, nor into the
interaction of this regularity with the elaborate theoretical and institutional structures upon
which they are so fond of focusing. The lack of insight into the foundations of regularity and
authority is manifested in their assertions of the existence of certain "social facts" and the
factual nature of their inquiries. In reality, however, this premature factuality merely serves
to eliminate insights into the foundations upon which positivist legal theory rests. Positivism
simply requires regularity to exist as a fact, and does not inquire into the sources of this
regularity. The same can be said for their view of authority. Legal positivism's theoretical
analysis is conditional upon the continued existence of the "social facts" of regularity and
authority. Yet little explanation is given of how these phenomena persist, and there is little
mention made of the conditions under which the factuality of such assumptions becomes
questionable. This is not to say that positivists do not question why individuals conduct
themselves with regularity, for the positivists are insistent that the reasons why individuals
conform to their notion of legal rules are multifarious. The questions which are not asked,
however, are how individuals come to act regularly in the first instance, and whether the
diversity which one finds in the reasons for acting regularly extends over to the mechanisms
by which such regularity is generated and sustained.
2 There is one potential misunderstanding of the argument of this thesis which must be averted. This is the
belief that this work is arguing that positivists do not understand the nature of authority or have made no
investigations into its nature. This would not be an argument made by this thesis. Positivists— and in particular,
Joseph Raz (1975; 1979; 1980; 1994) — are indeed very interested in the nature of authority, and have made
substantial contributions in this area. However, these studies tend to restrict their focus to what authority is, i.e.
"what it is to have authority or to be in authority" (Raz 1979, 5). This thesis, on the other hand, may be viewed
as an investigation into the pre-conditions which are necessary for the existence of authority. It is important to be
clear on this point. Thus, it is not one of the aims of this thesis to examine the "conditions that are in fact either
necessary or sufficient for holding...authority" (Raz 1979, 5), in that the aim of the thesis is not to investigate the
conditions under which particular individuals or groups come to hold authority, but rather to examine the pre¬
conditions for the existence of authority. This is a subtle difference, but one of the utmost importance, for while
the former implicitly assumes that authority exists and is concerned to investigate the conditions under which it
becomes connected to particular individuals or groups, the latter focuses on the pre-conditions which must exist
for there to be any authority at all. Thus, the argument of this work is that positivists have not devoted attention
to the foundations of authority, and in particular its dependence on conduct regularity.
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One manifestation of this blindspot to the foundations of social and legal systems is the
positivist insistence that law and legal systems exist as a "social fact". This social fact is
then contrasted with yet another: the existence of morality. Conflicts between these two
social facts are then examined in some detail, with the emphasis being on the separation of
"what is the case" and "what ought to be the case". Lost in the shuffle, however, is any
investigation into the pre-conditions for the existence of law and morality. How is it, then,
that these come to exist? Do they only flower in certain circumstances? And how are they
preserved? These questions are not considered by legal positivism because of its insistence
that the existence of law is a matter of fact, not value. What positivism lacks, however, is
any insight into the more complex relationship which exists between potentiality,
normativity, and actuality.
Connected to this are positivist arguments relating to the principle of the Rule of Law.
Again, this is viewed solely as an institutional feature, and further, as an exclusively
normative principle. Positivists are adamant in their view that law and legal systems can
exist even if they do not conform in the slightest degree to this principle.3 What remains
unquestioned, however, is the relationship between this principle and the foundations of
regularity and authority upon which legal positivism builds its elaborate theoretical
structures. Once again, positivism's focus upon the relationship between the "is" and the
"ought" blinds it to the relationship between the "could", the "is" and the "ought".
The positivists' theoretical blindspot to the foundations of legal order has several other
significant consequences. Haitian legal positivists tend to focus upon institutional structure
and ignore the foundations upon which it rests. This focus on institutions, and institutional
officials and their authority, tends to blind Haitian positivists to the interactive effects which
arise between these institutions and their own foundations. In effect, Haitian legal theorists
detach the authority of a legal system and its officials from the wider sphere of social
authoritativeness and its foundations in social regularity. Haitians tend to ask the question of
whether certain acts were authorized, without considering the interactive effects between
these acts and their authority. In effect, then, positivists treat legal authority as if it were
separated — as if it were autonomous — from its environment. It is the regularity of the
conduct of legal officials and their acts of recognizing authority which are the focus of
attention for Haitian positivists. What they fail to take into consideration are the
3 See, for example, Raz (1979, 211).
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consequences of acts which are "authorized" within legal spheres both upon individual
conduct regularity more widely considered and upon the foundations of legal authority
itself. The positivist idea is one of "free-floating" legal authority, unconnected to more
encompassing, more foundational, and more widely-shared forms of authority, existing as a
"social fact". Positivists are thus unable to consider how the authority of the legal system
might be undermined by feedback effects flowing from the acts of the legal system itself.
This idea of autonomous authority, which flows from a lack of understanding of the pre¬
conditions for law, legal systems and authority, raises further questions. Consider two of
these. First, how is legal authority to be differentiated from other forms of institutional
authority— from political authority, for example? Positivists hold that legal officials are the
ones who delineate the boundaries of the legal sphere, yet they provide no criteria for
identifying these officials in the first instance. To a positivist, the "legal quality" flows from
acting with legal authority. The question, however, is what constitutes the difference
between legal authority and other institutional forms. Haitian positivists' view of the matter
is that what is required is a bedrock of social conduct regularity (termed "efficacy") and
regular acts of authority recognition by legal officials. What this does not answer, however,
is how legal officials are to be identified and distinguished from other institutional actors
and hence what differentiates the acts of these actors from the acts of others.
This leads to a second question. If one were describing the positivist notion of legal order
in general terms, one might be inclined to say that it consists of the conformity of one group
to the acts which are institutionally recognized as authoritative by another. How, then, does
this differ from the order imposed by a gang of thugs onto unwilling individuals?
Presumably, the thugs might have a shared notion of what it is they consider to be
authoritative, which they might be able to institutionally enforce conformity to these
notions. Is this, then, a legal order? And what of a military organization? Might not a
military body have a shared notion of what is authoritative, and might they not be able to
institutionally enforce conformity to this? Is this legal order? And if so, what is it that
distinguishes this form of order as specifically legal?
These two questions manifest the implicit implications of the positivist presuppositions.
It is perhaps useful to consider the consequences of extending these two implications a bit
further. Consider one path, and extend the emphasis on the autonomy of a legal system. On
this view, one might choose to focus on the self-referentiality of legal systems, and their
independence and autonomy from the environments in which they are embedded. Under this
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view, the circular nature of legal authority is not profoundly worrisome, for in advanced
social systems with a complex division of labour and knowledge, such circularity should be
expected. Closed off from its environment, the legal system "validates" its own authority
through self-referential acts.
Now consider a second path, and extend the perspectivist aspects of the positivist
presuppositions. An emphasis on perspective comes from the insight that positivist legal
theory has often emphasized the point of view of legal officials, often to the exclusion of
those that are governed by the law. Once one turns to a consideration of the latter
perspective, it is quite natural to place an emphasis on the power aspects of law. That this
follows becomes clear when one realizes that under the positivist theory of law, only legal
officials need consider law to be authorized in the sense of imposing justified standards of
acceptable conduct. From the perspective of those being imposed upon, there is no such
authority. Such a situation is one in which one group is imposing its own standards of
acceptable conduct onto another group that does not consider such standards as justified or,
put differently, it is a situation in which one group exerts its unjustified power over another.
On this way of looking at it, legal authority is simply power by another name (i.e. from
another perspective, the perspective of the oppressed).
This is where the presuppositions of positivism lead legal theory. A view which stresses
the authority of some over others, without the authorization of those that are imposed upon,
and which stresses the lack of any foundation shared among "ordinary" individuals, for the
authority of law, leads quite naturally to the position that either legal authority is self-
authorizing, or it is not authorized at all. Underlying all of this (though it is only implicit
and inchoate) is the idea that shared values do not exist — there are no "meta-narratives"4
— and that the world in which we live is one in which value fragmentation has taken place
to such a degree that there are no longer any shared values. Positivism's presuppositions,
and the perspective they engender, lead to the denial of society-wide criteria of
authorization, and a stress upon the autonomy of law and legal officials. This in turn has two
related implications: that law becomes increasingly indistinguishable from other forms of
institutional authority and, in societies in which shared values do not exist, law becomes just
another form of power.
4 A term borrowed from Lyotard (1984, xxiv).
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4. The constructive dimension: a reformulation ofHayekian jurisprudence
This thesis takes a different approach. It argues that legal theory can profit from
incorporating some of the insights present in the central themes of the work of F.A. Hayek.
It should be noted, however, that the contents of the chapters that follow are not restricted to
Hayek's theorizing. Instead, an attempt is made to integrate the insights of other thinkers—
such as Adam Smith and Lon Fuller — into what might be called a Hayekian approach to
legal theory. That is, an approach based on the general themes of Hayek's work but not
restricted exclusively to them.
Given that this is the case, one might think that this thesis would build upon the analysis
of prominent authors in the literature on Hayek, and in particular the two most noteworthy
studies in the area: John Gray's Hayek on Liberty (1986), and Chandran Kukathas' Hayek
and Modern Liberalism (1989).5 Now, although these studies do make many useful insights
into Hayek's work and present many important arguments, for the most part their analyses
do not form the foundation upon which the chapters of this work will build. However, some
mention must be made of the reasons why this is the case.
The first reason for this is that this work focuses on the specifically legal strands of
Hayek's thought. Thus, while Gray and Kukathas do examine Hayek's legal theorizing, this
was not their primary interest, with Gray putting forward a comprehensive and insightful
survey of the entire body of Hayek's work, and Kukathas focusing on Hayek's political
thought. The present work, on the other hand, presents an extended examination of Hayek's
specifically legal analysis.6 But this is not, I think, the decisive reason for deciding to set
aside Gray's and Kukathas' analyses and to take a fresh look at Hayek's theorizing. Instead,
the most significant reason for restating Hayek's legal theorizing from first principles is the
difference in approach taken by this thesis, as compared with the studies of these two
authors. This work is interested in examining what previous studies have often simply taken
for granted: the existence of order in conduct and society and the mechanisms which make
such order a possibility. In particular, the focus of this work is on the relationship between
5 There are other surveys of Hayek's work which merit a mention, including Barry (1979) and Butler (1983).
6 There are two excellent short surveys of Hayek's legal theorizing — Ogus (1989) and Thomson (1991) —
though each has its own flaws, some of which are criticized, either explicitly or implicitly, within this thesis.
Consider the latter: Thomson's view that Hayek has strong functionalist tendencies is indeed accurate, but his
critique from a Habermasian perspective which implicitly assumes that a strong line can be drawn between issues
of functionality and issues of meaning is itself open to objection. For what is probably the most comprehensive
development of this point, see Millikan (1984; 1993), and for similar views, see Dennett (1987; 1995). For an
objection to Ogus' criticisms, see chapters six and eight.
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the properties of conduct governance mechanisms and the characteristics of the resultant
order which they sustain, or are capable of sustaining. It is, then, the focus on the
mechanisms of conduct regularity which leads to a substantive difference between this study
and the perspective taken by Gray and Kukathas, and it is this difference which manifests
itselfmost significantly in different conceptions of two of the pillars of Hayek's thought, the
notions of spontaneous order and cultural evolution.
To put it crudely, Gray and Kukathas tend to focus upon spontaneous order as a
genealogical concept, in that order which emerges "spontaneously" is treated as being
equivalent to spontaneous order. On this view, it is the nature of the origin of the order
which is decisive in determining whether or not it can be classified as spontaneous order.
This way of viewing the concept of spontaneous order implies that one distinguishes
spontaneous from non-spontaneous order on the basis of an examination of the history of an
order. Now, while I agree with the idea that an examination of the history of how an order
has emerged is of great importance, this thesis would argue that this is not the end of the
story. Within this work, examinations of history are essential when one tries to determine
what an order does, and is capable of doing, in different environments. Merely claiming that
an order has emerged "spontaneously", without comparing the differences in capability
between it and other types of order, does not shed light on what it does or what it allows one
to do, nor on what it has the capability of doing, or of allowing one to do. Thus, resorting to
a genealogical notion of spontaneous order, in isolation from an analysis of what this order
is capable of doing or being used for in different environments, produces what is primarily a
retrospective point of view.
There are numerous objections one could make to such a position, but as these are
brought out in the main body of text, only a brief summary will be offered here. The
principal objection to this approach is that these authors offer very little in the way of
insights into the different ways in which order emerges, and the characteristic properties of
the mechanisms which support each type of order. To them, the dividing line between
spontaneous and non-spontaneous order seems to hinge around whether order emerges
"spontaneously". But what, precisely, does "spontaneously" mean? More specifically, what
characterizes order which is spontaneous and order which is not? That there is no answer to
this in their work is not surprising, given their lack of insight into the relationship between
the properties of the mechanisms which govern order and their relationship to the
characteristics of the order which results. What might be more surprising is that, even
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though one of them complains that making the distinction between spontaneous and non-
spontaneous order is problematic,7 these authors devote little, if any, time to investigating
the differences between the two forms of order. In fact, their focus is almost exclusively on
spontaneous order, with their discussion proceeding as if the differences between the two
forms of order were obvious. Yet if there is one thing that the discussions of this distinction
in the literature on Hayek have demonstrated, it is that these differences are not obvious, nor
well understood.
These authors, then, devote little time to the difference between spontaneous and
organizational order, and hence do not state the properties of conduct governance
mechanisms which form the basis of such a distinction. In essence, then, their discussions
take place in a mechanism vacuum, in which the term "spontaneous" has only a vague
meaning. And this is not the only difficulty. Accompanying this, and in a sense based on
their lack of insight into the distinction between spontaneous and non-spontaneous order, is
a tendency to view too wide a range of evolved phenomena as being spontaneous orders.
Hence Gray's suggestion that it might be profitable to model totalitarian forms of
government as spontaneous orders8 — even though Hayek viewed totalitarian forms of
government as prime examples of what he calls organizational order, i.e. non-spontaneous
order. And hence Kukathas' comment that Hayek has the "tendency to call anything grown
and unplanned a spontaneous order" (Kukathas 1989, 202) — even though Hayek warns that
the "spontaneous character" of an order must be distinguished from the spontaneous
character of its origin (Hayek 1973, 46). It is, in the final analysis, this lack of understanding
of the essential characteristics of the concept of spontaneous order, particularly when
contrasted to non-spontaneous order, coupled with their lack of insight into the mechanisms
which are essential to supporting each type of order, which renders their analyses suspect,
perhaps even misleading, and ultimately of little value to the work at hand.
5. What are the questions?
It is, then, the lack of insight into the mechanisms which support social order and
individual conduct regularity which differentiates this study from those of its predecessors.
The present work aims to correct this oversight. It examines the mechanisms which support
7 See Kukathas' comments (1989, 103-105).
8 See the discussion in Hayek on Liberty {1986, 120-121).
Introduction • 11
conduct regularity and legal and social order, focusing on how such phenomena come into
existence and are sustained. Moreover, it examines the properties and action-generating
potential of conduct governance mechanisms and attempts to relate these to the
characteristics of the type of order they are capable of sustaining, i.e. this analysis looks to
the future, and not the past, to determine if a conduct governance mechanism having certain
properties can generate an order of actions which could be classified as spontaneous.
This change in perspective leads to new paths of inquiry. What, then, are the questions
which such a perspective seeks to address? This thesis argues that there are four intertwined
strands of thought which might be addressed. By way of summary, these may be stated as:
(a) How do individuals come to act regularly?
(b) Why do individuals act regularly? Why not irregularly?
(c) How are conflicts resolved, both within and between individuals?
(d) How is individual-level regularity and conflict-resolution related to conduct
governance in its more institutionalized forms? And what are the implications of such a
relationship?
These questions provide some of the common themes for the chapters which follow. The
entire thesis is an investigation into the mechanisms which generate and support regularity
at an individual level, and their reflection in and interaction with institutional forms of these
same mechanisms. Thus, the focus of this thesis is not at the level of the institutional. Nor is
it upon articulated knowledge nor deliberate reasoning within such an institutional
framework. Rather, the emphasis is upon the generation and maintenance of conduct
regularity at an individual level through the operation of various regularizing mechanisms.
Thus, the questions raised by this approach are different from those typically addressed
by legal theory. This thesis is interested in the conduct governance properties of different
mechanisms. Consider, for example, negative (prohibitive) and positive (performance
prescribing) rules. Some questions which might be raised about this distinction would be:
how do these differ in the way in which they govern conduct? How do changes in the degree
of abstraction affect each type of rule? And how adaptive is each type of rule to changes in
environmental complexity?
In this vein, one might also consider what have hitherto been considered to be principles
of institutions insofar as they are manifested in individual-level conduct governance. For
example, how is the principle of the Rule of Law manifested in the conduct of individuals?
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Are there any important analogies between its operation at this level and at a more
institutional one?
Each of these lines of investigation stresses the importance of considering how individual
conduct becomes regularized. As this thesis will demonstrate, the consideration of this
question leads one in four inter-related directions. First comes the idea that legal theory
must shift its attention to issues of how individuals govern their own conduct. Subjecting
conduct to the governance of rules occurs at both an individual and an institutional level,
and there is much to be learned from the ways in which individuals strive to govern their
own conduct which could be usefully applied to both the theory and the study of more
institutionalized governance mechanisms.
Second, it implies that there must be more attention paid to what might be called the
mechanisms of abstraction. These mechanisms are of fundamental importance to the
maintenance of rules of conduct which are capable of supporting abstract social relations,
and are intimately related to, what might be termed, the "legal quality" (i.e. the property of
being legal).
Third, and flowing from this, is a need to place a stress on two essential properties of
rules of conduct to which traditional legal studies have remained indifferent. The first
property is that of abstractness. The argument of this thesis is that the degree of abstraction
of a rule is of great importance to its governance properties, and to individuals' ability to
orient themselves in complex environments. Moreover, the issues surrounding governance
by abstract rules are intimately related to issues of morality and value which are, of
themselves, of no small importance. The second property of interest is negativity, which
comes in two forms, the first being in the sense of prohibition. This thesis argues that
negative prohibitive rules assume a greater importance as environments become
increasingly complex, and that they have fundamentally different governance properties
from positive, performance prescribing, rules of conduct. The second sense of negativity,
which takes on a great importance, is negativity in the sense of negating. This thesis claims
that the mechanisms of abstraction, and many of the conduct governance mechanisms of
law, can profitably be viewed as (evolutionary) selection filters9 which weed out
unacceptable rules of conduct. This selection occurs over potential rules of conduct which
9 The notion of interpreting selection mechanisms as filters is common in evolutionary arguments, and has
also been used by writers such as Robert Nozick (1974) when considering such arguments in a philosophical
context.
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embed "excessive" particularity. On this view, then, legal mechanisms are negative both
because they filter out particularity (and its manifestations in positive rules of conduct) and
because, in increasingly complex environments, the rules which are able to pass through
these filters are both abstract and predominantly negative (in the sense of prohibitive).
Fourth, and finally, this thesis emphasizes the importance of embedding the above
insights into an interactive, feedback, framework.10 This thesis' approach to legal theory is
evolutionary and cybernetic, in that the processes of legal reasoning are represented as
selection filters operating in interactive and mutually inter-dependent social systems.
Moreover, when one turns, in the final chapter, to the foundations of conduct regularity, one
finds an interactive, feedback-based, evolutionary approach indispensable.
6. The structure of the work
This thesis, then, addresses the question of how order comes to exist, both at the
individual and societal level. In doing so it examines the mechanisms under which such
order is generated and supported and the relationship between these mechanisms and
different resultant forms of social relations.
The first chapter discusses two alternative forms of social order and their relationship to
the properties of rules of conduct, while the second looks at the how social orders evolve
and their relationship to rules of conduct which are followed at an individual level. The
third, fourth and fifth chapters focus on mechanisms used to generate and support rules of
conduct, with the emphasis being on those rules which are capable of supporting abstract
social relations. The sixth chapter turns to an examination of the relationship between
individual and societal conduct governance and its connection to law, while the seventh
analyzes the principle of the Rule of Law, a crucial principle which provides a foundation
for abstract social order. The eighth chapter points out some limitations on social action
implied by an adherence to governance by abstract rules of conduct as manifested in the
principle of the Rule of Law, while the ninth and final chapter introduces a model of mind
which might explain how regularity comes to be embedded in human conduct at what is
perhaps its most foundational level.
10 Sometimes also referred to as a cybernetic, or systems theory, framework.
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There are a couple of final comments on the structure of this work which are perhaps
worth mentioning. The first pertains to the ordering of the work. The first two chapters (of
this work) examine what might be thought to be explicitly social issues, the first examining
the nature of social order and the second focusing on the notion of cultural evolution. Why,
then, does the thesis begin with a stress on social phenomena if the emphasis of the thesis is
on individual-level issues of conduct governance? There are three reasons which come to
mind. First is the obvious point that the views expressed in this thesis have evolved, with
more of a stress placed upon individual-level analysis as the writing of the thesis
progressed. Second comes the point that individual conduct governance does not occur in a
vacuum but always takes place within a social context. Indeed, the values and culture which
underlie conduct governance, both at an individual-level and from a more institutional level,
exist as part of complex, interconnected feedback systems which in their interaction
constitute the variety of societies in which individuals find themselves acting. It would be
pointless to consider individual conduct governance without a social context, for conduct
governance is about the adaptation of one's conduct to one's environment — and for all of
us, the various societies which surround us are a major part, if not the major part, of our
environment. Third, and finally, it is important to point out that the first two chapters, whilst
focusing on social order and cultural evolution, do emphasize the individual-level aspects of
each of these. Thus, the argument of the first chapter is that social order takes specific forms
because of the nature of the rules which govern individual conduct, while the second chapter
argues that cultural evolution may be interpreted as the evolution of systems of rules of
conduct which are instantiated by individuals and by institutional forms.
a second comment is in order on the notion of cultural evolution which animates this
work. There are, it seems, at least two ways that one can interpret a Hayekian approach to
cultural evolution. First, one can view cultural evolution as being intrinsically linked to
"spontaneous", unplanned and radically decentralized conduct. This is the idea that cultural
evolution proceeds primarily by trial-and-error at the individual level, with propagation
occurring by individuals copying other individuals, adopting certain practices and
abandoning others, and with selection being made in the sense that certain groups become
"powerful" by being governed by certain cultural practices.11 Now, this view of cultural
" Hayek presents only the rough outlines of this process in The Constitution of Liberty (1960), Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1973) and The Fatal Conceit (1988), but for a more detailed analysis, one might wish to
consult Boyd and Richerson's Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985).
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evolution is indeed supported by Hayek's writings on the matter, and there is little doubt
that he believed it to be an important form of cultural evolution.12 Nor is its importance
disputed in this work. Indeed, this form of cultural evolution lies at the very heart of the
concept. But that being said, the important point to keep in mind is that if one views cultural
evolution in this way, and only in this way, one can be led to make a rather fundamental
error: that of ignoring other forms of cultural evolution. In particular, one might overlook
the role of legal systems as evolved selection mechanisms. In other words, an over-emphasis
on trial-and-error evolution at an individual level might blind one to the fact that legal
mechanisms are themselves one type of cultural evolutionary selection mechanism which
filters out mal-adapted rules of conduct. There is nothing intrinsic to the notion of cultural
evolution which demands that it take place only at a decentralized level. Indeed, much of
Hayek's work supports precisely the opposite point of view, and emphasizes instead the
importance of institutional mechanisms for cultural evolution. On this view, one can argue
that Hayek's investigations into cultural evolution extend to both decentralized phenomena,
such as markets, language, and morality, and to more institutionalized forms, such as those
of the legal and political spheres. Moreover, if one were to examine Hayek's work over the
years, one could argue that Hayek's primary concern was in ensuring that individual
evolution was well-supported by an evolved, and evolving, institutional framework which
acts as a selection filter, weeding out unfit forms of conduct and integrating individuals'
conduct within a social context.13 From this point of view, the crucial issue to be addressed
concerns which of the properties of a rule of conduct render it mal-adapted to its
environment, the answer to which in turn depends upon the properties of the social ordering
that is to be supported. This thesis argues that much of Hayek's legal analysis adopts such a
point of view, and that his dominant interest resides in precisely these issues and their
relationship to issues of conduct governance considered within such an evolutionary
framework.
12 See, in particular, The Constitution ofLiberty (1960) and The Fatal Conceit (1988) for more on this.
13 As Hayek puts it, "the efforts of the judge are...part of [the] process of adaptation of society..." in which
the judge "assists in the process of selection" (Hayek 1976, 119).
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7. A terminological note
There is one final point to note before turning to the main body of the work. This is a
word ofwarning to those readers who might be puzzled by the use of the term "mechanism"
in this thesis. I use this term in its abstract sense (in the sense which is prevalent in the
physical and cognitive sciences and in some of the social sciences), i.e. to refer to how
something comes about or, equivalently, as a system of actions which produce results, and
not in the more concrete sense of a machine or of a construct of deliberate human creation.
In the sense that this term is used in the thesis, mechanisms exist even though no one could
be said to have created them (i.e. they could have evolved in such a way that their existence
is independent of any acts of human creation). On this view, then, markets are a type of
mechanism, though once again I am referring to the abstract actions of the market
mechanism, and not to their more concrete manifestations. The "invisible hand" of Adam
Smith is another mechanism — one consisting of a complex network of cybernetic feedback
— which is part of the more general market mechanism. Likewise, universalization is
referred to as a filtering mechanism, part of the general processes of reasoning and
abstraction. Each of these mechanisms are abstract, in that they refer not to concrete objects
existing at a particular time and place, but rather to complex, inter-connected sets of actions
which lead to results.
CHAPTER ONE
Mechanism or Machiavellianism?
Hayek on order and the evolution of culture
1. Introduction
This chapter will introduce a Hayekian perspective on order and cultural evolution by
examining the recent treatment of Hayek's work in Alan Haworth's book, Anti-
Libertarianism: Markets, Philosophy and Myth (1994). In his work Haworth dissects the
arguments of some of the leading writers of libertarianism and argues that libertarianism is
not much more than a statement of faith (or as the back jacket of the book fittingly puts it, a
"market romance"). Hayek is included in this work because Haworth views him as a "guru
for libertarians", i.e. "almost always hostile to state and government" (Haworth 1994, 120).
Though Haworth recognizes that "Hayek thinks that government intervention is sometimes
justified, his view is that in reality, it is hardly ever justified" (Haworth 1994, 120, italics in
original). Thus, Hayek's inclusion comes about because of his alleged political and moral
prescriptions.
Anti-Libertarianism presents a starkly political interpretation of Hayek. I want to argue
against this. I will try to show that interpreting Hayek on political lines ignores certain
points of fundamental importance, points which can only be appreciated if one shifts the
focus from one of political issues to one concerned with the properties of conduct
governance mechanisms.1 It is because the political interpretation of Hayek's work is such a
popular one,2 and because Haworth's misconceptions are so widely held and frequently
repeated, that his erroneous critiques become of interest. In examining two strands of
Haworth's analysis— his examination of what he terms "the spontaneous order thesis", and
his criticisms of the notion of cultural evolution — I hope to demonstrate that the
1 A point appreciated by John Gray (1986, 40, 134-135), although it must be said that Gray does tend to
interpret Hayek in a political light as well.
2 Some notable examples include Kukathas (1989), Gray (1986), Rowland (1987), Tomlinson (1990), and
Thomson (1991).
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spontaneous order thesis is based on Hayek's interest in informational mechanisms, as
opposed to being predicated on a particular political ideology; that spontaneous order can be
distinguished from organizational order; and that a notion of cultural evolution is a coherent
one. In the conclusion I present some final thoughts as to why I believe Hayek's political
and normative conclusions are not simply the expression of a political preference.
2. A summary of Hayek's theory of spontaneous order
At this initial stage, it might be helpful to produce a rough outline of Hayek's notion of
spontaneous order, whilst at the same time highlighting certain definitional and
epistemological prerequisites for an accurate understanding of the thesis. So what is the
spontaneous order thesis? Consider Hayek's comments on the matter. The spontaneous
order thesis is concerned with:
...the old insight, well known to economics, that our values and institutions are
determined not simply by preceding causes but as part of a process of unconscious
self-organisation of a structure or pattern...This insight was only the first of a
growing family of theories that account for the formation of complex structures in
terms of processes transcending our capacity to observe all the several
circumstances operating in the determination of their particular manifestations.
(Hayek 1988, 9)
As Hayek points out, there has been an enormous growth of research into "the
evolutionary formation of such highly complex self-maintaining orders",3 under various
names "such as autopoiesis, cybernetics, homeostasis, spontaneous order, self-organisation,
synergetics, systems theory, and so on..." (Hayek 1988, 9).4 The spontaneous order thesis is
thus concerned with how and why things are ordered. It focuses on the mechanisms behind
that which appears as orderly.
Hayek's specific thesis is that there are two fundamental types of ordered systems:
spontaneous and organizational. Basically, organizational orders are systems which have
been designed with a high degree of conscious purpose, thus facilitating the exercise of a
high degree of conscious control. Spontaneous orders, however, are systems which have not
necessarily been designed, do not implement anyone's particular purpose and are not so
3 For examples of "self-maintaining orders", see Hayek's Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. i, Rules and
Order (1973, 35-54) and The Fatal Conceit (1988, passim).
4 One might also refer to Hayek's discussion in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. ill, The Political Order of
a Free People (1979, 158-159).
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readily controllable. An example of a spontaneous order would no doubt be useful.5 Imagine
you are at a dinner party, and people are interacting as people do at such events. If one
observes carefully, one might discern numerous patterns of behaviour. One individual might
conform to a pattern of talking very loudly. Another might continually stare at their shoes.
Now, some of these regularities of action might be connected only to these particular
individuals. Such idiosyncratic patterns are not of much interest for the spontaneous order
thesis. There are, however, two types of regularities which are of interest. First are patterns
which are more homogeneous across individuals. I will not look at these for the moment,
but will return to these when I examine the rules of a spontaneous order. Second, there are
patterns which are social (i.e. inter-personal). These patterns between individuals are one
way in which social interactions might be thought to be orderly (ordered). These social
regularities of action constitute an emergent6 system which is generated by the individual
interactions with, and mutual adjustment to, the actions of others. What is created, then, is a
situation where numerous inter-personal (social) patterns (regularities) of conduct exist even
though it was not necessarily the intention of any of the individuals involved that such social
patterns should emerge.7 Such an emergent system of patterns — of regularities —
constitutes a spontaneous order (of actions).
Up to now I think the discussion has been relatively straightforward. However, for
Hayek there is a crucial distinction between the rules that individuals are following and the
overall pattern of action which is generated by rule-following. The implications of this
difference are often not appreciated. What, then, constitutes a rule of a social order in the
above discussion? The answer to this is ambiguous. It could be that each of the social
regularities of action is a rule of a social order (of action). Or— and this is the usage Hayek
employs8 — it could refer to the common set of rules of conduct obeyed by all (or most) of
the individuals. Hayek's usage, then, is as follows: an order refers to a system of social
patterns of action (regularities of action), while a rule of an order refers to a regularity of
5 Hayek provides many of his own; see, for example, his discussions in The Counter-Revolution ofScience
(1979a, 141-152), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (1967, 66-81), The Fatal Conceit (1988, 11-
28), and, in particular, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I, Rules and Order (1973, 35-54).
6 For more on this notion, see for example P.M. Churchland (1988, 12-13).
7 It is of decisive importance to Hayek's social theory that one recognize the possibility of emergent social
phenomena. Indeed, "if social phenomena showed no order except in so far as they were consciously designed,
there would be no room for a theoretical science of society and there would be, as is often maintained, only
problems of psychology" (Hayek 1979a, 69) for "social theory begins with — and has an object only because of
— the discovery that there existed orderly structures which are the product of the action of many [individuals]
but are not the result of human design" (Hayek 1973, 37).
8 As in Hayek (1973, 96-97).
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conduct obeyed by most of the individual members of some such system.9 Hopefully it is
clear that these two things are not identical. A social order is a phenomenon produced by the
combination of the actions of many individuals. A rule of an order is a rule of conduct
which is obeyed by most of the members of a particular group.
So what makes a social order a spontaneous order? Is it that the resultant order is
governed by rules which have been generated "spontaneously"? This cannot be true, for
Hayek states that even where rules are dictated in advance the order which results could be a
spontaneous order (Hayek 1973, 45-46). Instead, whether or not a social order is
spontaneous depends on two inter-related criteria: the specificity/abstractness of the rules
governing the order, and the connection of these rules to the intentions, goals and values of
the individuals within that order. Once these criteria are understood, the relationship
between spontaneous and organizational order, and between the rules of the two types of
order, becomes relatively straightforward. Consider an example: a dinner party, similar to
the above, but different in that all the individuals present were given general rules to obey
before the interactions began (i.e. "be courteous to all you meet", etc.). In this situation, the
rules which the individuals obey are not of "spontaneous" origin, but the patterns which
emerge from the various interactions and mutual adjustments could be constitutive of a
spontaneous order.10 The question may then be asked how this is related to an
organizational order. In response it can be stated that if the rules which are handed out to the
interacting individuals were to become more specific and refer to more and more specific
actions, the system of actions which formed from following these rules might gradually
9 This is not to claim that such rule systems are uniquely related to particular orders of actions. As Hayek
notes, "it is at least conceivable that the same overall order of actions may be produced by different sets of rules
of individual conduct" (1967, 68). This being said, however, it should be noted that for particular orders of
actions, the term "a rule of the order" refers to a regularity that is generally obeyed by most individuals of that
system. The importance of this qualification will emerge later on in the work when attention is turned to legal
forms of order.
10 This illustrates one unfortunate aspect of Hayek social theory: his terminology. The use of the term
"spontaneous" is particularly unfortunate. It seems that "spontaneous" can refer either to the spontaneity of the
actions of the individuals involved or to that fact that a system has arisen or evolved spontaneously. Many
commentators (Haworth included) have made the mistake of considering it to mean the latter, or of not defining
what it is that differentiates a spontaneous from a non-spontaneous system. Given the ambiguous nature of the
term "spontaneous", this confusion is perhaps understandable. In the context of the terms "spontaneous" and
"order" even Hayek seems to recognize that it has caused difficulties for his readers:
[i]t was largely the growth of cybernetics and the related subjects of information and system
theory which persuaded me that expression[s] other than those which I habitually used may
be more readily comprehensible to the contemporary reader. Though I still like and
occasionally use the term 'spontaneous order', I agree that 'self-generating order' or 'self-
organizing structures' are sometimes more precise and unambiguous and therefore frequently
use them instead of the former term. Similarly, instead of 'order', in conformity with today's
predominant usage, I occasionally now use 'system'. (Hayek 1979, xii)
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result in a transition from a spontaneous order to an organizational order. This transition, if
it is to occur, depends upon two factors: the degree of abstractness of the rules the
individuals are obeying, and the connection of these rules to the goals and values underlying
the order. To put it crudely, a rule of spontaneous order is abstract enough (in the sense
elaborated below) if it allows individuals to obey the rule and at the same time achieve their
own particular goals. A rule of organizational order is less abstract and restricts to a greater
degree the ability of an individual to follow their own goals. Finally, it is worth noting that a
command (a particular type of rule of an organizational order) is even more restrictive than
a rule of organizational order, and produces a situation in which obedient individuals would
merely be implementing the goals of the commander.
3. The abstract/concrete dichotomy
To flesh out the distinction between the two types of order it is probably necessary to
give the reader a couple of warnings concerning terminology. Just as the term
"spontaneous" in spontaneous order is apt to be misinterpreted, so is the term "abstract" as
used in the discussion above. An "abstract" rule does not refer merely to the mode of
expression of a rule. Expression is insufficient to define what is meant by abstract, for the
most detailed particulars can be defined in abstract terms.11 Instead, "abstract" refers to the
scope of a rule. That is, "abstract" refers to the spatio-temporal applicability of a rule. This
means that the more space and time which is governed by a rule, the more abstract the rule.
"Abstract" in this sense refers to the rule's content, and not to its form. "Abstract, general
rules" refer to rules which are relatively less space-time specific than rules which are
particularistic and concrete. That is, the conditions they describe could occur in a larger set
of space-time locations. What distinguishes rules of spontaneous order from rules of
organizational order is their generality of reference to time and space. The rules of
organizational order are specific and particular precisely because they refer to more specific
space-time locations than do rules of spontaneous order. An example might be useful.
Consider three rules picking out particular things: a bottle of orange juice, a bottle of juice
and a bottle. For the above definition of "abstract", the rule picking out a bottle of orange
juice is more space-time specific than the one referring to a bottle of juice, and the rule
11 As noted by Hayek (1976, 35).
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picking out a bottle of juice is more space-time specific than the bottle rule. What this
means is that the set "bottle of orange juice" occupies a smaller space-time location than
does the set "bottle of juice". Of course, all three are unlimited in the time and space to
which they refer and hence all three could be called "abstract" rules. But relatively
speaking, once the rule is applied in a particular environment (and its reference is fixed),
these relationships of relative specificity will then hold.
There are two points which flow from this notion of abstraction which should be
emphasized. The first is an epistemological one. The concrete/abstract dichotomy is of
decisive importance because a spontaneous order may be much more complex than an
organizational order. Organizations are "relatively simple or at least necessarily confined to
such moderate degrees as the maker can still survey"; they are frequently "concrete" in the
sense that "their existence can be intuitively perceived by inspection" of the external
physical order; and finally, "having been made deliberately" or consciously "they invariably
do (or at one time did) serve a purpose of the maker" (Hayek 1973, 38). A spontaneous
order, by contrast, has "a degree of complexity" that is "not limited to what a[n individual]
human mind can master"; "need not manifest itself to our senses but may be based on purely
abstract relations between elements" both ofwhich "we can only mentally reconstruct"; and
"not having been made it cannot legitimately be said to have a particular purpose" (Hayek
1973, 38, italics in original). The complexity of a spontaneous order is the reason why it is
necessary to resort to abstract rules which deal only with select aspects of an order.
Spontaneous order is, in this sense, an epistemological characterization of an order.
The second point has to do with the notion of "purpose" and "function". While one
cannot assign a human purpose to a spontaneous order we can legitimately speak of the
purposes of its elements12 and, as well, attribute a general sense of purposiveness to the
action of the elements in the sense that "their actions tend to secure the preservation or
restoration of that order" (Hayek 1973, 39). In this context, Hayek's notion of such a general
purpose might equally be referred to as one of the functions of these actions. It is this move
away from the particular purposes of individuals, and towards the general "purposes", or
functions, of social systems, that is apt to cause confusion. Now, given that Hayek's use of
12 For example, it is difficult to speak of the concrete purposes of a language (though not of its general
"purposes", or functions), but it is not so difficult to talk of the concrete purposes of the individuals using that
language. It is important to remember that Hayek is using "purpose" in the sense of very concrete ends and not in
the more general sense with which one might be familiar.
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the term "purpose" has caused numerous confusions in the past, and given that an
understanding of this usage is in my view essential for a proper understanding of his notion
of social order, it is perhaps worthy of some additional elaboration. Consider a conceptual
point, integral to his theorizing, that Hayek continually stresses: that the rules of a
spontaneous order are "independent of any common purpose" (Hayek 1973, 50). What
precisely does this mean? In this context, "purposes" refers to the goals of individuals. But
why, one might ask, does Hayek claim that there are no common purposes in this type of
order? To answer this, one has to consider Hayek's characterization of the two types of
order.
To Hayek, organizational order is based on rules of organizational order and
commands.13 Commands determine "the function to be performed by each member", "the
purposes to be achieved, and certain general aspects of the methods to be employed" (Hayek
1973, 49). The rules of organizational order "depend on the place which [they have] been
assigned and on the particular ends which have been indicated for [them] by the
commanding authority" (Hayek 1973, 49). To be precise, we are talking of "rules which at
least to some degree are specific to the functions assigned to particular persons" (Hayek
1973, 50, my italics). An organizational order is a "fixed structure" in which "the place of
each individual...is determined by command" and their actions are governed by rules of
organizational order. To summarize, then: in an organizational order we find (a) a structure,
and in particular, desired ends, determined by specific individuals and (b) the rules that each
individual obeys are conditional on the individual's position in this structure.
The situation is quite different for spontaneous order. Rules of a spontaneous order are
"independent of purpose", or more accurately, "independent of any common purpose"
(Hayek 1973, 50, my italics). Moreover, the rules of a spontaneous order are "the same, if
not necessarily for all members, at least for whole classes of members not individually
designated by name. They must be...rules applicable to an unknown and indeterminable
number of persons and instances"14 (Hayek 1973, 50). What this means is that in a
13 a command differs from an abstract rule in that (a) it necessarily presupposes a person who has issued it
and (b) it is less general and abstract (Hayek 1960, 149).
14 i.e. universal over a particular set.
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spontaneous order rules (a) have no common ends and (b) are not conditional on the relative
position of an individual within a fixed15 structure.16
It is of some importance to keep in mind that Hayek's discussion rests upon a
background distinction which is crucial to his argument, but which is rarely emphasized or
discussed. This is his contrast between goals (ends) and values. For the moment, consider
the former, and in particular, a contrast between two distinct types of goals (two types of
ends): conditional and ultimate. What is it that makes "ultimate" goals ultimate? And what
differentiates them from conditional goals? In a sense, conditional goals are manifestations,
at a particular point in time, of ultimate, and more encompassing, goals. Goals are
conditional because they condition on particulars — particular times, places, etc..17 As
conditional goals become more abstract, they transition into ultimate goals, which are less
dependent on the conditions of the moment, and the particular, temporary, will of the
individual. Note that if over a period of time one continually follows a conditional goal, this
sequence of conditional goals might equally be viewed as an ultimate goal. That is,
conditional goals transition into ultimate goals in that a conditional goal that extends over
time and is repeatedly striven for can become, in effect, less conditional and can be
transformed into (revealed as) an ultimate goal. In this light, conditional goals might be
considered to be the consciously chosen over manifestations of ultimate goals. As such,
conditional goals have a relatively brief temporal existence relative to ultimate goals.
Now consider the difference between goals and values. What is it that constitutes this
difference? First, and to a matter of degree, goals seem to be the subject of choice and of
consciousness, i.e. one can consciously choose between them.18 One can do this, however,
only because one accepts certain values unquestioningly. Goals are dependent upon certain
values in the sense that goals presuppose the existence of these values. Such values form the
foundation for goals, often existing as unquestioned "givens" which are simply presumed to
15 Fixed in the sense that the position of any individual is determined by the authority of particular
individuals; that is, the rules which govern the actions of that individual are, in important aspects, determined by
an authority.
16 In the sense of "fixed" by the ends of another.
17 Within a Hayekian framework, they are the "particular expected effects which motivate particular actions"
(Hayek 1976, 14).
18 That is, a goal is "most of the time" the focus of "conscious attention" and will "normally be the result of
the particular circumstances in which [one] finds [oneself] at any moment" (Hayek 1978, 87).
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exist.19 In other words, goals exist within a framework established and sustained by the
continuing existence of values.
Second, and related to this, values are differentiated from goals by being temporally
more enduring. This difference in the degree of abstraction from the particulars of space and
time is of crucial importance, for in the same way that conditional goals transition into
ultimate goals as they persist over time, so do goals shade into values as they become more
enduring and more continual in exerting their effects— i.e. as they become more long-term,
as they transition from "executable" to "a standing obligation" (Hayek 1973, 127), and as
they are less and less the objects of conscious choice.
Within a Hayekian framework there are, then, a variety of differences between goals and
values, most of which overlap to a certain extent and which tend to differ by a matter of
degree. These differences are, however, based upon a single distinguishing property: values
are, within this framework, more abstract than goals.20 This manifests itself in a variety of
ways. First, the element of conscious choice is more applicable to goals than it is to values.
This can be taken to mean that values are often present without the choice, or even
conscious knowledge, of the individual.21 It is probably of more importance, however, to
interpret this as meaning that, relatively speaking, purposive activity, in the sense of "acting
for a purpose", presupposes the possibility of striving for alternative goals over which one
consciously chooses. Under the framework elaborated above, such goals rest upon an
abstract foundation of enduring values which act as the pre-conditions for such choice. In
19 On this view, it is important to keep in mind that the fact that one has certain values does not imply that
this came about as a matter of choice, nor does it imply that one is conscious of, or can articulate, what these
values are. The fact that one has values does not imply that one consciously knows what they are.
20 In this light, consider Hayek's discussion of these two terms. Goals, he stipulates, are the "particular
expected effects which motivate particular actions" (Hayek 1976, 14), and are, under these stipulative
definitions, associated with "will" (or "willing"), which is "the aiming at a particular concrete result which,
together with the known particular circumstances of the moment, will suffice to determine a particular action"
(Hayek 1976, 13). To Hayek, willing is necessarily associated with concreteness, in that willing "always refers to
particular actions serving particular ends" (Hayek 1978, 85, my italics). Moreover, under this notion of willing
"the will ceases when the action is taken and the end (terminus) reached.", i.e. to Hayek "an act of will is always
determined by a particular concrete end (terminus) and the state of willing ceases when the end is achieved"
(Hayek 1978, 86).
Contrast this with his discussion of values. These are "generalized aims" (Hayek 1978, 86), "generic classes
of events, defined by certain [abstract] attributes", existing as "a lasting attitude of one or more persons to a kind
of event" (Hayek 1976, 14, my italics). They are associated with abstract "opinions", which Hayek stipulates as
"lasting or permanent disposition(s) towards (or against) kinds of conduct", which "have no [particular] purpose
known to those who hold them" (Hayek 1978, 85), and which are in many cases held without "any known
reasons for them except that they are the traditions of the society in which they have grown up" (Hayek 1978,
85).
21 As Hayek puts it, values are "largely culturally transmitted and will guide the action even of persons who
are not consciously aware of them" (Hayek 1978, 87).
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this sense, values would not be the object of choice, but would instead be the abstract
framework upon which the possibility of choice between goals depends. A second
manifestation of the greater degree of abstraction of values is that goals, relative to values,
are relatively short-term, and are in many cases achievable and hence terminate when and if
they are achieved. Values, on the other hand, are continual, long-term, and ongoing.22
The importance of all of this emerges when one realizes that Hayek's argument centres
around the claim that there is an intimate relationship between the governance properties of
rules of conduct and whether these rules serve (concrete) goals or (abstract) values. In
effect, the claim is that rules serving particular goals are more concrete (in terms of the
space-time specificity of their reference) than rules serving values. Why would this be the
case? The general idea is that rules of organizational order work within certain environments
presupposed by these rules. This restriction on the environments to which these rules are
applicable, in addition to the restrictions which flow from the association of these rules with
the (concrete) goals of specific individuals, renders them less abstract than rules of
spontaneous order. In other words, it is because rules of organizational order presuppose the
existence of a delimited sphere, within which certain (concrete) goals are striven for, that
they are less applicable across different environments and hence more concrete than rules of
spontaneous order.
Why, then, do rules of spontaneous order lack "common purposes"? They do so because
Hayek defines "ends" and "purposes" as being relatively concrete and person-specific
(Hayek 1976, 12-14), and because rules of spontaneous order serve abstract values, and not
concrete purposes.23 Organizational order is such that the rules of the order are, to some
degree, aim at the achievement of particular individuals' specific goals. A spontaneous
order is one in which the rules of the order, though they may be used as tools by individuals
for the achievement of their own particular goals, do not aim at the achievement of
particular goals. One important implication of this is that the rules of spontaneous order will
be less space-time specific than rules of organizational order. That is, under the stipulative
framework Hayek sets up, it can be said that to a matter of degree, the rules of
22 These (matter-of-degree) differences are for convenience summarized below:
Goals— are concrete, i.e they are Values— are abstract, i.e. they are
(a) the objects of choice the pre-conditions for choice;
(b) short-lasting enduring;
(c) achievable, terminable ongoing, perpetual, not terminable.
23 As Hayek puts it, the rules of spontaneous order "serve not (concrete or particular) ends but (abstract and
generic) values" (Hayek 1976, 14).
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organizational order are more context-specific (as they, to some degree, presuppose
particular environments and embed particular individuals' concrete goals24) and hence are
also more space-time specific. Another implication is that in obeying the rules of an
organizational order, one's actions will be to some degree contingent upon the goals of the
organization. In other words, the rules of organizational order manifest (to some degree) the
context-specific goals of the organization. The rules of a spontaneous order, on the other
hand, allow the individuals who are obeying them to pursue their own goals to a much
greater degree.25
4. The importance of the abstract/concrete distinction
The discussion above has attempted to spell out the differences between spontaneous and
organizational order. But what, then, is the importance of such a distinction? To Hayek, all
social order is a mixture of the two types of order. But — and this is the decisive point —
one cannot mix the two types of order in any proportion which is desired.26 They are, in a
sense, mutually exclusive. The argument presented here is that Hayek emphasizes the
difference between the two types of order by emphasizing the abstract/concrete nature of the
rules of an order. Why does he do this? The reason, it seems, is that Hayek is concerned
with the results of following rules of different degrees of abstraction. Hayek's argument,
briefly put, is that the order which results from following rules of organizational order is
less diverse, less complex, less amenable to the possibility of objective judgment, and less
likely to be able to fulfil the goals of the largest number of individuals. In Kantian terms,
then, the ideal Hayekian society would be one in which everyone followed their own goals
and values (i.e. one in which an individual pursued their own ends, observed their own
values, while being governed by the same rules as everyone else). To put Hayek's
fundamental concern another way (and very crudely): the important point is the number of
people following their own goals and values in society. The fewer people following their
own goals and values there are, the more a social order approaches an organizational order.
24 Though as Hayek admits, "in most complex types of organizations...little more than the assignment of
particular function and the general aim will be determined by command of the supreme authority" (Hayek 1976,
50).
25 One implication of all of this is that rules of spontaneous orders can be considered the means to different
ends (i.e. the ends of those using, or following, the rules) whereas rules of organizational order will necessarily
embed particular ends.
26 As in Hayek (1973, 46).
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The more people following their own goals and values there are, the more a social order
tends towards a spontaneous order. Yet another way of looking at it would be to ask the
following questions: (1) am I a means to someone else's ends and values? and (2) if so, am I
achieving my own ends and respecting my own values at the same time?27 In a spontaneous
order, even if one is a means to someone else's ends, one has sufficient latitude to
simultaneously achieve one's own goals and respect one's own values. In an organizational
order, on the other hand, individuals other than the organizational goal-dictators achieve
their own ends and values to a lesser degree; Hayek's main concern, then, is to maximize
the chance that individuals with their own goals and values, which might not be known to
anyone else, are able to achieve or respect them to the greatest possible extent.
The differences between the two types of order assume even more importance when one
realizes that the above discussion is intimately related to Hayek's legal theory and in
particular to the Hayekian notion of what it is that gives a governance mechanism its "legal
quality". In an argument strikingly similar to Lon Fuller's, a Hayekian would argue that law
is a mechanism concerned with regularizing conduct,28 and that this function — and not
positivist arguments relating to "authorization" — distinguishes legal mechanisms from
other governance mechanisms. Moreover, a regularization perspective leads one to make
two related arguments, which shall be pursued at greater length in the later chapters of this
thesis. First comes the claim that one of the primary functions of legal mechanisms is to
regularize conduct by filtering out particularity and concrete goals. Second comes the
related argument that to regularize conduct, both the individuals obeying the law and the
law-makers themselves must subject their conduct to the governance of rules.29 Both of
these arguments are based on the underlying idea that in a complex, Gesellschaft-type
society, individuals must resort to governance by abstract rules if the regularity required by
the other members of that society is to be generated and sustained. The rationale behind
these two arguments is that legal mechanisms aim at regularizing conduct, and they strive
for this by filtering out particularity, both in the goals that guide individual conduct, and in
27 This is, of course, similar to one of Kant's elaborations of the "categorical imperative", as presented in his
Foundations ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals (1959, 47) and Critique ofPractical Reason (1949, 87), and discussed
at some length in Paton's study, The Categorical Imperative (1948, 165-179).
28 As emphasized in Hayek's later legal theorizing and, in particular, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. I,
Rides and Order (1973, 94-123 and specifically 112-115).
29 In the law-maker's case, to the governance of the rules constituting Fuller's "inner morality of law".
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the activities of those who partake in the enterprise of subjecting individual conduct to the
governance of rules.
None of this should be taken to imply that Hayek is arguing that individuals are not, or
should not be, guided by concrete goals, nor that concretes are unimportant or irrelevant to
issues of conduct governance. Instead, the argument is that abstraction is an essential
element of conduct governance in complex societies, and that this being the case implies
certain restrictions on the incorporation of concretes into conduct governance mechanisms.
Moreover, Hayek is at pains to stress the importance of concrete knowledge, and the central
role it plays within society.30 What Hayek can be seen as arguing is that in some cases
individuals have what might be thought of as a privileged access to their own concrete
goals,31 but that this privileged access does not extend to the concrete goals of others. The
implication of this for conduct governance is that individuals following their own goals are
in a sense better positioned to integrate these goals into a framework of abstract rules based
on values than would be the case in a scenario in which their conduct were guided by the
goals of others. The claim is, then, that if individuals are forced to make reference to the
concrete goals of others, this implies that in certain cases these individuals will have a
greater difficulty in acting autonomously and in conformity with general rules based on
general values.32 This implication is of some importance, for it feeds into the argument that
if the rules governing interactions in a complex society become more concrete and function
so as to implement the concrete goals of specific groups, spontaneous order becomes
transformed into organizational order, and in the process a Gesellschaft-type society would
change into a less diverse and less complex societal form. It is precisely this transformation
which Hayek opposes.33 Small wonder, then, that the distinction between the concrete and
the abstract is of such importance to Hayek, for this distinction provides the basis for his
legal theory, for distinguishing between legal mechanisms and alternative forms of
30 See, for example, his economic arguments in Individualism and Economic Order (1948) concerning the
central role played by such forms of knowledge.
31 Note that this does not claim that individuals' access to their own goals is somehow "transparent",
"unmediated", or infallible. Nor does it imply that there is no interpretation required for one to "figure out" what
their own beliefs are. Rather, the point being made is that if individuals have a different, and in some cases,
closer, connection to their own goals than to the goals of others (who in turn can have a different relation to their
own goals), then this should be taken into account by any conduct governance mechanism which aims to
regularize individuals' conduct in a social context.
32 For if the values were general enough to allow individuals to pursue their own goals rather than the goals
of others, individuals would not have to refer to others for their goals.
33 This idea is repeated throughout his work. See, for example, The Road to Serfdom (1944), and his
discussion in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. II, The Mirage ofSocial Justice (1976, 133-152).
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governance, and provides an insight into a method whereby the complexity of a
Gesellschaft-type society might be sustained.
5. Havvorth on spontaneous order
The justification for spending so much time elaborating Hayek's spontaneous order
thesis is twofold. First, this thesis might be unfamiliar to the reader. And second, the
purpose of this chapter is to examine and critique Haworth's analysis of Hayek's social
theory, with the aim of relating this critique to the wider concerns of this thesis. As
Haworth's analysis rests in large part on his objections to the spontaneous order thesis, it
seems appropriate to spell out in some detail the implications of this idea. I have contended
that the difference between the two orders manifests itself in a variety of ways, such as the
abstractness of the rules governing each order, the presence or absence of conscious
purposes from the order, and so on. Haworth attacks the adequacy of all of these criteria. He
claims that they are not adequate to distinguish the two types of order, and that in specific
cases the thesis lacks any substantial content at all. Now, it should be said that Haworth
does find much to recommend this thesis in general, particularly as it applies to the
evolution of morality (Haworth 1994, 118-119). However, this does not imply that
Haworth's analysis is predominantly positive. Indeed, much of the chapter on Hayek
focuses on the weaknesses of the spontaneous order thesis.
Haworth begins by focusing on explicitly political issues. He wants to understand the
relationship between the spontaneous order thesis, libertarian ethics, and competing
economic theories. In particular, one question to be considered is whether "the spontaneous
order thesis logically entails the overtly libertarian moral prescriptions Hayek recommends"
(Haworth 1994, 121). What are Haworth's arguments against the proposition that the
spontaneous order thesis entails Hayek's "libertarian" prescriptions? First, he argues that in
cases of interest, the spontaneous order thesis tells us nothing about how to act or about
when to rely on spontaneous order and when to resort to organizational order (Haworth
1994, 122). Is this argument correct? Perhaps not, for consider the following: spontaneous
order, as Haworth correctly points out, has no (intention-dependent) purpose, but it does (or
can) perform numerous functions.34 Hayek's point is that spontaneous order can, in certain
34 The use of the term "functions" should not be taken to imply that these functions, nor the order considered
holistically, are functional or dysfunctional. That is, no judgment of the value of these functions should be read
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environments, fulfil certain functions better than organizational order. The question is why.
Hayek argues that in certain circumstances this is the case because of the dispersed,
fragmented and perspectivist nature of knowledge.35 Consider an example. Hayek claims
that in many cases markets, a particular example of spontaneous order, are better at
coordinating fragmented knowledge than are organizational orders. Haworth seems to be of
the view that Hayek is claiming that this coordination advantage exists in all circumstances
and situations. This leads to Haworth's criticism that Hayek does not give an indication of
when to rely on spontaneous order and when to rely on organizational order and, in the
particular case of interest, when to use the market mechanism and when to resort to
alternatives. Is this correct? And does Hayek almost always recommend the use of the
market mechanism? I think not. It is important to point out that he commends organizational
structures in many cases. The critical issue, however, concerns the coercive use of
governmental organization. Conscious organization is one thing when goals are agreed upon
and individuals strive in harmony to achieve these ends. It is quite another thing if there is
disagreement about the ends to be pursued, with the result being that some have to be forced
to accept the choices of others. The important issue in this context is the compatibility of the
governance mechanism to its environment or, put differently, between the match between
the properties of a governance mechanism and its ability to implement desired goals or
support certain values.
None of this implies that Hayek does not advocate the use of alternative mechanisms,
including governmental forms, in some situations, including coercive ones. But the resort to
a particular governance mechanism must take into account the limitations of the
recommended mechanism in different environments. The same applies to recommendations
for the use of market mechanisms. Hayek, and many other economists as well, would
recommend the use of organizational order when there is what economists term a market
failure. Some reasons why markets might be an inappropriate mechanism might include
inadequate definitions of property rights (including non-excludable and indivisible goods,
externalities, etc.) and the market mechanism's weakness in coordinating actions which, by
necessity, must be rapid and of a high degree of precision. Haworth claims that "the number
into this usage. A spontaneous order can act as a means to one's ends, and it is in this sense that it can perform
numerous "functions".
35 This is a dominant and enduring theme in Hayek's work, and is emphasized in his 1937 paper "Economics
and Knowledge" (1948, 33-56), and in later works, particularly The Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 22-38), Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1973, 11-17; 1976, 1-30; 1979, 67-70), and The Fatal Conceit (1988, 6-105).
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and magnitude of the problems which quite clearly do demand collective action and planned
intervention is much greater than Hayek suggests. (AIDS, war and pollution are examples)"
(Haworth 1994, 122). This would seem to imply that Hayek suggests that these are
inappropriate areas for government action. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Hayek states
quite clearly that in cases of "epidemics" (Hayek 1979, 44), "pollution" (Hayek 1979, 43),
and "war" (Hayek 1960, 54), government action is desirable. Why is this so? As Hayek puts
it, market mechanisms are effective in environments where "the producers of particular
goods and services will be able to determine who will benefit from them and who will pay
for their cost" (Hayek 1979, 43). If this condition does not hold, markets would be rather
ineffective. Epidemics, pollution and national defence are examples of instances where "it is
either technically impossible, or would be prohibitively costly, to confine certain services to
particular persons, so that [therefore] these services can be provided only for all (or at least
will be provided more cheaply and effectively if they are provided for all)" (Hayek 1979,
44). Furthermore, in times ofwar what is required is a mechanism that can deliver rapid and
precisely coordinated centralized actions, and markets have difficulties achieving this. It
would be a mistake, then, to claim that Hayek advocates market mechanisms as appropriate
for all environments, just as it would be erroneous to claim that he is "almost always"
hostile to government. Such an error seems to indicate that Haworth has mistaken Hayek for
a "typical" libertarian, and has failed to discern that there is an argument based upon the
properties of governance mechanisms underlying his seemingly political prescriptions.
There is, however, another, more fundamental, source of Haworth's errors. One only begins
to discern exactly what this is when one turns to Haworth's analysis of the difference
between the rules governing spontaneous and organizational orders.
6, Haworth on the distinction between abstract / general and particular / specific
rules
Haworth analyzes Hayek's notion of rules and the difference between "general, abstract"
rules and "specific and particular" ones. In criticizing Hayek's notions, Haworth makes
what I consider to be a rather bizarre claim: that "there can be no such thing as a class of
'specific and particular' rules with which to contrast the abstract and general" (Haworth
1994, 124). What exactly is the argument here?
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Hayek's argument is that an abstract rule is defined by "a classical juridical formula"
under which a rule "must apply to an unknown number of future instances" (Haworth 1994,
123, quoting Hayek, 1976, 35). It is not enough, then, for a rule to be merely expressed in
abstract terms (Hayek uses the example of a rule referring to fingerprints to make this
point). Rather, it is the scope of the reference of the rule which is decisive. Haworth argues
that the "unknown number of future instances" criterion is insufficient to distinguish
abstract from particular rules. He claims that there cannot be a specific and particular set of
rules because "even classes which only contain one member — in fact and so far as we
know, that is — potentially contain more" (Haworth 1994, 124). Hence, even "very specific
rules... 'apply to an unknown number of future instances' and match the juridical formula
Hayek cites" (Haworth 1994, 124). And what does Haworth have to say of rules which
specify a single member at a particular time and place? How do they potentially contain
more members? Haworth argues that "if time is cyclical and history repeats itself infinitely
right down to the last detail", there would be an "infinite number" of future members
(Haworth 1994, 124).
What is one to make of this argument? As Haworth puts it, "[this] speculation may be
fanciful, but that is neither here nor there. It is sufficient to demonstrate that Hayek's thesis
is, in at least one way, empty. Since it has to be true of all rules that they are 'applicable to
an unknown and indeterminate number of persons and instances', it follows that there can
be no such thing as a class of 'specific and particular' rules with which to contrast to the
abstract and general" (Haworth 1994, 124).
This argument is simply bad reasoning. What Haworth can claim is that //"history is in
fact cyclical, then it will be true that all rules which are external to this cycle are infinitely
referential. If, however, the rules are themselves internal to each particular time cycle, it is
not at all obvious that they refer to other time periods.36 And all of this applies solely to life
on this "possible world". If, on the other hand, it is not the case that history is cyclical,
Haworth's claim of infinite referentiality is not demonstrated but merely asserted. The
general point is this: just because in one "possible world" rules might be infinitely
referential does not imply that in our particular world they are. Unless, of course,
36 Imagine that history is cyclical and that one is considering a fingerprint rule which uniquely picks out a
single individual. Why should it be the case that a fingerprint rule which exists now should be the one which
refers to a particular individual in the future? If everything repeats itself down to the smallest detail, does that not
imply that the rules repeat as well (and hence that a rule at time t0 refers to a world at t0, while a rule at t, refers
to a world at t,, unless it were explicitly stated as otherwise in the rule).
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demonstrations of the cyclicity of our history and refutations of the criticisms above are
forthcoming.
A more general criticism of this argument is that it ignores the fact that "abstract" and
"particular" are relative terms, and hence some rules might be abstract relative to other,
more particularistic, ones, depending upon how much space-time each refers to. The idea
behind Haworth's argument seems to be that for something to be a rule, it must refer to
multiple future cases, and hence there can be no such thing as a particularistic rule. It is as if
the very notion of a "rule" requires it to be "abstract" and that this is the same thing as
asserting that the rule governs more than one case. The question which must be asked,
however, is whether this is at all relevant to issues of conduct governance. The answer, I
think, is that the central issue for questions of conduct governance is the scope of the space-
time reference of a rule, and hence Haworth's conceptual issue is of little importance. Is it
not of obvious importance for issues of conduct governance to take into consideration the
number and type of such references and their possibility of occurrence in a given
environment? Haworth's argument in a sense separates the question of whether a rule is
abstract or particular from the content of the rule and the environment to which the rule
applies. But how, one might ask, could one determine whether a rule refers at all without a
consideration of both of these aspects?
Although I have been critical of Haworth's interpretation, I would agree with him that
Hayek's "classical juridical" criterion is a rather poor one, as it seems to obscure more than
it clarifies. Consider an example. Imagine one was considering a rule governing behaviour
solely over the next week. Is this an example of a rule which governs an "unknown number
of future instances", even though it is in effect for a known time? This would depend, it
seems, on the content of the rule and the environment to which it was referring. Hayek's
characterization is, I think, an inadequate one for determining whether a rule is abstract or
particular, for such a characterization requires a consideration of its content and the
environment to which it is applied. Of course, one could claim that almost all rules which
govern future interactions might be instantiated an unknown number of times, but when
considering issues of conduct governance the decisive questions concerning the range of
applicability of rules can only be decided by turning to an examination of their content in a
given environment.
The question of primary importance at the moment is whether the damage inflicted by
Hayek's inadequate characterization of what it is that distinguishes abstract from
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particularistic rules is fatal to the enterprise of constructing a Hayekian social theory. I
would argue that it is not. As I shall argue in this chapter and later on in the thesis, Hayek's
theory can be made coherent. My criticism notwithstanding, my interest in Hayek in this
chapter, and in the thesis more generally, is not primarily destructive. Rather, I am more
concerned with making the best ofHayek's argument by presenting an interpretation which,
given Hayek's work as a whole, presents a Hayekian theory at its best. To this end, I have
abandoned Hayek's inadequate definition for one which is compatible with the body of his
work and which is more coherent with the foundations of his social theory. The abstractness
of a rule, then, refers to the scope of its reference, and not necessarily to the mode of its
expression and thus specific, particular, rules can be held in contradistinction to abstract,
general rules as a matter of degree.
7. Haworth on the difference between spontaneous and organizational order
Haworth tries to make an argument that a distinction cannot be made between a
spontaneous and a 'made' order. First, he claims that Hayek's argument is that an order
which has spontaneously evolved is based on rules of a general and abstract character,
whereas a 'made' order is based on commands (Haworth 1994, 124-125). Next, he points
out that one difference between a rule which has spontaneously evolved37 and a command is
that only the latter is issued intentionally, with a purpose (Haworth 1994, 125). Finally, he
tries to show that a spontaneously evolved rule can simultaneously be a command.
Unfortunately, whether Haworth's demonstration is correct or not is quite beside the point,
for he has made two mistakes which completely undermine his argument in terms of a
critique of Hayek.
First, and most importantly, Hayek does not claim that the difference between
spontaneous and organizational order rests on the difference between abstract, general rules
and commands. He in fact says that it rests on the distinction between rules of spontaneous
and organizational orders. Rules of organizational order are not identical with commands,
for commands are, relatively, more specific and particular. Nor does Hayek claim that one
can distinguish between spontaneous and organizational order using the difference between
abstract, general rules and commands. Haworth himself brings out this fact when he quotes
37 This is Haworth's usage.
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Hayek as saying "[r]ules of organization are necessarily subsidiary to commands, filling in
the gaps left by the commands" (Haworth 1994, 125, from Hayek 1973, 49), and hence are
different from commands. Thus, Haworth's point is neither here nor there. It is irrelevant.
Second, Hayek does not equate a rule which has "spontaneously evolved" with a rule of
spontaneous order.38 As Hayek puts it, "while the rules on which a spontaneous order rests,
may also be of spontaneous origin, this need not always be the case" (Hayek 1973, 45). In
fact, "it is at least conceivable that the formation of a spontaneous order relies entirely on
rules that were deliberately made" (Hayek 1973, 45). Thus, "[t]he spontaneous character of
the resulting order must therefore be distinguished from the spontaneous origin of the rules
on which it rests, and it is possible that an order which would still have to be described as
spontaneous rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate design" (Hayek 1973,
46). Haworth has conflated the spontaneous nature of the rules governing an order with the
spontaneous nature of the order. In Hayek's conceptual framework, it is the order of actions
which is, or is not, spontaneous. Moreover, it is the properties of the rules governing an
order, and not merely their origin, which differentiates a spontaneous order from an
organizational order. Once again, Haworth is arguing against a position which Hayek does
not hold. And once again, Haworth's point is irrelevant to Hayek's spontaneous order thesis.
8. Haworth on cultural evolution
We will now turn away for the moment from the focus on spontaneous order and
examine instead Haworth's critiques of the notion of cultural evolution. I will postpone a
discussion of the specifics of Hayek's theory until the next chapter, and will instead focus
upon Haworth's more general objections to the idea of cultural evolution. These consist of
38 Though many discussions of Hayek seem to assume this is in fact the case. See, for example, Kukathas'
discussion, where he seems to be assuming that the distinction between spontaneous and organizational order as
applied to social institutions lies in whether or not the institution can be considered a "spontaneous development"
(1989, 103-105); or MacCormick's critique of Hayek's notion of social justice (1989), where similar thoughts
are expressed. Gray's discussion of spontaneous order (Gray 1986) leads me to believe that he makes a similar
error. Gray's work is notable for its lack of any discussion of the differences between organizational and
spontaneous order. Instead, he focuses almost exclusively on instances of "spontaneously" evolved order.
Moreover, he argues that it might be useful to consider certain "spontaneously evolved" institutions as examples
of spontaneous order even though this contradicts Hayek's claim that they are instead instances of organizational
order (Gray 1986, 120-121). That the rules governing spontaneous and organizational order might be different,
and that this might constitute the decisive difference between the two forms of order, never enters the discussion.
Instead, his comments seem to revolve around the idea that "spontaneously" evolved order is equivalent to
spontaneous order, and that it is this genealogical difference which is sufficient to distinguish the two types of
order.
Mechanism orMachiavellianism? • 37
two inter-related critiques of the theory of cultural evolution which are of some importance.
First, he claims that "whereas there is good scientific evidence to support the theory of
evolution in biology there is nothing corresponding to this in the case of Hayek's theory"
(Haworth 1994, 128). That is, "in the case of the former, experiments have tended to
confirm the evolutionary mechanism — the selection and random mutation of
DNA...actually operates" (Haworth 1994, 128). He argues that "there ought to be something
analogous to this within Hayek's evolutionistic social theory; that is, evidence that non¬
interference with the spontaneous order produces optimal results" and this evidence "ought
to be independent of the historical record which simply describes which 'orders' have
actually tended to predominate over time" (Haworth 1994, 128). Second, he posits that
although "the evolution of morality has left us with some out-of-date attitudes...it ought to
be obvious that we have absolutely no way of determining which of our attitudes are the
outmoded ones" (Haworth 1994, 128).
The first of these objections is ambiguous. There are two possible meanings. Perhaps
Haworth is merely claiming that experiments in biology have demonstrated that
evolutionary mechanisms operate (but do not necessarily produce optimal results). If this is
the case, it would be sufficient for Hayek to point to evidence that cultural selection
mechanisms actually operate. The evidence for such mechanisms is not hard to find. It has
been documented in some detail39 in Boyd and Richerson's Culture and the Evolutionary
Process (1985).40 One might also argue that Hayek's investigations into the processes of
law41 represent a detailed and sustained examination of some of the specialized cultural
selection processes which act over and filter out particular rules of conduct (and indeed, this
is the argument put forward in the chapters which follow).
Haworth, however, seems to be arguing for more than this. He states that Hayek should
present evidence that "non-interference with spontaneous order produces optimal results"
(Haworth 1994, 128). There are a couple of difficulties with this. First, Haworth does not
39 There are also discussions in, inter alia, the works of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's Cultural Transmission
and Evolution (1981) and Moran's Human Adaptability (1982).
40 This work is particularly valuable in that it points out how cultural evolutionary mechanisms can
"malfunction" in the sense that what one would think to be optimal does not necessarily fare well in the selection
mechanism. This is a point which should be stressed. The fact that there are mechanisms for cultural evolution
does not imply they produce results which we find desirable. Nor does the fact that a culture has passed through
a selection filter imply that it is therefore optimal in the sense that we find it desirable. The selection filter itself
may be "flawed" in that we do not find its results desirable or we cannot understand why certain types, which we
do not value, prosper while others, which we do value, decline.
4' Consider, for example, The Constitution ofLiberty (1960) and Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1973; 1976;
1979).
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spell out the meaning of the term "interference" in this statement — a meaning which is
obviously central to his very objection. It would be difficult to claim that Hayek argues for
allowing the spontaneous order of society to evolve in a completely decentralized manner
and without the involvement, correction, and guidance of legal or political mechanisms. As
I have pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, such a decentralized (and politicized)
interpretation of Hayek's notion of cultural evolution overlooks the role that legal and
political institutions play as selection mechanisms, and under-emphasizes the role of
rational examination, critique, and change in a Hayekian vision of society.
Notwithstanding this ambiguity in Haworth's argument, there is yet another issue which
is problematic. Haworth seems to be positing that experiments with Darwinian evolutionary
mechanisms have demonstrated that "optimal" results emerge. But — and this is the
interesting question — what does "optimal" mean in this context? That the organisms that
pass through the evolutionary filter of a selection mechanism are "well-adapted"? And what
does this mean? "Well-adapted" to their environment?42 "Well-adapted" to performing
actions which produce results which are "valuable" (under some set of criteria) within that
environment? And isn't this similar to claiming that evolutionary mechanisms generate
means which are well adapted to certain ends and values? If this is the argument that
Haworth is presenting, then providing evidence for it in the cultural sphere would be an
exceptionally difficult point, for the ends which humans desire and the values they cherish
seem to be much more numerous and diverse than those of other organisms. As well, it
becomes extremely difficult to separate the various ends, values and means (they are
interconnected and they overlap). Nevertheless, Hayek does make general arguments that
some institutional mechanisms which have evolved are well-adapted (or, to be more precise,
not mal-adapted) to certain environments which have also evolved.43 Hayek's argument
focuses on the limitations imposed by a space-time existence, as manifested in the
fragmentation of knowledge. Presupposing these limitations exist, he then goes on to argue
that well-adapted methods for generating and sustaining a "complex" order are those
42 Note that survival is not a sufficient condition for "well-adaptedness". If one assumed it were, one would
create a tautological circle, i.e. organisms which pass through — i.e. survive — a Darwinian selection
mechanism are optimal, optimal is defined as "well-adapted", and "well-adapted" is defined as "surviving".
Hence, organisms which survive selection are optimal because they survive.
43 Note that this is not to argue that all institutions which have evolved are well-adapted, or that certain
institutions are well-adapted to all types of environments. In addition, it does not imply that biological and
cultural forms of evolution might not be in conflict. For a general discussion of how cultural evolution can
produce mal-adapted cultural results, see Boyd and Richerson (1986, 241-279); while for an analysis of the
potential tension between biological and cultural evolution, see Boyd and Richerson (1986, 172-240).
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institutional mechanisms which have evolved to coordinate individual behaviour under
minimal common-knowledge conditions. Hence his advocacy of market mechanisms
(interaction mediated through the emergent, abstract and social phenomena of number
prices, an externalized metric of value — money — and governed by "abstract rules of just
conduct") and the principle of the Rule of Law (using Hayek's notion of that ideal, as dealt
with in later chapters). This also explains his opposition to forms of distributive justice
which conflict with the principle of the Rule of Law, and to centralized governmental
economic planning in general. Hayek does not advocate market mechanisms in all contexts,
nor does he always oppose centralized planning and the ideals of distributive justice (if they
do not conflict with the principle of the Rule of Law, for example). What he does stress is
that the choice of the appropriate mechanism depends in large part on the informational
environment under consideration and the goals which one desires to be achieved. His claim
is that some mechanisms are better adapted to particular informational environments than
are others and, in the final analysis, that in the environment of a "complex" society, the
well-adapted mechanisms are those of markets and the principle of the Rule of Law.
What Hayek does not do is provide experimental evidence for this claim. Instead, he
points to population changes which have accompanied what he considers to be the adoption,
to a greater or lesser degree, of these cultural artefacts.44 This leads to the question of what
should constitute evidence of "optimality". Evidence on the well-adaptedness of animal
species does tend to use changes in population as evidence of evolutionary suitability (or
unsuitability). For instance, the fact that certain species have become extinct is prima facie
evidence that they were not adapted to their environments (with "environment" defined in a
broad sense). In a sense, then, arguments that one species has experienced rapid population
growth while others have experienced a rapid decline is a sign — but not conclusive
evidence— of evolutionary fitness or unfitness. How conclusive it is depends, inter alia, on
how the term "environment" is defined and on the evidential weight given to reproductive
fitness as a measure of overall fitness. The question which Haworth raises, however, is
concerned with how one can point to evidence of cultural evolutionary "optimality" without
making reference to a historical record of that which has actually dominated. In this vein,
Haworth argues that Hayek should provide experimental evidence of "the optimality of non¬
interference with spontaneous orders".
44 See his statements in The Fatal Conceit (Hayek 1988, 120-134).
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This brings me back to the argument made above, i.e. that it is questionable whether
Hayek's notion of cultural evolution depends upon the dubious argument that culture should
be left to evolve in a radically decentralized manner, to the exclusion of rational critique and
modification, and independent of cultural institutions. If this argument is a poor one, and if
Hayek's notion of cultural evolution is instead a much wider one, the question arises as to
what sort of evidence could be used to argue for the well-adaptedness of certain practices or
institutions. One type might emerge in the form of general arguments concerning the well-
or mal-adaptedness of certain institutions and cultural artefacts to certain environments. As I
have argued above, Hayek does make these type of arguments. Another form of evidence
might focus on the ability of specific mechanisms to generate specific results in
experimental situations. Now, while there is some documented empirical evidence of the
relative adaptedness of various products of cultural evolution, most of it is not
experimental.45 Why that should be the case is not difficult to guess. A combination of
ethical restrictions (in what ways should adaptiveness be allowed to be demonstrable? over
what time period? which individuals should benefit?), the difficulty of experimental design
(what would constitute an "optimal" linguistic development, for example?), and numerous
other difficulties lead to experiments in this area being relatively rare.46 Given that there is
not much experimental evidence in use in the social sciences,47 it does seem a bit
unreasonable to demand that Hayek produce evidence of that type.
In closing out this section, let us turn briefly to a consideration of Haworth's second
objection to the notion of cultural evolution, this being that there are no known mechanisms
for determining which of our moral attitudes are outmoded. On examination, this turns out
to be a variation of one of his earlier arguments, i.e. that there is no evidence that cultural
evolution selection mechanisms generate "optimal" results and hence, even if our morality
has evolved, there is no way for us to know which of our moral attitudes are well- or mal-
adapted. On the face of it, this is a poor argument, for many of the same reasons as are
discussed above. Perhaps the most important of these is that it ignores the role of discussion,
rational examination, and immanent criticism, taking certain values as a given. I have no
doubts that such an examination is fraught with difficulties and value-laden. But, given our
45 See Boyd and Richerson (1986).
46 There is, however, some experimental evidence on the informational and allocative properties of markets
presented in The Handbook ofExperimental Economics, (1995).
47 Depending, of course, on how one classifies psychology.
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evolved systems of values and beliefs about what we consider to be important, we can argue
that certain cultural, or moral, artefacts are mal-adapted to the system as a whole or to the
type of society we desire to promote.48 This is not the end of the matter, however. Once
such a mal-adapted artefact has been identified and it has been decided that change is
desired, it must then be decided how the change will be brought about. This is in fact a
question of utmost importance, for the methods of bringing about change must also accord
with our system of values and with certain regularities we take as given. Thus, the question
is not merely one of identifying what is mal-adapted or not, but also one of identifying the
best mechanism for changing this mal-adapted cultural artefact. Although it can be argued
that it is possible through immanent criticism to identify some cultural practices which do
not accord with our general values, it should not be thought that this identification is the end
of the story. Nor should it be assumed that the artefact and its effects can be modified in an
equally effective manner by any mechanism of one's choosing. Different mechanisms
produce different effects in different environments. Thus, it should be recognized that an
examination of the roles played by cultural artefacts in an ongoing social order, and an
analysis of their compatibility with that same order, are by themselves insufficient to
address the question of what is to be done and how it is to be implemented and supported.
For this issue to be addressed, there must be consideration given to the different
mechanisms which can be resorted to and their ability to produce the desired results in the
environments under examination. That this raises difficult issues is unquestionable, but this
is not to say that they cannot be made, nor that there is no criterion to which one can resort
in trying to resolve these issues.
9. Conclusion
Having examined Haworth's objections to the notion of cultural evolution, we have seen
that these lead to issues of fundamental importance to Hayek's social theory. Similarly, and
as pointed out previously, substantive issues are at stake when considering Haworth's
arguments concerning the impossibility of distinguishing spontaneous from organizational
order. It can be claimed, without exaggeration, that without the framework of ideas that
underlie this distinction, Hayek's political and legal theory becomes incoherent. As argued
48 Using what Hayek would term "immanent criticism" (1976, 24-27).
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above, this dichotomy rests in large part on the difference between abstract, general rules
and specific, particular ones. And how important is this distinction? I will argue in later
chapters that it provides the basis for much of Hayek's legal theory, and is intimately related
to the nature of the power / authority structure of society. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Hayek is so concerned to defend his spontaneous order thesis and his views on abstract and
particular rules.
There is another fundamental point at play here. Much of Hayek's economic, political
and legal theory is based on the idea that knowledge is fragmented.49 An extremely
interesting question is why this might be the case. The reason is both obvious and profound.
Organisms exist in space and over time, and there are certain limitations imposed on
organisms by temporal and spatial separation (i.e. we can't be everywhere at the same time;
the fact that something exists in a certain space-time implies something else cannot;
performance takes place at particular points in space and time; etc.). If one applies this
insight to knowledge, one can see that access to some knowledge might be time-space
specific, that is, it could not be known unless one were in some particular time-space
relation to it, and, if one tried to know it, one would instead know something different,50
The implications of this insight are many and varied and form the foundation upon which a
Hayekian social theory is based. Indeed, it can be argued that the central problem that
Hayek sets out to address is how individuals and societies adapt to the restrictions imposed
by an existence in space and through time.
Many of Hayek's prescriptions can be better understood once one realizes that this is the
question Hayek is addressing. For instance, consider Hayek's views on market mechanisms.
Hayek argues that markets exhibit a high degree of spontaneous order. But Hayek is arguing
more than this. He is not merely claiming that an economy is a spontaneous order but also
that it should be (or that we should strive to make it so). And why should it be a spontaneous
order? The argument is that a dependence on a high degree of spontaneous order is
necessary if one wants to sustain the diverse and interconnected relationships which
constitute a "complex" society because of the fragmentation and division of knowledge (and
goals). This fragmentation arises because of the limitations inherent in a space-time
existence. It is the desire for a "complex" civilization, widely-ranging in time and space,
49 As is pointed out in the analyses of both Gray (1986, 134-136) and Kukathas (1989, 10-12).
For example, my knowledge of my emotions from my perspective is quite different from knowledge of
my emotions from the perspective of another person related in a different spatio-temporal way to them.
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and the belief that it can only be sustained by allowing individuals to use decentralized
judgment, that leads Hayek to condemn measures of centralized control. In fact, if Hayek
believed that a centralized institutional framework could generate the same results, he
would not argue against them.51 Hayek's entire argument is that these types of mechanisms
cannot sustain the complexity with which we have become accustomed in a modern
civilization. Hayek's social theory and its consequent recommendations are not simply the
expression of a political preference. Instead, it would be more accurate to say that his
political views are the expression of his social theory.
51 See, for example, his statement in The Fatal Conceit (Hayek 1988, 6-7).
CHAPTER TWO
The Evolution of Order
A Hayekian approach to cultural evolution
1. Introduction
Haworth's criticisms of cultural evolution which were addressed in the last chapter were
directed for the most part against a general notion of cultural evolution, and not, to a great
extent, to the particular version that Hayek puts forward. This chapter puts forward Hayek's
views on cultural evolution and examines some of the criticisms that have been made of
them. Hayek's ideas have been much discussed and criticized by his commentators. There
is, however, much confusion in this critical literature. Hayek has occasionally been accused
of advocating Social Darwinism. Others claim his definition of cultural evolution is
tautological, generating the unacceptable conclusion that whatever evolves is well-adapted
and beyond criticism. Still others believe his formulations are hopelessly vague and lacking
any substantial content. While I have some sympathy for the last of these objections, they
are all nevertheless erroneous, and none of them can be sustained given a careful and
reasonable insight into Hayek's work. Social Darwinism may well be mistaken, but this
does not impact on Hayek's theory, for he is not a Social Darwinist. However tautological
some formulations of evolution might be, it is certainly an error to claim that Hayek's
notion is tautological. And finally, whilst Hayek's work might be vague in part and lacking
in "essential" details, there are important epistemological reasons for this, and they are
consistent with the body of Hayek's work. This chapter, then, will try to elaborate the
essential aspects of a Hayekian view of cultural evolution and, at the same time, point out
those aspects which are not part of this theory.
Before turning to a summary of such a theory, I would like to stress the deliberately
limited remit of the restatement presented in the pages that follow. This chapter will focus
for the most part on the criticisms of commentators one might be inclined to say are
intellectual compatriots of Hayek. The writers under examination are James Buchanan,
44
The Evolution of order • 45
Chandran Kukathas and John Gray, three of the best-known writers in the literature of
classical liberalism. The justification for restricting the study to these writers is that one
might think that they would attempt to cast Hayek's work in its best possible light, given
their shared predilection for the ideas of classical liberalism. In other words, one might
expect these writers to have a better understanding of Hayek's writings, given the similarity
of their underlying presuppositions and values. Unfortunately, this assumption would be
incorrect. I will demonstrate that these three writers misunderstand and misinterpret
Hayek's notion of cultural evolution. There is, it seems, no coherent understanding of
Hayek's notion within the writings of these major contemporary exponents of classical
liberalism. One of the reasons for this will emerge as the later chapters of this work unfold.
However, I will be arguing, albeit indirectly, in this chapter, that Hayek's political views are
a by-product of his more serious interest, the focus on conduct governance mechanisms and
their connection to the nature of social order. The insights elaborated in this chapter, and
much of the discussion of later chapters, aim to show that Hayek's political concerns are for
the most part based on his investigations into the properties of the mechanisms of social
order and, in particular, into the nature of the resultant social order which evolves by
passing through a number of selection filters. If this view is correct — if Hayek's political
preferences are for the most part a reflection of his insights into the properties of conduct
governance mechanisms and the forms of social order these mechanisms are capable of
sustaining— then it is perhaps not surprising that his classical liberal compatriots, who tend
to emphasize the political aspects of his thoughts, come to misunderstand his work. Hayek, I
would argue, is preoccupied with an investigation of the mechanisms which support an
abstract society, and not so much with the particular constellation of values which happen to
be associated with classical liberalism. In any case, it is the investigation of these
mechanisms, and not the examination of any particular sets of values, which will constitute
much of the chapter that follows.
This brings up a second and final point. It would perhaps be unfair to the commentators
mentioned above to include Hayek's last work, The Fatal Conceit (1988), given that it
would have been unavailable to them at the time of their comments. Accordingly, when
examining the interpretation of each of these commentators, this chapter will focus on
works available at the time of their comments.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section focuses on the definition of
Hayekian cultural evolution — both what it is, and what it is not. The second section
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examines some criticisms of Hayek's notion of cultural evolution made by a number of
Hayek's classical liberal commentators, with the validity of each criticism being assessed in
the light of material available to each author at the time that they wrote. In considering these
criticisms, the definition of Hayekian evolution is augmented and further fleshed out.
Finally, the third and final section considers some general objections to a Hayekian theory
and forms the conclusion of the chapter.
2. An overview
It is of the utmost importance to realize that Hayek's notion of cultural evolution works
on two inter-connected levels, the individual and the social. Moreover, the Hayekian
approach is characterized by its analysis of the interplay and inter-relationship between
these two levels. The first level of analysis is a relatively decentralized one, focusing on
issues of individual conduct governance and how it is that individuals, in their day to day
conduct, are able to adapt to the various environments they encounter. Consider the
following, somewhat over-simplified, summary of Hayek's views on this aspect of cultural
evolution. Hayek claims that the products of decentralized human action over long periods
of time are in many cases more adaptive than the products of a more centralized, and more
rational, design. The idea is that that which is unplanned and not designed at a centralized
level can be more adaptive than that which is rationally, and centrally, designed. In this
vein, Hayek claims that "[hjumiliating to human pride as it may be, we must recognize that
the advance and even the preservation of civilization are dependent upon a maximum
opportunity for accidents to happen" (Hayek 1960, 29).'
These adaptations at a decentralized, individual, level are closely connected to a second
level of analysis at a more inter-personal, social, or institutional level. One of Hayek's
primary concerns is the way in which institutional level conduct governance mechanisms
interact with mechanisms which are operating at a more individual level. It is this concern
with the interaction between these two levels, and with the way that institutional level
mechanisms mesh with individual level governance, that leads Hayek to recommend certain
types of mechanisms as being better adapted to certain types of environments. For example,
1 i would qualify this statement by pointing out that what is desired is not merely a maximum of accidents,
but rather such a maximum combined with a minimum of damaging consequences. The idea is that by grounding
experimentation at a decentralized level, social harm can be minimized.
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in the context of a complex society, to achieve the goal of maximizing "accidents", while at
the same time minimizing the degree of damage caused by these "accidents",2 Hayek
advocates decentralized social, legal and governmental mechanisms. In economic systems,
he prefers relatively decentralized market interaction to relatively centralized government
direction. In law, he prefers change to be implemented via the relatively decentralized
decisions of courts rather than through more centralized legislatures. And in government, he
prefers less centralized systems to more centralized ones. Hayek's goal would be to have
systems of social regularities— rules — generated from as many decentralized sources and
within as many different "societies" as is possible. His claim is that decentralized evolution
often produces systems of rules which are better adapted to their environments than those
which are generated by a more centralized rational examination and selection.3 To Hayek,
well-adapted systems of social rules are those regularities which have grown out of smaller
"societies" and remain adaptive when put in the context of larger, more complex, societies.
They are not, in many cases, the result of a deliberate and centralized design or choice.
None of this is to say that rational examination or design does not have a role to play in a
Hayekian social theory. This is certainly not the case. Many writers on Hayek's notion of
cultural evolution seem to assume that it is by its very nature unplanned and radically
decentralized to an individual level, as if this were somehow central to the very notion of
evolution itself. This is, I think, a mistake, and particularly so when considering cultural
evolution in the context of a study of legal mechanisms which act as evolved selection
filters over mal-adapted rules of conduct. Both institutions and individuals have a role to
play in cultural evolution, and it would be a mistake to emphasize the role of one at the
expense of the other. This being said, the important point which is emphasized by a
Hayekian analysis is the interaction and interplay between these two levels, and the
restrictions the activities of one level implies for the activities of the other. Neither
individuals nor institutions are unrestricted in their adaptive efforts, for they must both take
into account not only the ongoing activities of others and the effects of their actions on the
2 This is an important qualification, and is only implicit in Hayek's discussions of cultural evolution. It is
nevertheless central to his notion of cultural evolution. Without making this assumption, one might be led to
argue that Hayek's goal would be to continually increase conflict and maximize the number and scale of
accidents, regardless of their effects. This is not what Hayek has in mind; rather, the idea is one of a balancing
between maximizing the opportunity for experimentation, while at the same time minimizing the harm which is
caused by such experimentation.
3 See, for example, his discussion in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of
Ideas (1978, 3-22) and The Fatal Conceit (1988, 6-105).
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system of values that underlies their actions, but also the institutionalized constraints which
exist around them.
From the point of view of Hayekian cultural evolution, the issue of primary importance
centres around the match between mechanism and environment or, put differently, between
what is desired or valued and the way in which it is achieved or sustained. It is of no small
importance to keep in mind that certain mechanisms are only well-adapted to certain types
of environments and are hence restricted in their range of adaptive applicability, i.e. they are
well-adapted to certain environments, and mal-adapted to others. Legal mechanisms are in
this respect no different from any other form of conduct governance mechanism, including
market mechanisms and governmental forms — each is well adapted to performing certain
types of activities in certain types of environments, and each is mal-adapted to performing
other types of activities in other environments. The crucial issue, then, is the match between
a governance mechanism and its environment, and this turns on what a mechanism is well-
adapted, or mal-adapted, to delivering, given the (particular) goals and (abstract) values
present in a particular environment.
All of this is related to Hayek's persistent emphasis on the process of abstraction as a
fundamental component of conduct governance mechanisms in complex societies. Consider
for the moment a radically decentralized form of cultural evolution. This type of social
evolution has at least one potential difficulty: it can tend to produce too much diversity, too
many individualized regularities, and hence increase the complexity of an already complex
modern society. Thus, a radically decentralized social evolution can tend towards an ever
increasing degree of informational and performative complexity, and orienting oneself can
become increasingly difficult. How can this difficulty be overcome? Hayek's view is that
one of the major roles of social conduct governance mechanisms is to reduce this type of
complexity and at the same time allow individuals to successfully orient themselves in a
complex society.4 One way of doing this is by generating regularities, or rules, which when
conformed to make society more predictable. However, if these rules are to reduce
informational and performative complexity they must be relatively abstract.5 To Hayek, the
filtering out of context-specific knowledge and information through abstraction is a
4 This is one of the dominant themes in Hayek's later works, including The Constitution of Liberty (1960,
22-38), Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, 8-34; 1976, 1-30) and The Fatal Conceit (1988).
5 Closely connected to this is the property of negativity, which will be examined in some detail in later
chapters.
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fundamental method of reducing complexity. Hayek's advocacy of the principle of the Rule
of Law and his praise of market-based mechanisms can be viewed from this perspective. So
too can his objections to the notion of distributive justice. Hayek's primary concern is to
emphasize the connection between abstraction, the properties of conduct governance
mechanisms, and the form of society which results from the application of different types of
governance. His emphasis, then, is based on the idea that the properties of governance
mechanisms are intimately connected to their informational properties, and it is this element
which is of decisive importance in assessing whether or not a social mechanism (or a goal
which can only be implemented by certain types of mechanisms) is well-adapted to the
framework of a particular societal type.
3. Hayekian cultural evolution is not identical to genetic evolution
So much for a general overview of Hayek's notion of cultural evolution. What of its
specifics? Hayek's theory has two components: negating and positing. The negating side has
two main features. First, cultural evolution is not the same as Darwinian genetic evolution.
Cultural evolution differs from Darwinian genetic evolution in "the manner in which the
process of selection operates in the cultural transmission that leads to the formation of social
institutions, and the manner in which it operates in the selection of innate biological
characteristics and their transmission by physiological inheritance" (Hayek 1973, 23). In his
view Social Darwinism errs in focusing on "the selection of individuals rather than on that
of institutions and practices, and on the selection of innate rather than on culturally
transmitted capacities of individuals" (Hayek 1973, 23). Given these statements, it would be
difficult to claim that Hayek confuses genetic and social evolutionary processes.
4. There are no "laws" of evolution
The second negative aspect of Hayek's theory is his denial of the possibility of
formulating "laws" of evolution. Hayek believes that there is "no justification" for '"laws of
evolution'", except perhaps "in a special sense of the word 'law'", it being as an
"explanation of the principle" or the prediction of "the abstract pattern the process will
follow" (Hayek 1973, 24). That "the theory of evolution consists of 'laws of evolution'"
which are a "statement of a necessary sequence of particular stages or phases through which
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the process of evolution must pass and which by extrapolation leads to predictions of the
future course of evolution" is "certainly not true" (Hayek 1973, 23). The theory of
evolution, he believes, "will depend on a very large number of particular facts, far too
numerous for us to know in their entirety, and therefore does not lead to predictions about
the future" (Hayek 1973, 23-24). Thus, Hayek's claim that there are no laws of evolution is
equivalent to the claim that there are no particularized/concrete laws of evolution. He is not
arguing, then, that there are no abstract principles which hold in general for evolving
systems. "Predictions", in Hayek's sense of the word, refers to the foretelling ofparticular
or specific events as opposed to more general "predictions of the principle" (Hayek 1967, 3-
42). This distinction is in accord with elements of his epistemology.6 When Hayek speaks of
particular detail he is referring to the specificity and epistemological requirements of
particular predictions. For a prediction of particular detail, what is required under Hayek's
criterion is the complete set of particular facts which will determine all of the relevant
details of the prediction. If these are not known — or knowable — then only prediction of
the principle is possible.7
There is, however, one qualification which must be made to this argument. Hayek is
presupposing a criterion of relevancy exists and that it is the same as his level of
specification. He seems to be assuming that criteria of relevancy are shared between
individuals, and that the degree of specificity of these criteria are the same (i.e. that these
criteria are objective). This is not necessarily the case. Different individuals can hold
different criteria of specificity depending on the goals and values which motivate their
investigations. To put it simply: what is considered a "complete" set of particular facts and
what is considered "relevant" depends on the goals and values of the individuals
undertaking an investigation. There seem to be no grounds for assuming that they will be
the same for all individuals. What this means is that the existence or non-existence of laws
of evolution depends upon the informational criteria of the particular study in question,
which will in turn depend upon the particular goals and values of the investigators. What
^ As expounded in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, chapters one and two (Hayek 1967); New
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, chapters one to three (Hayek 1978); The
Sensory Order (Hayek 1952), and as reformulated in the later chapters of the present work. It might be noted that
Hayek's epistemic concerns have emerged in contemporary discussions of chaos theory, non-linear dynamics,
and complexity theory. For a popular introduction to chaos theory and non-linear dynamics, see Gleick (1987),
while for complexity theory, see Lewin (1993).
7 What is relevant and what is irrelevant will be conditional upon the classification underlying the
investigation. Thus, Hayek's claim would be misunderstood if one made abstract predictions and hence required
only a relatively abstract set of relevant details to occur.
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one investigator might call a particular law of evolution, another might describe as an
"explanation of the principle". If different individuals do not agree on the level of
specificity of the investigation, and on what is relevant and what is irrelevant, there can be
no resolution of this difficulty. The best that can be achieved is a clear statement of the level
of abstraction that one is presupposing and the level of regularity that is sufficient within the
assumptions of that theory to constitute a "law". There is little point in debating whether or
not "laws" of evolution exist if one is not clear on the implicit assumptions of the
investigation which make this a meaningful claim. Once one has staked out a position
concerning one's desired level of abstraction, the required degree of regularity, and the
particular aims of the study, there exists little more to say about whether or not a "law" of
evolution is a "law", for the meaning of such a definition would depend on the perspective
underlying the study. Although there will be tests of the internal consistency and coherency
of such a perspective, and although there may be degrees of overlap between different
perspectives which allow comparative evaluations, one might posit that it is of little value to
label different conceptions of "laws" of evolution as "right" and "wrong", rather than
merely different.
5. Restating the Hayekian notion of cultural evolution
The discussion thus far has focused on the negative side of Hayek's notion of cultural
evolution. What, then, constitutes the positive side of this theory? Hayekian cultural
evolution has four important aspects. First, it focuses on systems of rules of conduct.
Second, it is concerned, in part, with the evolution of mind. Third, it has its own definition
of what it is for an order of actions, and a system of rules of conduct, to be "adaptive".
Fourth and finally, it is based on a notion of feedback and cybernetic interaction.
The first feature of Hayekian cultural evolution focuses on the evolution of systems of
rides of conduct. Hayek continually emphasizes that cultural selection typically acts upon
systems of rules and not upon particular rules considered in isolation.8 In complex cultural
systems, the effects of rules are not easily disentangled. The effect of one rule typically
depends upon the other rules which are in effect at that time. As well, there is a variety of
feedback effects operating in such systems. Given such interactions, it is frequently difficult
8 i.e., "systems of rules of conduct will develop as wholes...the selection process of evolution will operate on
the order as a whole" (Hayek 1967, 71).
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and often counter-productive to the enterprise of understanding the effects of a rule to
separate it from its systemic implications. This might explain, then, why Hayek continually
emphasizes the systemic quality of rules.
One implication flowing from the above is that Hayekian cultural evolution does not
focus on the evolution of genes except insofar as they impact on systems of rules.9 Nor is
the focus upon the evolution of groups of individuals, except insofar as groups are defined
by their members being governed by "common" rules ("shared rules", if you will). In other
words, except where the existence of groups is defined by the existence of a common set of
rules, groups of individuals and systems of rules do not necessarily have the same referent.
The second feature of Hayekian cultural evolution is its emphasis on the evolution of
mind. Hayek's main interest is in how individuals orient themselves in different
environments. Hayek's argument is that in certain situations they do this through the
governance of systems of rules of conduct. These rules of conduct embed themselves in the
mind, and it is, essentially, the adaptation of mind to its environment which Hayek is
interested in investigating.
It is important to keep in mind that this project also involves an examination of the
relationship between the nature of different environments and the properties of different
rule-systems which are well-adapted to orienting individual conduct. The Hayekian
argument is that as environments become more complex, there must be a move towards
rules which are relatively more abstract in their reference. That is, abstract rules are better
adapted to environments of increasing complexity than are more concrete rules. Thus,
Hayek's concern is with conduct governance in different environments, and in particular in
issues of conduct governance in abstract and complex societies. It is this focus which leads
him to emphasize the fundamental importance of the process of abstraction and of the
mind's ability to form abstractions.I0He stresses that if individuals are to be adequately
guided in increasingly complex societies, they must come to depend to an increasing degree
upon abstract rules of conduct.
There is another aspect of this investigation into abstraction which merits a brief
mention. This is the analysis of the standardization of the rules which govern (and in part,
constitute) mind. This analysis of standardization is intimately related to the generation of
9 See Hayek's statement on this in The Fatal Conceit, p. 25.
10 This shall be one of the topics of discussion in the final chapter (which discusses a Hayekian theory of
mind).
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objectivity, which is itself based upon the idea of a uniformity of rule-responses to different
types of environments." The Hayekian position is two-pronged. The first prong is the idea
that abstraction sets in motion the potential generation of objective rules of judgment. This
is an idea of great importance, and it shall be the subject of much investigation in the
chapters which follow. The second prong is the relatively undeveloped insight that the
standardization of rule-responses (of classification) can be put into effect by standardizing
that which is classified. In other words, it is possible to arrange the environment in such a
way that classifications of its aspects are made in an increasingly objective manner. This
imposition of regularity onto the external environment, while extremely interesting, is
however a relatively undeveloped aspect of Hayek's theory and will play a relatively minor,
though important, role in the chapters which follow.
The third feature of Hayek's theory of cultural evolution is his notion of the well-
adaptedness of a system of rules. In the context of cultural evolution, well-adaptedness
refers to how well matched a system of rules is to its environment. This in turn depends on
the nature of the environment in which individuals are trying to orient themselves. The
Hayekian argument is that in complex environments concrete rules are inadequate guides to
conduct, and hence are increasingly mal-adapted in increasingly complex environments.
Abstract rules, on the other hand, are well-adapted to complexity (but can be poorly adapted
to concrete situations), and hence tend to be increasingly resorted to as social interaction
grows in complexity.
All of this is related to the fourth aspect of this theory, which is the idea of feedback.
Feedback focuses on the adaptations individuals make to their conduct in order to achieve a
better matching between their goals and values and the results of their conduct. Feedback
effects are ubiquitous in cultural evolution and occur in situations of learning, where
individuals are trying to adapt to certain types of situations. These adaptations can involve
either a change in the goals and values themselves, or the adoption of different means to
pursue one's fixed goals. Feedback, then, embeds the idea that adjustments are made to
one's behaviour under a variety of error-correction mechanisms, many of them operating
without the intervention of conscious direction. One important insight in this regard
concerns the connection between feedback and abstraction. The Hayekian claim is that one
of the general results flowing from continual error-correction at an individual level in
11 Both in the uniformity of externalized performance, and in the more internal aspect of rules, such as their
meaning.
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increasingly complex environments is the generation of increasingly abstract rules of
conduct. The argument, then, is that in an increasingly complex environment it will be
adaptive to resort to increasingly abstract rules for, otherwise, one will not be able to adapt
to the increasing diversity of particulars which in part constitutes social complexity.12
Note that the above should not be taken as an argument for the abandonment of reason as
a tool to be used to generate abstract rules of conduct or as a means of guiding one's own
conduct. Far from it. Instead, it is a call for the recognition of both the existence and
importance of other ongoing systems of rules, which exist in some cases as pre-conditions
for reason, and for the acknowledgment that it is the interplay between reason and these
ongoing systems of rules which is of decisive importance when analyzing the properties of
conduct governance mechanisms in different environments. The Hayekian claim is that for a
conduct governance mechanism to be adaptive in increasingly complex environments it
must be capable of generating, or at least sustaining, increasingly abstract systems of rules
of conduct. In addition, such mechanisms must to some degree mesh with systems of rules
of conduct which are already in operation, and in particular with those rules, the existence of
which, the conduct governance mechanism implicitly presupposes. Neither of these
conditions necessarily conflict with the operation of reason as a means of guiding one's
conduct, so long as reason conforms to the restrictions such conditions imply.
6. The well-adaptedness of social orders
Two of the aspects mentioned above require a bit more elaboration. The first concerns
"well-adaptedness": what precisely does Hayek mean when he states "the natural selection
of rules will operate on the basis of the greater or lesser efficiency of the resulting order of
the group" (Hayek 1967, 67)? Or by his stating "the evolutionary selection of different rules
of individual conduct operates through the viability of the order it produces" (Hayek 1967,
68)? Is Hayek not referring to the well-adaptedness of the resultant order of actions rather
than to the adaptedness of the rules of conduct upon which such an order rests?
Furthermore, what is his notion of "efficiency"? Of "viability"? And finally, what process of
selection is ongoing over different actions?
12 For a detailed discussion of this argument, see chapter 6.
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Consider, for the moment, a few more quotations which give a more specific picture of
what Hayek is claiming. A "superior kind of order..." is one based on practices which help
individuals to "more effectively pursue their ends" (Hayek 1978, 9-10). Such practices "are
successful adaptations to the irremediable limitations of our knowledge, adaptations which
have proved more effective methods for dealing with that incomplete, dispersed knowledge
which is [human's] unalterable lot" (Hayek 1978, 72). The function of these particular
practices "was thus not to organize the individual efforts for particular agreed purposes, but
to secure an overall order of actions within which each should be able to benefit as much as
possible from the efforts of others in pursuit of their own ends" (Hayek 1978, 136).
From the above quotations one can infer that Hayek is indeed claiming that it is an
evolved order of actions which is well-adapted in some way. But which way is this? His
argument seems to be that one order of actions is better adapted than another if "the chances
for any individual taken at random to achieve his ends" are greater in the former than in the
latter. This is the case "even if it cannot be predicted which particular aims will be favoured,
and which not" (Hayek 1978, 184).13 In other words, if, for a randomly chosen individual,
the chance to perform a desired action is maximized, the order in which that individual is
embedded is "well-adapted" in Hayek's sense of the word. This is, then, what Hayek has in
mind when referring to the "efficiency", "viability" and "superiority" of different orders
(Hayek 1978, 9-10 and 1967, 68).
An important objection which should be raised at this point is why Hayek insists on
referring to an individualistic criteria. Why, one might ask, is he focusing on the
achievement of an individual's goals, and not on other social goals which one might think to
be of equal, if not of greater, importance? This is an important question, for it brings to light
an implicit assumption which underlies much of Hayek's social and legal analysis. This is
the assumption of the spatial and temporal range of the social systems he has under
consideration. Hayek is implicitly presuming that the social systems he is examining are
diffuse, spread out over space and enduring over time. As I argue at length in a later chapter,
Hayek is comparing the governance properties of rules of conduct while at the same time
presupposing that social interaction retains a complexity roughly equivalent to that of a
complex, Gesellschaft-type society. To be more specific, he is asking the question of
whether concrete rules of conduct are capable of dealing with the levels of complexity of a
13 See a similar idea in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976, 132).
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Gesellschaft-type society. If this is the question of interest, then there is a case to be made
that the criteria for well-adaptedness of a social order must resort to an abstract individualist
level for the reason that the degree of commonality, which is presupposed by more
collective criteria, either does not exist or is in many cases not implementable in a relatively
objective way in a complex society based on abstract social relations.14
But why, then, does Hayek refer to the well-adaptedness of an order of actions and not
instead (as I have done) to the adaptedness of systems of rules which govern this order? Is
there a significant difference between the two perspectives? The answer is, I think, that
there is no significant difference between the two, for they are merely two sides of the same
coin. To see this, imagine a biologist referring to, say, the well-adaptedness of an organism.
Saying that an organism is well-adapted always presupposes some background environment
to which the organism is adapted. The notion of adapted, then, always presupposes the
broader notion of "adapted to some environment". The same holds true for references to the
well-adaptedness of rules of conduct. These rules are well-adapted to certain forms of
environments, but perhaps not to others. For a statement of the well-adaptedness of a system
of rules of conduct to be intelligible, there must always be a reference made to the
environment within which the notion of "adapted" takes its meaning, be it explicit or merely
implicit. Having said this, the important insight into the symmetry between Hayek's
statement and the one made in this thesis comes when one realizes that the environment to
which rules of conduct are adapted is in large part constituted by the actions of others, and
that Hayek is presupposing a level of complexity in the environment of individuals equal to
that which would be found in an abstract, Gesellscha/t-type society. In other words, my rules
of conduct are well-adapted to my environment which consists of the conduct of other
individuals following their rules of conduct. The same holds true for each and every
individual and group in a society. In a complex society the order of actions which comes to
exist is "viable" (in the sense of allowing individuals to pursue their own goals) because
14 To be more specific, Hayek is arguing that the governance mechanisms of a Gesellschaft-type society are
in large part based on and adapted to an abstract individualist criteria. The reason for this, he argues, is that a
Gesellschaft-type society is sustained by individuals governing their own conduct using mechanisms based on
common abstractions which are in large part manifested as negative rules. That they are based on common
abstractions flows from the claim that concrete commonality is lacking, while their being based on negative rules
implies that these mechanisms can govern simply by ensuring that individuals refrain from certain types of
conduct. These arguments are presented in some detail in chapters six and seven and, consequently, i will not
rehearse them here.
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individuals are following at least to some degree well-adapted abstract rules of conduct.15 In
other words, it is because others are acting regularly and basing their conduct on well-
adapted abstract rules that produces a viable social order which gives me the chance to
achieve my goals to the greatest possible degree.
The symmetry of perspectives concerning orders of actions and abstract rules of conduct
flows from the fact that statements concerning the well-adaptedness of certain orders of
action necessarily presupposes the existence of some set of rules of conduct which generate
this order. This holds with special force for Hayek, who focuses on abstract and complex
forms of society, and hence is arguing that individuals must be guided by abstract rules of
conduct which must in turn be, at least to some degree, well-adapted to the abstract order of
conduct which in part constitutes the abstract order of society (for otherwise the individuals
would not be able to guide their own conduct and hence act in a regular enough way to
sustain that society).16 To argue, then, that an order of actions is "efficient", more "viable",
or "superior", is equivalent to arguing that the rules of conduct followed by the individuals
in that society are well-adapted (to life in that society) — and in an abstract, Gesellschaft-
type, society this implies, as will be discussed at greater length in a later chapter, that these
rules are relatively abstract.
To stress this point, I might put it another way. For Hayek to argue that a social order is
more "viable" is to argue that it allows for individuals to achieve their own goals to a higher
degree than some other order. Hayek chooses this criterion because he is concerned with
maintaining the level of complexity and spatial scope of an abstract society. That is, in the
feedback loop flowing from the ongoing order of actions to the individual's expectations
and choice over their plans of action, and then back again, the general Hayekian aim is that
there be the highest degree of conformity between what happens and what one expects to
happen. It is this matching of expectations to actuality that gives individuals the chance of
fulfilling their feasible plans of action. In a similar way, the claim that a system of rules of
conduct is well-adapted means that such rules produce a minimum of conflicts in the order
of actions which they engender and hence give individuals the maximum chance as
individuals to pursue their own goals in their own ways.
15 It should be noted that the possibility of rational examination presupposes exactly the same pre-conditions,
in that those advocating a resort to reason must be presupposing that at least the rules governing the operation of
reason are well-adapted to their tasks.
16 This is one of the main arguments which underlies chapter 6.
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One of Hayek's reasons for emphasizing the "efficiency" of a social order rather than of
rules of conduct was his desire to contrast the ability of different conduct governance
mechanisms to support different societal types. Thus, much of Hayek's discussion of
"efficiency" and "viability" refers to between society comparisons of governance
mechanisms, taking the desired degree of complexity to be that of a Gesellschaft-type
society. To put it another way, Hayek's baseline for evaluating a conduct governance
mechanism is its ability to sustain a Gesellschaft-type society. Though such an evaluation is
also of interest in this thesis, the goals pursued here are somewhat different. The main
reason for placing a stress on the adaptedness of rules of conduct, and shifting the focus
away from orders of action, is that this work focuses on the various selection filters acting
over these rules within an ongoing society. For reasons of informational and performative
complexity, these filters are almost inevitably focused on individual rules of conduct and
not on the overall order of actions. Thus, under these mechanisms for filtering out
unacceptable conduct, it is intelligible to say that one mode of conduct is mal-adapted,
taking a certain order of actions as a "given". The issue, generally speaking, is not whether
the entire order of actions is viable or conducive to individuals' achievement of their own
goals, but rather whether a particular rule of conduct is compatible with an ongoing order of
actions. Another advantage of focusing on the adaptedness of rules of conduct rather than on
the "efficiency" or "viability" of a social order of actions is that one can then speculate on
the effects associated with the introduction of hypothetical rules and examine their potential
conflicts with an ongoing order of actions. This advantage, however, is a limited one, as I
shall discuss in the section which follows.
7. Feedback and cultural evolution
The importance of the idea of feedback to Hayek's theory of cultural evolution cannot be
underestimated. The reason for this is that feedback impacts on the feasibility of
implementing systems of rules. Consider an example. Throughout his life Hayek made
numerous objections to what might be called old-style socialism (i.e. socialism with the goal
of nationalizing the means of production, distribution, and exchange).17 Hayek's attacks for
the most part aimed at establishing the factual impossibility of achieving the socialist vision
17 See Hayek's discussion of this concept in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 253-254).
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of society and at the same time preserving the Gesellschaft-type social relations of an
abstract society. Hayek, in arguing against socialism, claimed that socialist plans were not
merely contrary to the values of particular groups of society but, further, that they were
impossible to achieve within the framework of an abstract society. Whether or not this is in
fact the case for a socialist regime is not of interest at this point. I am more concerned with
the implications of this type of argument for Hayek's notion of cultural evolution. Of special
interest is why Hayek believed these plans to be infeasible.
This brings us back to the notion of feedback effects. It is the interplay between Hayek's
notions of feedback and well-adaptedness which is of special interest here. Consider the
implications of an argument for replacing a system of individual rules of conduct with
another such system. It might be argued that within an existing system of rules conflict is
not minimized and hence the rules are in some sense mal-adapted. Why not change these
rules for another system of rules which is better adapted? Now, certain conduct, if
performed by everyone in a coordinated manner, might very well reduce conflict more than
an existing system of decentralized rules of conduct. The essential point, however, is in
specifying precisely the alternative rules of conduct and the method by which they are to be
implemented and sustained. Simply asserting the desirability of certain results is not
enough, for it is conceivable that there might exist no system of rules which can both ensure
such coordination will take place and, at the same time, preserve those values which
underlie the argument for the replacement of the individual rules of conduct in the first
place.18 In other words, some of the values which people have come to depend on may very
well depend upon the observance of the individual rules of conduct which, by assumption,
no longer exist.
But why presuppose that we are replacing a system of rules with another? Perhaps it is
the mechanism itself which is at fault. Why not replace the rule-based mechanism with
another type of mechanism which can reduce conflict more effectively? The issue then
centres on a choice between two mechanisms: one based on decentralized rules of conduct
and another, as yet unspecified. Assume for the moment that conflicts exist within society
which decentralized rules cannot eliminate. Another mechanism, if implemented (if
implementable), might be able to reduce conflicts which a more decentralized rule-set
cannot eliminate. So, why not choose the second route? This might seem like the obvious
18 For a similar argument, see Hayek (1976, 25-27).
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thing to do, but appearances can be deceptive, for reasons analogous to those given above.
First comes the problem of specifying the mechanism which will govern conduct. Next
comes the question of implementation and sustainability. For the new mechanism to be the
better-adapted, it must first be determined that (a) the conflict generated by the
implementation of the new mechanism is not "too" substantial and (b) that the new
mechanism is capable of supporting those ongoing values of society which led to its
introduction.19 If, for example, these values include those which are associated with
Gesellschaft-type societies, it must be asked whether the new mechanism is capable of
supporting these. It should be emphasized that the argument is not that a new mechanism
might not be able to reduce forms of conflict which might not be within the scope of
decentralized rules. This might very well be the case. What is being argued, however, is that
it is the conflicts that emerge in the path towards being governed by a new method,
combined with the ability of the new governance mechanism to support the ongoing values
which are essential to its being brought into play in the first place (and which are
presupposed by the very argument for a new governance mechanism), which are of the
utmost importance and which must be subject to the same rigorous examination and
articulation as is accorded to that which we hold to be desirable and worthy of pursuit. This
implies that one must be careful to take into account any conflicts which may arise from the
implementation of a new mechanism, both in terms of the transitional effects and in terms of
the ability of the new mechanism to live up to the expectations and values which brought
about the desire for change in the first place. In particular, it is the mechanism of
19 It might be questioned whether this addresses the scenario in which a new mechanism is introduced
because the old mechanism and its attendant values are seen as outmoded. Surely in such a case, the elimination
of certain values is one of the goals of introducing a new mechanism, and hence it would be spurious to argue
that the new mechanism must be able to support the values associated with the old mechanism. This argument is
a strong one. However, it might not undermine the one being made in this section, for the following reason. The
fact that the old mechanism is considered to be outmoded says nothing of the ability of a new mechanism to
support certain values. The view that one mechanism is inadequate in some respects does not imply the existence
of another mechanism which is up to the task. And such a new mechanism must be able to support some of the
values used to justify its introduction — otherwise, on what grounds can one argue that the new mechanism
should be introduced? Moreover, values are often inter-connected with each other and with certain conduct
which supports them. If there exists a connection between the values which are seen as outmoded, and those
values which one desires to be preserved, one might find that one cannot simply eliminate certain values without
undermining still others which one wishes to preserve. The fact that some values are seen as outmoded and
associated with certain mechanisms does not imply that alternative mechanisms exist which are capable of
supporting the complicated nexus of values and regularities which one does desire to support. Arguments which
focus on the unacceptability of certain mechanisms to support certain sets of desired values often forget to
inquire as to whether the new mechanisms which are advocated are capable of supporting these same values. In
many cases, this capability is simply presupposed to exist — and yet it is precisely the argument of this section
that what is required is a careful and detailed examination of the ability of the new mechanism to ensure that such
values can, at least in principle, be preserved.
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implementation and the time-scale which is under consideration which are key elements in
deciding whether or not such a new governance mechanism would reduce conflict.
In the final analysis, the objections to both of these scenarios (i.e. with a new system of
rules, or with new forms of governance mechanisms) are concerned with the adequate
specification of the mechanism by which a set of rules of conduct is implemented, and the
compatibility between the mechanism and the order of actions which is generated by these
rules of conduct. The general aim is to ensure that the mechanism used to implement these
rules of conduct, and used to resolve conflicts between these rules, is compatible with the
order of actions which they generate. Hayekian objections are focused on mechanisms
which do not generate sustainable orders of actions. Sustainable social orders are those
which endure over time and which do not generate an order of actions capable of
undermining the very values which support them.20 This is an extremely complex issue, for
such an undermining can take place over long periods of time. Values do not appear or
disappear overnight, and the processes of cultural selection will be extremely complex. This
being said, Hayek's claim is that in the long run21 one will tend to observe the survival and
propagation of systems of rules that are well-adapted in the sense of minimizing conflict
within22 ongoing social orders.23 According to Hayek, systems of rules that do not have this
20 i would agree with Hayek (1976, 67) that it is definitely not the case that the striving for impossible
dreams is a harmless activity. This follows from the fact that what is "impossible" and what is not often depends
on human actions. Thus, it is the attempt to change the "impossible" to the "possible" which leads to many of the
difficulties.
21 Which is, of course, a rather nebulous concept.
22 Though not necessarily between social orders. So long as relatively closed societies minimize conflicts
within their own sphere, they continue to be sustainable. This means, then, that different rules can apply to
outsiders. When, however, more abstract societies come into existence, they too must be based on the idea of
minimizing conflict, and hence come to conflict with the idea of treating outsiders differently from insiders (for
if an abstract society is extended to include the whole of humanity, everyone becomes an insider).
Hayek has been justifiably criticized for ignoring conflicts between social systems, and for overlooking the
use of violence and other forms of coercion by members of one social system in subduing or eliminating those of
another— see, for example, Gray's comments (1986, 138). This is a valid point and Hayek does downplay it. A
social system can extend and propagate itself by a resort to violence. Of this there is no doubt, and it has been a
persistent feature of human history. Can it be argued from this, then, that such violence is well-adapted
behaviour? To answer this question (and, more generally, to argue for the well- or mal-adaptedness of a certain
form of conduct), one must turn to a consideration of the goals and values which such behaviour promotes, and
the environments in which such conduct might be considered to be well- or mal-adapted. Consider for the
moment a Gemeinschaft-type social setting. Hayek would probably argue that the widespread perpetration of
physical violence within such a social setting is incompatible with the foundations of social life, and that if the
existence of social life is a value to individuals (and he argues that it is), then such conduct is mal-adapted to
such environments. The question which must be considered, however, is whether widespread violence between
Gemeinschaft-type societies — in effect, within a Gesellschaft-type society — can be considered in the same
light. Once again, this would depend upon the goals and values which are to be supported and promoted under
this form of conduct. 1 would argue that physical violence substantially undermines the foundations of an
abstract, complex society and hence is mal-adapted within this form of society. That much of human history has
been a story of violence and oppression does not imply that these societies were evolutionary "successes" under a
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property will have a tendency to be selected out as unfit, implying that they will not
propagate as "effectively" in the long run. That these are "selected" does not, of course,
necessarily imply that they have been deliberately chosen by any individual or groups of
individuals (nor, however, does it rule it out); rather, in this context "selection" refers to
between society evolutionary selection, which ultimately is concerned with the
propagation24 or the contraction of the system of rules under examination,25regardless of
whether this comes about by deliberate choice or by less intentional means.
8. Hayek's classical liberal critics: Buchanan and the tautological error
That concludes the restatement of a Hayekian theory of cultural evolution. I now turn to
a critical examination of some of the objections which have been made to this theory by
some of Hayek's classical liberal compatriots. Although one might be led to think that a
similarity in political preference might lend some additional insight into Hayek's arguments
for cultural evolution, this turns out not to be the case. It would seem that one's political
preferences have little to do with one's ability to understand Hayek's arguments in this area.
It is hoped that the discussion which follows goes some way to demonstrating this.
One criticism of Hayek is based upon a misunderstanding of his notion of spontaneous
order and its relation to cultural evolution. Eminent Nobel Prize-winning economist James
Buchanan, for example, argues that Hayek errs in "seeming to suggest that those institutions
that have evolved spontaneously, through the independent responses of persons to the
choices they faced, embody efficiency attributes" (Buchanan 1977, 32). In fact, he suggests
that Hayek implicitly attributes "efficiency to whatever institutions emerge from an
Hayekian theory of cultural evolution, nor does it imply that such methods are well-adapted to increases in
complexity or to the abstract form of social relations which accompanies such increases. Though some societies
may have fulfilled the minimal necessary evolutionary selection criteria of survival through the extensive use of
aggressive violence, this does not imply that such forms of conduct are "well-adapted" for modern, complex
societies, nor that they are well-adapted to life within more concrete societies. In my view, physical violence is a
form of conduct which must be prohibited across different forms of social relations, for it fundamentally
undermines social order if tolerated within, and destroys other cultures if tolerated without.
22 In an abstract society, this minimization will coincide with maximization of the chances of individuals
within this society to achieve their desired actions. It does not imply that all individuals in all societies will have
this conditions fulfilled, though as one moves to a more encompassing notion of society which embraces wider
and wider segments of various sub-societies, this will increasingly be the implication.
24 Note that propagation or reproduction would seem to be a necessary condition for the evolutionary
adaptedness of a social system. It is not, however, a sufficient one. In other words, the mere fact that a system has
survived does not mean that it is well-adapted.
22 This is of course resorting to Hayek's notions of "efficiency" and "viability" for such a between system
comparison.
TheEvolution of order • 63
evolutionary process" (Buchanan 1977, 33). Referring specifically to market institutions,
Buchanan repeats this claim: under Hayek's theory of cultural evolution as "applied to the
market economy, that which emerges is defined by its very emergence to be that which is
efficient" (Gray 1986, 70). Buchanan believes that "this result implies, in its turn, a policy
of non-intervention" (Gray 1986, 70). If "this logic is extended to the structure of
institutions (including law) that have emerged in some historical evolutionary process, the
implication seems clear that that set which we observe necessarily embodies institutional or
structural 'efficiency'. From this it follows, as before, that a policy of nonintervention in the
process of emergence is dictated" (Gray 1986, 70). Thus, while admitting that Hayek
"seems to allow for reform" to correct for evolutionary aberrations, he points out that Hayek
offers no criterion for judgment of an institution's fitness. Indeed, Buchanan's opinion is
that "to imply, as Hayek seems to do, that there neither exists nor should exist a guideline
for evaluating existing institutions seems to me to be a counsel of despair" (Buchanan 1977,
34). This allowance for reform, coupled with both a lack of any criteria forjudging whether
an institution is fit or unfit and the claim that what emerges is, in any case, efficient,
Buchanan finds to be "logically inconsistent" (Buchanan 1977, 37). Thus, in short form,
Buchanan implies that Hayek subscribes to the view that spontaneously evolved institutions
are, by definition, efficient and hence cannot be amenable to reform.
Now, are Buchanan's arguments correct? Notwithstanding Hayek's claims to the
contrary, does Hayek commit a tautological error which, in effect, rules out reform?
Furthermore, does Hayek equate that which evolves "spontaneously" with his concept of
spontaneous order? Turn for the moment to the first of these questions. To address this, one
must first examine Buchanan's notion of "efficiency". Assume that "efficient" has a well-
defined meaning. Typically in evolutionary arguments it is taken to mean structures which
are well-adapted. To make the best sense of Buchanan's argument I will assume that this is
what Buchanan means in this context.26 Unfortunately, even this does not help Buchanan's
argument. He — but not Hayek — commits the error of regarding as informative the
tautology of equating "that which has survived an evolutionary process" with "that which is
26 Otherwise, i am at a loss to deduce precisely what he means. Perhaps, however, he is referring to
efficiency in the "technical Pareto sense" using his notion of contractarian agreement as its foundation. This is
the idea that efficiency is "the institution's ability to command assent in comparisons with effective alternatives
that might be suggested" (Buchanan 1977, 34). That such a conscious, choice-based evaluation of efficiency is
incompatible with the Hayekian notion of the actual matching between expectation and actuality (regardless of
such a matching being consciously recognized), goes a long way to explaining why a contractarian notion of
efficiency is not the one adopted in this section.
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efficient". Survival does not ensure that an institution is efficient, nor can one state that all
institutions which have survived until now are, from an evolutionary standpoint, efficient.
Survival is one result of evolutionary efficiency— it is not identical with it.
9. Response to Buchanan: Hayek on the notion of "efficiency"
Focus for a moment on the assertion that an efficient institution is one that is not
amenable to reform. What one intends to assert is clear: an institution which is "best"
(efficient) cannot be improved upon — for if it could it would not be "best" (efficient). The
question, however, is how such an assertion meshes with Hayek's theory of cultural
evolution. It should be clear that the identification of the aspects of an institution which are
"best" is a very difficult problem which the above assertion assumes has already been
solved. But according to Hayek it is precisely this identification which constitutes the
crucial difficulty of claiming an institution is "best". Within a framework in which all the
relevant attributes of an institution were known to all the minds involved in the evaluation,
the term "best" or "efficient" would have a clear meaning. But such a scenario rules out the
very real possibility of a difference in perspectives, in which different sets of attributes were
thought to be relevant by different individuals, or in which some sets of attributes were
thought to be more important than others — both of which might result in different notions
of which institutions were "best". And all of this presupposes that the set of attributes which
are relevant to such an exercise were known. Yet is it not arguable that social institutions are
multi-functional and that it is often a matter of considerable difficulty to discover the
multiplicity of functions such institutions serve?
All of this points to difficulties with the notion of "efficient" institutions. But, in fact,
Hayek does not resort to such a notion. Rather, the Hayekian argument is that the difficulties
in knowing which institutions are "best" or "efficient" does not rule out the possibility of
recognizing particular aspects of institutions as being mal-adapted to their environments.
One can know, for example, that a rule of conduct is mal-adapted without knowing a rule of
conduct which would be well-adapted.27 The possibility of reform, therefore, is intimately
tied to the central themes of later chapters, these being the primacy of minimal conditions,
negative rules, and the filtering out (the negating) of evolutionary mal-adaptations.
27 A theme which is recognized by Lon Fuller in The Morality ofLaw (1969, 10-13).
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It might be added that Hayek does not make the related claim that an evolved institution
is not in need of institutional reform, nor does he say that such an institution is not amenable
to reform. In fact, he explicitly recognizes the need for, and ability to conduct, institutional
reform of evolved institutions — a fact these commentators cannot explain. To give one
example, consider his statement that "the fact that law evolved in this way [spontaneously]
has certain desirable properties does not prove that it will always be good law or even that
some of its rules may not be very bad. It therefore does not mean that we can altogether
dispense with legislation" (Hayek 1973, 88). In other words, particular rules, or even "whole
sections of the established system of case law" (Hayek 1973, 89) may be mal-adapted and
have to be reformed using legislation. It is difficult to see how one can claim that Hayek
denies the need for, or the possibility of, reform given this explicit statement on the issue.
10. The conflation between spontaneous and evolved order
There is a related confusion concerning the relationship between Hayek's concept of
spontaneous order and the notion of evolution. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is
sometimes argued that a spontaneously evolved institution is necessarily a spontaneous
order (for instance, in Kukathas28 and to some degree in MacCormick29). Now, if an
institution is a system of rules governing certain conduct and states of affairs, then this is
incorrect. Hayek does not claim that a spontaneously evolved system of rules is equivalent
to a spontaneous order, for he explicitly states that a spontaneous order may be an order of
actions governed by rules which are not spontaneously evolved. As he puts it, "while the
rules on which a spontaneous order rests, may also be of spontaneous origin, this need not
always be the case" (Hayek 1973, 45). In fact, "it is at least conceivable that the formation
of a spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately made" (Hayek 1973,
45). Thus, "[t]he spontaneous character of the resulting order must therefore be
distinguished from the spontaneous origin of the rules on which it rests, and it is possible
that an order which would still have to be described as spontaneous rests on rules which are
entirely the result of deliberate design" (Hayek 1973, 46). It is, therefore, the properties of
the rules and the nature of the order of actions which results from their being conformed to
28 It is argued in Hayek and Modem Liberalism that Hayek has the "tendency to call anything grown and
unplanned a spontaneous order" (Kukathas 1989, 202). It can be argued that it is Kukathas rather than Hayek
who has this tendency.
29 In MacCormick (1989, 48-49).
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— and not merely the origin of this order — which differentiates a spontaneous order from
an organizational order. If MacCormick and Kukathas imply that any institution which has
"spontaneously" evolved is spontaneous order, then this is incorrect and does not follow
from Hayek's notion of spontaneous order. If this is their claim, then Hayek's critics are
conflating those institutions which have emerged through a "spontaneous" evolutionary
process with those institutions which are generated by rules of spontaneous order. Again, it
must be stressed that these are not necessarily identical.
11. Hayek's classical liberal critics: Gray and the "fictions" of mind
John Gray, in Hayek on Liberty (1986), believes Hayek's evolutionary epistemology is
fatally flawed because "the evolutionary trends of the human mind may well be leading us
farther away from the truth", for in "carving out an ecological niche" humans "may well
have evolved a view of the world which [they] cannot transcend, but which embodies only
fictions that have proved profitable to it across a long period of its history" (Gray 1986,
136). To put it succinctly, the problem is that under an evolutionary epistemology, there
might be a "likelihood that the human mind, as it has been shaped by evolutionary pressure,
in no way mirrors accurately the actual structure of the world" (Gray 1986, 136).
Is this, then, a valid critique of evolutionary epistemology? Perhaps not. Consider for the
moment how Gray might have come to hold this view. Hayek comments that "since all we
can ever learn from experience are generalizations about certain kinds of events, and since
no number of instances can ever prove such a generalization, knowledge based entirely on
experience may yet be entirely false" (Hayek 1952, 168). But "false"— to what mind? And
at what point in time? Truth and falsity have meaning only within the framework of mind —
within the so-called "fictions" of mind which exist at particular points in time. If Hayek is
implying that an individual's knowledge, based on experience, might be entirely false, then
this is a meaningful assertion. Or if he is claiming that, from the perspective of future
individuals who have different knowledge, our knowledge might be considered to be false,
then this too is meaningful. But to extend this claim to all minds, however, is meaningless,
for falsity necessarily conditions on the structure of some knowledge at some point in time.
It seems, however, that Gray is interpreting Hayek in this third sense. Evolutionary trends
may very well be leading mind "astray"; the question is how does Gray propose we
overcome this? It is perhaps not obvious that Gray's view of the question manifests Hayek's
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notion of a "constructivist"30 form of rationality and hence is subject to Hayek's numerous
criticisms of that concept.
12. Response to Gray: the Hayekian concept of mind
"Truth", for Gray, seems to be a notion which exists independent of a mind which has
itself evolved. To claim that mind "embodies fictions" which have been "profitable to it" is
to implicitly believe that one can recognize these "fictions"— and how would one do that?
In other words, according to which perspective are they false? The question, then, is not
whether the human mind accurately mirrors the "actual" structure of the world, but rather
whether the notion of an "actual" structure to the world has any meaning at all if we do not
condition on an evolved order of mind. That there does not exist truth or meaning which is
independent of the evolved structure of mind is the central proposition of a Hayekian
evolutionary epistemology. On this view, separating the "true" world from the world of
"fictions" would have to be based upon values and knowledge which have themselves
evolved. If this is the case, how would one know that this separation is not itself a "fiction"?
By a further set of values and knowledge? It should be obvious that Gray's critique rests
upon the implicit assumption that there is a stopping point to this regress, and that at some
point there is something external to this process which can be used to distinguish between
truth and fictions, but which cannot itself be so distinguished. And is this "something" not
the same foundation upon which Gray's notion of truth rests, and which leads Gray to
criticize evolutionary epistemology as flawed, for evolutionary pressures might lead the
human mind away from truth?
Gray does not seem to realize that within an evolutionary epistemology, judgments, be
they of truth or of any other kind, must always take as a given the evolved order of mind.
Mind cannot rise above its own evolved structure and seek the "objective" truth — the
"actual" structure of the world — independent of the system of ongoing actions which give
it its meaning and condition its structure. There is no recognition of truth or fictions
independent of the evolved structure of mind, and hence it is meaningless to speak of the
"actual" structure of the world independent of a mind which makes this meaningful. Gray
criticizes evolutionary epistemology because "evolutionary trends may be leading us further
-50 For a detailed discussion of this notion of rationality see Hayek (1967, 82-95).
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away from truth" (Gray 1986, 136), but he cannot account for our presupposed ability to
distinguish between the two, nor can he account for how such a claim could be intelligible,
without presupposing the existence of a mind which stands outside the evolutionary process.
Thus, Gray's criticism is implicitly presupposing that at least some part of mind stands
outside the evolutionary process and that this "core" represents a "fixed point" in judgment
space which can distinguish between the "actual" structure of the world and that which
merely seems to be the case (i.e. the structure of the world from the point of view of the
evolved mind). Moreover, it would seem that such a mind could distinguish between the
"actual" structure of the world and our merely provisionally evolved knowledge of it— for
otherwise, how could we know whether we were approaching truth or heading away from it,
and hence how could we know whether Gray's criticism of an evolutionary epistemology
had any force or meaning?
It is put forward that Gray's criticism implicitly assumes that such a distinction could be
made and that it is intelligible to speak of truth-claims over the actual world as distinct from
truth-claims over the world that we know through our evolved minds. Yet it is precisely the
point of evolutionary epistemology to deny this, and to deny that truth-claims can be made
which distinguish between an "actual" world and that which is known by our minds, which
are themselves the product of an evolutionary process. Thus, Gray's criticism is based on an
implicit theory of mind which is directly contrary to a Hayekian evolutionary epistemology.
Under the latter, judgments of truth require that we take as given the evolved structure of
mind, and hence Gray's criticism of evolutionary epistemology dismisses the problem such
an approach sets out to address by assuming the existence of a mind which can distinguish
between the "true" world and that which is known using the evolved "fictions" of our
minds. The Hayekian view, on the other hand, is that all knowledge and all judgment is
based upon an evolved order of mind. Under an evolutionary epistemology, judgments
which distinguish between the "actual" and "fictitious" world, and between truth and
fiction, are always based on a mind which has itself evolved. The idea that mind, constituted
of evolutionary "fictions", might be leading us away from truth, itself assumes that there is a
way of distinguishing the "actual" world from that which is known by our evolved minds,
and it is this assumption which an evolutionary epistemology explicitly rejects. The
attempts of individuals to construct a more stable system of knowledge based on the
standardization of mind's classification responses, or upon more stable methods of
classification external to, and known in a derivative manner by, mind, are perhaps the best
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we can do, but even these are only relatively more stable systems. The "actual" structure of
the world which we can know always depends upon a mind which has itself evolved. Our
view of the world is always an interpretation relative to the evolved structure of mind and,
in the final analysis, it is one which we cannot transcend.
13. General critiques of Hayekian cultural evolution
As we saw in the previous chapter, it is sometimes argued that Hayek has not presented a
suitably specific process for cultural evolution, and in particular, one which would allow for
the evaluation of the products of cultural evolution.31 Although this is to some degree
correct, it must be qualified in the following manner. To be sure, Hayek does not discuss the
specific selection processes which govern the evolution of culture in all of its areas. Such a
task would be an enormous undertaking. As a consequence he is quite vague on the
evolution ofmany aspects of culture. This is, however, not a feature of his thought alone but
is rather a feature of the literature of the area at the time that he was writing. Research into
general models of cultural evolution has only begun relatively recently, as is well
documented in Boyd and Richerson (1985).
In some areas, however, Hayek does consider specific mechanisms of cultural evolution
and selection, and it is one reflection of the lack of understanding of his work in this area
that this has not been widely acknowledged or recognized. Hayek does consider the
evolution of culture insofar as it manifests conflict — and this plays a central role in his
investigations into the governance properties of market, legal, and political mechanisms.
Consider his investigations into markets. Markets are mechanisms for resolving conflicts
between particular preferences. They also have an evolutionary aspect to them, and can,
under a Hayekian analysis, be viewed either as "discovery procedures"32 or as selection
filters (depending on how one chooses to view them). Or consider his analyses of political
and legal mechanisms. Political mechanisms are also selection mechanisms, under which
various policies are selected and others filtered out. Legal mechanisms are extremely
complex judgment filtering mechanisms (as later chapters shall argue) and are designed to
weed out certain types of conduct using a variety of filters. Now, as it is the purpose of the
31 See Gray (1986, 32) and (1986, 137-138), Buchanan's comments in Gray (1986, 70), the criticisms in
Tomlinson (1990, 47, 134) and in Rowland (1987, 40, 55). For another perspective on this, see the response
made in the first chapter to Haworth's similar objections.
32 A term used by Hayek (1978, 179-190; 1979, 67-70).
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remainder of this thesis to examine these issues, I will not go into this any further at the
moment, save for a comment on the state of the critical debate in this area. It is somewhat
discouraging to realize that many of Hayek's critics fail to understand both his arguments
concerning cultural evolution and their implications. What is even more disturbing,
however, is the apparent blindness to the fact that Hayek is basing his argument on
evolutionary grounds. In other words, some of Hayek's critics seem oblivious to the fact
that he is even making an evolutionary argument, and hence seem to be unaware that their
own objections to the lack of evolutionary mechanisms can only be viewed with a certain
perplexity by those adopting a Hayekian perspective.
There is another aspect to this line of thought which, though similar, is not identical to it.
Some authors complain of Hayek's lack of suitable criteria for evaluating evolutionary
products. This complaint, however, ignores important elements of Hayek's epistemology.
His evolutionary epistemology emphasizes the importance of recognizing that any particular
criterion will itself be evolving. If the criterion is evolving the notion of evaluating
evolutionary processes will necessarily be incomplete — for what criterion could be used to
evaluate the criterion itself?33 Seen in this light, the criticism takes on a new meaning. If all
criticism must be within a framework of unquestioned values then all criticism must be
internal criticism; internal, that is, to the framework generated by these values. Now, it is
not problematic for Hayek's epistemology to assume that one can conditionally evaluate the
results of evolutionary processes, taking as unquestioned a set of values which are
themselves evolving. In such a scenario, the criteria for evaluating the results of
evolutionary processes would be the set of unquestioned values which are themselves the
product of evolutionary processes. What would be problematic, and in some senses
unintelligible under an evolutionary epistemology, would be the claim that there exists
unconditional criteria which could be used to evaluate the products of evolution and which
are not themselves subject to the process of evolution. Under a Hayekian framework, values
are themselves a product of evolution that are neither necessarily conscious nor articulated.
Values will, in many cases, have to be discovered by detailed investigation based on still
other evolved (and evolving) values. It is the dependence of all analyses on unquestioned
(and, in a sense, unquestionable) values which implies that, for Hayek, criticism is always
33 This is one instance of a much more general, Godel-Iike, objection to the possibility of a "transcendent"
criterion for evaluation and judgment. It might be noted that this objection is similar to one made by Hayek in a
different context (Hayek 1967, 61-62).
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within a framework of pre-existing values, most of which cannot be questioned without
depending on still other unquestioned, and evolving, values.
In a related criticism, some authors claim that Hayek's work is plagued by its inability to
identify specific institutions as well- or mal-adapted. Initially, this seems justifiable, but
further reflection proves it to be as unjustifiable as the previous criticisms. To say that the
large body of linguistic, legal, moral and scientific rules are, in general, well-adapted rules
is to state what many people would consider to be obvious. Particular rules within these
sets may be mal-adapted, but it has to be noted that this is a separate issue from the mal-
adaptedness of the set as a whole. Constructing a rational argument that would be capable of
demonstrating that the entire system was well-adapted would, by contrast (to evaluations of
individual rules within the system), be much more difficult, if not impossible. We are not
free to rationally evaluate systems of rules in any way we see fit, for there is an obvious
problem in ascertaining the measure against which we can evaluate them. This is not,
however, the only difficulty, nor is it necessarily the most important one. An issue that is
sometimes overlooked, but which might be of fundamental importance, is the relationship
between the institution under evaluation, and the evaluation criterion itself. If it should turn
out to be the case that the institution in question performs functions which are in some sense
essential to the evaluation criterion itself, and these functions were intimately tied to the
institution such that the elimination of the latter implied the elimination of the former, then
one's criticisms of the institution would be limited to those which do not endanger these
essential functions. If one's criticisms extended to these essential functions, one would in a
sense be committing a form of cybernetic contradiction. This is, perhaps, what lies behind
Hayek's insistence on immanent criticism, the idea being that meaningful reform must
always take place within systems of ongoing orders of action, only certain aspects of which
can be meaningfully questioned, as other aspects of these orders form the foundation for the
possibility of asking any meaningful questions at all.34
14. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to restate Hayek's theory of cultural evolution and to counter
certain criticisms of this theory which have emerged from within the classical liberal
34 For more on this see Hayek (1976, 24).
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tradition. It has emphasized that Hayekian cultural evolution is not Darwinian, and that
Hayek's claim that there are no laws of evolution is intelligible, if not incontestable. It has
also tried to explain his emphasis on decentralized evolution, and a reliance on sets of rules,
as being based upon a concern for the adaptiveness of conduct in situations of informational
and performative complexity. It is hoped that this chapter has, at least partially, managed to
correct some of the more obvious misconceptions concerning Hayek's theory.
In the following chapter, a particular cybernetic selection process is examined. The
chapter will outline Adam Smith's construct, the impartial spectator, and the mutual
sympathy mechanism which underlies it. The properties of the mechanism and its products
are examined and related to the notion of negative justice and negative rules of conduct.
Chapters four and five will continue, and expand upon, the discussion of this chapter, with
the former examining some of the mechanisms of reasoning, while the latter focuses upon
the distinction between negative and positive rules.
CHAPTER THREE
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part I
Adam Smith's impartial spectator and the mutual sympathy
mechanism
1. Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the general framework of a Hayekian theory of cultural
evolution. This chapter will consider the moral theory of Adam Smith from the perspective
of its elaboration in Knud Haakonssen's The Science of a Legislator (1981). The focus of
the chapter is on the process underlying this theory: the mutual sympathy mechanism. As
will be seen, this is a very useful construct, and feeds directly into some of the major
concerns of a Hayekian theory, including the evolution of cultural norms and the generation
of objective abstract rules. Such a process can and should be integrated into a Hayekian
social theory, and it is the goal of this chapter to demonstrate one way in which this might
be done. The plan of the chapter, then, is to outline Adam Smith's mutual sympathy
mechanism and the theory of the impartial spectator which emerges from this mechanism as
an example of an interactive feedback mechanism which is capable of generating abstract
rules of conduct. Central to this explanation is a fleshing out of Smith's notion of sympathy,
which forms the basis for the mutual sympathy mechanism and its resultant construct, the
impartial spectator. Following this is a discussion of two of the properties of rules which
emerge from the application of the mutual sympathy mechanism: their relative objectivity
and their negativity. The chapter ends with a look forward to the more detailed discussions
of reasoning and negativity in the chapters which follow.
2. Sympathy and the mutual sympathy mechanism
Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976) is based upon two theoretical
constructs. The first is the impartial spectator. The second, which provides the foundation
for Smith's impartial spectator model, is his notion of sympathy. How would one
characterize this notion? Consider the summary given by Haakonssen of how Smith built
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upon Hume's notion of sympathy. Hume's idea was that "when [an individual] perceives the
expressions of a passion in another [individual], [they] form an idea of this passion on the
basis of [their] own earlier experience, and this idea is turned into an impression, that is,
into a passion similar to the original one in the other person" (Haakonssen 1981, 46). What
Smith did was to "broaden the causal factors in the creation of the sympathetic reaction of
the spectator to include the situation in which the original passion and its expression
occurred" (Haakonssen 1981, 46). Thus, "[s]ympathy...does not arise so much from the
view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it" (Smith 1976, 12, quoted
in Haakonssen 1981, 46). There is thus "a distinction between the object of sympathy,
which is another [individual's] passion, and the cause of sympathy, which is the whole
situation that gives rise to the original passion" (Haakonssen 1981, 46). This is of decisive
importance because it allows for the "possibility that the spectator can say what the original
passion should have been according to [their] view of the situation" (Haakonssen 1981, 46).
Hence, "to be able to judge is to be able to know the situation, and hence the ideal of the
impartial and informed spectator" (Haakonssen 1981, 47). What is of decisive importance
here is that situations will be knowable to different degrees, depending on the type of
knowledge and information which is available. Thus, in some situations one will be able to
judge in greater detail than in others.
What aspects of sympathy are most relevant to the discussion of this chapter? There are
three aspects of some importance. First, sympathy is something interpersonal (Smith 1976,
109-111), mutual between individuals (Haakonssen 1981, 52). It is not merely how
sympathy extends out from an individual or how one receives it. Rather, it is the interplay
between the two forms which is of decisive importance. Following Haakonssen's usage this
interplay of sympathies shall be termed the mutual sympathy mechanism. The second aspect
of importance is that sympathy is a process (a mechanism). It is not so much the results of
this process as the fact that everyone will be using this same process which is of decisive
importance for Smith's impartial spectator (Haakonssen 1981, 55). The third aspect to stress
is that this process is a selection mechanism, whereby "behaviour which is not fitted will
tend to be weeded out by means of antipathy conveyed through the mutual sympathy
mechanism, whereas behaviour which is fitting will tend to be reinforced by approval
conveyed in the same way" (Haakonssen 1981, 59). All three of these aspects are related to
a Hayekian theory. In essence, the mutual sympathy mechanism is a dynamic interactive
feedback system which provides a framework for the workings of the evolution of culture
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and the generation of rules of conduct. As one has seen in previous chapters, the evolution
of culture is a matter of some concern for Hayek. In addition, Smith's mechanism is in
principle capable of generating relatively objective judgments. That this is a pressing
concern to Hayek will be documented in some detail in later chapters, particularly the one
which focuses on his objections to certain notions of distributive justice. It seems, then, that
there is a strong element of accord between the theory of Smith and the goals of Hayek.
But what, then, are the specifics of the mutual sympathy mechanism? It follows a three-
step process. Imagine you are in a situation where you are going to make a moral judgment.
How does one come to an impartial judgment? The mutual sympathy mechanism would
proceed as follows: first, you try to imagine how a spectator would view the situation;
second, you try to imagine the degree to which this imagined spectator could put themselves
in your situation; and third, you try to imagine the judgment of the spectator who has put
themselves into your situation (Haakonssen 1981, 54). Putting it another way, what
"viewing ourselves as others view us" means is that we strip away all the knowledge and
information which is not accessible to outsiders and use, as grounds for judgment, only that
which could be held in common by some abstract observer. It is important to note what is
not being claimed. Smith is not claiming that the impartial spectator, generated by the
process of mutual sympathy, would come to the same judgments as an actual spectator.
Mutual sympathy is an abstraction, an act of imagination, and thus depends upon the
particular interests, passions, knowledge and information of the judging individual. It is
possible, then, that different individuals might, if faced by the same environment, generate
many different impartial spectators.
3. The generation of objectivity
One might be wondering at this point how it is that the judgments of the various
impartial spectators come to converge? That is, how does moral judgment come to be
objective? Smith's answer to this would be that objectivity is an unintended by-product of
the mutual sympathy process.1 Objectivity arises through the stripping away of arbitrary,
person-specific detail which occurs at each step of the mutual sympathy mechanism. By
trying to view yourself as others view you, you must eliminate any knowledge which is
1 As pointed out in Haakonssen (1981, 55).
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known only to yourself. This implies you must consider the degree to which others could
enter into your situation as spectators (i.e. without your specific knowledge). Thus, the
judgment which is made, based on the idea of spectators who can only to a limited degree
enter into your situation, is objective to the degree that the knowledge and information upon
which a decision would be based would be that which could be shared by the participant and
a potential observer. Moral judgment is thus different from the actual judgment of existing
spectators in that the impartial spectator bases judgment upon what a potential spectator
could know, and not upon what actual spectators do know. By this process, then,
information which is idiosyncratic, individual-specific, and known by only particular
individuals is eliminated as grounds for objective moral judgment (Haakonssen 1981, 57).
Of course, this does not imply that moral judgments will be objective, but merely that this
method is the way in which they strive to be. In fact, it is the differing
information/knowledge requirements and the assumptions of individuals about the
knowledge of the impartial spectator that spurs on the growth of morality. It is the relative
degree to which individuals hold different views of the knowledge of the impartial spectator
that determines the relative objectivity of the judgments of that spectator. The differences
between each individual's notion of the impartial spectator also makes it possible for an
individual to evaluate the judgments of others and to say what they should have been
(relative to that particular individual's notion of the impartial spectator, of course).
The mutual sympathy mechanism thus in some senses imposes a criterion which
separates objective from subjective knowledge. The striving to achieve an impartial
spectator perspective acts as a filter over person-specific knowledge, leaving objective
knowledge as the basis of a judgment. In this sense, then, the impartial spectator perspective
and, perhaps more importantly, the mutual sympathy mechanism, form a criterion for
distinguishing which knowledge is to be considered relevant to an impartial decision.
It might be argued, contrary to this view, that the impartial spectator ideal embodies a
notion of an "ideally-informed" but imaginary spectator who would know which
information was relevant and which was not.2 On this view, it is to this spectator that
individuals appeal when trying to come to an impartial judgment.3 How, then, is this notion
2 I thank Neil MacCormick for raising this point.
3 John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, seems to argue for such an interpretation. On this view, which
Rawls claims is "reminiscent" of the views of Hume or Smith (Rawls 1971, 184), the impartial spectator is
described as "endowed with ideal powers" and as a "perfectly rational individual who identifies with and
experiences the desires of others as if these desires were [their] own" (Rawls 1971, 27). In this way, then, this
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of the impartial spectator ideal related to the one of this chapter? Implicit within such a
notion is the idea that the problem of relevancy has already been solved, in that such a
spectator already knows what is relevant and what is not. The question which this raises,
however, is how this crucial distinction comes to exist. In other words, by what criterion
does the impartial spectator come to have this knowledge? This view of the impartial
spectator seems to assume, as previously stated, that this problem has already been solved,
and implies that there has already been a separation of the partial from the impartial. The
question which remains, however, is by which mechanisms, and under what criterion, does
such a separation come to exist? The argument of this chapter is that it is the mutual
sympathy mechanism which puts into effect the separation criterion of whether or not the
knowledge would be shared by an imaginary observer put into the situation faced by the
individual. Thus, it is the overlap between the individual's and the impartial spectator's
perspective which forms the dividing line between the partial and the impartial.
impartial spectator "ascertains the intensity of these desires and assigns them their appropriate weight in ...one
system of desire" (Rawls 1971, 27, my italics). Notions of what is right emerge when "an ideally rational and
impartial spectator would approve of it from a general point of view should [they] possess all the relevant
knowledge of the circumstances" (Rawls 1971, 184). That there are many difficulties with such an interpretation
is perhaps obvious, as Rawls himself notes when he comments that it is questionable whether the notion of
"relevant knowledge can be specified without circularity" (Rawls 1971, 184). From the point of view of this
chapter, what is important to note is that Rawls is concerned for the most part with criticizing utilitarian visions
of judgment, and hence Rawls' discussion views the impartial spectator construct as an aggregation and filtering
mechanism over different individual perspectives. On this view, the impartial spectator is able to encompass
different individuals' views, gauge their intensities, and assign them a weight in a single framework of valuation
— the impartial spectator's. From the point of view of the discussion of this chapter, this conception of the
impartial spectator is objectionable for a variety of reasons. First, Rawls' discussion seems to overlook the fact
that different individuals might arrive at different impartial spectators. There is nothing in Smith's notion of the
impartial spectator that guarantees the same impartial spectator construct will exist for each and every individual.
Second, there is no reason to believe that an impartial spectator will be able to incorporate every individuals'
desires and views into a single coherent and consistent framework. There are many difficulties in combining
individual perspectives into a coherent single vision, even if one takes a narrow view of perspectives, such as that
provided by "public choice" economics, with which Rawls was no doubt familiar (as is evidenced by his
references to it in his work). See, for example, the discussion of combining individual frameworks into a
coherent whole provided by Arrow (1951) and the summary of these difficulties in Mueller (1989, 373-441). If
one were to try and by-pass these difficulties, and simply assume the existence of a rank-ordering which could
resolve conflicts between the desires of different individuals, the questions remain — from where does this rank-
ordering originate, and how can individuals know what it is? Third, and finally, Rawls is right to question
whether the definition of the impartial spectator that he provides might not be circular. That it is follows from the
insight that the impartial spectator is the resultant construct of a process (the mutual sympathy process) which
separates relevant from irrelevant knowledge and generates a notion of impartiality. It is probably more accurate
to say that it is not the choices of the impartial spectator that determine what is relevant and irrelevant to deciding
impartially, but rather that it is the process of the mutual sympathy mechanism which leads to the formation of an
impartial spectator position under which the notion of impartiality, and those aspects which are relevant to it,
obtain their content. In this sense, then, the impartial spectator position is an artefact which contains knowledge
relevant to impartial judgments because of the way it was constructed. This is, perhaps, the main objection to the
Rawlsian notion of the impartial spectator position, and it is elaborated in greater depth in the main text above.
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The argument that there is an "ideally-informed" impartial spectator, must in the same
way adopt some mechanism and criterion for separating the partial from the impartial. The
question which this position must address, therefore, is how this separation is made. This
question is not answered by simply assuming that individuals have an ideal in mind, for the
issue is precisely how this ideal comes to be formed. My view is that it is incumbent upon
those who argue for an "ideally-informed" impartial spectator to spell out not only the
grounds for such a separation, but also the mechanisms whereby such a separation comes
into existence. The argument of this chapter, rather than focusing on the impartial spectator
as a pre-existing criterion of relevancy (i.e. as a state of being), emphasizes the process
whereby a perspective becomes impartial. Thus, the striving towards the impartial spectator
ideal, and the mutual sympathy mechanism which underlies it, are viewed as the processes
under which impartiality is generated, in contrast to the view which takes the impartial
spectator as a given and then focuses on its application to specific circumstances.
To summarize, then: in this chapter, the mutual sympathy mechanism is a filtering
process under which one strives to achieve an impartial spectator perspective. The argument
for an "ideally-informed" impartial spectator in effect assumes that the mutual sympathy
mechanism has already performed its task and generated such an "ideally-informed"
perspective. If, however, one is interested to investigate how the partial becomes impartial,
it does not further the investigation to assume that there already exists some "ideal"
perspective which can perform this task.
One final aspect of Smith's theory is of some interest. He argues that general rules of
judgment are the product of the mutual sympathy selection process. As Smith puts it
We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions, because, upon
examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule.
The general rule, on the contrary, is formed by finding from experience that all
actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved of.
(Smith 1976, 159)
Put differently, abstract rules of morality grow from numerous particular instances of
evaluation.4 Abstract rules do not pre-exist these evaluations but instead grow up out of
them, in a social environment in which one generates moral rules based on the evaluations
4 Of course, this presupposes that, at a minimum, general values and beliefs pre-exist such particular acts of
evaluation and provide the foundations upon which such evaluations are made (though it is important to keep in
mind that the terms "values" and "beliefs" are not necessarily being used in their conscious sense). How these
values and beliefs might come to exist and are sustained forms much of the discussion of the final chapter of this
thesis.
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of others. Given this assumption about the nature of the growth of moral rules, Smith also
claims that the rules of judgment which evolve under the mutual sympathy mechanism will
be generally well-adapted to their particular environment.5 What this means is that
"behaviour which is not so fitted will tend to be weeded out by means of antipathy conveyed
through the mutual sympathy mechanism, whereas behaviour which is fitting will tend to be
reinforced by approval conveyed in the same way" (Haakonssen 1981, 59).
4. The properties of rules generated by the mutual sympathy mechanism
What are the properties of rules which have been generated in this way? Does the
assumption of a mutual sympathy mechanism and its generation of an impartial spectator
have any implications for the nature of the rules of judgment which emerge? There are two
aspects which need to be considered, and these form the topics of the sections and two of the
chapters which follow. The first is the relative objectivity of the rules which emerge from
the process. As discussed above, the mutual sympathy mechanism can potentially generate
objective rules of judgment. What this means is that there is the potential under this
mechanism for the generation of rules which overlap to a large degree between individuals
and which can produce similar judgments regardless of the individual which is actually
performing the particular judgment. This independence from the particulars of individuals is
the essence of objective judgment within the framework of this thesis.
The second aspect of some importance to this analysis is the negative nature of the rules
which emerge. "Negative" in Smith's sense flows from a rule being primarily focused on
harmful effects (Haakonssen 1981, 83-87). In other words, "negative" refers to rules which
govern situations which are undesirable. This is not, however, the only sense of the term
"negative" which might be employed. One might describe, as Hayek does, rules which
prescribe conduct to be performed as "positive", and rules which prohibit conduct as
"negative".6 Both of these senses of the term "negative" will be discussed in much greater
depth in the section on negative justice and the chapter on negative rules which follow.
These argue that there is an intimate connection between the two senses of the word and
hence between Smith's emphasis on the primacy of the negative nature of justice (in the
5 See Haakonssen (1977, 59).
6 For example, in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976, 26, 36).
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sense of its association with undesirable outcomes) and on Hayek's emphasis on negative,
prohibitory, rules of conduct.
5. Smith's concept of negativity
The sections which follow examine Smith's conceptions of negativity. They argue that
the mutual sympathy mechanism generates rules which are to a large extent negative, both
in the sense of being related to undesirable outcomes, and in the sense of being solely
prohibitive. An argument is then made that Smith's notion of negativity is related to the idea
of necessary (as opposed to sufficient) conditions, with the argument being that there is a
fundamental relationship between the idea of informational and performative requirements
of a mechanism and the type of rules which provide its foundation. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the relationship between Smith and Hayek, and with a glance forward to a
more detailed discussion of the differences between negative (prohibitive) and positive
(performance requiring) rules.
6. Smith on negativity and the argument from necessity and sufficiency
The sections on Smith's mutual sympathy mechanism and impartial spectator pointed
out that "negative" in Smith's sense derives from a rule being focused on displeasure, on
harm, and on actions which are negative in the sense that they produce undesirable results.
Smith gives two reasons for his emphasis on undesirable results. First, Smith argues that
pain and displeasure are stronger and longer lasting feelings than pleasurable ones
(Haakonssen 1981, 83-84). He claims the reason for this is evolutionary, i.e. it is pain and
not pleasure which has the highest survival value for us. Pain deters us from that which
might end our lives and hence is very important from the standpoint of survival, whilst
pleasure is an addition to survival and hence not as valuable from an evolutionary
perspective. Second, and following from this, Smith believes that pain and displeasure are
more universally shared than are feelings of pleasure (Haakonssen 1981, 85-86).
One can extend Smith's evolutionary argument in the following way. It can be argued
that the reason that negative feelings are stronger, of longer duration, and more universal is
because they arise from the violation of rules which constitute minimal necessary
conditions for ordered social life. Pleasurable feelings, on the other hand, presuppose the
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satisfaction of necessary conditions and hence are an additional requirement to be satisfied.
In a way, then, pleasure arises from the satisfaction of rules which constitute sufficient
conditions for a satisfactory social life. As I shall argue below, the difference between the
two types of feelings are based in part on the differences in environmental complexity upon
which they depend.
Returning to the discussion of the mutual sympathy mechanism, the essence of the
argument is that the mutual sympathy mechanism will generate a set of rules concerned, for
the most part, with necessary conditions. This needs to be fleshed out. What is being argued
is that necessary conditions represent less complex conditions than do sufficient conditions
because sufficient conditions presuppose the satisfaction of necessary conditions. As a
result, mechanisms which strip off person-specific information and knowledge and aspire to
objective grounds for judgment will tend to generate rules which are in large part dealing
with necessary conditions.
Consider the following rules as representative of the necessary and sufficient conditions
for Y. IfA is necessary for Y then one may formulate a rule as
(i) only ifA, then Y possible,
or (ii) if no A, then no Y,
or (iii) if no A, then Y impossible.7
IfX is sufficient for Y then we have
if X, then Y.8
What is not mentioned in the above is that if the necessary conditions are satisfied, the
sufficient conditions can also be written as
7 This formulation is a general one. One could reformulate this as "if no A, then Y impossible", where A={B,
C, and D}, or A={B, C, or D} with little difficulty, thus extending the rules to cover multiple causes and the
cases of intersection or union. What one sees is that the set of exclusionary preconditions for Y— the conditions
without which Y is excluded — has expanded. However, the preconditions are still essentially exclusionary in
that without a member of the precondition set, Y will be impossible.
8 Again, this formulation is a general one. One could reformulate this as "if X, then Y", where X={B, C, and
D}, or X={B, C, or D}. And once again, the set of preconditions for Y has expanded. However, these
preconditions remain non-exclusionary in that the absence of either B, C or D, or indeed all three, does not
preclude the possibility of Y.
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if X and A, then Y.
The assumption that X is sufficient for Y must necessarily presuppose that A has also
been satisfied. If this were not the case, X could not be sufficient for Y because the
necessary conditions for Y — in this case, A — would not be satisfied. Thus, sufficient
conditions are in this case based upon a foundation of necessary ones, and in this sense the
satisfaction of necessary conditions is presupposed by all sufficiency claims. The argument
which flows from the above analysis is quite simple. Sufficient conditions are more
complex and hence more demanding because they presuppose the satisfaction of certain
necessary conditions. In a sense, sufficient conditions build upon a foundation of necessity.
If one tries to test a claim of necessity one is not presupposing a sufficiency requirement.
But the reverse does not hold. Necessary conditions are always taken as a given by
sufficiency conditions. A mechanism which generates relatively objective rules ofjudgment
will strip away individual specific knowledge and information and leave as a remainder
aspects which are shared in common — which overlap to varying degrees — across
individuals. As pointed out above, the mutual sympathy mechanism is one such process
which strips away knowledge and information which is particular to certain individuals but
which would not be available to an impartial spectator. A complete information set which
would allow someone to judge the conduct of an individual would consist of both the
conditions which were necessary for the action to take place (these are usually presupposed)
and the sufficient conditions which actually led to the action. The stripping away of
idiosyncratic detail by the mutual sympathy mechanism eliminates certain information and
knowledge. This knowledge is constituted of sufficient conditions (the specific
knowledge/information which generated the particular act), for it is often not accessible to
outside observers, depending as it does on, for example, the disposition of the individual,
their specific knowledge, feelings, etc.. What is certain to remain, however, are those
aspects which are widely held and those aspects which are seen as essential preconditions
(and hence presuppositions) of any action at all. What remains, then, is commonly held
knowledge and a set of necessary conditions for action.
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7. The relationship between undesirable outcomes and prohibitive rules
The discussion concerning necessary and sufficient conditions made an evolutionary
argument for a connection between undesirable states of affairs and necessary conditions.
On this argument, necessary conditions are focused upon harmful outcomes. Rules
governing such outcomes would, therefore be "negative" in Adam Smith's sense of that
word. This section seeks to address a further relationship between negative, in the sense of
harmful, and negative in the sense of prohibitive. The argument will be that not only is there
a relationship between necessary conditions and harmful outcomes, but also that there is a
connection between harmful outcomes and prohibitive rules.
Why, one might ask, should harmful states of affairs be associated with the violation of
rules of conduct which prohibit certain forms of conduct? The answers are related to
informational and performative complexity. The question would probably be more
informative if one asked why one would want to frame rules relating to necessary conditions
and harmful states in such a way so as to impose only prohibitions. In other words, why
would one be interested in framing the rules of a conduct governance mechanism in terms of
violations of negative rules rather than in terms of the fulfilment of positive ones?
As is pointed out in the chapters which follow, there are a variety of reasons why one
might want to focus on rules which do not impose obligations to act or on rules which
prohibit conduct rather than on rules which prescribe actions to be performed. I will not
rehearse those arguments here. However, I will consider some additional arguments which
might be made for this choice. For the moment, then, consider the following. If a necessary
condition relates to an undesirable action (or state) one does not want this action (or state) to
occur or to continue to exist. This provides a link between harmful states and rules of
conduct, for one might either prohibit the actions which lead to the undesirable condition or,
on the other hand, impose the requirement that if these states occur, action must be taken to
eliminate them. The argument for resorting to negative rules which is set out below is that
such rules are more amenable to referring to the relatively well-defined and separable
actions of a single individual than are positive rules, which are more heavily dependent
upon references to a nexus of actions which rely upon coordination with, or which condition
upon, the actions of other individuals. A rule referring to group action typically requires
more coordination between individuals and hence is typically more complex.
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Note that none of this implies that prohibitions are less complex than prescriptions of
performance if they are equally simple to satisfy. The question is, of course, whether rules
expressing prohibitions and prescriptions of performance satisfy this condition. The answer
to this question is, of course, that both prohibitive and conduct-prescribing rules vary in
their complexity. Rules which oblige one to perform acts can be addressed to single
individuals, and do not necessarily imply obligations between individuals. However, in
many cases imposing an obligation to act in order to eliminate an undesirable state creates
more complexity than simply prohibiting individual action.9 The reason for this is that in the
cases where someone is in an undesirable state and cannot leave it without the help of
another, an obligation to act might be imposed on someone to assist them in escaping it. If
such an obligation is owed, this must presuppose some mechanism for resolving which
particular individuals owe which obligation to which other individuals in which situations. It
is the presupposition that such a mechanism exists which renders duties owed to others
relatively more complex than simple prohibitions. Simple prohibitions require that one
attempt to control oneself but do not require a transfer of one's actions — or the results of
one's actions — to another. Rather, they call for the opposite — that such a transfer not take
place. In a sense, then, the obligation to control oneself is an obligation to all. Obligations to
others, on the other hand, require transfers, and any such transfers presuppose that there is a
mechanism for resolving the complexities of such transfers.
Return now to the discussion of the mutual sympathy mechanism. The essence of the
argument is that the mutual sympathy mechanism generates a set of rules concerned for the
most part with necessary conditions. These conditions are, generally speaking, concerned
with harmful states of affairs. Now, for these states of affairs to come about there must be
either certain conduct which we desire to occur or certain conduct which we do not want to
occur. If a necessary condition refers to actions which one does not desire one can either
prohibit the actions which lead to the condition occurring or one can impose an obligation to
eliminate the condition if it occurs. The discussion above points out that the former is in
many cases informationally and performatively less demanding than the latter (so long as it
refers to prohibitions of individual, as opposed to group, conduct). Hence, a selection
mechanism which is sensitive to the informational and performative complexity of rules will
be more likely to select rules which prohibit conduct rather than require its performance.
9 As pointed out in Hayek (1976, 36).
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8. Rules of conduct and rules referring to states of affairs
There is one essential qualification which must be added to the discussion above. Return
for the moment to the discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions. It is important to
realize that these conditions can be satisfied by either states of affairs or conduct. The focus
of attention in this and later chapters is upon the latter, for the following reason. The work
examines obligations upon individual conduct. The obligations associated with states of
affairs are based upon conduct which could and should (a) sustain or eliminate an ongoing
state of affairs or (b) generate or refrain from generating a potential state of affairs. In this
work, obligations are obligations over conduct.
Consider for a moment necessary conditions relating to states of affairs. Though it is
certainly meaningful to discuss necessary conditions as states of affairs and to ignore the
way in which these conditions come to exist (or come to be eliminated from existence), it is
not meaningful to assert that obligations exist over these states of affairs without referring at
least implicitly to the way in which these states of affairs come into existence. Obligations
necessarily refer to forms of conduct which can either sustain, bring about or eliminate
certain states of affairs.
The focus of this work is on the mechanisms under which obligations are put into effect.
This in turn leads to an examination of different governance mechanisms under which
obligations take on different forms. The obligations mechanisms of particular interest in this
work are those based on governance by abstract rules of conduct. As I shall argue in the
remainder of this chapter and in the whole of chapter five, when one turns to a consideration
of abstract rule-based conduct governance mechanisms there is an important distinction to
be made between rules demanding the performance of conduct and those which demand that
one refrain from certain forms of conduct. This is the distinction between "positive" and
"negative" rules of conduct. It is of decisive importance that one keep in mind that the terms
"positive" and "negative" as used in the remainder of this work refer to conduct, i.e. to the
performance or prohibition of certain forms of conduct. In particular, these terms do not
refer to the demand for (or elimination of) states of affairs. This type of demand would
constitute another sense of the terms "positive" and "negative", and one that is quite
different from the usage of this thesis. The sense of "positive" and "negative" associated
with states of affairs is the one which is connected to descriptive rules, and is the same one
that Adam Smith uses when he attributes "positive" to desired states of affairs (or effects of
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conduct) and "negative" to undesirable states. Though this is an important and valid use of
the terms "positive" and "negative", it is crucial to realize that this is not the sense in which
this thesis considers rules of conduct to be positive or negative.
It is important to be clear on this point, for the obligations implied by the different
notions of "positive" and "negative" have substantially different implications for the form of
obligation over individuals' conduct.10 Consider prohibitive rules. Rules which prohibit
conduct deal explicitly with conduct. If, on the other hand, one is referring to a rule which
prohibits a state of affairs, its effect on conduct is less obvious. The central question is this:
is one under an obligation to act, or to refrain from action? Must one perform certain acts
such that the state of affairs does not come about? Or must one refrain from performing
certain conduct so that a state of affairs does not come about? Prohibitions of states of
affairs can lead to obligations to perform certain conduct, or they can lead to obligations to
refrain from certain conduct. Such a gap between rules and obligations is precisely the
problem with resorting to rules which refer to states of affairs. This fundamental ambiguity
concerning rules prohibiting states of affairs — in that such "prohibitory" rules do not
necessarily prohibit conduct, nor do they necessarily imply prohibitive obligations — is one
reason why this thesis applies the terms "positive" and "negative" solely to rules of conduct.
If one is focusing on obligations— as this thesis does — then it is preferable to examine the
relationship between different forms of the obligations and their effects on conduct, rather
than resorting to inferring a connection between undesirable states of affairs, obligations
arising from this undesirability, and the effect of these obligations on conduct. In a sense,
then, prohibitions of states of affairs are only indirectly related to conduct, and it is this
indirectness which allows for ambiguity in the relationship between a prohibition on state of
affairs and its effect on obligations and conduct. As the focus of this work is on conduct
governance mechanisms, and in particular those based upon rules of conduct, it is important
to be clear that within this thesis the terms "positive" and "negative" are attributions made
to rules of conduct.
10 This is one of the central arguments of chapter five, which focuses on the governance properties of
negative rules of conduct.
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9. Negative justice: the connection between Smith and Hayek
All of this is related to Adam Smith's argument that justice is for the most part
concerned with undesirable outcomes. It also forms the connection between Smith's notion
of negative justice, which is concerned with undesirable outcomes, and Hayek's, which
focuses on rules which do not require performance of an act, or equivalently, which only
prohibit conduct. Both Smith and Hayek are noted for having a negative conception of
justice. These conceptions are, however, not identical. For Smith, the negativity of justice
flows from its concern being primarily focused on displeasure, on harm, and on actions
which are negative in the sense that they produce undesirable results. To Hayek, on the
other hand, justice is negative because it cannot be given positive content, in the sense that
justice is concerned with what one should not do, rather than with what one should do. On
this view, justice being negative refers to the fact that for the most part the rules of justice
are negative. It does not refer to the fact that the rules are concerned with outcomes which
might be thought to be undesirable.11
Return for the moment to the idea of the impartial spectator and the mutual sympathy
mechanism. This mechanism is interactive and feedback-based, with a continual interaction
and adjustment taking place and generating rules of moral judgment. This is one mechanism
which could be used to generate rules of conduct and rules of justice. Smith's argument is
that the rules of justice are in large part negative in the sense that they are connected to
undesirable outcomes. In addition, an argument has been made that undesirable outcomes
are, for reasons of informational and performative complexity, associated with the
generation of predominantly negative rules in the sense of rules which do not prescribe
conduct to be performed or which prohibit forms of conduct. It is the connection between
undesirable outcomes and rules which do not prescribe conduct to be performed or prohibit
acts which links Smith's conception ofjustice to Hayek's.
Consider, then, Hayek's emphasis on negative justice. Hayek's focus is mainly upon the
necessary conditions for social order and is for the most part concerned with prohibitive
rules and those which do not prescribe conduct to be performed. Why does Hayek adopt this
perspective? The argument would be that rules should be prohibitive or at least not prescribe
conduct to be performed because of the connection between these types of mechanisms and
11 As in Hayek (1979, 130-131).
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the types of society they are capable of sustaining. The Hayekian argument is that there are
fundamental differences between positive and negative rules of conduct and the associated
conditions for their satisfaction. As it is the task of a later chapter to elaborate on these
differences, I will not go into their details at the moment, but will instead present only a
summary outline of the discussion. Briefly put, then, these differences flow from the fact
that a negative rule of conduct must be continually satisfied if it is to be satisfied at all; a
positive rule of conduct must be satisfied at a particular point in time and space. Hence, a
negative rule of conduct imposes a condition which applies more generally across time and
space than does a positive rule of conduct. If this is the case, then in this respect a negative
rule of conduct will be more abstract (in the sense of the temporal and spatial specificity of
its reference) than a positive rule of conduct.12 Based on this difference in degree of
abstraction, the Hayekian argument is that, generally speaking, negative rules of conduct are
better adapted to governing conduct in complex, Gesellschaft-type societies than are
positive rules of conduct.
If this is the case (and for the purposes of the present discussion I shall assume that it
is),13 it might explain Hayek's generally critical attitude towards normative constructs based
on positive (performance requiring) notions of rules. In this context, Hayek's critique of the
notion of rights might prove a useful example.14 Negative rules of conduct govern what may
be termed negative rights. What this means is that they rule out certain forms of action
which might impinge upon other individuals. These rights are "standing obligations" to not
act in certain ways, and they are supposed to govern the actions of all individuals. Positive
12 There is an interesting and important relationship between negative rules of conduct and necessary
conditions which is based on this difference, and it flows from a similar distinction existing between necessary
and sufficient conditions. If one is discussing the necessary and sufficient conditions for an event to occur, one
should be aware that all of the necessary conditions for that event must always be present for the event to
possibly occur. The same does not hold true of sufficient conditions if there are alternative sets of sufficient
conditions, each of which is by itself sufficient for an event to occur. If this is the case (and it does seem to be an
integral part of the notion of what it is to be a sufficient condition that there do exist alternative sufficiency
conditions — for otherwise, would not such conditions be necessary ones?), then it can be stated that not all of
these sets must be continually satisfied for the event to take place. That is, although it can be argued that some
particular set of sufficient conditions must be satisfied if the event is to occur, it is not the case that all such sets
are required. This difference in the scope of necessary and sufficient conditions — with necessary conditions
embedding the idea of a lack of alternatives, and with sufficient ones based on the idea of a multiplicity of
alternatives — is connected to their difference in their degrees of abstraction, in that necessary conditions apply
across wider domains of space-time than do particular sufficient conditions. This constitutes an important
difference between the two types of conditions, and provides an important link between necessary conditions and
negative rules of conduct.
13 As it is the task of chapter five to elaborate on the differences between negative and positive rules of
conduct, I will not go into the arguments supporting these claims at this point.
14 See Hayek (1976, 101-106).
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part I ■ 89
rights, on the other hand, establish certain actions which can be relied upon to occur and to
whose satisfaction one has a right. What this means is that there is an obligation upon some
individual to act in a certain way for another individual. It is this interdependency which
constitutes the additional informational complexity of positive rules. The essential idea is
that there must be additional rules which govern these interdependent relationships. These
rules would have to govern when such acts would be required, who would receive priority
when claiming the acts of another, and how conflicts between priorities would be resolved.
Put another way, because a negative rule does not demand conduct, it does not lead to
conflicts between the actions generated by the rule. The same is not true of rules prescribing
performance. The same positive (performance requiring) rule imposed on two individuals
could generate actions which are in conflict. Positive (performance requiring) rules
presuppose the existence of a mechanism which can resolve these conflicts.
The discussion above is related to Hayek's notion of freedom as "freedom from the
coercion of another individual" (Hayek 1960, 11-21), Hayek defines freedom in a negative
way, i.e. that one is free if one is not being coerced by another.15 Hayek is opposed to
defining freedom as the ability or inability to do certain things because such a definition
does not emphasize the difference between not being able to do something because someone
intentionally stopped you and not being able to do something because of some other form of
impediment. To be able to identify the former, one need only identify such intentional
blockages under some definition of what is (and ought to be, within some normative sphere)
disallowed as the intentional and unjustified manipulation of another.16 To be able to
identify the inability to act for more general impediments, one needs to know not only
whether someone contravened a code of conduct but rather more detailed knowledge about
the reasons for the lack of ability to act. This raises interesting but complex questions of (a)
could an impediment be changed by human action (b) should it be changed by human action
and (c) by which method (if there is more than one) should it be changed (implying the
question "and upon whom should the responsibility fall to change it")? It would seem that
Hayek's notion of freedom as freedom from coercion, being limited to contraventions of
15 This discussion is extend and supplemented by a similar examination in chapter six.
16 Implying, of course, a notion of responsibility and consequent closure over the causal distance between
certain acts and their effects. The question is, then, whether there was a normatively unjustifiable act which
produced normatively unjustifiable effects which one ought to have expected (implying that one was "close
enough" to the effects in normative terms to be held responsible for them). Note that the question is not whether
one could have expected the results, but rather one of whether one ought to have expected the results. Thus, the
issue is not merely one of foreseeability, but rather one of normative foreseeability.
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essentially negative rules of conduct, rules which do not prescribe conduct to be performed
but rather prohibit certain forms of activity (or at least do not prescribe that acts be
performed), is related to issues of informational and performative complexity. A regime of
prescriptive rules generates additional complexity and hence will be more difficult to
implement. This does not imply, of course, that the additional informational complexity
might not be worth the effort, or that there might be some positive rules that should be put
into effect. All that is being pointed out is that the implementation of such rules will call for
additional mechanisms. This in itself is not the major difficulty. Rather, it is the consequent
social and power structure which is required to implement a regime of prescriptive rules
which is the focus of Hayek's objections. Hayek emphasizes the difficulties which arise
from the manner in which information enters into judgments, the costs — and not merely
the financial costs — of gathering this information, whether this additional information can
be objective or not, and the social and power structure which such a prescriptive system of
rules presupposes.
None of the above rules out arguments which claim that some positive necessary
conditions for action and for social life can and should be fulfilled. It would be a mistake to
ignore such arguments, and it is a trap that Hayek is sometimes accused of falling into. My
view is that Hayek's emphasis is not on this point but, to be fair, he does not totally ignore
it. One can argue that Hayek's list of some positive necessary conditions for individual
action, and the governmental role in providing a framework for these action, is greater than
one would obtain from, say, a strict libertarian reading (consider Nozick (1974), for
example).17 But the main point is this: Hayek's focus of attention is not so much with what
is included in the set of necessary conditions as with the methods of fulfilling any necessary
conditions. Hayek's interest, in the final analysis, lies less in the content of the pre¬
conditions for social life, and more in how they are generated and supported. This leads,
then, to his persistent focus on the properties of the conduct governance mechanisms which
underlie and support these pre-conditions.
17 For example, in The Constitution of Liberty (1960), Hayek advocates — in addition to a governmental
monopoly on coercion and the provision of a legal system (pp. 142-144)— care for the disabled and infirmed (p.
144), the provision of a minimum income and mandatory health insurance (pp. 285-286), most sanitary and
health services (p. 213), mandatory minimum standards of education (pp. 377-384). Hayek goes further than this
and advocates the provision of roads and information (p. 144), a stable monetary system, a system of weights and
measurement, surveying and land registration systems (p. 223), many of the amenities provided by municipalities
(p. 213), including parks, museums, theatres, and facilities for sports (p. 259), public housing and town planning
(p. 346), and the regulation of health and safety (p. 225), techniques of production (p. 224), construction (p.
225), qualifications (p. 227), agriculture (p.364-366) and the environment (p. 369).
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10. Conclusion
This chapter has introduced Adam Smith's impartial spectator perspective and the
process which generates this, the mutual sympathy mechanism. The discussion focused on
how this process generates rules and what the properties of rules generated in this way
might be. Smith's mechanism generates rules with two important properties: they have the
potential to be relatively objective, and they are predominantly negative. The first property
— objectivity — flows from the ability of the mutual sympathy mechanism to generate
rules which, to a degree, overlap between individuals. It is this overlap between rules which
underlies the similarity of judgments which are governed by these rules, and this similarity
of judgment — the relative independence ofjudgments and person-specific particulars — is
the basis of objective judgment within this thesis.
The discussion in the following chapter examines an implicit presupposition of the
discussion of objectivity of this chapter. It has so far been presupposed that there exist
processes of reasoning which underlie objective judgments. The next chapter turns to an
examination of the general aspects of these processes. The generation of objectivity, then,
and its relationship to different forms of reasoning and the restrictions on these processes,
will be the next subject of discussion.
Following this, the thesis turns to an examination of the second property of rules
generated under a mutual sympathy mechanisms. This is their negativity, in the sense that
they are prohibitive. The latter sections of the present chapter focused on the informational
and performative requirements of prescriptive and prohibitory rules. It was argued that in
many cases negative rules which manifest prohibitions are informationally and
performatively less complex to obey than are positive, prescriptive, rules. Finally, this
chapter tried to relate negative — in the sense of undesirable— outcomes to negative — in
the sense of prohibitory — rules. All of this presupposed, of course, that the distinction
between negative and positive rules was an intelligible one and that it could be made.
Chapter five focuses on the identification of negative rules and examines the view that any
negative rule can always be put into the form of a positive rule. It examines in detail some
objections to the negative rule distinction, and spells out the implications for authority
structures which are based to a large degree on one type of rule or the other. Once this is
completed, and based upon the insights of these and previous chapters, the thesis turns to an
examination of the general principles underlying Hayek's notion of law and the idea of the
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Rule of Law, the feasibility of distributive justice in an abstract society, and the theory of
mind and abstraction which underlies much of this thesis.
CHAPTER FOUR
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part II
Particularity filters and the processes of reasoning
1. Introduction
The discussion of the impartial spectator in the previous chapter presented a general
process capable of generating abstract rules. In particular, it was argued that the striving to
achieve an impartial spectator perspective could lead to the generation of objective rules of
judgment and conduct via the mutual sympathy mechanism. The focus of that chapter, then,
was on a method whereby abstract rules of conduct were generated, with the important
proviso that only certain types of rules could be generated and supported by virtue of the
restrictions implicit in the very method which was under discussion. This chapter will build
on the discussion of the previous chapter by considering models of reasoning and judgment
as methods of generating rules, with a focus in particular on deductive and non-deductive
methods. It will also examine restrictions — filters — one might place upon the growth of
rules under these methods. The argument of the chapter will be that the application of
reasoning and its filters, in combination with the striving towards an impartial spectator
perspective, can lead to the generation of objective rules by providing criteria by which a
rule (or a judgment) can be judged acceptable or unacceptable. These selection criteria
include the universalizability, consistency, coherency and consequences of the rule under
consideration. As we will see, there is some overlap between them. Nevertheless, each
emphasizes a particular aspect of an acceptable decision and hence it may be useful to
discuss them separately.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. To be able to point to the differences and
similarities between deductive and non-deductive processes, a general framework for
reasoning will be introduced. Once the general aspects of this model of reasoning have been
examined, I proceed to a more detailed analysis of each method of reasoning. Restrictions
on reasoning and their interaction with the more general restriction which is manifested in
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the striving to achieve an impartial spectator perspective are then introduced. Finally, a
debate between MacCormick and Jackson is considered, with the goal being to consider the
application of rules and the nature of their universality.
It should be kept in mind that this chapter focuses on the differences between deductive
and non-deductive processes of reasoning, and does not directly examine the differences
between deductive and inductive reasoning, although the latter process will be examined in
some detail in the final chapter of this work.1 Why, then, focus on such a dichotomy and not
upon a deductive/inductive split? The reasons for this are numerous, but probably the most
important is that the chapter is primarily interested in focusing on the boundaries of
deduction, the situations in which it becomes more difficult to apply, and the reasons for
these difficulties. The chapter focuses on these boundaries, and the term I have chosen to
use to mark out the other side of these boundaries is the term "non-deductive" reasoning.
The essential difference between deductive and non-deductive reasoning is, in this chapter,
the explicit exclusion of weights or intensities in the former, and their explicit inclusion in
the latter. Though there are doubtless many other ways of distinguishing deductive
reasoning from other forms of reasoning, this dichotomization is chosen because it is
important to make clear the relationship between intensity and closure and because the
relationship of closure to reasoning is the subject of some discussion in later chapters.
While the consideration above explains why the focus of this chapter is on deductive
versus non-deductive reasoning, it only explains in part why it seems that inductive
reasoning is not discussed in this chapter. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the
1 It might be noted that this chapter dichotomizes reasoning in a similar way to many works in artificial
intelligence and cognitive science. See, for example, the discussion in Stillings et at. (1995, 116-135) and Russell
and Norvig (1995, 92-520). This chapter does, however, take a slightly different view from these works, in that it
emphasizes the difference in the treatment of closure provided by each perspective. Seen in this light, there are a
couple of points worth mentioning. First, this emphasis on differences in closure is in some ways analogous to a
distinction made in the theory of logic between bivalent and multivalent logics. In specific, the distinction
between logic based on "crisp" sets and those based on "fuzzy" sets is similar to the distinction made in this
chapter between all-or-nothing and matter-of-degree closures. For an introduction to crisp set theory and logic,
see Suppes (1960) and Suppes (1957), while for an introduction to fuzzy set theory and logic, see Zimmermann
(1985) and Lin and George (1996).
A second point worth mentioning concerns the effects of basing one's reasoning predominantly on one view
of closures or the other. That is, it can be argued that different notions of closure tend to be associated with
different general notions of reasoning, and in particular with different conceptions of what reasoning does. It is
interesting to note that these different conceptions of reasoning have a contemporaneous manifestation in the
different approaches taken by two alternative (or perhaps complementary) approaches to artificial intelligence
and cognitive science: the symbolic (classical) paradigm and the connectionist alternative. For a introduction to
the symbolic perspective in cognitive psychology, see Anderson (1995). For more on the operationalization of
reasoning within AI, and for an excellent introduction to its symbolic paradigm, see Russell and Norvig (1995),
while for an overview of a connectionist view, see Lin and George (1996). Finally, for a comparison of these two
approaches, see Stillings et at. (1995, 15-83).
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previous chapter has already discussed induction under the guise of the mutual sympathy
mechanism and the impartial spectator perspective. General rules being generated by
particular examples is one definition of induction, and that was what was being described by
Adam Smith's model. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the growth and generation
of abstract rules from concrete particulars will be discussed at some length in the final
chapter of this thesis. The discussion of the previous chapter was in a sense preliminary to
this and, of necessity, rather more general. To undertake a more complete discussion of
induction, one requires a more precise set of conceptual tools. These will be introduced in
the final chapter. Thirdly, and finally, this chapter does discuss the generation of abstract
rules from the consideration of concrete circumstances. Much of this chapter develops
insights into selection filters on reasoning, and it is precisely these filters which, starting
from a particular judgment over a particular situation, generate rules of greater and greater
abstraction. That I have not, throughout this chapter, described such a process as induction,
does not take away from the fact that that is precisely what it is.
2. A general model of reasoning
Having surveyed the general outlines of the chapter, it is now time to turn to an
examination of deductive and non-deductive processes of reasoning. Such a discussion has
the potential to be quite confusing, given that different models of reasoning can be described
in a variety of alternative ways. At least part of the difficulty lies in the terminology which
is adopted. How, then, might this problem be addressed so that a comparison between
reasoning processes can be undertaken with a minimum of terminological difficulty?
The strategy adopted in this chapter for addressing the issue is to provide a general
framework which encompasses various alternative processes of reasoning. This framework
must be general enough to capture the important differences between processes, but not so
general that the distinction between them is lost. I believe that the framework outlined here
(and developed at some length in the final chapter on the theory of mind) is up to the task.
The framework that this chapter will work within is termed the classification model ofmind
or, equivalently, mind-as-classifications.2 Under this model, mind is composed in its totality
2 As this model will be discussed at greater length later on in the work, this section provides only a minimal
introduction to some of its more important features. This characterization of mind is in many respects a
refinement of Hayek's theory, as presented in some detail in The Sensory Order (1952), although it should be
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of a variety of classifications of differing intensities. But what, then, are "classifications"?
And why, one might ask, are they of differing "intensities"? Consider the definition of
"classifications". The notion of "classification(s)" which underlies this chapter is in some
ways quite similar to its common usage. When one sets out to classify phenomena using a
variety of classifications, one is only able to classify that which falls within (or under) these
pre-existing classifications. In common usage, then, individuals use classifications to
classify what they already know.
Under the theory ofmind underlying this chapter, things are a bit different. In a model of
mind-as-classifications, not classifying a phenomenon is identical to not knowing it. In
other words, knowing is viewed as classifying.3 It is important to be clear on this point, for
if one does not keep it in mind confusion is sure to follow. The difference between the usage
of this chapter and one's commonsense notion of classifications (and classifying) is that our
commonsense notion presupposes that there is something in our minds which does the
classifying. That is, "one" merely uses classifications to classify phenomena which "one"
already knows by other means. Under the framework of this chapter, the act of classifying is
identical to the act of knowing.4 Classifying, then, is how one knows what one knows and,
under the theory of mind-as-classifications, classifying is the only way that knowing occurs.
Hence, one way that the commonsense notion of classifications differs from the one of
this chapter is in the distinction between classifying and knowing phenomena. When one
uses a classification (but knows by other means), one can resort to a classification system
which includes a category that classifies phenomena "not applicable under any other
classification". Using such a system of classification, one might come to think that any
phenomenon would be classifiable. This is not exactly correct. What is correct is that this
classification system can classify anything which is known. If something is not known, it
cannot be classified. The classification model of mind, on the other hand, eliminates the
distinction between knowing something and classifying it. Knowing is considered to be
pointed out that the theory outlined here puts a much greater emphasis on the intensity aspects of mind than did
Hayek's characterization.
3 This way of conceiving of knowing is similar to Hayek's discussion of the process of classifying, as
elaborated in The Sensory Order (1952, 48-52). It is important to keep in mind that this way of viewing the
process of knowing is, for the purposes of this chapter and the remainder of the work, all-inclusive. Thus, the
various forms of knowing— sensory, perceptive, and cognitive— all fall under this general framework. It might
also be noted that on this view knowing is not necessarily conscious, nor is there a necessary connection between
knowing and consciousness.
4 Thus, the term "classifications" can have quite a different meaning from ordinary usage. The terms
"classifying" and "classifications" should, then, be viewed as stipulative terms which in later chapters will not
necessarily conform to ordinary everyday usage.
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equivalent to classifying, and vice versa. Classifying, then, is a necessary and sufficient
condition of knowing.5
The other unfamiliar aspect of this model is the association between classifications and
"intensities". In this model, all classifications have an associated intensity, and these
intensities can be different. This implies that some classifications are stronger than others.
"Strength", in the sense used in this chapter (and in the thesis more widely), implies that
when there is a conflict between classifications, the stronger classification excludes the
weaker.6 One example7 of a conflict between classifications would be a conflict between
beliefs. Within this model, an individual's mind can contain conflicting beliefs. "Conflict"
in this context means that it is impossible to realize these beliefs simultaneously within the
framework of the individual's mind. One belief — one classification — excludes the
realization of the other.8 Intensities, then, delimit the scope of applicability of
classifications.
These two aspects — classifications and their intensities — constitute the essential
elements of the theory of mind resorted to in this chapter. One aspect, however, remains to
be discussed — the value of such a general theory of mind to a discussion of the processes
of reasoning. There are three aspects which should be considered, and two others which
5 It is not, however, sufficient for having or generating true (or "correct") beliefs. It should be obvious, but
might be worth stressing, that this conception of knowing is not equivalent to "having knowledge" (in the
standard philosophical usage of the latter phrase, i.e. knowledge as true, justified beliefs), but rather is closer to
the idea of "having in mind". The importance of this difference comes from the fact that whilst knowledge is
necessarily associated with truth-claims, forms of knowing are not. That is, while it makes sense to claim that
certain beliefs are true and therefore are knowledge, it does not make sense to claim that certain ways of knowing
are true (or false). Rather, such ways of knowing are simply better or worse at performing certain activities, such
as generating knowledge (truthful beliefs). To give an example: whilst it does make sense to say that my belief
that it is raining outside is one which can be found to be true or false, it does not make sense to say that the
mechanisms which generated or supported this belief are true or false, or that the various ways that I might have
of knowing that it is (or is not) raining outside are themselves true or false. In each case, these mechanisms are
simply better or worse ways of generating true beliefs or of knowing what the truth is. Thus, even though the
way in which one arrives at one's beliefs is in many cases related to the truth or falsity of these beliefs, it cannot
be said that these methods are themselves true or false, but merely that they are better or worse at generating or
sustaining truthful beliefs.
6 The source of the strength of classifications will be discussed in the final chapter which examines the
theory ofmind underlying this work.
7 Though not, of course, the only one.
8 There is another aspect of closure which is of some interest. Consider the interpretation of phenomena.
When individuals interpret a phenomenon, they give the phenomenon meaning within the framework of their
own classifications. This implies that classifications which do not exist within the mind of the interpreter cannot
be part of an interpretation. "I don't share your beliefs (goals, values), and hence I have come to different
conclusions" would mean, within the framework of this chapter, that "because our classifications are different, I
classify things differently from you". What this implies is that the very pre-existence of classifications means that
some aspects which cannot be classified by these classifications cannot be included in — and must be excluded
from — any interpretation. In this sense, then, exclusion and closure are built into the very foundations of this
model ofmind.
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should be mentioned. In my view, the primary benefit of the model is its theoretical clarity.
The unity of the framework implies that all processes of mind are encompassed by this
model. Furthermore, all manner of terms which enter into discussion of reasoning —
premises, rules of inference, conclusions, goals, values, implicit presuppositions, etc. — are
addressed within a single framework. What is lost in differentiation is made up for in clarity
of thought, for the question of interest becomes "what are the properties of the different
classifications in a reasoned argument?" rather than "but what does 'premise' mean? Is it
articulated? Conscious? Merely presupposed? etc.". Using the classification model of mind,
then, allows one to focus on the similarities and differences between theories of reasoning in
a clear and explicit manner and under a common framework of analysis.
Another reason for resorting to this model is that many models of reasoning implicitly
presuppose the existence of other types of knowledge which impact on the processes of
reasoning but which do not enter the model in an explicit manner. By referring to all forms
of knowing as classifying, this difficulty is explicitly addressed.
A third reason for using this model would be its relatively clear connection to the notions
of subjectivity and objectivity used in this thesis. Relatively objective classification is
classifying that takes place in a relatively similar way across minds,9 while relatively
subjective classification is classifying that takes place in a relatively different manner across
minds. Similarly, relatively objective judgment is that which is similar across minds faced
with the same environment, with the degree of similarity constituting the degree of
objectivity.
There are a couple of other reasons for resorting to this model. First, there is an intimate
connection between it and the process of abstraction. As will be apparent from this, and
previous, chapters, abstraction is a process of fundamental importance. The chapters which
follow emphasize this repeatedly. There is, as we shall see, an intimate connection between
the mind-as-classifications model and the process of abstraction. This connection is related
9 Relative to a third classification system, of course. It might be pointed out that knowing something
objectively does not imply that this knowledge is independent of all classification-systems, nor that this
knowledge is independent of its environment and context, nor that all knowing which depends upon a
classification-system is necessarily subjective. Thus, the question "but is it really like that?" would be
meaningful only if one were implicitly comparing the classifications of the particular phenomenon in its
particular context under one classification-system with those of another (which is taken to be the standard of
comparison). Consider, for example, the question of whether a particular apple is "really" red. This question
could only be answered by referring to the interaction between that which is classified and the classification over
it in a particular environment. It should be obvious that there may be different answers to this question,
depending upon the classifications which are taken as "canonical", and the environment within which the acts of
classification take place.
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to a second reason for using a classification model of mind, this being that such a model will
be shown, in the final chapter, to be the model of mind which underlies this entire work.
Thus, the mind-as-classifications model provides the general framework for all of the
various concepts introduced up to this point, and for all those that shall follow. The reason,
then, for introducing this model of mind is that it makes explicit what is sometimes merely
implicit.
3. The similarities between processes of reasoning
Having said all of this, it is perhaps time to turn to the two processes of reasoning which
will be examined in this chapter: deductive and non-deductive. Fundamental to any process
of reasoning is the existence of classifications under which phenomena are classified.
Deductive reasoning typically uses articulated classifications, non-deductive reasoning
relies on unarticulated classifications to a greater degree.10 The question of interest at the
moment is what these processes share in common. As mentioned previously, these
processes depend upon classifications under which different events, actions, etc., are
classified into a variety of classes. The assumption of the existence of classifications is
therefore one point of similarity. Now, probably the most important point of similarity is
that both of these processes rely upon classifications which exist outside the reasoning
process itself and which are used by that reasoning process. These classifications typically
remain unquestioned during an argument. If one wished to examine them within the
framework of reasoning one would have to resort to still other classifications which could
not themselves be questioned by the individual conducting the investigation. There is, then,
a limit on the scope of an investigation which any single mind can undertake, and it is these
classifications which form the limits beyond which an investigation cannot proceed.11
Finally, these processes share a dependence on classifications which are both articulated and
10 For completeness, it should be mentioned that inductive reasoning is concerned with processes which
generate classifications.
11 This Godel-like restriction applies in a static sense across all reasoning which takes place within a mind —
a point noted by Hayek (1967, 61-62), but applies only in a much more general way when one is considering the
dynamics of reasoning, and in particular when one is considering its inter-personal dynamic.
Rule-GeneratingMechanisms, Part II • 100
unarticulated, conscious and unconscious. The degree to which they depend upon each is of
course different, but both do depend upon on classifications of these types.12
A process of reasoning, then, is constituted by a variety of processes of classifying. Each
type of reasoning is constituted by these classification processes. In other words, the
complete classifying action-set under which actions, events, etc., are classified are
constitutive of each type of reasoning.13 The "implications" of these classifications are
always derived within the framework of reasoning that these processes generate. Thus, the
form of these processes is intimately related to the content which emerges.
4. Deductive reasoning
Consider the case of deductive reasoning, as expounded, say, in Neil MacCormick's
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978). Such reasoning usually recognizes as "valid"
within a deductive argument only articulated classifications. These articulated
classifications are typically known as premises, and are taken to be unquestioned within the
deductive framework. These articulated classifications are then applied to particular actions
which "fall within" the framework they establish. After a resort to rules of inference,
conclusions follow; that is, implicit or explicit within the premises are results which are
considered unquestionable and "follow" from "application" of the premises and the rules of
inference to particular cases.
5. Criticisms of deductive reasoning
Criticisms of deductive reasoning typically focus on the lack of unarticulated
classifications explicitly within its structure. All deductive argument uses both articulated
and unarticulated classifications to provide a foundation for other classifications which act
as the explicit, articulated premises of the argument. It is impossible in principle to
construct a completely deductive argument — this being an argument where all of the
unquestioned classifications are articulated — for there will always exist classifications
12 One could, of course, point out other properties of classification which the processes of reasoning share in
common — these are not the only properties of classifications which are important — but they are the ones
which will be stressed in this discussion.
13 None of this is to say that processes of reasoning are independent of the environment in which they
operate, however, for the classifications of mind are intimately and inseparably connected to their environment, a
point which shall be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.
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which underlie articulation and which are themselves unarticulated within the framework
established by these classifications.14 This means that a deductive argument necessarily
rests upon a foundation of classifications which cannot, in principle, be justified
deductively. If a deductive justification is required for a classification to be considered as
deductively justified, then this is in principle impossible, for all deductive reasoning resorts
to both articulated and unarticulated classifications, some of which cannot be deductively
justified.
6. Deduction within a more general framework
It should be emphasized that the conclusions of a deductive argument are always
embedded in the unquestioned classifications structuring the argument. That is, the
conclusions necessarily follow from the structure of classifications which generate a
deductive argument, including both the articulated and non-articulated classifications. The
soundness of a deductive argument, of course, will depend upon the conflicts between the
classifications of the reasoning process and the more general set of actions within which it is
embedded. Now, one could say the soundness of a deductive argument depends on (i) the
truth of the premises, (ii) the validity of the principles of inference and (iii) their correct
application ifwe considered a deductive argument to be relatively "self-contained". If, on
the other hand, one took a more abstract view one could note that the decision about the
"truth" of the premises and the "validity" of the principles of inference and their application
implies these fall under a more general framework under which these terms achieve their
meaning. Now, whether or not a premise is "true" or whether the principles of inference are
correctly applied depends on their interaction with the other actions with which they are
connected.15 If there is a "substantial" conflict between the classifications which construct a
deductive rational structure a premise can be "poorly defined", a principle of inference can
be "unsound" and their application can be utterly incorrect. What is decisive is the conflict
between the classifications which generate the deductive framework. Typically, of course,
these conflicts are not considered to be substantial and hence this model of reasoning is
relative uncontroversial. For this to be the case, the closure which separates the internal16
14 The questioning connections could be articulated by other connections of articulation or by other minds.
Both, then, would contain differing perspectives, depending on which connections were doing the questioning.
15 Note that this presupposes a premise is "well-defined".
16 Internal in a negative sense: by being external to the connections which do the questioning.
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part ii • 102
aspects of the argument (premises, principles of deduction and their application) must not
embed "significant" conflicts.17 If they do, the "barrier" between the internal aspects and
those external to it disappears. A deductive argument, then, will begin to "unravel"; that is,
more and more previously external classifications will become part of the internal
framework. Given the non-articulable nature of many of the classifications of mind, this
implies that it will often be the case that a "strictly" deductive argument -— articulated
premises, principles of deduction and application — will become, in part, non-articulated
and, hence, non-deductive (sometimes termed "intuitive"). This, of course, reveals the fact
that both types of reasoning are instances — special cases — of a more general form of
reasoning. A deductive argument, then, eliminates conflicts by excluding them from the
internal boundaries of the framework (i.e. conflicts cannot be an element of a deductive
argument). If deductive arguments attempt to contain conflicting elements, they will unravel
and become another form of reasoning: non-deductive reasoning.18
7. Non-deductive reasoning: utilitarian and principled
Non-deductive reasoning recognizes the necessity of the existence of unarticulated
classifications for reasoning. It typically involves using some articulated and unarticulated
classifications to define the "essential" elements of a particular case. It does not attempt to
articulate all of the premises which define the framework within which arguments take
place. Reasoning of this form comes in a variety of guises, but we shall mention only two in
particular. Consider, for example, utilitarian reasoning. In its various manifestations it
attempts to evaluate the results (consequences)19 of particular arguments. Utilitarian
reasoning typically takes as unquestioned the rank-order valuations of the results
(consequences) under consideration.20 A second type of reasoning, principled reasoning,
takes a set of principles and a rank-ordering of these principles (not necessarily articulated)
17 Thus, a reasoned argument (and in particular a deductive argument) is predominantly based upon quantity,
all-or-nothing closures with their strong overriding capability. Strong overriding, then, is the basis of the
elimination of conflict and incompatibility.
18 This issue will be discussed further in chapter nine.
19 i am familiar with a distinction sometimes made between "results" and "consequences", the latter being a
more inclusive (i.e. abstract) set than the more restricted (i.e. concrete) one of "results", but i will not be using it
in this thesis.
20 For a classic, if rather mathematically formal, development of the concept, and implications, of rank-
ordering within a utility framework, see Debreu (1959). For some of its uses when combined with the typical
assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, see Varian (1982).
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as unquestioned. This type of reasoning usually disdains the attempt to consider the
consequences of the conclusions of its reasoning, in contrast (and frequently in opposition)
to utilitarian forms of reasoning.
8. Criticisms of non-deductive reasoning
There are at least two obvious difficulties with non-deductive reasoning. It should be
noted that these problems are present to some degree in deductive reasoning as well; that is
to say they are not unique to non-deductive reasoning. First, this form of reasoning
sometimes attempts to escape the bounds implicit in the structure of reason by questioning
the classifications which define the structure within which all argument must take place.
That is, this form of reasoning frequently attempts to question the classifications which
define the framework of the questions — an act which (at least implicitly) conflicts with the
very structure of reasoning which requires that, at least provisionally, unquestioned
classifications remain unquestioned. Second, non-deductive reasoning, depending as it does
on unarticulated classifications, tends to be more difficult to defend on "rational" grounds.
This last criticism does have some force, and it does seem to be the case that non-deductive
reasoning does tend to be less amenable to conscious examination. The fact, however, that
one "feels" one's way along in an non-deductive argument says nothing about whether or
not they are correct arguments, nor does the fact that an argument is difficult to articulate
imply that it is incorrect. The difficulty or ease of articulation is not determinative of the
correctness of an argument.
9. Differences between deductive and non-deductive reasoning
The two types of reasoning focus on different aspects of arguments and have different
concerns. In the main, deductive reasoning focuses on articulated arguments, with non-
deductive reasoning concerned to a greater extent with their unarticulated aspects. As well,
deduction is based predominantly on strong closures (all-or-nothing), while non-deductive
arguments are based to a larger extent on quality, matter-of-degree, closures. Deductive
reasoning differs in other ways as well. Deduction is reasoning in which the conflicts remain
external to the argument. Thus, conflict (if it exists) has been resolved or at least ordered
before a deductive argument can be constructed. Non-deductive reasoning, on the other
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hand, explicitly examines conflicts between classifications. Now, an interesting point is that
a deductive argument may be seen as one possible outcome of a conflict between
classifications. In other words, a deductive argument traces out the results of various
conflicts which have already been resolved external to the deductive sphere. This is why a
deductive argument contains no internal conflicts — how could it, when it conditions upon
the results of the resolution of various conflicts outside the deductive sphere? Thus, critics
of deductive reasoning who claim that it eliminates all difficult decisions miss the point that
that is precisely what deductive argument does, i.e. it provides a statement which, by
inference, is conditional upon the results of resolved conflicts which lie outside its sphere.
10. Justification and restrictions on reasoning
An implicit presupposition underlying the methods of deductive and non-deductive
reasoning is that justifications of judgments are important. Both methods are amenable, in
varying degrees,21 to the imposition of a variety of criteria which can be used to separate
acceptable from unacceptable judgments. Consider some of the restrictions placed upon
reasoning in MacCormick's discussion of legal reasoning in Legal Reasoning and Legal
Theory (1978). MacCormick outlines various filters through which particular manifestations
of reasoning — in this case, legal arguments — must pass if they are to remain "good"
arguments. The first of these is the test of universalizability. This is the requirement that one
must be willing to apply the rule which governs a judgment in all situations which are
"similar". Second, there is a test of consistency, which requires that the rule does not
conflict with any other rules which are considered "valid". Thirdly, there is a test of
coherence, meaning the rule must fall under a more general rule which is considered valid.
Fourth, there is a test of the general consequences of implementing the rule (as opposed to
the concrete results in the particular case).22 If a rule manages to pass though all of these
filters,23 it is considered a "good" rule for resolving the case at hand.24
21 It can be argued that non-deductive arguments are more holistic and hence less amenable to the separating
out of individual rules of judgment. Non-deductive reasoning tends to use combinations of rules and relies to a
lesser extent on individual rules. Deductive reasoning tends to be more amenable to separable rules. The reason
for this lies with the nature of the closures which underlie each type of process. All-or-nothing closures are more
amenable to separable rules; matter-of-degree closures make such separations more difficult.
22 I will consider this filter in a different light in a later chapter. It will return as a part of what I refer to as
the minimum coercion filter.
23 This is not to imply that all of these filters will be used in any particular case. It merely implies that if they
were applied, they would not filter out the rule under consideration.
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11. The impartial spectator and its relation to other filters on reasoning
The discussion to this point has assumed that the goal of justifying judgments is a
desired one. If this is indeed the case, the question arises as to whom the judgment is
considered justified. This is a question of perspective. Different forms of justification, be
they based on universalizability, consistency, coherence, or consequences, will be
considered valid by other individuals only if the individual making the judgment strives to
achieve a perspective which is shared to a large extent by these other individuals. It is this
striving which connects the methods of justification discussed in this chapter with the
mutual sympathy mechanism and its resultant construct, the impartial spectator. The striving
towards an impartial spectator perspective is an additional restriction to that of
universalizability, consistency and coherence. To see why, consider the following. The
restriction of universalizability implies that an acceptable rule will be one which an
individual is willing to apply in all similar cases. How does this relate to the rules generated
by the mutual sympathy mechanism and its resultant construct, the impartial spectator? An
individual engaged in the mutual sympathy process tries to construct the perspective of an
imaginary observer, and tries to incorporate into their rules of judgments only those aspects
which could be known to this spectator. In other words, the individual selects those aspects
which could be known in common by themselves and an imaginary spectator who is
observing their situation. It is the choice of aspects which are held in common which relates
the impartial spectator to universalization, for not only must the individual be willing to
apply in every similar case the categories of the rule they have under consideration, but they
must also search for categories (classifications) which an impartial observer would be
willing to apply.25 Though the judging individual might have person-specific knowledge or
information which could augment the rule which governs a judgment, it should not be
incorporated into the rules of the final judgment unless that knowledge could be known
from the impartial spectator's perspective. Thus, the aspects which the individual is willing
to apply in all future cases, as mediated through the impartial spectator, are those which
could be known by that observer. To put it another way, one might ask how the impartial
24 MacCormick also deals with the process of forming new rules when he considers arguments of analogy.
Analogy is the growth of new rules by identifying aspects which are common across situations. The filters
mentioned above are tests which apply to pre-existing rules; analogy is one process whereby new rules are
generated. This is, as one shall see, closely related to the discussion of the restrictions placed upon the growth of
new rules of judgment.
25 And, obviously, which could be known by that observer.
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spectator perspective is related to the universalizable condition that one is "willing" to apply
the rule in all similar cases? The answer to this is that while universalization hinges on the
issue of whether an individual having certain values is willing to apply these aspects in all
future cases, the impartial spectator widens the scope of this and asks what an impartial
observer would be willing to apply in all similar cases. The impartial spectator restriction
thus considers rules which would be acceptable to, and can be used by, impartial external
observers, while universalization is concerned with what an individual is willing to accept
as an acceptable rule, given their own partial standpoint.
The same argument applies to the consistency, coherence, and acceptable consequences
requirements. These restrictions apply to the workings of an individual's judgment, given
their knowledge, information, and value ordering. The impartial spectator requirement adds
to this by imposing the condition that one should strive to achieve a perspective that could
be achieved by an imaginary spectator observing one's situation and circumstances. Thus,
when combined with the striving for an impartial spectator position, consistency, coherence
and acceptable consequences are not merely requirements within an individual mind (i.e.
"the rule you chose should be one which is consistent, coherent, and produces acceptable
consequences within the system of other rules you obey"), but rather are requirements which
apply to observers who do not share the complete set of knowledge and information which
is available to the actual individual who is required to make a judgment (i.e. "the rule you
chose should be consistent, coherent, and have acceptable consequences from the
perspective of an impartial spectator who can only know select aspects of what you know").
12. Universalization
To flesh out the discussion above, consider universalization as a method of justification.
Under this method a classification must apply universally to be valid; that is, it must apply
to all cases of the same (or similar) type. Now, a question of some interest is the meaning of
the terms "all", "universal", "same" and "similar". It is obvious that we cannot verify that a
logical classification applies to future cases, for they have not yet occurred. It seems that the
universal application of a classification is conditional upon a particular time and space; that
is, it refers to a restricted time and place — and that this is necessarily the case. For
example, a universal classification of human action is typically restricted to wherever
humans are — and more. If it is to be universalized it must refer to combinations of actions
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which are known by a mind; otherwise, a mind would find it impossible to universalize the
classification. Universalization is, then, conditional upon the structure and knowledge of the
universalizing mind, and upon those environments within which classification can take
place. The set over which the classification is universalized is, in fact, the set of actions
known to that mind. A universalized classification, then, is necessarily conditional upon the
knowledge and structure of the universalizing mind. This does not imply, however, that
universalization could not be commonly shared across minds, and in this sense
universalization does not necessarily depend upon the idiosyncratic details of a particular
mind.
Now, if the universalization of a classification is conditional upon a particular time and
space (for it typically does not extend into the infinite future or back into the infinite past) is
it in some other sense conditional as well? The answer is yes. As in the discussion above,
universalization is conditional upon the structure of the mind doing the universalizing. As
an example, consider the classification "one should not lie to one's spouse". This
classification contains particular detail relative to other more abstract classifications. For
example, one could say "one should not lie to anyone" or "one should not act, intentionally
or non-intentionally, such that a truth-conflict results". What, then, determines the level of
abstraction of the classification which is used? One could answer "the process of
universalization determines the level of abstraction: if too detailed or too abstract, it will not
be applicable to 'enough' cases." But what, then, does "enough" mean? The answer is:
"enough" relative to some classification. Universalization is a process of resolving conflicts
between classifications, but the point to note is that its operation is governed by still other
classifications. These other classifications determine the application and meaning of
universalization.26 That is, they define the meaning of "enough" cases in the answer above.
Thus we come to a crucial point, for it is not obvious that these further classifications are
commonly shared across minds. If they are not, then universalization is conditional upon the
particular classifications which underlie the process of universalization in each mind which
26 It is important to note that in legal contexts these other classifications could include "institutional"
constraints on reasoning, as is pointed out in MacCormick (1978, 119-128). The "force" ("strength") of these
constraints would depend, of course, on how these constraints are incorporated into the mind forming the
judgment. It should also be noted that the fact that institutional constraints might be thought to exist independent
of the will of any one individual does not imply that these constraints are shared across minds and hence, in the
terminology of this thesis, they are not necessarily objective. Although it could be argued that one sense of
"objective" requires "existence independent of individual's wills", this is not a necessary nor is it a sufficient
condition within this thesis. "Objective" in the sense of this thesis merely implies that a classification is shared
across minds.
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universalizes. Universalization, then, is not necessarily objective, nor does it necessarily
produce the same results for different minds. This is not to say that universalization is
necessarily subjective, but merely that universalization on its own is not sufficient to
produce objective results.
A final point might be made about universalization. It is frequently claimed that
universalization is "merely" a formal requirement.27 It might be asked why this is so. If the
classification set over which a classification is universalized is particularized enough
universalization is not merely formal but rather becomes material (or substantive).28 Thus,
one might claim that there exist two forms of universalization: formal and material. Formal
universalization refers to relatively abstract rules which are relatively unlimited in their
space-time reference, while material universalization refers to more concretized, less
abstract, rules which pick out a smaller set of space-time. It must be pointed out, however,
that there is a difficulty associated with the notion of material universalization. If there exist
concretes which are in some way necessarily associated with a particular space and time, it
might be difficult to claim that one could include these in a rule which is then extended over
space-time. Put another way, if there are particulars which cannot be made the elements of a
general rule because they are in some way restricted to a particular space-time, this might
rule out their inclusion in a rule which is supposed to be applicable over a larger set of
space-time. An example might be useful. Imagine a rule which in its expression uses
universal terminology but in its application picks out a unique individual (a fingerprint rule,
say, or a rule detailing DNA might be of this type). Could such a rule be universalized? If a
rule applies solely to a very specific space-time location, it would be difficult to make the
notion of "universalized" meaningful. In what sense is a rule "universal" if it refers to a
single case? The answer is: in its expression. If, however, generality does not merely refer to
the mode of expression of a rule, but rather depends upon its space-time reference, the
universalizability of such a rule might be questionable. Seen in this light, the generality of
expression is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a rule being
universalizable. The crucial matter, then, is whether or not that which is referred to by a
27 See, for example, MacCormick (1978, 73-99) and Paton's discussion of Kant's "categorical imperative"
(1948, 61-62, 71-73), the formal nature of which is discussed at some length in Foundations of the Metaphysics
ofMorals (1959).
28 Why is this so? It would seem that this claim is in accord with one notion of the formal/material
dichotomy based on the set-theoretic notion that a formal set is always a subset of a larger, material set. Of
course, if one were not using such a definition, one would not necessarily come to the same conclusions as
above.
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classification is universal enough to be considered an element of a universalizable rule. This
is a question the answer to which depends upon the content, and not merely upon the form,
of a rule.
13. Universalization and values
There is one final point which might be made concerning universalization, and it is one I
shall return to later in the thesis when considering the principle of the Rule of Law from the
perspective of a conflict-resolution mechanism. Universalization asks the question of
whether or not a mind finds it acceptable to apply a rule at all points within a set. But what
does "acceptable" mean? Acceptability is, in the final analysis, a matter of value (of
intensity, of weight). The question is, then, whether the action which we are attempting to
universalize is of sufficient "weight" to dominate other actions with which it conflicts
within a set of actions which is itself closed off by criteria of relevancy which are
themselves based on values? In which situations? And when does the intensity of the action
diminish to such a point that another action overrides it?29 That is, what are the boundaries
of universalization?
It is obvious that the answer to these questions depends on the ongoing values in the
minds of the group of individuals in question.30 Thus, the universalizability of an action
depends intimately on these same ongoing values. Universalizability, on this view, rests on
a substantive foundation involving, ultimately, a test of the rank-order intensity of the
actions in conflict. How, one might ask, does this relate to justification and, in particular,
justifying arguments for the occurrence of particular actions? Articulated justifications are,
it seems, the discovery and articulation of the conflicts between, and the relative intensity
of, the actions in question.31 Thus, an action is justified if it is higher in rank-order than the
other actions with which it potentially conflicts. In the final analysis, justification is always
29 These issues, and the question of the source of intensities, will be addressed in a different context in
chapter nine.
30 And this is not all, for if these values themselves depend upon aspects of the environment in which these
minds find themselves embedded, it may be the case that the intensity ranking of individuals' minds is
interactively dependent upon its environment in a symbiotic manner. Thus, if it is the case that some of the
intensities of mind are dependent upon the continuing existence of aspects of their environment, then it will be
the case that the continued existence of these aspects will enter reasoning as implicit "presuppositions" which
remain unquestioned for the purposes of any particular exercise. In this case, the presuppositions of reasoning are
not merely those within mind, but also those aspects of the environment the existence of which are assumed, for
the purposes of the reasoning in the particular case, to remain unquestioned.
31 i.e. relative to other actions which might, but did not, occur.
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part II ■ no
based upon the relative intensity of the actions in question, with the most powerful action(s)
being termed justified.32
14. The nature of the application of rules
There is one final issue of some interest to the discussion of this chapter, and it is
concerned with the application of rules, both within the realm of thought and to the "real"
world. To introduce this topic, turn now to Bernard Jackson's side of a debate between
himself and Neil MacCormick concerning the application of rules to the external world
(Jackson 1992, 203-214). For the moment, focus on a syllogism used in this debate:
(1) All men are mortal,
(2) Socrates is a man,
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Jackson asserts that:
[w]hen used in such a proposition, as opposed to an assertion, 'Socrates' is an
indefinitely referring expression, not the name of a particular individual. There may
be many people in the world called Socrates...the word 'Socrates' as used in [the]
syllogism has sense within that propositional discourse; it is only when the
syllogism is taken out of that propositional discourse, and it is applied to the real
world, that 'Socrates' assumes reference to a particular individual". (Jackson 1992,
205)
This reference to the real world is "ascription", meaning "the speech-act of referring"
(Jackson 1992, 205). These ascriptions "involve decisions" (Jackson 1992, 205). Though
there is "a sphere within which the [Socrates] syllogism works without interference from
'decisions' — the sphere of pure propositional (or, for that matter, predicate) logic", this is
not the case when one asks "whether it applies" (Jackson 1992, 205). In other words, the
question of whether "we regard phenomenon x as belonging to class y...does indeed involve
a decision" (Jackson 1992, 210).
Now, that the domain of quantification of a syllogism or proposition needs to be
specified before one can know the actual references made by a rule is true enough, but it is
not this aspect of Jackson's discussion upon which I wish to focus. Instead, my interest lies
32 "Powerful" being, from the definition of this thesis, the ability to exclude other actions from occurring.
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in two slightly different issues. First, I wish to examine the implications of Jackson's
statement that when the term "Socrates" is used in this proposition, it is an "indefinitely
referring expression". Second, I wish to examine the nature of the "decision" which Jackson
claims must be made in any act of ascription.
Is it, then, necessarily the case that "Socrates" is always an "indefinitely referring
expression"? In the syllogism that Jackson considers, perhaps it is. In other syllogisms,
however, this is not at all obvious. Consider a modified syllogism:
(1*) All men having characteristics X are mortal.
(2*) Socrates is a man having characteristics X,
(3*) Therefore, Socrates is a mortal.
Are there then an indefinite multitude of people in the world called Socrates under the
modified proposition (2*)? Perhaps not. It would depend upon the set of characteristics X
which pick out "Socrates" in time and space. The modified syllogism can restrict the space-
time dimensions of the various propositions to varying degrees. At what point, then, does it
cease to be a "universal"? In other words, at what level of particularity does a "universal"
syllogism become a "particular" one? This question, concerning the level of abstraction of a
syllogism, is of decisive importance. Can a proposition refer to the "real world" without
requiring an ascription? This would seem to be impossible, for what is required is a
specification of the domain of quantification of the proposition, and this, Jackson argues,
always requires a decision. What seems to be overlooked by such an assertion is the way of
getting around this that I have resorted to above. Basically, the modified syllogism above
incorporates aspects of the domain of quantification into the syllogism. This means that the
proposition "Socrates is a man having characteristics X" can become more and more
detailed, more and more precise, without an explicit specification of the domain to which it
is to be applied. The question, however, is whether such an increase in specificity could ever
eliminate the act of ascription used in "connecting" a proposition to the "real world" and
hence obviate the need for a "decision" which Jackson argues is a necessary feature of
ascription.
Looking back at Jackson's argument, it would seem that the elimination of "decisions" is
impossible. Why would this be the case? It turns out that Jackson's argument reveals that he
divides the world into two spheres which can only be connected by "decisions". One is the
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realm of "pure propositional logic", the other is the "real world". To connect these two
spheres requires — according to Jackson — decisions. The question that must be raised at
this point is why this is so. Consider the nature of the realm where no "decisions" need
interfere: the sphere of "pure propositional logic". Jackson argues that "[i]f the proposition
that 'all men are mortal' is true, and if the proposition that 'Socrates is a man' is true, then
the proposition 'Socrates is mortal' must be true" (Jackson 1992, 205, my italics). If, then,
one is within the sphere of "pure propositional logic", then one has no decision as to
whether or not the conclusion is true.
This sheds light on the meaning Jackson ascribes to the term "decision". Jackson is not
arguing that it is conceivable that one could deny the conclusion of the syllogism, for this is
certainly possible. One could simply not accept it. But this is not what Jackson means by
one having no "decision". Instead, he is arguing that if one is governed by the rules33 of
propositional logic, and one is within the sphere governed by these rules, then one has no
decision to make concerning the truth or falsity of a syllogistic conclusion. This does not
involve ascription, then, for one is merely "pondering the logical implications of the
hypothesis that the claim is true — 'and //Socrates is a man'" (Jackson 1992, 206). These
"logical implications" are such, then, that one has no decision to make concerning the truth
of the conclusion of this syllogism.
For the moment I shall leave unquestioned whether the existence of such a realm (where
one has no decision to make) is a possibility and shall simply assume that it is (however, I
will return to this important issue in due course). If, then, such a realm exists, this leads one
to an interesting question: if one has no "decision" to make concerning logical implications
within the sphere governed by rules of propositional logic, can there not be other spheres,
governed by different rules, which eliminate "decisions" in a similar manner? Indeed there
can. Under Jackson's argument, one cannot be within "pure" linguistics and yet not obey the
rules of grammar and semantics which govern it. Otherwise, one is not within the sphere.
One has no "decision" to make because one's being within a sphere is determined by one's
conformity to its governing rules. Nor can one be within, say, the sphere of "pure" chess and
not conform to the rules which govern its sphere. There are, it would seem, many spheres in
which one has no "decision" to make.
33 It should be emphasized that the term "rules" being used here does not necessarily refer to articulated
rules, nor exclusively to relatively concrete ones.
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But what has this to do with references to the "real world"? Surely there must be
"decisions" to make when one refers to it? Perhaps one must "decide" — but not in the
sense that Jackson uses this word. If one is within a sphere which is governed by certain
rules, and it is one's conformity to these rules which allows one to be within that sphere,
then one can find that one has no "decision" to make if one wishes remain within that
sphere. To see this, I will take what might seem like a rather roundabout approach. I will
argue that there are situations within "pure" logic in which it seems that one does have a
"decision" to make. Once I have examined how this result comes about, I return to this
question and try to demonstrate that there are indeed situations in which one has no
"decision" to make regarding the application of a rule.
To begin, then, imagine that I am considering the original syllogism and whether or not I
accept its conclusion. Suppose I were to say that I do not accept the truth of the conclusion
that "Socrates is mortal". Jackson would claim that I have no decision to make on the
matter. I must accept its truth — or be outside its sphere. This is what Jackson means by
saying that there is no decision to be made within this sphere. But consider my argument: I
do accept the rules of "pure" propositional logic, but I do not regard this particular
phenomenon as falling under these rules. Thus, I regard the syllogism as an improper
application of the rules of "pure" logic. For such an evaluation to be a possibility, it must be
the case that there exist criteria other than those of "pure" logic which are used to judge
whether or not the rules of "pure" logic have been applied properly. In this case, then, I
seem to have to make a "decision", for (to paraphrase Jackson) I must decide whether
phenomenon x belongs to classy.
If this is the case, then Jackson is forced to argue that either one has a "decision" within
"pure" propositional logic as one does in classifications over the "real world", or he has to
argue that one has no "decision" in "pure" logic and that the same may hold for
classifications over the "real world", which is contrary to his original assertion. He cannot,
however, have it both ways. And either way, the implication is that that there is no
difference between classification within the spheres of such "pure" logic and classifications
over the "real world".
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15. The sources of Jackson's difficulties
What are the sources of this difficulty? There are two: one relates to a mistaken notion of
abstraction, while the second goes to the heart of Jackson's argument. Consider the first.
Jackson's first error is in presuming that classifications over particulars only occur when
considering the "real world". This is manifestly false, for such classifications also occur
within mind. Even if there is no reference to the world external to mind, there continues to
be the need to distinguish particulars falling under (governed by) general rules. The Socratic
syllogism that Jackson describes as belonging to the realm of "pure" logic belongs there
only if it conforms to the more general rules of "pure" propositional logic. It is, then, a
particular instantiation of a much more general syllogistic form. Jackson errs in assuming
that such a syllogism is abstract because it is expressed in abstract terms, and because the
terms of its reference are "indefinitely referring", but he overlooks the point that it is also
particular in that it is a particular instantiation of the syllogistic form as governed by the
rules of "pure" propositional logic. The reason, then, that it is a particular instantiation of a
general syllogistic form, and the reason that Jackson would say that I have no "decision" to
make, seems to be nothing more than that it is obvious that this example falls under the rules
of "pure" propositional logic, or that somehow the rules of "pure" logic are "self-applying"
(which he seems to deny as a possibility when one applies rules).
Jackson's second error is in a sense much more fundamental. Jackson has an implicit
view that references within mind are somehow profoundly different from references to the
"real world". This is a misunderstanding of decisive importance, and it seems to flow from
two related but distinct assumptions. The first source of Jackson's difficulties is definitional,
concerning his notion of the abstract and the particular (the concrete). To Jackson,
"abstract" refers to the realm of thought, while "particulars" live in the "real" world. What
he does not take into account is that the abstract/particular dichotomy can also be used in a
relative sense within mind, to underlie comparisons of the relative space-time references of
different rules. Jackson's errors stem from considering the world of the mind to be the sole
sphere of abstractions, while the particular remains in the sphere of the "real world". This is,
as I have argued, a false dichotomy, for within mind there are also abstracts and particulars.
There is nothing "different" about mind's references to its own particulars, and mind's
references to those that exist externally to it. Both either require "decisions" or they do not,
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for both are concerned with the question of whether certain particulars are, or are not,
governed by the abstract rules which govern the sphere in question.
All of this leads to the second source of Jackson's difficulties. The argument thus far
might seem to be saying that Jackson has merely used the terms "abstract" and "particular"
in an unhelpful and potentially misleading way, and that this has led him astray. But there is
a more fundamental issue lying just behind this. This is that Jackson is implicitly assuming
that mind is not a part of the "real world". This is perhaps why Jackson associates
abstractions with thoughts, and particulars with the "real world". Implicit in this argument is
the assumption that mind and thought occupy another realm, and that to connect to the
world of particulars — to connect to the world at all — requires "decisions", "assertions"
and "acts ofvolition".
It is put forward that Jackson's difficulties flow from an implicit presupposition which is
on first glance unobjectionable. This is the belief that thought — and one subset of it
("pure" logic) — and the "real world" are fundamentally different, separated, and separable
spheres. Once Jackson has separated logic from the "real world" (once he has separated the
"abstractions" of mind from the "particulars" of the "real" world) there naturally arises the
need for one to refer to another using ascription. Otherwise, how does thought "connect" to
the "real world"? But is it not precisely because a separation between the world of thought
and the "real world" is presupposed to exist that Jackson's difficulties emerge, and that the
issue of connecting these two worlds becomes of such importance? Unanswered in all of
this is the question of whether thought can be separated from the "real world", and the
related issue of whether thought and the "real world" are so separate that there is a need to
n?-connect them.34
16. Jackson's "decision"
The path returns, then, to the difficult question confronting Jackson. It is important to be
clear on what the issue is — and is not. The issue does not turn on some fundamental
difference between areas of "pure" thought (with no reference to the "real world") and the
34 This is a notion of mind which, in the final analysis, is essentially dualist, in that mind is somehow
separated from the "real world". i find such a theory of mind unacceptable for a variety of reasons, some of
which are discussed in the final chapter of this work. One of the main reasons for rejecting this theory, however,
is that it leads to difficulties such as those of Jackson, and forces one into the difficult position of trying to re¬
connect mind and thoughts with the "real world". All of these difficulties disappear when one accepts that mind
and thoughts are a part ofthe "real world".
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application of these thoughts. Both areas might require a choice over which classification to
make, or both might not. But either way, there is no substantive difference between the two
types of classification which would lead one to assert that classifying within one sphere
does not require choice, while the other necessarily does. The issue, then, is whether one has
a "decision" to make when classifying within "pure" propositional logic and over aspects of
the "real world", or whether there are situations in which one has no "decision" in
classifying such aspects. Consider a rephrasing of this question. Are there spheres, the
membership of which is determined by one's conformity to rules, within which one has no
choice in how to conform to these rules and at the same time remain within the sphere, or is
there always a choice as to how to conform to a rule and remain within a sphere? The
question, then, is whether there are spheres which are governed by rules, the proper
application of which leaves one with no acceptable choice, i.e. under one's evaluative
criteria for conforming to rules, there is no choice over which conduct to perform if one is to
conform to the rules governing that sphere. This is, I think, the essential question.
Presuming, then, that one wishes to remain within the sphere governed by a certain rule-set,
is it possible that these rules are so restrictive that they leave one with no choice when
conforming to them?
There are, it seems, two strands to consider which are relevant to the difficult decision
facing Jackson. The first strand focuses on the effect of an increase in the particularity of
rules on one's ability to conform to them. The second strand focuses on how increases in
specificity decrease one's scope for choice by narrowing down one's acceptable choice as
defined by some evaluative criteria. Consider the first strand. As I argued at an early point
in this discussion, it is possible for a rule-system to specify increasing degrees of
particularity. Consider, for example, the modified proposition that "Socrates is a man
having characteristics X". As the proposition becomes more and more particularized, so the
scope for its "indefinite" reference decreases. If we restrict its space-time dimensions, we
will be able to focus ever more tightly on particular individuals. Clearly, it is possible to
limit space-time reference in such ways. The question is, can it be narrowed to such a
degree that one has no choice in the matter but to accept the result of a rule application that
one may not like and that one would want to make differently if one could?
It would seem that such a result is indeed a possibility. If, say, a rule specified a
particular sector of space and time under a set of rules for space-time that were governing
that particular sphere, and further, one referred to an external event which was classified in
Rule-Generating Mechanisms, Part ii ■ 117
the same way by different individuals (such as colour), one might have no choice but to
apply the rule to the situation. Or consider a rule which identified individuals by their
fingerprints or DNA. If such a rule were restricted in space and time, could such a rule pick
out unique individuals? Indeed it could. Does one's choice enter into the application of this
rule? Perhaps not. The point is that it would depend on how detailed and specific the rule-
system was which would govern the application of these rules, and the range of choice
which such specificity would restrict. One could, of course, simply act contrary to the rules
(by acting contrary to one's own evaluation of what the rules require), but then one would
no longer be acting within the sphere governed by those rules. The decisive question, then,
is how much increases in particularity narrow the choices which are considered acceptable
or as proper applications of the rules to some individual. It is not necessarily the case, then,
that rules can be applied in any way that an individual likes, nor that their application
requires a "decision" in Jackson's sense of "being able to choose as one likes and still
remain within the sphere governed by the rules". Rule-systems which eliminate choice are
clearly a theoretical possibility, and rules of impressive detail have been incorporated into
legal systems on occasion.35
Whether such systems of rules are practical, however, is another matter and indeed one
of the reasons for failures of "formalist" systems in which all matters are specified by "self-
applying" rules. It is also at best questionable whether such detailed rules could form the
basis of a conduct governance system. In practical terms, the decisive question would be the
degree to which rules reduced choice. This is a fundamentally important question, and it
could be argued that the reason for some rules of conduct containing a vast amount of very
complex and detailed conditions is that it is thought that until a rule is applied, it is
necessarily abstract. This would be, however, the same conflation made by Jackson, i.e.,
between theory and abstraction, and between practice and particulars.
The second, and final, issue which must be addressed is implicit in the argument above:
how does one determine that one (or another) has deviated from the rules to such a degree
that one (or another) is no longer a member of the sphere under consideration. This, then, is
the question concerning the evaluative criteria which are used to judge whether or not
35 For an example of the one such rule, consider the case noted by Hayek of a German customs rule "which,
to avoid a most-favoured-nations obligation, provided for a special rate of duty on 'brown or dappled cows
reared at a level of at least 300 metres above the sea and passing at least one month in every summer at a height
of at least 800 metres'" (Hayek 1960, 489). This level of detail is only suggestive of much more detailed rules
which could be constructed.
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certain conduct is conforming to the rules in question. This is an extremely complex issue,
and consequently I will only focus on one aspect of this more involved topic, this being the
question of the type of closures which underlie an evaluative criteria. Jackson's discussion
of "pure" propositional logic assumes that such evaluations (and consequently exclusions or
inclusions) would be based on all-or-nothing closures. Under Jackson's evaluative criteria, I
would have no "decision" to make because I am either conforming to the rules of logic, in
which case I would be within the realm of "pure" logic and hence "bound" to accept the
truth of conclusions governed by its rules, or because I am not conforming, in which case I
would be outside the realm of "pure" logic and hence have no decision to make within the
realm of "pure" logic. All-or-nothing closures underlie evaluative criteria which apply to
situations where there is no choice to be made, where any deviation from any rule governing
that sphere constitutes an exclusion from that sphere. Choice within the sphere is ruled out,
then, by excluding those who do not obey its principles in the "proper" way — with
"proper" being a criteria based on all-or-nothing closures. If the rules to which one must
conform are restrictive enough to exclude individual choice in the matter of how the rules
are conformed to, then such an exclusion can take place without individual judgment being
made. But things are rarely this simple. Typically, the deviation from the rules governing a
sphere are deviated from to a matter of degree. If this is the case, there must be a judgment
made whether the deviation is of sufficient importance to constitute an exclusion from the
sphere. This is a much more difficult question, and goes towards the consideration of
justifications why one believes one is fulfilling the rules while others believe they are being
contravened, whether one's reasons are sufficient to justify one's fulfilment of the rule, and
so on. In the final analysis, this points to the need for a careful consideration of such criteria,
a notable legal example of which would be the work of Neil MacCormick, including his
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978).
17. Conclusion
The previous chapter examined the potential growth of objective rules of conduct. This
chapter has looked at restrictions — selection filters — over this growth and their role in
generating objectivity. It has examined two different processes of reasoning — deductive
and non-deductive — under the framework of a classification model of mind. It has
sketched out the outlines of the general structure of reasoning and considered the
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restrictions imposed on reasoning by different particularity filters and examined their
interaction with the impartial spectator perspective. It has also considered the process of
universalization and put forward the view that abstraction refers not to the mode of
expression of a rule but rather to its space-time reference. Finally, the chapter concluded
with an examination and rejection of an argument which attempted to view the application
of rules to external conduct as somehow inherently different from the application of rules to
activities within mind.
With this chapter completed the thesis now turns to a discussion of one of the most
significant properties of many of the rules generated by the application of the selection
filters of the last two chapters — their negativity. As was discussed in the impartial
spectator chapter, negative rules have different governance properties from positive rules.
Negative rules, therefore, impose a different type of obligation from positive rules. All of
this, however, presupposes that an intelligible distinction between negative and positive
rules is a possibility. If it were not, how could one talk of the differing governance
properties of each type of rule? It is important, then, to be to clearly distinguish between
negative and positive rules. The majority of the discussion of the next chapter focuses on
how one distinguishes between negative and positive rules and on objections to this
distinction that one might raise. In the course of this discussion, several points are raised,
which augment the analysis of the impartial spectator chapter, concerning the governance
properties of negative versus positive rules. Finally, a few simple examples are given to
illustrate the idea which underlies our emphasis of the importance of this distinction.
CHAPTER FIVE
Governance by Negativity
Negative rules of conduct as a governance mechanism
1. Introduction
The previous two chapters introduced the idea that negativity and negative rules have an
important role to play in conduct governance mechanisms, and in particular those of a
complex society. The chapter on the impartial spectator emphasized a mechanism for
generating relatively objective rules, and pointed out that the rules which flow from the
mutual sympathy mechanism were in large part negative. It also developed the idea that the
governance properties of negative and positive rules are different, and that this difference is
related to the ease, or difficulty, of obeying each type of rule. Finally, it began an
examination of the connection between negative (undesirable) outcomes and negative rules
which imposed an obligation of non-performance. The chapter which followed the
discussion of the impartial spectator focused on some of the particular selection filters over
reasoning which eliminate particularity from rules. It is these filters which, in combination
with the impartial spectator perspective, potentially generate objective rules of conduct
which are predominantly negative.
The Hayekian view, then, is that this negativity, and its manifestation in negative rules of
conduct, provides an essential foundation for the mechanisms of law which govern a
complex society.1 Moreover, for a society to extend its spatial and temporal boundaries and
increase in complexity, there must be an evolutionary transition from concrete to abstract
rules of conduct. Now, while these views of Hayek might be well known, they are
sometimes presented as the simple expression of a political view. I would argue, on the
contrary, that Hayek's political views, and his emphasis on negative rules, flow from his
insights into the properties of social conduct governance mechanisms. This change of




perspective, from one focusing on political ends to one grounded upon insights into the
governance properties of different means, undermines political interpretations of Hayek's
stress on negative rules. The previous chapter undertook the first steps in such a re-
evaluation and considered negative rules from a governance mechanism perspective. The
goals of this chapter are in a sense more foundational. My first and primary objective is to
demonstrate how negative rules differ from positive ones, and to trace out the implications
of such a difference. My second objective is to examine some criticisms of this conceptual
dichotomy, and to see if, when, and where they go wrong. Third, I hope to lay one plank in
the foundation for the following chapters, in that I shall be arguing that negative rules are an
integral part of the mechanisms governing abstract and complex societies. Although the
proposal to emphasize negative, rather than positive, rules also meets with a variety of
objections, these will not be met in this chapter. This is the task of later chapters, and in
particular, the three chapters which analyze law from a mechanism perspective.
There is one final point which should be mentioned. This chapter focuses for the most
part on the difference between rules which impose an obligation to act and those which do
not. As will be apparent in later chapters, the obligations to which I am referring are not the
more concrete obligations which exist only in certain circumstances between individuals
with a pre-existing concrete relationship (though there are of course exceptions, which will
be noted in due course). Though of obvious importance, these more limited (in the sense of
to whom they apply) obligations are not the focus of this chapter or this work. Rather, the
discussion is limited to those obligations which extend across individuals in the social
settings of an abstract society. This choice of perspective and its implications will not be a
topic of discussion in this chapter but will instead be examined and justified at some length
in the chapters which follow.
2. Summary of the argument thus far
The fundamental issue discussed in this chapter is the idea that there is an important
distinction to be made between rules which prohibit conduct — negative rules — and rules
which do impose an obligation to act — positive rules.2 The argument will be that not only
2 Thus, in this chapter the normative sphere is divided into rules which impose an obligation to act and rules
which impose an obligation to refrain from acting. The final sections of this chapter will introduce two other
categories of rules — "permissive" rules (Schauer 1992, 8) and "power-conferring" rules (Hart 1961, 78) — but
only the latter shall receive any detailed consideration within this chapter.
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is it possible in certain circumstances to make such a distinction, but also that it is important
to clearly distinguish between these different rule-types.
The qualification "in certain circumstances" is an important one. Much of the
indifference to and confusions around the concept of negative rules of conduct stems from
the failure to articulate the background assumptions which underlie such analyses. The role
of this chapter, then, is to put the spotlight on these implicit presuppositions and to highlight
their role in arguments concerning negative rules.
Now, it is of no small importance to be clear about what the argument has been up to this
point. The previous chapters outlined some arguments for the importance of negative rules
of conduct. There were two arguments of primary importance. First, it was argued that the
goal of striving for objective judgments and conduct governance was both a possible, and an
important, one. Taking this as a given, it was then argued that notions of serious harm were
more widespread and shared in common across individuals (i.e. more objective) than were
notions of pleasure and benefit. This claim was based on arguments concerning the greater
evolutionary importance of avoiding serious harm relative to the striving for benefit and
pleasure. If this is the case, one might adopt either of two different perspectives on how this
impacts on conduct governance mechanisms. First, one could focus on the existence of
harmful states of affairs. Second, one could turn attention to harmful events which occur or
do not occur, and to the human conduct which brings these about. As I have argued in
earlier chapters, and shall argue at greater length in this chapter, if one is interested in the
conduct governance properties of different mechanisms, the latter perspective which focuses
upon actions is a more productive approach to adopt.3 Taking this as a given, one could then
dichotomize harmful events into those whose occurrence leads to harm, and those whose
failure to occur leads to harm. Insofar as the former arise from human conduct, negative,
prohibitive, rules are an effective conduct governance mechanism (as one desires such
events not to occur). Insofar as the latter relate to human conduct, positive, performance-
prescribing rules are, in simple environments, an effective mechanism. The reason for the
restriction to simple environments is that, as complexity increases, there exist increasing
difficulties for certain forms of rules which impose an obligation to perform certain acts. I
3 None is this would argue, however, that action is in some sense more fundamental than states of affairs, nor
that it is the primary concept, with states of affairs being a derivative notion. It merely states that if one is
interested in how a mechanism governs conduct, one should pay more attention to rules which focus on conduct,
rather than on those which solely refer to states of affairs.
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refer to these forms of rules as "transfer-obligating". For such rules, in relatively simple
environments, it may be possible to know to whom, when and where a positive obligation to
act is owed. However, as social complexity increases, such obligations become increasingly
difficult to fulfil in a decentralized way, under .^//"-governance.
3. The decisive difference between negative and positive rules lies in their differing
degrees of abstraction
The above discussion may be reframed in a way that sheds light upon one of the central
concerns of this chapter and those that follow. One way of viewing the different types of
rules outlined above is through their differing degrees of abstraction. Consider the
following. Negative rules are continuously in effect. They are not "satisfied" by conduct
which occurs at a particular point in time and space, but rather exert their obligation
continuously over time. Moreover, the class of obligations under examination in this chapter
and in the rest of the work (i.e. commonly-shared obligations) are addressed to no one in
particular and everyone in general. Positive rules, on the other hand, are discrete, and call
for a particular quantity of acts at particular points in space-time. There are two varieties of
such rules. First, there are those which can be framed as "if you do X, then also do Y". In
other words, such rules impose an obligation to perform X in specific ways. Second, there
are what I have termed "transfer" obligations, which call for the transfer of conduct from
one agent to another.4
From the point of view of this chapter, the primary difference between negative and
positive rules, and between the two varieties of positive rules outlined above, is their
increasing degree of particularity (of reference). In other words, commonly shared
obligations which are manifested in negative rules of conduct govern wider sets of space
and time than do obligations manifested in positive rules, i.e. negative rules are
continuously in effect, whereas positive rules are only in effect when one acts in a particular
manner. Futhermore, when one considers transfer-type positive rules, the degree of
particularity increases (transitioning from obligations continuously addressed to everyone,
to obligations between particular individuals performed in particular space-time intervals).
4 As discussed in chapter four, in the examination of the relationship between undesirable outcomes and
prohibitive rules.
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This difference in the particularity of the reference of rules is important because of its
impact on the governance properties of rules of conduct. Three such effects are outlined
below.
4. Implications of differences in particularity, I: the observer's epistemological
advantage under mechanisms based on negative rules
The first effect of this difference in particularity is of some interest to observers of those
who are governed by rules of conduct. Relative to violations of positive rules, observers
have an epistemological advantage in observing violations of a negative rule. How does this
come about?
This can be answered as follows. Concrete actions are actualized at specific points in
space-time. Non-actualized actions, however, do not occur in space-time. Thus, this means
that a negative rule can be continuously satisfied over a particular interval even if no actions
occur. For a positive rule to be satisfied, the actions required by the rule must have occurred
at some point in space-time (either during the interval under observation or before that
interval). In a sense, then, one could argue that positive rules are satisfied by concrete acts,
while negative rules are satisfied by more abstract conditions (i.e. the lack of a concrete act).
Now, as a concrete act occurs at some particular point in space and time, while an act that
does not occur does not, this implies that an observer must know relatively more (space-
time) to verify conformity to a negative rule. That is, non-occurrences extend over a larger
chunk of space-time and hence it is more difficult to verify that a negative rule has been
satisfied than it is to know the same for a positive rule.5 Flipping perspectives around, this
means that it is easier for an observer to verify violations of a negative rule of conduct and
more difficult to verify violations of a positive rule. This might, then, constitute one reason
why social conduct governance mechanisms based on negative rules focus on violations. It
might also be pointed out that governance mechanisms which rely on positive rules require
5 As an example of this, consider the following. Pick a particular interval of time, starting at t0 and ending at
tj. If a positive rule is instantiated at a particular point in space-time within this interval, its satisfaction must
occur sometime between t0 and q. A negative rule, if instantiated over this same interval is satisfied at every
point in the interval. Thus, if the positive rule is instantiated before tj, this implies that there is less time required
for an outside observer to know whether a positive rule is satisfied than is the case for a negative rule. This
property is related, of course, to Karl Popper's distinction between verification and falsification, as discussed in
Popper's The Logic ofScientific Discovery (1959) with elaborations in Conjectures and Refutations (1965).
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verification techniques that are informationally more demanding than would be the case
under mechanisms based on negative rules and their violations.
5. Implications of differences in particularity, II: the exclusion properties of rules in
environments of different complexities
The second effect of the difference in particularity of negative and positive rules emerges
when one focuses on their operation in environments of different complexities. Consider the
following example, in which there are two forms of society, one simple and one complex. In
a simple society, the set of actions potentially available to achieve an individual's ends is
small relative to the set in a complex society. That is, the means to achieve particular ends
are less numerous in a simple society than in a complex one. Now, given the alternative
paths to the same end are less numerous in one form of society than in the other, what does
this imply about the use of negative and positive rules?
This would depend in part on the level of abstraction of the rules in question. Assume for
the purposes of this example that rules are relatively specific. In simple societies, then, with
few available paths of action to any one end, whether one obeys a specific positive rule
specifying a particular action or one obeys a negative rule which prohibits a specific action
might seem to make little difference. For instance, if there were only two ways, X and Y, of
achieving a particular end, imposing a positive rule for X or a negative rule against Y would
lead to exactly the same path being chosen, assuming of course that the end was desirable
and that one of the two actions would be chosen to achieve it. Even in this case, however,
the governance properties of the different types of rules shows through. It should be
apparent that a negative rule would allow an individual to do nothing (though this might not
be a very appealing choice in this particular case), while a positive rule would demand
performance of a particular action — in effect, excluding the choice of Y.6
Now consider a more complex action-set available in a complex society. In this context,
the imposition of the specific positive rule for X implies, in effect, the exclusion of many
more actions than in a simple society. The specific negative rule for Y, on the other hand,
excludes only Y but not other paths to one's goals. Thus, the implementation of a specific
^ Note as well that that unless you preferred to have no choice at all, you could not improve your alternatives
when governed by a positive rule unless this rule applies differently to some other individual so that they perform
something beneficial for you. The explicit and concrete transferability of actions is one of the governance
properties applying to positive rules.
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positive rule over a large number of potential actions (i.e. means) implies that the rule will
be able to determine the action of the individual obeying the rule and that a large number of
potential alternatives are being excluded from performance. A specific negative rule, on the
other hand, excludes only the particular action falling under the rule, leaving the choice of
which action to adopt with the individual obeying the negative rule.
6. Implications of differences in particularity, III: the exclusion properties of
systems of rules
The above discussion is related to yet another difference between negative and positive
rules: their different systemic governance properties. Imagine a finite number of mutually
exclusive actions (100, say) may be chosen by an individual within a 24 hour period.
Assume, for simplicity, that each action takes one hour to perform. Now, impose on the
individual 24 negative rules which must be obeyed, each one prohibiting one action from
the set of 100. This leaves 76 actions, from which the individual can choose 24 to perform.
Now consider the situation with positive rules. Again, assume there are 100 actions and that
they demand one hour each to perform. Assume we impose 24 positive rules, which must be
obeyed, on the individual. This means the individual is required to perform these actions
before they choose their own actions. In this case, the individual will choose none of their
own actions — their actions will be totally determined by the requirements of the system of
positive rules.
7. Objections to the negative/positive dichotomy
The discussion thus far has highlighted the differences between negative and positive
rules of conduct, and has emphasized their implications for conduct governance. Despite
these considerations, remarkably little discussion is given to the differences between
negative and positive rules of conduct. The reasons for this seem to be twofold. First, there
are doubts whether such a distinction can even be made. Second, and assuming that the
distinction is an intelligible one, there remain doubts as to its importance. In the sections
that follow, I will attempt to undermine both of these doubts, my goal being to demonstrate
that behind these objections lies a buzzing hive of confusions which only serves to highlight
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the general indifference of traditional views of this dichotomy to the issues which are
fundamental to an understanding of conduct governance.
Before turning to these objections, it is important to reiterate precisely what is meant
(and what is not meant) by the terms "negative" and "positive" when referring to rules of
conduct. This chapter, and the thesis as a whole, focuses upon rules imposing obligations.
The negative/positive dichotomy is related to how an obligation is satisfied. A negative —
prohibitive — rule of conduct can be satisfied if no conduct occurs. A positive rule requires
that conduct be performed if the rule is to be satisfied.
It is important to keep in mind that this does not imply that a positive rule of conduct
tends towards positive effects and a negative rule of conduct tends towards negative effects.
That is, in this thesis the ascription of the terms "positive" or "negative" to rules of conduct
does not reflect the beneficial or harmful effects of the rules under consideration. No
judgment of utility is implied by these terms, whether it be in their immediate or more
distantly connected effects. Within this chapter, these terms refer to rules which impose an
obligation either to perform certain conduct or to refrain from performing certain conduct,
with a positive rule demanding performance and a negative rule demanding that one refrain
from certain conduct.
8. Distinguishing negative from positive rules: the background assumptions of the
rewriting critique
It is time, then, to turn to a consideration of some of the criticisms which have been
*
made of the importance of distinguishing negative from positive rules. It should be noted
that much of the argument has thus far presupposed that it is possible to distinguish a rule
prescribing action from one which prohibits it. If this cannot be done, all the arguments
concerning negative rules collapse. It is of decisive importance, therefore, to make clear the
manner in which it is, and is not, possible to distinguish between the two different rule
types.
I will do this by considering some objections to this dichotomization. Perhaps the most
forceful of these is the claim that articulated negative rules can always be rewritten as
positive rules. If this is the case, does it undermine my arguments concerning negative
rules? Perhaps not. To see why not, consider a fleshing out of the "rewriting critique". This
critique claims that whether a rule is negative or positive is "merely" a matter of
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perspective. Logically one can always rewrite a negative rule as a positive one. This fact
leads to arguments that it is therefore a matter of indifference whether a rule is written in a
positive or negative manner (as in any case one can always transform the one into the other).
Hence, why all the fuss about negative rules?7
What is one to make of this critique? Is it correct? And, if so, is it a forceful one? I shall
take an indirect route in answering these questions, and the questions I will address will be
slightly different. There are two in particular of some importance. First, what are the
implicit presuppositions of such a claim? And second, what do these reveal about those that
make such an argument?
The first presupposition to note is the general indifference of the argument to both the
content of rules and the contexts in which rules are embedded. If one takes the critique up
on this point of indifference, many questions arise. For example, does the critique apply
equally to rules which are abstract or concrete in their reference? Is the critique referring to
rules of conduct, rules governing states of affairs, or both? What is the environment in
which such rules are embedded? And is the environment in which these rules operate simple
or complex?
Consider the question of the environment in which rules operate. That one's environment
is important, and that it has an influence on the governance properties of a rule, should be
obvious. There are two reasons for this.8 First, conduct governance mechanisms operate
7 This view seems to be relatively widespread — so much so as to perhaps explain the relative lack of
interest in the differences between the governance properties of the two types of rules. For example, in a
conversation with one jurisprudential thinker, i was told that it was "obvious" there was no substantial difference
between the two types of rules because every negative rule can be rewritten as a positive rule. Furthermore, his
opinion was that Hayek's emphasis on negative rules reflected both Hayek's legal and philosophical "naivete"
and his political bias. As I shall point out, this jurisprudent was presupposing (a) that Hayek uses a solely logical
distinction to define "negativity" (he does not) (b) that a logical distinction is the only valid one (it is not), (c)
that such a rewriting occurs in practice with enough frequency to be relevant (it does not) and (d) that whether a
rule is formulated negatively or positively is a matter of indifference (this chapter argues that it is not). As i shall
point out, i do not disagree with the claim that logically any negative rule can be rewritten as a positive rule. i
merely think that it is irrelevant to the issue of whether there is a significant difference between negative and
positive rules of conduct from the point of view of their governance properties.
8 Actually, there are three. As I shall argue in the following chapter, the evolutionary transition from specific
goals to general values as guides to action represents another reason for considering the environment in which
rules operate. This property will be discussed at some length in the chapter which follows, so the discussion here
will be necessarily brief. The general idea is that for rules of conduct to adapt to increases in environmental
complexity, there must be an increase in the degree of abstraction of these rules. This increase in abstractness
applies to the scope of reference of a rule. This in turn implies that increases in abstractness are associated with
increases in the abstractness of the classifications underlying the rule — and this implies that rules which are
grounded upon more general classifications will have a wider scope of reference. When one takes into account
the economy ofmind, i.e. the notion that there are a limited number of rules which can operate within mind, the
upshot is that rules which are based on more general classifications — such as general, abstract, ongoing values
— will be better adaptations to complexity than would be rules based upon particular goals. This is not to deny
that particular goals are not adapted to particular environments. But for these goals to be adapted to more
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within ongoing orders of action. Whether or not performance is required by a rule of
conduct will depend upon whether that performance is already taking place, and this is
intimately related to the issue of the environment in which an individual is embedded. For
example, imagine an individual is in an environment in which there is an obligation not to
look at certain images. If one is surrounded by such images in one's environment, and one is
already looking, one would need to perform conduct to satisfy this obligation. Thus, in such
a restricted environment, one satisfies a rule prohibiting conduct by performing other
conduct (exiting the environment, closing one's eyes, etc.).
Secondly, and in a related point, the complexity of the environment in which individuals
are embedded is of decisive importance for ascertaining the governance properties of the
rule of conduct in question. In particular, being in an environment of restricted complexity
is important because in such environments the substantive difference between not
performing an act and performing an act is of little note. This is of importance when one is
considering the difference between the two types of rules in situations where a concrete
goal, which demands for its satisfaction that acts be performed, is presupposed to exist. If
this is the case, the goal in a sense delimits the environment within which a rule guides
conduct. Consider an example of two rules, one which obliges one to feed one's children,
and the other which prohibits one from starving one's children. Is this not an example of the
rewriting critique in action? And does this not demonstrate the lack of a substantive
difference between positive rules and negative rules?
Perhaps not. The first rule imposes a positive obligation to act (and to feed one's
children). The second rule seems to be a prohibition of certain conduct. But what conduct is
this? Starving another person can come about from a lack of conduct, i.e. starving someone
else can come about by not feeding them, or it can come about by acts which make it
impossible for another to obtain such food. Which situation is being considered in the above
scenario? If the rule refers to the obligation not to interfere with the ongoing actions of
others in feeding themselves, and not to an obligation to perform actions for them, then it is
indeed a negative, prohibitive, rule. But if the goal in this situation is to ensure that
individuals feed their children, to whom such an obligation is owed, then such a goal will
not be satisfied by individuals not acting at all, but rather requires that conduct take place so
complex environments, there must be an increase in their number. Combine this with the limits to individuals'
knowledge imposed by an economy of mind, and the conclusion emerges that abstract rules based on abstract
values are more effective adaptations to increasing complexity.
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that the obligation is satisfied. Whether this obligation is put into the form of a positive rule
which requires feeding, or a negative rule which prohibits the lack of such conduct, the goal
of not allowing children to starve can only be fulfilled by certain conduct taking place.
Thus, both of these rules might be positive rules, depending upon whether or not conduct is
required to fulfil them.
The question of importance, then, is whether an obligation can be satisfied by a lack of
conduct or whether there must be conduct for an obligation to be fulfilled. Ask the question:
if the individual to whom the obligation is directed ceased to exist, would the obligation be
(or continue to be) fulfilled? If the answer is yes, then it is a negative obligation. If the
answer is no, then it is a positive one. What, then, is the difference between the two rules
outlined above? The difference lies in the underlying goal of ensuring that an action take
place. Both are directed towards the fulfilment of a particular goal. Is there, then, a
substantive difference between the two rules? From the point of view of this chapter, the
substantive question when considering the negative/positive dichotomy is whether a rule can
be satisfied by not acting at all. Can the obligation in either of these cases be satisfied by not
acting? This is the decisive question.
This discussion illustrates the primary flaw in the rewriting critique: its failure to
consider the effects of both the content of rules and the contexts within which rules operate.
Moreover, this critique seems to miss the point that how a rule governs conduct is of no
small importance. This is in turn directly related to one final presupposition of the rewriting
critique which should be mentioned: its indifference to the distinction between rules
referring to states of affairs, and rules which govern conduct.
From the point of view of this chapter, the fundamental difference between rules of
conduct and rules over states of affairs is that the latter include no specification of the
conduct which leads to these states of being coming into existence or ceasing to exist. As
such, there is no direct connection between these states and how they are to be brought
about, preserved, or eliminated. Such a connection, if it exists, is only implicit.
The upshot of this is that one must take care when examining arguments concerning the
difference between negative and positive rules. Consider prohibitive rules. It is of some
importance to be clear as to what is being prohibited, for a rule which prohibits certain
conduct has different implications for conduct governance than does a rule which prohibits a
certain state of affairs. The reason for this is that while a rule of conduct spells out the forms
of conduct which are to be prohibited, a rule governing states of affairs spells out only the
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state of affairs which one desires not to exist, and hence does not make clear which forms of
conduct are to be considered the acceptable or unacceptable paths to the state of affairs in
question. Thus, rules prohibiting states of affairs might require conduct to be performed if
they are to be satisfied. Similarly, rules demanding the existence of states of affairs might
require one to refrain from conduct if they are to be satisfied. The difference between rules
governing conduct and those governing states of affairs, then, might be crudely put as the
difference between rules which govern what people do as opposed to rules which govern
things which happen. What does not seem to be realized, but what is of decisive importance,
is that some things happen to individuals because other people do certain things. Insofar as
conduct governance is concerned, states of affairs come about, persist or are eliminated
through human conduct. And it is human conduct, either refrained from or performed, which
produces states of affairs.
9. Distinguishing negative from positive rules: a critique of logical and linguistic
criteria
All of this is related to a general critique of the theoretical concerns of those that put
forward a rewriting critique as a decisive objection to distinguishing between negative and
positive rules of conduct. Those who hold to such a view are oblivious to issues of conduct
governance as pertains to performance, and are preoccupied with attempting to distinguish
between negative and positive rules as articulations, as concepts, without regard to how they
actually govern conduct. In fact, the view here seems to be that formal logical or linguistic
criteria ought to be the ones which are used to distinguish negative from positive rules. In
other words, formal logical or linguistic criteria ought to be the sufficient (and not merely
necessary) conditions for distinguishing negative from positive rules. Most of the force of
the rewriting critique flows from this assumption (i.e. if they cannot be distinguished on
logical and linguistic grounds, they cannot be distinguished at all). The question that will be
asked is whether this is a reasonable assumption.
Consider logical criteria. If one accepts that on logical grounds there is no fundamental
difference between negative and positive rules, what does this entail? Nothing more and
nothing less than that in terms of formal logic —judged by the criteria of logic — there is
no fundamental difference between negative and positive rules. The question is: how does
this affect arguments concerning negative rules? After all, if a difference cannot be based on
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a test provided by logic (typically accepted as an important standard), of what value would
such a differentiation be?
This is not the time or place to engage in a detailed critique of logic as a judgment
criterion. It is necessary, however, to briefly point to some of its limitations as they relate to
the arguments which will follow. Briefly put, those aspects which are typically considered
to be the strong points of logic — its universality, its objectivity (flowing from its context-
independence and abstractness) — are, in this context, its weaknesses. The fact that in
theory any set may always be divided into A and not-A and that by simply relabelling one
can transform negative rules into positive rules does not imply that in practice this
relabelling is a simple matter, or that it is useful to transform rules in this way (both of
which shall be discussed in more detail later on). Nor does it imply that such a relabelling
actually occurs. It merely points out that it is possible. In my opinion, this is a rather weak
critique. One could, I suppose, refer to oranges as not-apples, not-bananas, not-automobiles,
etc., and one would have relabelled the world in the manner presupposed by the rewriting
critique. But do we do this? Is it useful to do this? Is this a reasonable possibility? Perhaps
in some situations it is. But in other situations it is not.9 It is the abstractness of logic, its
context-independence, which makes the rewriting critique irrelevant to the issues which are
discussed in the following sections. Logic is a formal system. It imposes restrictions on the
form of acceptable inference. It does not determine acceptable content. Whether a rule is
positive or negative is not a formal property — at least not in the sense that I will use it —
but rather a matter of its content. Hence, logical criteria are not conclusive in classifying
rules as positive or negative.
Note that the comments apply equally to attempts to define negative and positive rules
using formal analyses of language. One can argue that any negative rule which prohibits
action can be rephrased as a positive rule requiring action, and that this being the case, the
distinction between the two types of rules is merely a matter of wording and hence
irrelevant. For example, consider the negative rule "do not kill". One could use words like
"avoid" and "refrain" rather than an "explicit" negation and thus claim that a rule such as
"one must avoid killing another" is a positive rule. It should be obvious that this claim is
just another form of the rewriting critique. It presumes, as did the approach based on logic,
9 If it were, it should be pointed out that not merely all rules but in fact all things of any kind which can be
put into sets can, in principle, be relabelled in exactly the same manner, and hence any criticisms applicable to
the negative rule, positive rule dichotomy also apply more generally.
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that a negativity or positivity is defined by certain words appearing in a rule, and not by the
meaning of the rule itself. This language-based approach searches for formal criteria of
negativity. This is not how either Hayek or I use these terms. What is required is a
consideration of the content of the rule. The fact that "negative" words are used in a
sentence (i.e. "not") does not make a rule negative. A "negative" rule refers to fact that a
rule imposes an obligation to refrain from certain actions. This means that the rule can be
satisfied by not acting. A "positive" rule imposes an obligation to act. These are the only
criteria used in this chapter, and in the thesis more widely considered. Rules of language and
rules of logic can be used to aid in the determination of whether or not a rule is negative or
positive, but they are not sufficient criteria on their own. They are merely used as tools in
attempting to determine whether or not a rule prescribes the performance of conduct.
10. Reasons why one does not rewrite rules of conduct: the absence of duality and
the change in degree of abstraction
There are, finally, other grounds which undermine the argument put forward by the
rewriting critique. Some of these have been mentioned in passing above. It is perhaps time
to consider these in more depth. All of them may be considered as responses to a single
question: "if in theory one can always rewrite a negative rule as a positive one, why is it in
practice this very rarely takes place? Why not rewrite?" The answer to this question comes
under two general headings, these being two reasons why it is not a trivial matter to rewrite
rules from negative to positive. The first of these is the lack of duality in articulation, the
second is the change in the degree ofabstraction of a rewritten rule.
Turn to the first of these two reasons. To what does "duality in articulation" refer?
Consider an example set out in two rules, the first negative, the second positive: (a) "one
must not open a store" and (b) "one must close a store". At first glance one might think that
the effect of these rules is exactly the same (i.e. if the store does not open it must be closed).
If this is the case, is there any point in arguing for the difference between negative and
positive rules? I will argue that there is. The key point to note in the common perception is
the supposed duality between a store being "opened" and a store being "closed". That is, it
is often assumed that if a store is not open it must be closed. But is this necessarily the case?
What if the staff of the store were inside the store — taking inventory, say? Would the store
be open or closed? "Closed", one might say. Now, what if the people in the store opened
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their doors to the general public but did not sell their products? What if they merely
discussed with whoever came in the nature and business of the store. Is that "open"? What if
goods were handed out at no cost? What if contracts, to be signed later, were handed out?
The list of actions can go on and on. The essential assumption of the above example is now
clear: that actions have distinct and clear "opposites" which completely exhaust the set of
possible actions which could occur. In other words, the above argument assumes the set of
actions can be divided in binary fashion into two sets — the set were the action occurs and
the set where the action does not occur — and, crucially, that terms exists to clearly
describe (name) both of these sets. Now, it is obvious that this is very often not the case. For
example, what is the opposite action set to "kill"? Or to "assault"? These action sets have a
large number of action sets which are different from, but not in opposition to, the actions of
the original set. Moreover, as environments become more and more complex this feature
becomes of greater and greater importance. It is trivially true that in principle there are only
two sets of actions which can be considered within the framework of logic — action and
not-action — but this does not imply that in practice a precise concrete description exists of
both of these sets. Nor does it imply that such a binary division will be of value when
complexity increases and the action-sets under consideration move from bivalency
(opposites) to multivalency (differences).
Turn now to the second reason for not rewriting rules: the change in the degree of
abstraction of the resultant rule. Consider two rules: "do not kill" and "act in such a way that
you do not kill". One difference between these rules is the scope of the obligation implied
by each. The first rule — a negative rule — obliges one to not kill. So long as one does not
kill, one satisfies the obligation imposed by that rule. Now turn to the second — positive —
rule. This rule obliges one to act in ways other than killing. But — and this is the crucial
point — it does not state the conduct which is obligatory. Thus, the set of obligatory
conduct is potentially very large indeed. For this obligation to govern conduct, there would
have to be a concretization of the conduct which is required to be performed — and it is
precisely the way in which this concretization takes place which is of decisive importance.
For the moment, however, the point to emphasize is the lack of symmetry between these
two obligations. The obligation extended by the negative rule applies to a relatively specific
form of conduct (killing), while the obligation extended by the positive rule applies to a
much more inclusive set of conduct. Thus, in each case an obligation is being extended, but
these obligations apply to different sets of conduct.
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This change in the degree of abstraction (i.e. in the space-time reference) of a rule is
related to the fact that although in theory any negative rule can be rewritten as a positive
rule, in practice this rarely happens. The reason for this is simple: changing the form of
expression of a negative rule into a positive rule changes the level of abstraction — i.e. the
degree of specificity of its reference — of the rule. Thus, a negative rule prohibiting a very
specific class of action (e.g. "do not drink wine in the corridor next to Neil MacCormick's
office in the law school between 5 P.M. and 5.30 P.M. on Thursdays") would, when
rewritten as a positive rule, be satisfied by a very general class of actions. Now, if the
degree of specificity of the rule were unimportant to the function of a rule of conduct this
qualification to the rewriting of rules might be safely ignored. A problem remains because
this is not the case — the specificity of a rule is an issue of primary importance, for it
determines how easy or difficult it will be to follow a rule and whether a rule achieves its
desired effect. It is also intimately related to the authority structure which forms the context
within which the rule operates, as we shall see later on in the thesis.
11. An evaluation of the rewriting critique
It is posited that the cumulative effect of all of these criticisms of the rewriting critique
serve to dissipate its force. In effect, the claim is that that nothing of much importance rides
on the fact that in principle negative rules of conduct can be rewritten as positive rules. The
argument has been, then, that although it is possible in principle to rewrite a negative rule of
conduct as a positive rule, there are good reasons why this does not happen in practice and
that these reasons render the "in principle" argument of the rewriting critique quite
irrelevant to the issues ofwhether one should in practice rewrite rules or whether it might be
important to distinguish between negative and positive rules of conduct.
Now, nothing that has been said should be seen as detracting from the fact that the
determination of whether an articulated rule prescribes performance or prohibits actions can
be difficult in some cases. The aim of the next section is to point out some theoretical
reasons why this might be the case.
Before turning to this, I would like to emphasize one further point. It is one of the claims
of this chapter that a positive/negative rule distinction can be of the utmost importance. The
fact, then, that rules can be articulated in an unclear manner, and that rules are in some cases
complex combinations of negative and positive obligations, does not undermine the analysis
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of this chapter. Rather, it reinforces it, for the argument of this chapter implies that rules
should be clearly written so that an individual governed by them knows as precisely as is
possible whether a rule is requiring or prohibiting conduct. The fact that some rules are
difficult to categorize as positive or negative, be it from poor articulation or other causes, is
not a reason for declaring that the positive/negative distinction is unimportant nor that its
clear distinction should not be a goal towards which aspiring rule-makers strive.
12. Rules and closure
It would be foolhardy to deny that there are situations in which it is difficult to classify a
rule as positive or negative. Consider the rule "avoid killing". Is this a negative or a positive
rule? It depends, crucially, on how one interprets the rule: if the rule is satisfied by
refraining from killing, it is a negative rule. If the rule is satisfied by the performance of
conduct other than killing, it is a positive rule. In other words, one can interpret the rule as
"do act such that you do not kill" as "do not kill". The former, of course, requires that some
action be performed, while the latter does not. One might make the case that the rule "avoid
killing" can quite reasonably be interpreted in either way. Why is this?
The answer hinges upon one of the more difficult aspects which underlies a theory of
rules of conduct — the concept of closure. Though it is a complex notion, closure is also
one of the most important elements of a theory of conduct governance by rules, and hence
must be addressed. My strategy for doing so will be to consider a related and more obvious
example, and then to return to the example above once this more obvious case has been
discussed and understood.
What, then, is closure? I will introduce this concept by considering an example: the
identification of an orange. Assume for the moment we are considering a genetically
engineered orange, i.e. this engineered orange contains some apple DNA. Assume also that
this engineered orange has some sensory characteristics of both an orange and an apple.
That is, it looks, smells, tastes, and feels like an apple and an orange to some degree. Is it,
then, an orange, an apple, or both? One could make an argument either way. It might taste
more like an orange, but look more like an apple. Or it may feel like an orange in some
ways and like an apple in others. The number of such conflicts could be numerous. Assume
further that the struggle between those favouring "orange" and those favouring "apple" goes
on indefinitely.
Governance byNegativity -137
What is going on in the example above? What, then, drives this conflict? And how does
it relate to closure? Recall, for the moment, the discussion of the previous chapter
concerning the classification model of mind. Under this model, mind was constituted of
numerous classifications and associated intensities. Under this model of mind, then, the
aspect to emphasize in the conflict above is the presence of incompatible classifications.
What, then, does "incompatible" mean? An incompatibility occurs when two classifications
exclude each other. In other words, the individuals above are arguing that it is not possible
under their classifications of orange and apple for an apple and an orange to occupy the
same space at the same time. Under these classifications, then, something is either an apple,
or an orange, but not both at the same time. This is directly related to the concept of closure,
for each classification excludes the other being in effect. In other words, one classification
closes off the possibility that another classification can govern the definition of the event (or
object) in question. This incompatibility between classifications is, then, the basis of
closure.
Now, when one considers the types of exclusions which might be possible, one realizes
that there are two types of closure which are possible. First, one classification can dominate
another in an all-or-nothing manner. In the example above (assume for the moment that only
two alternative classification-sets are being considered)10 this would mean that the object in
question is either an orange or not an orange, or an apple or not an apple. This type of
closure I refer to as a quantity, or all-or-nothing, closure. Such closures are based on the
existence of a dominating set of classifications which override all other competitors. In
other words, there is what I shall term an "unbalanced" conflict between classifications,
with one side dominating the other. Now, this is not the only type of closure that exists.
There is another form of closure called a quality, intensity, or matter-of-degree closure. This
type of closure arises in situations where one classification does not dominate in an all-or-
nothing fashion, but rather is engaged in an ongoing struggle to exert its effects. If one were
considering the apple/orange debate above, this would mean that the object in question is to
some degree an orange and an apple, and to some degree not an orange or an apple. Taken
as a totality, then, the object would be both an orange and not an orange, an apple and not an
10 In other words, assume that the options have been closed off by a background set of exclusions and
closures.
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apple — at the same time. There is, then, some overlap between classifications." This co¬
existence between classifications makes sense under the assumption that matter-of-degree
closures are underlying the discussion. Note that such a co-existence would not make sense
if one were assuming that all-or-nothing closures provided the foundation of the
examination.
Having said all of this, are there any general comments which one can make about
closure? The first thing to emphasize is that most classification conflicts will manifest
elements of both all-or-nothing and matter-of-degree closures. Both types of closure have a
role to play in rule-systems which govern conduct.
The second aspect to stress is that closures are manifestations of conflict. Related to this
is the important point that the conflicts which are manifested in the linguistic formulations
of rules are not merely conflicts between competing articulations. Rather, conflicts are
between different classifications. These classifications are not necessarily articulated, nor
are they necessarily conscious. None of this is to say that conflicts between articulations are
unimportant, for they are. The point, however, is to emphasize that ambiguous articulations
often reflect (and point to) other forms of fundamental conflict which underlie them. An
ambiguous term in an articulation, then, is in a sense a symptom of an underlying conflict.
As an example, consider the term "avoid" from the example above. This word manifests
conflict in that it is a non-universal prohibition. Non-universals implicitly embed conflicts
between different classifications (in the same way as an articulated rule conflicts with its
exceptions). This is, then, a conflict in "meaning", where this term does not necessarily take
on articulated or conscious connotations. Non-universals differ from universals in that the
latter attempt to eliminate conflict by ignoring (excluding) possible conflicts. They do this
by being based on all-or-nothing closures. Non-universals, on the other hand, are based on
matter-of-degree closures.
The third point to keep in mind is that each side of a conflict manifests a perspective.
Thus, one can see that from one perspective "avoid" and "refrain" may be "negative"
(prohibitive) terms, while from another they might be considered "positive" (prescriptive).
It is in part the exclusion properties of the terms involved which are crucial to the
11 As pointed out in the previous chapter, this idea is analogous to those made in the "fuzzy" logic literature.
In fact, the distinction I am making between all-or-nothing and matter-of-degree closures maps directly onto the
bivalent/multivalent dichotomy employed in bivalent and multivalent logics. For an entertaining, if slightly
bizarre, introduction to the ideas of fuzzy logic, see Kosko (1993). For the more mathematically minded, see
Zimmermann (1985) and Lin and George (1996).
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determination of whether or not one takes the perspective that an articulated rule is negative
or positive. The exclusion properties are themselves manifestations of the type of conflict
present under a classification: with "evenly balanced" classification conflicts, we have
matter-of-degree (intensity or quality) closures, while with "uneven" classification conflicts
we have all-or-nothing (quantity) closures.
Fourth, and finally, it is of decisive importance to emphasize that there is an intimate
relationship between closure, complexity, and the degree of abstraction of rules of conduct.
As environments become more complex, abstract rules provide better guides to conduct, for
they enable individuals to orient themselves more effectively than do more concrete rules.
This move to increasingly abstract rules is accompanied by a transition in the closure
properties of rules, away from rules grounded upon all-or-nothing closures, and towards
rules based on matters-of-degree closures. The reason for such a change flows from the
increased degree of overlap between increasingly abstract rules of conduct, engendered by a
move away from rules focused on minimal conditions, and a move towards rules governing
phenomena which presuppose that such minimal conditions have already been satisfied.
Such a transition has an important implication. If it is desired that a conduct governance
system be restricted to areas grounded upon all-or-nothing closures, such a system must
restrict its scope to a relatively narrower set of phenomena than would be the case in less
complex environments. All-or-nothing closures are closely related to the degree of
commonality of certain classifications, and this commonality decreases and at the same time
becomes more abstract as complexity increases.
To sum up, then, closure is, in the final analysis, derived from the incompatibility of
certain aspects under certain classifications. Closure manifests a conflict, and it is the nature
of the conflict and the strength of the opposing classifications to a struggle which
determines which type of closure is under consideration. That is, evenly-balanced conflicts
tend to be manifested as matter-of-degree closures, while one-sided conflicts tend to be
manifested as all-or-nothing closures. And all of this is related to complexity. Increases in
complexity imply evolutionary selection pressure favouring rules which are increasingly
abstract, and such rules, because they encompass wider expanses of space-time, are more
likely to be based on matter-of-degree closures. If one desires conduct governance to be
based on all-or-nothing closures, then there is pressure to decrease the scope of such
governance mechanisms such that this remains a possibility.
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13. Implications of closure
Having examined the notion of closure, return now to the example given at the beginning
of this section: "avoid killing". To see why it might be difficult to classify this rule as
positive or negative, note the degree of strength of the obligation imposed by the term
"avoid". It could perhaps be argued that some killing might not violate the rule. In other
words, the obligation of the rule does not seem to exclude all actions of killing. In this case,
then, it seems that this rule is based upon a matter-of-degree (intensity, quality) closure.
Now, the question of interest from the point of view of classifying a rule as negative or
positive is whether the rule implies an obligation to refrain from killing or implies an
obligation to perform other conduct. One might argue that a more "natural" perspective
would focus on an obligation to refrain from the conduct spelled out by the rule. On the
other hand, one might claim that it is more "natural" to focus on the positive obligation of
this rule. The important question, of course, is how defensible each perspective is.
Thus, the "focal point" of the closures — the particular perspective one has — becomes
of crucial importance in determining which type of rule is more closely connected to the
rule "avoid killing". Is one focusing on the obligation not to kill; that is, is the rule
"violated" if the actions of killing do occur? Or is one focusing on the obligation to perform
acts other than killing, so that the rule is "satisfied" by the performance of this other
conduct? Which perspective, then, does one adopt?
This would depend on the goals and values — the classifications— of the participants to
a dispute. It would seem to be the case that in principle there always exists (at least) two
perspectives on a rule, one negative and the other positive. Whether one adopts a particular
perspective in practice, however, should depend not only on one's goals and values but also
on the ability of each type of rule — evaluated from the perspective of its governance
properties — to support these same goals and values. One can make sense of the objection,
then, that in principle and on logical grounds any rule can be framed as either negative or
positive. That one can in principle do this does not imply that in practice one ought to do
this, nor does it lead to the conclusion that there is no difference between negative and
positive rules as judged by their relative abilities to support certain goals and values. Thus,
it is sensible to argue that any rule can in principle be viewed from these two perspective—
that is, any rule can be thought of as negative or positive. The important question remains
whether in practice each perspective is equally valid. This chapter, in addition to the one
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focusing on the impartial spectator and those which follow, argues that while it might be
logically possible to view any negative rule as a positive rule, it may in practice be
impossible for one form of conduct governance mechanism to support certain values, and
hence in practice such a theoretical rewriting becomes an unattractive option. That it is not a
matter of indifference whether an obligation refers to the prohibition of a particular action,
or the demand for performance of a very general class of actions which would have to be
concretized for the obligation to be fulfillable by individuals, is one of the central arguments
of this chapter. The degree of abstraction of a rule of conduct, and of the obligation which
underlies it, is of decisive importance for issues of conduct governance and the question of
how such an obligation will come to be fulfilled. It is hardly a matter of indifference if one
form of rule requires an authority structure which undermines individual autonomy, is
unable to support the value of an objective resolution to disputes, and is incapable of
sustaining social complexity.
The argument, then, that it is "merely" a matter of arbitrary choice which perspective one
adopts for viewing a rule as negative or positive is a poor one. In certain situations there are
values which we want to support which cannot be maintained by governance mechanisms
based on positive or negative rules. In other words, in certain cases, and given a nexus of
values which a group implicitly or explicitly require to be maintained, the ability to choose
whether to resort to positive or negative rule based mechanisms disappears. Some conduct
governance mechanisms cannot support— are incompatible with— certain types of values.
In more concrete terms, certain ends cannot be achieved by certain means. There must be a
matching — a compatibility— between the ends and the means (between one's values and
the means that one chooses to support these values) or conflict will result, with one
consequence being the potential undermining of one's values by the means one has chosen
to support them.
The fact, then, that it may be difficult in some circumstances to choose between
perspectives does not imply that it is difficult in all circumstances. Nor does it imply that
the negative/positive distinction is not useful or that there "really" is no difference between
the two types of rules. Though a rule may be couched in affirmative terminology, this does
not mean a rule is positive. The point of decisive importance when considering rules as
governance structures is whether the rule may, or may not be, satisfied by the non¬
performance of actions. Closure properties — the exclusion and inclusion properties of a
rule — become important because in some situations it is difficult to clearly know the
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circumstances in which a rule is satisfied. A negative rule prohibits action. But how does
one differentiate between a rule which imposes an obligation to act and one which imposes
and obligation to refrain from acting? In cases where an articulation has two potential
perspectives, this comes down to a resort to the goals and values underlying each, and to the
compatibility between these goals and values and the abilities of alternative conduct
governance mechanisms to support them. It is the argument of the chapters that follow that
if complexity and diversity are valued, if one supports individual autonomy, if one desires
objective conflict resolution, or if one desires an abstract form of social relations or there is
a need to resort to such relations, then one must resort to mechanisms based primarily upon
negative rules of conduct.
14. A final note to positivist readers
It might be asked, particularly by readers of the legal positivist school of thought, how
such categories as "power-conferring" rules (Hart 1961, 78), and "permissive" rules
(Schauer, 8), are related to the discussion of this chapter. Moreover, it might be questioned
whether a discussion of rules of conduct which focused predominantly on a
positive/negative dichotomy is relevant to the important questions faced by legal theory in
complex societies.
As an answer to the latter question of whether the positive/negative dichotomy is an
important element in a legal theory applicable to modern, complex, societies, this entire
chapter, and the chapters that follow, put forward the argument that it is. My interest in this
chapter, and in the thesis generally, is upon the foundations of legal theory and legal
authority, and the questions of interest from this point of view are how authority comes to
exist and is sustained. This work thus focuses attention on the mechanisms of conduct
governance which are capable of generating and sustaining regularity of human action
which is presupposed in many arguments concerning the authority of law, and emphasizes
both how the different properties of rules affect conduct governance in different
environments, and how these properties impact upon the form of social regularity which
arises from being subject to governance by rules of different types. From this perspective,
and for all of these issues, the negative/positive dichotomy does have an important role to
play.
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As to the former issue, concerning the relationship of the analysis of this chapter and to
the issue of power-conferring and permissive rules, there are a couple of point which might
be made. First comes a specific issue concerning the perspective of the chapter. In this
chapter the normative sphere is divided into rules which impose an obligation to act and
those which impose an obligation to refrain from acting. Thus, insofar as power-conferring
or permissive rules impose obligations, they are to be considered negative or positive rules,
depending on the nature of the obligation. If they do not impose an obligation, but are rather
descriptive of the pre-conditions for obligations to exist, they fall under the category of
descriptive rules and hence fall outside the normative sphere under investigation in this
chapter.12
Second comes a few comments which should be made concerning the foundations of the
concept of power-conferring rules and their relationship to the negative/positive dichotomy
set out in this chapter. The first comment is a general one, relating to this thesis as a whole.
It can be argued that much of the discussion surrounding power-conferring rules deals with
issues of authority (how it is transferred, rank-ordered, applied, etc.). But very little of this
literature deals with how such rules lead to regularity of conduct. Instead, it is typically an
assumption of such discussions that such regularity simply exists (or does not exist) as a
"social fact".
Why is there so little concern for the way in which different types of rules govern
conduct? Though any answer to this question is to some degree speculative, if one had to
pinpoint a single reason, it would probably be because it is often simply presupposed that
the aspect of central importance with respect to conduct governance is their "authority". The
general idea seems to be that so long as conduct governance is in the "right" hands — i.e.
the "authorized" hands — there remains little need to worry about issues of how conduct is
actually governed. Nor is there much concern for the content implemented by conduct
governance mechanisms. Again, there seems to be a general fall-back upon the belief that so
long as whatever measures are implemented are "good", that is the end of the story. Indeed,
the entire notion of an investigation into how conduct governance mechanisms govern
conduct is often represented as merely a "practical" problem, to be considered, if at all, as
12 Although not outside the scope of this thesis, which constitutes an investigation into those activities —
those mechanisms (as opposed to "pre-conditions") — which must be operating for obligations to come to exist
and to be sustained.
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an afterthought to the much more absorbing questions surrounding the issues of authority
and those concerning conflicts between values.
This chapter, and the chapters that follow, argue against this. The general argument is
that it is a mistake to believe that investigations into conduct governance should be
primarily focused upon issues of authority. It is equally misguided to hold to the view that
so long as conduct governance remains in the hands of the good, and that so long as the
measures that it implements are the "right" ones, its operation will be for the most part
unproblematic. Though these issues are important, they are not the end of the story. Setting
aside for the moment the nature of the "good" in complex societies (and the argument that it
is in fact the "bad" — the harmful — which is of central importance for issues of conduct
governance in such societies), there exist still other issues which remain unaddressed —
questions such as: what are the governance properties of the mechanisms under
examination? How do they govern conduct? And what is the relationship between these
properties and the role of such mechanisms in sustaining regularity? Complexity?
Autonomy? Diversity?
This brings me to another, and final, point concerning power-conferring rules and their
relationship to negative and positive rules of conduct. It might not be obvious that this type
of rule brings with it its own set of presuppositions, one of which is intimately related to the
discussion of this chapter. Power-conferring rules deal with alienating — externalizing —
authority. As such, they necessarily presuppose that such authority is alienable. The
question which rarely, if ever, seems to be asked concerning such a presupposition is its
relationship to the form of obligation which is alienated. Given the discussion of this
chapter, it can be argued that there is indeed such a relationship. Power-conferring rules
alienate positive obligations, and confer the authority to perform certain conduct. The reason
for this is that positive obligations and positive rules demand action at particular points in
space and time, and for some obligations this action is transferable in the sense that that
agent X can perform this same act and satisfy the rule for agent Y. Now consider a negative
obligation. This is an obligation not to perform certain conduct. This obligation runs
continuously over space-time, and for the class of obligations under investigation in this
chapter (i.e. those which are the same for all), is addressed to all. Can such an obligation be
alienated to another, i.e. can agent X "fulfil" agent Y's obligation to refrain from certain
conduct? Does this question even make sense? Probably not.
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The reason for the divergence of these two types of rules lies in their different degrees of
abstraction, and the asymmetry that this potentially engenders in satisfying their obligations.
Negative rules manifest obligations which are not "satisfied" at a point in time by concrete
action. Rather, they are ongoing obligations. In a sense, then, there are an infinity of non¬
performances, extending over every moment in time, which attach to particular individuals
who satisfy these rules. Moreover, these obligations are symmetric, in that they are owed by
all individuals to all other individuals. Contrast this with the positive rules, and in particular
the class of transfer obligations discussed above. Such rules are discrete and can be owed
from one party to a concrete other. Thus, it is possible for an obligation owed by X to Y to
be transferred from X to another party if this party then performs the actions which are
owed by X to Y. Moreover, such obligations are asymmetric in performance, in that one
party is the giver of the action, while the other is the receiver.
All of this is related to legal positivists' interest in power-conferring rules. Given their
interest in authority and especially their presuppositions about the sources of social order
which I will discuss in the chapter that follows, such an interest is hardly surprising. As I
shall argue there, positivists' interest in power-conferring rules stems from an implicit belief
that authority is alienable, and that alienated authority in a sense takes on "a life of its
own".13 What may be more surprising, however, is how such interests, combined with
positivists' lack of insight into the distinctive differences between positive and negative
rules, and their emphasis on the deliberate creation of rules in the form of words, lead to
theoretical difficulties at the very foundations of positivist thought. That such cracks appear
where they might least be expected is in fact one of the central arguments of the chapters
that follow.
15. Conclusion
This chapter divides the normative universe into two parts — obligations to perform
certain acts, and obligations which do not demand performance. This much it has in
common with traditional legal debate, which centres around which acts should be
"permitted" to occur and which should be prohibited, with neither of these categories
imposing an obligation to perform certain conduct. But this chapter goes forward in a
13 The familiar positivist argument that law may have any kind of content is merely one manifestation of this
more general belief.
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different direction, and focuses upon rules which impose obligations to perform and rules
which impose an obligation to refrain from certain forms of conduct. These it terms
"positive" and "negative" rules of conduct, respectively.
The argument is then made that it is both possible and in some cases important to
distinguish between negative and a positive rules. It is not merely a desire for unbridled
individualism which is behind this claim, but rather an appreciation of the different ways in
which negative and positive rules govern action, which forces one to come to this
conclusion. Regardless of whether one is in favour of decentralized individuals acting for
their own purposes, or one supports a more community oriented notion of action, it is
important to understand the different properties of each form of rule governance and the
implications this has for their role in each type of society. The difference between negative
and positive rules is not merely one based on the formalities of logic or linguistics, nor is it
necessarily based upon a political preference. Rather, it is one which can be grounded upon
an insight into the governance properties of different mechanisms. To satisfy a negative rule
one must refrain from certain types of conduct. To satisfy a positive rule, one must perform
conduct. It is the different ways in which each type of rule is satisfied which underlies their
respective differences in conduct governance properties.
This chapter, and the ones before it, have argued that in situations of increasing
complexity it will become increasingly difficult to resort to positive rules and the type of
obligation that they impose and, at the same time, preserve autonomy, diversity, complexity,
and objective decision making governing the conduct of all. The reasons for this are
threefold. First, obligations governing transfers between individuals become increasingly
difficult to fulfil through autonomous action in situations of increasing complexity. Second,
as the complexity of social interaction increases, the exclusion properties of relatively
concrete positive rules dictate that increasing numbers of alternative paths of action are
excluded from individual consideration. More general positive rules which allow for more
alternatives are possible but require a "filling in" of their content if concrete results are
desired — and the question remains of who performs this "filling in". Third and finally,
social governance mechanisms based on discovering violations will impose a more
demanding epistemic requirement upon observers if they are based on positive rules rather
than on negative ones. All of these factors point to the conclusion that if one wishes to
maintain abstract social relations, or if one is surrounded by substantial social complexity
which one wishes to preserve (such as those associated with abstract, Gesellschaft-type
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societies), there must be a resort to mechanisms of conduct governance based predominantly
on negative rules.
It is important to note that none of this argues that positive rules are without benefits. In
situations with numerous alternative paths of conduct facing individuals, positive rules can
achieve concrete and specific goals, while in such situations it can be much more difficult
(if not impossible) to achieve these same results using only negative rules. The difficulties
with positive rules, however, stem from the same source as their benefits. Whose goals are
being achieved? At what cost in terms of lost alternatives to individuals? And, in situations
of increasing complexity, is it possible to specify positive rules such that individuals can
obey them and continue to act in a decentralized manner? Or must there be a resort to a
"filling in" of the content of these rules by those who know the desired specific results, with
a consequent decrease in the ability of individuals to guide their own conduct? These are
fundamental questions, requiring a careful consideration of the implications of resorting to
rules which import substantivity and all of the difficulties that this entails.
Some of these difficulties are outlined in the chapters that follow. The thesis now turns to
a general consideration of the interplay between individuals and their environments in
situations of substantial social complexity. This leads to a sustained study of the relationship
between individual and social conduct governance mechanisms extending over the next
three chapters. The chapter that follows makes use of the insights of two legal thinkers —
F.A. Hayek and Lon Fuller— and presents the outlines of what it terms a mechanism model
of law. Once this has been completed, the chapters that follow turn to a examination of the
implications of this notion of law, both for the principle of the Rule of Law and for the ideal
of "social", or distributive, justice. Finally, the thesis concludes with a consideration of a
Hayekian theory of mind which underlies the theoretical analysis of this chapter, and that of
the work as a whole.
CHAPTER SIX
The Mechanism is the Message*
A mechanism model of law
1. Introduction
This chapter will attempt to draw together the various strands of thought discussed thus
far into what might be called a mechanism model of law. It will do this by focusing on the
insights of F.A. Hayek and Lon Fuller into the sources of social order and by sketching out
some of the implications of these ideas for the causal connection between law and society.
This chapter, then, attempts to unite the previous chapters into a coherent framework. It
draws on the distinction between different forms of social order and examines the evolution
of a Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft form of society, emphasizing a mechanism — abstract
rule following — which might provide a foundation for such a transformation. It puts to
work one particular method by which such rules might be generated — the mutual sympathy
mechanism of the impartial spectator model — and outlines further filters on reasoning and
justification which are used to sustain an abstract form of society. And finally, this chapter
emphasizes two of the most important properties of rules of conduct which have passed
through these filters and are capable of sustaining an ongoing, abstract type of society —
their abstractness and their negativity.
The general goal of this chapter, then, is to outline the structure of a mechanism
approach to law. This mechanism model is based upon a fusion of the insights of two legal
thinkers: F.A. Hayek and Lon Fuller. Fuller's work is, in some aspects, very similar to
Hayek's,1 in that they seem to share many of the same theoretical concerns. Accordingly,
* The title is a modification of an expression made famous by Marshall McLuhan (1964), in a work heavily
influenced by the seminal investigations of Harold Innes (1950; 1951). McLuhan acknowledges the influence of
Innes by stating that an earlier work, The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), was a mere "footnote of explanation"
(McLuhan 1962, 50) to Innes' Empire and Communications (1950).
1 This similarity extends to their more philosophical interests as well. One interesting example is Fuller's
work, in 1930-31, on legal fictions (Fuller 1967) which explored the implications of the "As-If' philosophy of
Hans Vaihinger (1924). This "As-If' theory stressed the interpretive nature of mind and emphasized the
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my goals in this enterprise are twofold. First, I will take up a project that Lon Fuller began
but did not complete: a theoretical examination of the bases of social order, and a critical
analysis of the problems of institutional design. The theoretical and critical analyses which
follow are adapted to, and influenced by, the works of both Fuller and Hayek. This leads to
my second goal: to combine elements of Hayek's and Fuller's theories of law and provide
the outlines of a synthetic and coherent legal theory that can serve as an alternative to some
of the frameworks constructed by legal positivists. That an alternative is necessary flows
from what I believe to be the two fundamental insights of Hayek's life's work. The first is
the importance of clearly and carefully distinguishing between the abstract and the concrete.
Hayek believed that positivists misunderstood both the nature and the importance of the
process of abstraction. The centrality of this insight cannot be underestimated. Arguments
based on the assumption of the primacy of abstraction underlie most of Hayek's social
theory. His critique of distributive justice is but one aspect of this more general theory. In
addition, most of his attacks on legal positivism (or, more accurately, Kelsenian legal
positivism,2 though I will argue that these objections can be extended to encompass more
modern strains as well) are based on this same concern with the importance of abstraction.
Hayek's second insight relates to his first. Hayek came to the view that the type of social
order which could be generated and sustained by certain mechanisms was intimately
connected to the way in which these mechanisms governed behaviour. Furthermore, he was
of the view that the manner in which a mechanism governed behaviour was intimately
connected with the abstractness or concreteness manifested by the mechanism. In a sense,
Hayek's argument was that certain types of societies were associated with certain types of
governance mechanisms or, put differently, that conduct governance mechanisms must have
certain properties if certain forms of social relations are to be sustained.
My ambition, then, is to outline a legal theory based upon Hayek's insights into the
distinction between the abstract and the concrete and upon Fuller's reflections on the
importance of institutional design. This theory will focus on the properties of different types
of conduct governance mechanisms, and will examine the relationship between the different
importance of abstractions to human thinking. As we shall see in the chapter which examines Hayek's theory of
mind, these same concerns lie at the very heart of Hayek's theorizing.
2 It is important to keep in mind that Hayek's notion of positivism refers specifically to Kelsenian positivism.
Otherwise, Hayek's comment that "the work of Professor H.L.A. Hart...in most regards appears to me one of the
most effective criticisms of legal positivism" (Hayek 1976, 56) might appear inexplicable. That Hayek objected
primarily to Kelsenian positivism does not, of course, preclude an extension of some of his general themes to
Hartian positivism, as I shall argue in this, and later, chapters.
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types of mechanisms and the resultant forms of social order which each type is capable of
generating and sustaining. The general argument will be that Hayekian concerns can be used
in conjunction with the insights of Lon Fuller to create the basis of an alternative to
positivist theories of law.
From the outset, it should be stated that my interest is primarily focused on the role of
rules of conduct in Gesellschaft-type societies. I implicitly assume that there already exist a
diversity of more commonality-based, Gemeinschaft-type societies within these
Gesellschaft-type societies.3 Assuming this is so, my goals are to examine how the members
of these different and more commonality-based societies interact and integrate into more
abstract societal forms. In particular, I am interested in how individuals adapt to increases in
complexity4 which are encountered when interactions take place between commonality-
based societies, and in the relationship of these adaptations to the conduct governance
mechanisms underlying a Gesellschaft-type of society. The reason for this interest is
twofold. First, it is of some interest to see how individuals adapt to situations of increasing
complexity. The general argument of the chapter is that they do this by adopting
increasingly abstract rules of conduct. Second, and as an implication of this argument,
comes the insight that such a method of adaptation also produces the potential for
generating objective rules of conduct. The mechanisms for producing such rules and some
of their properties have been outlined in previous chapters. What has not been emphasized is
that these objective rules can serve as the basis for conduct governance and conflict-
resolution in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. Thus, this adaptation to complexity also
allows for the possibility of objective justice in disputes between the members of different
Gemeinschaft-typo societies. The details of the relationship between abstraction and the
objective resolution of conflicts shall, however, form the basis of the investigations of the
chapter which follows, and hence shall only be referred to in passing in this chapter.
This present chapter, on the other hand, examines the role abstract rules play in conduct
governance by looking at a rather dated debate between two schools of legal theory. These
schools of thought are the mechanism model approach that I have attributed to Hayek and
Fuller, and that of legal positivists. The sections that follow use these two schools' distinctly
different approaches to, and understanding of, the idea of "subjecting human conduct to the
3 The nature of these societal types will be discussed later on in the chapter.
4 Speculation on the nature, sources and causes of such an increase in complexity will be discussed in later
sections of this chapter.
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governance of rules" to illustrate the significance of governance by abstract rules for
individuals' conduct in a Gesellschaft-type society.
With this aim in mind, this chapter will expand upon a few of the implications of the
abstract/concrete dichotomy. First, I will focus on Fuller's distinction between moralities of
duty and aspiration, with a view to introducing the debate between Lon Fuller and his critics
concerning his so-called "inner morality of law". I will argue that this debate rests upon a
confusion concerning the distinction between minimal conditions and that which is
dependent upon these. Emanating from this confusion is a related misunderstanding of the
role of abstraction and its relationship to, and importance for, issues concerning conduct
governance and, in particular, the mechanisms which support social life in complex
societies.
The discussion then turns to a more detailed examination of why Fuller believed his
principles to be a "morality" and not merely a means to other ultimate ends. I argue that
there are good reasons for considering the "inner morality of law" to be a value, and that
this stems from the intimate relationship between the type of society which different
governance mechanisms are capable of supporting. Flowing from this is a reassessment of
the coherence of notions of an "inner morality of law" and "subjecting conduct to the
governance of rules", which in turn leads to an examination of Fuller's critique of the
managerialist tendencies of legal positivism. This section outlines what I perceive to be the
two fundamental differences between Fuller and Hayek and their positivist critics: their
notion of order and their views concerning the causal relationship between law and society.
These differences in perspective provide the foundations for a re-examination of Hayek's
and Fuller's notions of law. This consists of a consideration of the distinguishing
characteristics of legal mechanisms from both a Fullerian and Hayekian perspective. Here,
the argument is that law is a mechanism concerned with regularizing conduct, and that it is
this function — and not positivist arguments relating to "authorization" — that makes it
distinctly legal. Following from this is the argument that for conduct to be sufficiently
regular, both the individuals obeying the law and the law-makers5 themselves must subject
their conduct to the governance of rules.6 Related to this is an argument that one of the
5 The issue of who exactly are law-makers (which seems to imply that law is made), and the compatibility of
this seeming inference with Hayek's notion of law are discussed in the sections that follow and in the following
chapter on the Rule of Law.
6 In the case of law-makers, to the governance of the rules constituting Fuller's "inner morality of law".
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primary functions of legal mechanisms is to filter out any attempts to subject individuals to
the governance of particular goals.
Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining some of the implications of a Hayekian-
Fullerian theory. In particular, it points towards a reassessment of the foundations of the
principle of the Rule of Law and of the feasibility of distributive justice, and a re-evaluation
of the importance of abstraction and the mechanisms by which it is generated.
2. Fuller's contribution and the positivist critique
So much for a general overview. What I want to do now is to provide a point of entry to
Hayek's abstract/concrete distinction, and to the ideas underlying conduct governance using
abstract rules. To do this, I am going to focus on Fuller's debate with his numerous
positivist critics. As we shall see, this discussion leads quite naturally to a more general
discussion of abstract rule governance.
To begin, then, I should point out the works to be examined. I will focus on the
arguments of The Morality ofLaw (1964, 1969) and some of the critical responses this work
engendered. The 1969 version of The Morality of Law consists of four parts. The first is
concerned with distinguishing between duty- and aspiration-based moralities. The second
makes a distinction between the inner and outer moralities of law, and outlines the
principles constituting the former. The third section focuses on the outer morality of law and
its relationship to the "inner morality", while the fourth section is a response to criticisms
made against the original edition of the book. The first section to be examined will be
Fuller's "reply to critics", following which the discussion turns to an analysis of the "inner
morality of law" and the distinction between duties and aspirations.
For the moment, then, turn to Fuller's "reply to critics"; let us focus on the debate over
the propriety of using the term "morality" to describe Fuller's "inner morality of law". It
might seem a bit odd to examine a point which Fuller himself came to regard as quite
fruitless (Fuller 1969, 203-204), but there are some good reasons for doing this. I would
argue that Fuller never quite managed to articulate the basis of his disagreement with the
positivists. The idea I put forward is that the objections and counter-objections which flew
back and forth in this debate are manifestations of a fundamental difference in perspectives,
one side of which has not yet been systematically explored. This chapter represents the
The Mechanism is the Message • 153
beginning of the rectification of this lacuna, and the beginnings of such a detailed
investigation. That being said, onto the debate.
The positivist objection to Fuller using the term "morality" to describe his principles of
legality can be summarized quite simply: Fuller has conflated purposive with moral action.
His critics would prefer that Fuller use the term "efficiency" rather than the term "morality"
in describing his principles of legality. Fuller counter-attacks by claiming that (a) positivists
do not understand the meaning of this distinction and/or (b) the positivist notion of law is
fundamentally different from his own (and the positivist conception of law is fundamentally
flawed). This is, in short, a summary of the debate.
But what underlies these claims? Why do the positivists think Fuller is making a mistake
by referring to his set of principles as a morality? And why does Fuller think that it is the
positivists who are making the mistake? Who is in error? What errors are made? And how
do these errors arise?
The sections which follow argue that the answers to these questions will only be
forthcoming after one has examined two issues which provide the context for this debate.
The argument is, then, that to understand this debate one must first understand the two
issues of fundamental importance which underlie it. First comes the distinction between the
minimal conditions for social life and those aspects which build upon this pre-existing
foundation. This is related to the distinction between minimal duties and aspirations and to
the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions, as discussed earlier in the thesis.
Second comes the distinction between the abstract and the concrete. This is connected to the
negative/positive rules dichotomy, and to the differences between values and goals. With a
clear understanding of these crucial conceptual distinctions in hand, one is in the position to
turn to a consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of guidance by morality as
opposed to pursuing particular purposes. Once this has been completed one will perhaps be
able to understand why Fuller thought it proper to refer to his "inner morality of law" as a
morality, and to know why he believed his positivist critics were so profoundly confused.
3. Fuller on moralities of duty and aspiration
The first issue to be discussed is Fuller's distinction between aspirational and duty-based
moralities. I will argue that far from being a peripheral element of legal theory, this
distinction is one of the centrepieces of both Fuller's and Hayek's theories of law. Its
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importance emanates from its relationship with (a) the informational and performative
requirements of conduct governance mechanisms and (b) the negativity of the rules which
constitute these mechanisms. The argument will be that duties are for the most part
negative, that this negativity is related to the informational requirements of rule-based
systems of governance, and that there is an essential and intimate connection between
negative duties and legal mechanisms.
It might not be obvious that either of the two aspects, (a) or (b), are related to Fuller's
distinction between the two types ofmorality. But consider the following. Fuller claims that
his "inner morality of law...embraces a morality of duty and a morality of aspiration" (Fuller
1969, 42). At the same time, however, he argues that "the inner morality of law is
condemned to remain largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty" (Fuller 1969, 43). In
other words, his notion of the "inner morality of law" is based for the most part on
aspirations rather than duties. This differs from the "basic morality of social life" in which
"duties that run toward other persons generally (as contrasted with those running toward
specific individuals) normally require only forbearances", i.e. they are "negative in nature"
(Fuller 1969, 42). In contrast to aspirations, which are difficult to define clearly, such duties
"lend themselves with a minimum of difficulty to formalized definition", i.e. one is "able to
develop standards which designate with some precision...the kind of conduct that is to be
avoided" (Fuller 1969, 42). To pick out some points of interest: Fuller argues that (a) the
"basic morality of social life" is primarily prohibitive and (b) that these prohibitions are
easier to formalize than are aspirations. He also argues (c) that his "inner morality of law" is
primarily aspirational.
What lies behind these claims? I will consider two inter-related lines of investigation.
The first examines the differences between an aspirational morality and one based on duties.
In this context it attempts to explain why Fuller claims the "inner morality of law" is an
aspirational morality. The second line of investigation is based on a more detailed
consideration of the properties of duties and aspirations, and asks why the "basic morality of
social life" might be composed primarily of forbearances. It asks whether there is a
relationship between a minimum morality being negative and it being amenable to
formalized definition. Finally, it questions what it is about an aspirational morality that
makes it difficult to formalize.
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4. The distinguishing features of duties and aspirations
At first glance, the primary feature which distinguishes aspirations from duties is the
presence of a stronger obligation in the latter. That is, some form of conduct is in some
sense required (or prohibited) even if the individual does not want to perform the prescribed
acts (or does want to perform the prohibited acts). In this sense, then, duties are in some
cases independent of the desires of particular individuals. Aspirations, on the other hand,
manifest the desires of certain individuals and are not in conflict with these desires. Another
way to put this would be to say that duties exist independent of the particular desires of
particular individuals, while the existence of aspirations depends intimately on some
individual's particulars.
This is related to Fuller's claim that duties can be defined relatively easily, while to do so
for aspirations is more difficult. Fuller's distinction between duties and aspirations hinges
on the difference between relatively objectively defined acts and relatively subjectively
defined ones. Fuller's claim is that the aspirational aspect of his "inner morality of law",
with the possible exception of promulgation, is relatively subjective and dependent on
perspective. Why might this be the case?
One answer would be that the notion of duties that is at play here is restricted to those
forms which represent necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for social life.7 As such there
are evolutionary reasons why they would be more widely shared across individuals than
would be sufficient conditions.8 That they are necessary conditions (and necessary
obligations) which are widely shared across individuals is related to three further properties
of duties: (a) the greater strength of their obligation, (b) their relative objectivity, and (c)
their negativity.9 Thus, that duties manifest widely shared necessary conditions for social
7 This idea is similar to the one discussed in The Morality ofLaw (Fuller 1969, 9).
8 As mentioned in the chapter on the impartial spectator.
9 These conditions, however, are not sufficient to ensure that it will be relatively easy to formalize necessary
conditions into articulated rules which are obeyable. For that to be the case, the rules also need to be based on
actions observable to the acting individuals. If the knowledge and information upon which the rules depend is
not widely accessible to external observers, then it becomes increasingly difficult to formalize rules (using
Fuller's sense of "formalize"). Fuller seems to be arguing that the principle that rules should be promulgated is a
formalizable rule because it can be based on criteria which are externally observable, and that the remainder of
the rules governing the aspirational aspects of the "inner morality of law" are based to a greater degree on actions
which cannot be observed with the directness of external conduct. It is the type of actions, their degree of
"knowability" by observers, and the objectivity of their classification that is intimately related to the possibility
of their formalization. An increasing standardization of classification occurs when rules are based less on
knowledge / information which depends upon the particulars of individuals and more upon actions which have
the same effects on classifications independent of which particular individual does the observing. It is the role of
the filters introduced in the previous chapters to strip off individual-specific particulars. The argument I am
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life explains their relationship to the will and individual desires: wills are more individual-
specific, with aspirations being manifestations of these wills, while duties are in some sense
above the will, independent of the will, and often contrary to the particular will of a
particular individual.
5. Why duties are easy to formalize, why aspirations are not
If the notion of duties that underlies Fuller's discussion is constituted of widely shared
necessary conditions for social life, this goes some way to explaining why duties are easier
to formalize than aspirations. Aspirations are, in most cases, positive acts, things that one
strives to achieve. Duties, on the other hand, are in large part negative. Ask yourself: do you
aspire to refrain from performing certain actions? No, or at least not to the same degree as
with the performance of acts. Why is this? Because duties are minimal conditions which are
expected of individuals. One does not strive for them, in the sense of striving for the
perfection of certain acts. Rather, one tries to meet their minimal conditions as a foundation
for all of our other strivings. Once these minimal conditions are satisfied, and only then, do
aspirations enter the picture. Aspirations are, then, sufficient conditions for the achievement
of the "good" life. Duties, on the other hand, are necessary conditions for this life. Duties
are concerned with actions which override all others, actions which are not substantially in
conflict. Only in such a situation can the concept of "duty" retain a clear meaning. If there is
substantial conflict between "required" actions it can become difficult to define what "duty"
means. The more conflicts between "required" actions, the more difficult it becomes to
define what is meant by "duty".
All of this is related to two of the defining features of duties: their heightened degree of
compulsion (relative to aspirations) and their greater degree of objectivity. As negative
necessary conditions are relatively commonly held and a necessary foundation for social
conduct they will tend to be given greater weight than will, say, sufficient conditions. This
greater weight allows these negative conditions to override other actions with which they
conflict. This commonly held importance manifests itself as a heightened degree of
objective compulsion, and it is this objectivity which leads to negative duties being
making, then, is not only that knowledge of necessary conditions is more commonly shared across individuals,
but also that this commonality implies that there is a greater degree of standardization of classification for
necessary, as opposed to sufficient, conditions.
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relatively easy to define in simple rules. Aspirations, on the other hand, are more diverse
across individuals, and hence are not as commonly shared as these duties. The fact that they
are not as commonly shared implies that there might be a greater degree of conflict10
between the different aspirations of different individuals than there would be between the
duties they obey, and hence that the degree of commonly shared "importance" of these
aspirations would be less than for duties.
6. Is the "inner morality of law" aspirational?
Why, then, does Fuller claim the "inner morality of law" is aspirational? The reason lies
in the way in which Fuller defines his "inner morality of law". Fuller's "inner morality"
conditions upon the existence of a "basic morality of social life" which is for the most part
comprised of prohibitions. This "basic morality" is constituted of the minimum conditions
for orderly social conduct. If these minimum conditions are not satisfied, social order, and
its equivalent, social regularity, will not exist. If social order does not exist, it will not be
possible to perfect rules which are to govern individual conduct, for no such rules will exist.
In this sense, then, the "inner morality of law" consists of two parts: minimal conditions,
which must be satisfied if law is to exist, and aspirational conditions, which presuppose
these minimal conditions are in fact satisfied.
Fuller's claim, then, is that without a bedrock of social regularity, law cannot exist. The
aspirational aspect of his "inner morality of law" conditions upon a pre-existing social
regularity and aspires to make it more regular. If the "inner morality of law" is in large part
aspirational, this is because it presupposes that the minimal conditions of this "inner
morality" have already been satisfied. If this were not the case, the "inner morality of law"
would not be primarily aspirational but would instead consist of two parts, one duty-based
and one aspirational. Fuller focuses on the latter because he assumes that the former has
been satisfied. To put it somewhat differently, aspirations are based on perfecting the form
of legal rules. The link between duties and aspirations lies in the fact that aspirations
presuppose duties, i.e. they condition on them. Law is aspirational, and can be aspirational,
10 If duties represent necessary conditions, as I have argued, there would be very little if any conflict
between them, and the existence of a conflict between them would begin to render the notion of duty less
intelligible.
TheMechanism is the Message -158
only to the extent that it fulfils the minimal necessary conditions for social existence
implicit in the "inner morality of law".
The aspirational element of the "inner morality of law", then, strives to make conduct
increasingly regular. Law is the activity of making conduct regular (i.e. subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules).11 Law is not merely an authorized set of norms. To
Fuller, law is a system of rules which helps individuals to make their conduct regular (by
subjecting their conduct to the governance of rules). It is not merely concerned with
authorization, for not all that is authorized leads to individuals acting regularly. Indeed,
authorized conduct might lead to an increase in the irregularity of individual conduct. If
authorized conduct is to facilitate regularity on the part of those who obey it, then those who
have authority must act in a way which makes this possible. This means that they must act
regularly, which means that they too must subject their conduct to the governance of rules
— the rules of the "inner morality of law".
7. The negative nature of the "basic morality of social life"
All of this is related to a primary property of the "basic morality of social life": its
predominant negativity. Previous chapters have argued that there are evolutionary
arguments which would lead one to expect that negative, prohibitive, rules of conduct would
be better adapted to guiding autonomous individual conduct in situations of increasing
complexity (why one would want to focus specifically on autonomous conduct governance
will be dealt with in due course later in the chapter). Thus, if one aspires to perfect the
enterprise of subjecting conduct to the governance of rules, and one is faced with an
environment of substantial complexity, one may find that one is forced to increasingly resort
to rules which in their content do not prescribe duties to act but instead merely prohibit the
performance of some forms of conduct. Why would this be the case? The argument, as
outlined in previous chapters, is based on the operation of rules of conduct in situations of
complexity. Negative rules of conduct, in the sense of rules which prohibit behaviour,
manifest minimal necessary conditions for social interaction and are less demanding to
11 This definition makes it clear that there will be areas where one will not desire to subject human conduct
to the direct governance of legal mechanisms. Such areas are those where regularity is a handicap, and where
adjustment to context and space-time specific information is of greater importance than acting with regularity
(and hence ignoring context or environment specific knowledge and information). Of course, the point of
decisive importance and maximal difficulty is in differentiating between these two different knowledge and
informational environments.
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implement than positive rules which impose a duty to act. Thus, if one desires to subject
behaviour to the governance of rules, and one is faced with situations of social complexity,
it may be more effective to use negative rules which prohibit conduct and which do not
impose an obligation to act than it would be to impose positive obligations to act. Negative
rules of conduct in a sense provide the minimal necessary boundaries for action which must
be for the most part obeyed if social interaction is to be possible. Negative rules of conduct,
then, outline the conditions which are necessary if individuals want to achieve their goals.
Positive rules of conduct, on the other hand, are often more complex than negative rules. If
they impose a duty to act on some individuals, they require a supplemental mechanism
which can allow one to know when and to whom a duty is owed. This additional complexity
implies that if one aspires to have individual conduct come under the governance of rules,
and one considers the performative complexity of these rules from the point of view of those
obeying these rules, it may be more effective to subject them to the governance of negative
rules. Of course, this does not imply that all necessary conditions can be realized using
negative rules. Some such conditions would require the use of positive rules, as the resort to
using negative rules does impose restrictions on which conditions can be realized. The point
to emphasize in this regard, however, is that these positive rules are, in many cases of
interest (and in particular, when what I have termed "transfers" are being considered),
informationally and performatively more demanding than are negative rules which do not
impose duties to act, and that this increase in complexity should be taken into consideration
when one is considering the type of rule which might be used to govern conduct.
8. Summary of the argument
It is time, perhaps, to summarize the argument. The focus has been on those features
which distinguish an aspirational morality from a duty-based one. One element is the degree
of compulsion which each morality demands. A duty-based morality does not present
choices. Rather, it makes demands, and these might be contrary to the desires of all
individuals. An aspirational morality, on the other hand, must manifest the desires of at least
some individuals. Now, why does Fuller claim that the "inner morality of law" is
aspirational? He does this, I believe, because he presupposes the duty element of this
morality has been satisfied. Only if these minimal conditions have already been met does
his argument make sense. Fuller further argues that these minimal conditions — duties —
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are for the most part prohibitions of certain types of actions. Why prohibitions? Because
duties represent necessary conditions for social life, and because mechanisms based on
negative necessary conditions are in many cases informationally and performatively less
complex than those based on positive necessary conditions and hence there is reason to
believe that such mechanisms would better survive cultural evolutionary selection pressures.
The exact same reasoning applies to the question of why negative necessary conditions
are easier to formalize than positive necessary ones. In other words, it is because negative
necessary rules tend to be addressed to single individuals (making them informationally and
performatively less complex than positive necessary conditions), combined with the fact
that necessary conditions would be expected to be commonly held and hence relatively
standardized (relative to sufficient conditions which would be more heterogeneous across
individuals), that leads to their greater ease of formalization.12
9. Fuller on duties and aspirations: some criticisms
By now, one might be wondering how duty- and aspiration-based moralities are related
to legal governance. Consider the following. Fuller argues that his "inner morality of law" is
aspirational. I have examined this, and have found that this "inner morality" is comprised of
tM>o parts, one duty-based and the other aspirational. Fuller concentrates his attention on the
aspirational elements of this "inner morality" because, as already stated, he assumes that its
minimal conditions have been satisfied. In my view, this is a strategic mistake, for the
essential function of the "inner morality" is two-fold.
First, there is a minimum set of conditions which must be met if social relations are to be
maintained. This is an essential function of law. Fuller points out, but does not emphasize,
that in abstract societies this function is implemented primarily by negative rules. This is a
point of decisive importance: the minimal conditions required by a complex Gesellschaft-
type society must be implemented by predominantly negative rules (an assertion I attempt to
justify by resorting to informational and evolutionary arguments). This chapter (and the
others of this thesis) make the argument that the negativity of these minimal conditions is an
essential element of the conduct governance mechanisms of complex, abstract societies, and
hence is of fundamental importance to a coherent notion of law in such environments.
12 As pointed out above, for this argument to work there would also have to be a relatively standardized
connection between external conduct and internal states so that objective judgment could be a possibility.
The Mechanism is the Message -161
Furthermore, it emphasizes the connection between this negativity and the degree of
obligation which accompanies a rule (i.e. the distinction between a duty and an aspiration).
It has been argued that if one recognizes that there exists a complex pre-existing social
order, and one wishes to preserve its abstract form, then duties (which have a greater degree
of obligation) must be restricted to negative rules. Thus, if the "purpose" of law is to
generate and support regularity, and this is of the kind demanded by an abstract,
Gesellschaft-type society, then it must resort to negative duties as its primary tool.
Second, there is an aspirational element to the "inner morality of law", which is
concerned with the perfection of these minimal conditions. This is the aspect which Fuller
emphasizes,13 and it is this emphasis which I consider to be a strategic error, for two
reasons. First, such an emphasis obscures the fact that many of the failures of law have not
been failures of the aspirational element of the "inner morality", but instead have arisen
through failures to meet the basic minimal conditions of this "inner morality". In my view,
it is not the failure to perfect law which has been of decisive importance, but rather the
outright failure to meet the minimal conditions of law, in part engendered by the desire to
implement aspirations other than those which Fuller enumerated, which should be
emphasized.
This way of putting it points to my second objection. This is that Fuller's approach does
not adequately stress the relationship between duties and negative rules and aspirations and
positive rules. This assumes an even greater importance in a complex, Gesellschaft-type
society. An understanding of this connection can lead to the insight that many failures of
law have occurred because of the attempt to implement aspirations which have conflicted in
varying degrees with the minimal conditions imposed by legal mechanisms. Fuller's lack of
stress on the minimal conditions of his "inner morality of law" leads him to pay little
attention to the connection between positive rules and aspirations, and hence to the role
aspirations play in undermining the minimal conditions upon which all such aspirations
depend. This interactive effect is of no small importance, and indeed coincides with many of
Fuller's own concerns. It is, then, regrettable (though perhaps in some ways understandable)
that Fuller chose to emphasize the perfection of law rather than its minimal attainment, for
such a change in emphasis is consonant with his abiding concern in the interactive nature of
13 Though not to the complete exclusion of emphasizing the minimal conditions necessary for law's
existence, as is made clear by his discussion in "A Reply to Critics" (Fuller 1969, 197-198).
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law, and with the perfection of law, once it is ensured that law has indeed come into
existence and is capable of being sustained.
10. A Fullerian objection to positivist "efficiency" arguments
Both of these criticisms are essential qualifications to the context within which the
debate concerning the propriety of using the term "morality" to describe Fuller's principles
of legality takes place. If one is interested in understanding Fuller's argument, it is
important to keep in mind the background assumptions which he is taking for granted. The
general idea, implicit in the discussion above but not stressed with sufficient force by Fuller,
is that aspirations rest upon a bedrock of standing obligations, and that these obligations—
these duties — are the minimal conditions for social action (unlike aspirations, which are
sufficient ones). These ongoing minimal obligations contrast with aspirations in that (a) they
are relatively commonly shared across individuals, implying that they are relatively
objective (b) they have a greater obligatory strength, and (c) they are abstract and in large
part negative. The general context resting behind Fuller's arguments, then, is that there is a
fundamental difference between minimal conditions and aspirations which condition upon
these minimal conditions being continually satisfied. The idea is that one is able to have
particular goals only because those conditions, which one shares with all other organisms
having the same abstract structure, have been satisfied. Such minimal conditions are pre¬
conditions for the more particular goals of particular individuals. Such minimal necessary
conditions are not necessarily in accord with the particular will of particular individuals, nor
are they necessarily conscious, or the product of choice or deliberation.
The general conclusion which one may draw from this is that the aspirations of
individuals depend upon the continuing existence of more generally observed minimal
obligations. It is of the utmost importance that one keep in mind that these obligations are
more abstract than the aspirations which condition upon them. That is, these obligations are
more enduring across time and space, and remain the same in a wider variety of
circumstances and environments. The importance of the abstract nature of these minimal
obligations in the present discussion is that it is this property which connects them to
Fuller's objection to the use of the term "efficiency" to describe what he calls the "inner
morality of law".
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The general theme underlying Fuller's objection to this usage rests on the implicit
presupposition that efficiency is a notion which is properly applied in environments in
which minimal conditions have already been satisfied.14 References to the efficiency
aspects of law stand in contrast to, and build upon, a background set of aspects which are
associated with the minimal conditions which must be satisfied if law is to exist. Fuller,
then, is implicitly arguing that in many cases when positivists are discussing issues of
"efficiency" in law as it relates to his "inner morality", they are actually discussing the
minimal foundations upon which the notion of efficiency is based. In this way, issues of
efficiency are conflated with issues concerning the pre-conditions for any evaluation of
efficiency. In other words, the argument is that his positivist critics simply presuppose that
they are within a realm in which evaluations of efficiency are a possibility, without
specifying or paying attention to the pre-conditions upon which such evaluations depend.15
From Fuller's perspective, then, it is the fact that his positivist critics do not take into
account the connection between the minimal conditions of social interaction and how these
minimal conditions are generated and sustained which leads them to argue that the "inner
morality of law" is merely a tool to make law more efficient. Note that this view
presupposes that law pre-exists the application of these principles. From his critics'
perspective, Fuller's "inner morality of law" is merely a set of principles which make law
more "efficient" because these critics presuppose the "legal quality" already exists. This is
an issue of decisive importance: the positivists' view presupposes that law exists
independent of the application of the principles of the "inner morality of law". In other
words, the positivist line is that the application of these principles is not a necessary
condition for the existence of law, but is instead merely a means to its perfection (or
imperfection).16 On this view, Fuller's principles are not moral principles because they are
not values; rather, they are merely means to various other ultimate goals (ultimate values).17
14 This distinction is at the base of another dichotomy which Fuller discussed, the difference between
reciprocity and marginal utility (1969, 15-27).
15 It is perhaps important to note that this critique extends more widely, and could be applied to what has
come to be known as "the economic analysis of law". For more on this perspective, see the collected work of one
of its founders, Gary Becker (1974), and the analyses of one of its most important exponents, Richard Posner
(1981; 1986; 1992). For a textbook introduction, see Cooter and Ulen (1988), while for one example of its
application to a specific area of law (torts), see the analyses of Shavell (1987) and Landes and Posner (1987).
16 Though as Fuller points out (Fuller 1969, 197-198), the positivists do seem to agree with him that these
conditions must be met, although, as this thesis has argued, they do not seem to understand the implications of
such pre-conditions for law and the existence of a "legal quality".
17 A difficulty in terminology arises because positivists are, in general, not concerned to clearly distinguish
between the different properties of, what I have here termed, "goals" and "values", such as their relative degrees
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To the critics, following Fuller's principles makes law more obeyable, inter alia, and if this
is assumed to be a goal, then law which conforms to Fuller's principles becomes more
efficient in guiding individuals' actions. From this perspective, making law more obeyable
is one goal. But there can be others. Raz lists a wide range of such ultimate goals, including
"democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or a
respect for persons or for the dignity of man" (Raz 1977, 211). A legal system and its laws
can be judged relatively efficient or inefficient to the degree they achieve ultimate goals,
whatever they may be. To Fuller's critics, then, subjecting individual conduct to the
governance of rules is not a value, but rather a means to other values. As H.L.A. Hart puts it,
only if the purpose of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, no
matter what their content, were itself an ultimate value, would there be any case for
classing the principles of rule-making as a morality, and discussing whether it was a
morality of duty or aspiration. (Hart, Essays, 351)
Surely, Hart seems to imply, Fuller does not intend to claim this. Hence he must be
committing a category error in calling such an enterprise a morality.
The discussion above implies that Hart's implicit assumption is incorrect. At least one
strand of Fuller's argument can be used to support the claim that Fuller did indeed view the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules as a value. I would argue,
contrary to Hart, that at least to some degree Fuller did hold a similar view, but that this was
obscured by his somewhat confusing discussion of the relationship between minimal
conditions, aspirational and duty-based moralities, and the "inner morality of law". The
obscurity of Fuller's argument notwithstanding, it is, I think, the duty-based, minimal
conditions strand of his argument which allows one to argue that it is a mistake to think of
his "inner morality of law" in efficiency terms. Fuller's argument (or, more accurately, one
strand of this argument) is that it is proper to refer to his principles of legality as a morality
because such principles are an "ultimate" value in that they are a minimal condition for the
existence of social order and in particular, of the type of social order that Fuller (and Hayek)
are concerned to preserve.
Is there any possible resolution to the disagreement between Fuller and his positivist
critics? Or are these protagonists doomed to talk past each other, agreeing only to differ in
their value judgments? I think a potential resolution is possible, and believe that some
of abstraction, etc.. As a result, it can be difficult to know if they are referring to "goals" or "values" as those
terms are used in this thesis.
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progress can be made towards this by asking why subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules could be a value. Once this is understood, perhaps it will be easier to
see why it should be. At the conclusion of the discussion of how subjecting human conduct
to the governance of rules could be a value, I will return to the question of why it is
important that Fuller's "inner morality of law" should be a value and discuss some of the
restrictions such a value would impose on rule-makers in a complex society.
11. Why subjecting individual conduct to the governance of rules is a value
To understand why subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules might be a
value requires a brief journey off the main path of the discussion. This diversion will
attempt to shed some light on one of the perspectives above — Fuller's perspective — and
attempt to tie his arguments in with those of another thinker, F.A. Hayek. At this point in the
discussion, then, Hayek reappears. He has not totally disappeared — in fact, many of his
arguments are well represented by Fuller— but he also has his own arguments to make. As
we shall see, his arguments and concerns are strikingly similar to Fuller's, but they do have
a different emphasis. Taken together, they provide powerful arguments for considering
subjecting conduct to the governance of rules as a value.
The first point to note when considering why this would be a value is that not any form
of rule will do. This chapter will make the argument that both Hayek and Fuller have only
abstract rules of conduct in mind when they discuss governance by rules as a value. Thus, to
Hayek and Fuller, the way in which social order is achieved is of decisive importance. It is
not merely governance by rules which is important, but rather governance by a particular
type of rule — abstract rules. The reason for this is that social order is not their ultimate
goal — only one form of social order is.18 This form of social order is what Hayek refers to
18 Fuller, in his article "Positivism and Fidelity to Law — a Reply to Professor Hart" (1958, 630-672),
approaches this issue in a different way. There, he argues that the distinction which should be made is between
order and "good" order. This is emphasizing a different point from the one in this section. Fuller's argument is, I
believe, that it is the compatibility of the governance mechanism with the goals which one wants to achieve and
the environment to which the mechanism is to be applied that is of decisive importance. Fuller's argument is that
it is this matching of mechanisms to goals and values which Hart overlooks. "Good" order is order generated and
sustained by mechanisms which are compatible with the goals and environmental restrictions of a certain type of
ongoing social setting. The emphasis of this section is similar, and yet its perspective is somewhat different. It is
arguing that there is an intimate connection between the degree of abstraction of the mechanism which is adopted
and the type of social interactions such a mechanism can sustain. Thus, the focus is on the connection between
the abstractness or concreteness of the resulting order and the type of mechanism which is capable of generating
and sustaining such an order. Now, I am arguing that Fuller implicitly attributes "goodness" to the mechanisms
associated with abstract social order (i.e. governance by abstract rules), and "badness" to the methods associated
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as spontaneous order. He contrasts this with what he calls organizational order. Now, as
has been pointed out in earlier chapters, there are two ways of looking at a social order. One
way is to focus on the order of actions itself. Another, perhaps more useful, perspective is to
concentrate on the rules which govern an order. The strategy of this chapter will be, as
before, to focus on the rules which govern spontaneous orders. In Hayek's system of
thought, then, a spontaneous order type of social ordering is generated by individuals being
governed by abstract rules of conduct. This governance by abstract rules is implemented by
the mechanisms described in the previous chapters.
Why, then, does Hayek hold such a form of governance to be a value? There are three
main reasons. First, such a form allows individuals to adapt to environments of increasing
complexity, and to generate a division of labour and knowledge of enormous diversity.
Second, this form of governance enables individuals to act autonomously and allows for the
growth of "individual freedom", "individual responsibility", and cultural and value
diversity. Third, and through the process of abstraction as manifested in the filters of the
previous chapters, this form of governance is capable of sustaining objective rules of
conduct. Such objectivity leads to the possibility of objective dispute resolution and
objective justice. The first two reasons will be explored in this chapter. Both of these are
aspects of Hayek's claim that the only way to generate and preserve an abstract,
Gesellschaft-type, social order is for individual conduct to be subject to the governance of
abstract rules. The third reason forms the basis for the discussion of the principle of the Rule
of Law in the chapter that follows.
It is important to be clear about what the distinction between spontaneous and
organizational order implies. Much of the thesis up to now has focused on the distinction
between abstract and concrete social order. "Abstract" and "concrete" in this usage refer to
with some forms of concrete order (e.g. those in which some command and some merely obey), insofar as he
desires Gesellschaft-type social relations to be sustained. Fuller's implicit argument, and the explicit theme of
this chapter, is that there are restrictions on the types of governance mechanisms which are capable of sustaining
certain forms of order, and that if this is the case it is the matching between the mechanism and the type of social
order which is of decisive importance when one considers whether a mechanism is "good" or "bad". Note that in
this context such attributions apply solely to the overall order of society, and that they are conditional both upon
Fuller's belief that modern society is already to some degree constituted of abstract social relations, and upon his
desire to preserve this form of social ordering. Within such societies (based on abstract social relations), there
may be both abstract and concrete forms of order, and these are judged "good" or "bad" insofar as they maintain
a compatibility between the type ofmechanism which sustains the order and the ends and values one demands be
satisfied by the mechanism. Thus, Fuller can be consistent in arguing that the application of legal mechanisms is
misplaced in the "economic" sphere (Fuller 1969, 170-177), and, at the same time, also arguing that an adherence
to his "inner morality of law" is a necessity if his desired form for overall society, a Gesellschaft-type order, is to
be maintained.
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the properties of the governance mechanisms of that social order. This is the same as the
distinction between the mechanisms of spontaneous and organizational order. There is
another distinction of some importance, and this refers to the degree of commonality
between individuals in a society. The chapter uses the terms Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft
to refer to the degree of commonality present in a social order, with the latter containing
more than the former.19 Thus, one form of abstract social order of particular interest to this
thesis is Gesellschaft-type social order. A Gesellschaft-type society is a particularly
complex form of abstract society, in which a diversity of Gemeinschaft-type societies exist.
These Gemeinschaft-type societies might also be governed by abstract mechanisms, and
hence be abstract societies in the sense that this term is used in this thesis. On the other
hand, these societies may be based on more concrete mechanisms, and hence be what Hayek
terms "organizational" orders. Organizational order is a specific type of Gemeinschaft-type
society.
It is of some importance not to confuse these two different dichotomies. The focus of this
chapter is on governance mechanisms and their relationships to social order. To understand
a conduct governance mechanism one must understand its relationship with its social
environment, i.e. the society of which it is a part and in which it is embedded. The reason,
then, for introducing a Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft societal form distinction is that it is
intimately related to the epistemic issues which are emphasized in this chapter and the
discussions of autonomy which are closely related to these topics. Gesellschaft forms of
society are those based on diversity— of cultures, values, etc. — and abstract commonality,
while Gemeinschaft forms are based on less diversity and more concrete commonality. One
of the central questions that this chapter seeks to address is the manner by which forms of
society based on lesser degrees of concrete commonality have emerged. The answer to this
question, as provided by this chapter, centres around the relationship between such societal
forms and ongoing adaptation by individuals to situations of increasing complexity.
Moreover, this chapter will argue that one can relate the emergence and growing importance
of notions of individual autonomy to this complex inter-relationship.
The distinction between a spontaneous and an organizational order, on the other hand, is
one between the different mechanisms used to generate and support such orders. A
spontaneous order is a social order based on mechanisms generating and facilitating conduct
19 i am presuming the reader is familiar with this distinction, characterized somewhat differently, in
Kamenka and Tay (1971; 1975).
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governance by abstract rules. An organizational order, on the other hand, has no such
connection with abstraction or abstract rules, and is associated with much more
particularistic and concrete forms of governance. Now, while this can be a useful distinction
which will be referred to occasionally, it is not the chapter's primary focus. Rather, the
contrasts between these different forms of governance will be examined in much greater
detail in the chapters which follow. This chapter, then, tends to focus on a single form of
conduct governance — governance by abstract rules — and stresses the implications which
follow from the operation of this type of governance in increasingly complex environments.
The reader must be careful not to conflate the abstract/concrete,
Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft distinctions made above. It would, for instance, be incorrect to
argue that societies containing large degrees of concrete commonality cannot be based on
following abstract rules of conduct. Indeed they can — such societies might very well be
governed primarily by abstract rules of conduct.20 That this could not be the case is not an
argument put forward by this chapter or this work.21 Rather, the argument is that abstract
forms of society are associated with mechanisms based on abstraction, and further, that it
could not be the case that an abstract society could be governed solely by concrete rules of
conduct.
I will end this discussion with a brief summary of the issues to be addressed in the
remainder of this chapter. The main goal is to explain why conduct governance mechanisms
based on abstract rules are important. There are three aspects to this. First, abstract rules are
adaptations to complexity. This is the epistemic aspect of the chapter. Second, abstract rules
allow individuals to follow their own goals. Call this the autonomy argument. Third,
abstract rules are important because of their potential objectivity. This forms the impartiality
facet of the chapter. The first two perspectives tend to be emphasized in this chapter, while
the impartiality claim is the centre of attention in the chapter which follows. In explaining
why governance by abstract rules is of importance, I resort to two fundamental distinctions.
First, there is a distinction between the degree of commonality present in a social group.
20 Though these rules would be relatively concrete in relation to the rules governing the Cesellschaft
societies which contain these Gemeinschaften as members. One important point to note: if the individuals of a
Gemeinschaft-type society evolve increasingly abstract rules of conduct, this implies both that these rules will
refer to wider and wider sets of individuals, and also that these rules will have a less substantive content — and
thus will be transitioning towards the level of abstraction of the rules governing the Gesellschaft-type societies of
which they are members.
21 Furthermore, none of the arguments of this thesis undermine the fundamental importance of Gemeinschaft
societies.
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This is the GesellschaftlGemeinschaft dichotomy. Second, there is a distinction between the
type of mechanisms which are associated with particular types of societies. This thesis
refers to societies governed by abstract mechanisms as abstract societies, and to societies
governed by concrete mechanisms as concrete societies.
12. Why individuals are governed by abstract rules: the argument from complexity,
part I
Hayek is arguing that in a complex society one would have to resort to abstract rules in
order to orient oneself in social interactions. He is also arguing that the existence of a
complex society is somehow dependent on individuals following these same abstract rules.
This is not merely a matter of definition but rather one of mutual dependency. This being
the case, it might be a fruitful line of investigation to ask why individuals in a complex
society would need to follow abstract rules. If there is a need to follow abstract rules, one
might then legitimately inquire into how this is related to the resultant form of society which
emerges from individuals orienting their behaviour using abstract rules. The plan of attack,
then, will be to consider why individuals would need to resort to abstract rules.
Before pressing on, though, one challenge to this line of argument should be addressed.
One way to object to this entire strand of thought would be to argue that individuals always
follow abstract rules of conduct, regardless of the type of society in which they find
themselves, and hence it is spurious to claim that abstract rules of conduct are necessarily
related to a Gesellschaft-type social system. This objection is a valid one insofar as it argues
that individuals in societies with large degrees of commonality could also be governed by
relatively22 abstract rules of conduct under the mechanisms outlined in the previous
chapters. This is unobjectionable, but it is also not at issue. The claim of this chapter is that
if an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society is desired, then social governance mechanisms
would have to be based on abstract rules which pass through the filters manifested by the
mechanisms outlined in the previous chapters. The argument, then, is that governance by
abstract rules is a necessary condition for the existence of a Gesellschaft-type society, but
not that it is also a sufficient condition. The argument is not, then, that it is inconceivable
22 Relative to the degree of concreteness of that society.
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that Gemeinschaft forms of society could be governed by abstract rules of conduct, but
rather that it is impossible for abstract forms of society to not be so governed.
The objection that individuals always follow abstract rules of conduct is, I think, correct
in claiming that individuals inevitably follow some abstract rules of conduct in their
attempts to orient themselves in social settings. This much seems unquestionable.23 The
question is, however, why they need to do so, the relative predominance of abstract versus
concrete rules in guiding social conduct in different types of environments, and hence the
relationship between the abstractness or concreteness of rules of conduct and the
environmental complexity — and societal type — that confronts an individual. This is what
our investigation will attempt to uncover.
It is possible, then, to imagine a society in which individuals relied primarily on
relatively concrete rules of conduct to guide their conduct and social interactions. To do this
is to imagine a society in which individuals' conduct would be heavily dependent on space-
time particulars (i.e. conduct would be based upon an individual's particular context and
circumstances). In this scenario, an individual's conduct would, in general, be relatively
more dependent upon space-time particulars than one would under a regime of more
abstract rules. Abstract rules of conduct, on the other hand, would be less reactive to
particular contexts, but more reactive to general aspects which endure over time and across
space. The move to abstract rules of conduct in a sense fdters out particularity, and makes
one responsive to types (classes) of stimuli, as opposed to particular stimuli.
If this is correct, what does it imply? Consider how individuals following the two
different rule types would adapt to new environments. Both types of individuals would be
guided by particulars and abstractions, but to differing degrees. If the new environment were
one in which many of the space-time particulars were unfamiliar, an individual following
concrete rules of conduct would have more difficulty orienting themselves and reacting to
these particulars. An individual oriented by abstract rules, on the other hand, would be less
dependent on particular spaces and times and hence able to orient themselves more
effectively.24 This is, essentially, Hayek's argument for the importance of abstraction: that
as environments change, abstract rules of conduct are more effective tools for orienting
23 See, for example, Huizinga's Homo Ludens (1950), which examines the relationship between rules and
play.
24 Note that this argument does not imply that there is no place for more concrete rules of conduct. Concrete
rules of conduct will always have an essential role to play in guiding individual conduct in environments which
contain familiar concretes, and in environments over which individuals have space-time specific knowledge.
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oneself than are context-specific rules which condition on particular chunks of space and
time.25
13. On the "sub-optimality" of using rules
This line of argument claims that abstract rules are an effective decision-making
adaptation. Sometimes, however, it is argued that the use of rules is a "second-best" solution
to problem solving. A typical argument, presented with admirable clarity, can be found in
Frederick Schauer's Playing by the Rules (1991, 100-102). Schauer claims that it is
necessarily the case that rule-based reasoning is "sub-optimal". This he deduces on
"logical" grounds, for he claims that it will always be better to use the justification for the
rule than the rule itself. The argument, simply put, is that exceptions to a rule constitute the
reason for its sub-optimality, i.e. one can always do better than a rule by implementing the
rule's justification on a case-by-case basis (hence, eliminating exceptions and hence
improving on the results produced by following a rule).
This is an appealing argument. It is nevertheless incorrect, for it implicitly imports
contingency into an argument of so-called "logical necessity". This contingency enters in
the form of an implicit assumption that the justifications of a rule are known. The argument
that if a rule's justifications are known, then it will be "sub-optimal" to follow rules would
be correct, but this is obviously a contingent argument, dependent upon the knowledge of
the justifications for particular rules. And, if the justifications for a rule are not known, what
is to be made of the claim that it is always better to impose the justifications directly? How
could one impose justifications which one does not know?
This argument leads to a more general point. Schauer's argument implicitly assumes that
there is a difference between judgments based on "all the information" and judgments based
on limited sets of information. He also seems to imply that one can never produce worse
results by considering all of the available knowledge and information. Both of these beliefs
are incorrect.
Is there a difference between judgment based on "all the information" and judgment
based on rules which limit information? No. All judgment is based on closures, on excluding
25 Hayek makes this argument in many of his works. Probably the most effective of these are in The
Constitution ofLiberty (Hayek 1960, 148-161) and the second volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek
1976, 1-30).
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some things from consideration while including others. The argument that case-by-case
judgment is always better than rule-based judgment simply presupposes that the momentary,
individual-specific closures of an individual are somehow better than those embedded in
rules. But why would this necessarily be the case? Schauer seems to be assuming that more
(knowledge) is always better. But need this be the case? Are there not some forms of
knowledge which, if excluded, would lead to a better implementation of one's goals or
values? And what type of knowledge might this be?
To answer this question, consider the following: Schauer's argument completely
overlooks the fundamental struggle between judgment based on momentary goals and
judgment based on long-term goals and values. The theory of mind upon which this thesis is
based argues that there is a continual struggle in every mind between the short- and longer-
term. Long-term goals and values exert their force continually, but they can be
overwhelmed by short-term goals based on short-term judgment. Schauer simply ignores the
fact that, relatively speaking, in situations of conflict between the short- and long-term, a
more complete consideration of the concrete circumstances of the moment implies a less
complete consideration of long-term interests.26 Rules counter-balance this. Rules reduce
short-term judgment and short-term weighting of situations, and hence are manifestations of
long-term priorities. Schauer, then, ignores the consequences for the rank-ordering of one's
priorities that a shift towards momentary judgment implies. Rules are one way of combating
the bias towards the present imposed by judgments based on momentary circumstances and
the heightened intensity which particular circumstances seemingly lend to some goals and
not to others. This heightened importance flows from simply ignoring — closing off to
consideration — long-term effects which are not recognized (and perhaps not recognizable)
in the short-term. This is one reason why individuals resort to rules.
Now consider rules of social conduct. These are resorted to because the goals flowing
from concrete circumstances generate conflicts between the concrete goals of different
individuals, and the possibility of an objective solution to these concrete disagreements
arises when we resort to general rules which deal with these conflicts in abstract, that is, by
excluding certain features of the concrete reality by using general rules which are based on
enduring, long-term values. The idea that "as a rule we will do X in situation Y" is one way
26 Assuming a fixed time interval over which such a consideration takes place, and assuming that "interests"
is taken to include both ultimate goals and values.
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of manifesting long-term values and allowing these to dominate competing short-term,
situation-dependent goals.
Case-by-case judgment, then, is not necessarily a superior method of judgment to one
based on rules. Instead, each method claims that certain forms of knowledge should be
given priority, and that their method of judgment is the best method of achieving certain
types of goals. Case-by-case judgment emphasizes person-specific, momentary judgment.
This way of reasoning gives greatest weight to momentary, individual-specific goals. Rule-
based judgment, on the other hand, emphasizes supra-individual knowledge based on
longer-term considerations, or values which might not be consciously known to the
individual.27
To summarize: the general argument that one can always do better by adopting a case-
by-case method of judgment is flawed in a fundamental way. Its implicit presupposition is
that an individual will always achieve better results if they implement their momentary
judgments of what best manifests their ultimate goals and values. The difficulty is that such
a view presupposes away any conflict between the short- and long-term — and yet this is
precisely when it becomes obvious that one's momentary judgments may not reflect one's
long-term interests. Some individuals resort to rules precisely because they realize that their
momentary judgment of the best way to achieve what they want is not as effective a strategy
as would be one based on following rules. Put simply, rules can be useful tools for achieving
one's long-term interests because they do not consider all of the available information. That
is, not considering all the available information can produce better results than would a
more complete consideration. But how could not using all the available information lead to
the best possible result? How could this be? The answer lies in revealing a misconception:
"all" the available information is never simply "given" to an individual making a judgment.
The idea that "all" the information can be used is an illusion. Judgment always requires an
interpretation of what shall be the "given" information. Such interpretation is based on
closures which necessarily "select" which information will impact upon a judgment. Such
closures can be based on person-specific or person-independent criteria. For the former to
produce "better" choices than the latter, one would have to show (a) that momentary
individual-specific closures are necessarily superior to supra-individual rule-based closures
27 This is, I think, the essential idea behind Hayek's numerous discussions of the difference between
judgment based on "principle" versus those based on case-by-case "expediency" (Hayek 1948, 1-32; 1973, 55-
71; 1976, 1-30).
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at discerning what is relevant and important to the achievement of one's goals and (b) that
individuals know the ultimate justifications for the rules they follow. If they do not, and if
they are governed by some rules without necessarily knowing the justification for doing so,
then individuals would in some sense be treating these rules as values, i.e. they would be
treating them as values and not merely as the means towards other ultimate ends or values.
This might be, then, one reason for Fuller's and Hayek's insistence that some rules should
be treated as values, and not merely as the means to achieve greater goals.
14. The relationship between abstract rules, Gesellschaft-type societies, and
complexity
The discussion above has argued that if there are limitations on knowledge, then rules
might in some cases be an effective orientation mechanism. This applies with even greater
force as individuals' environments become more complex, as it may be increasingly
difficult to ascertain the justifications for particular rules. Rules — and in particular,
abstract rules — might achieve an increasing importance in complex environments. Is there,
then, a fundamental relationship between abstract rules of conduct and orienting oneself in
an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society? The Hayekian argument is that there is. The
argument is that only by obeying abstract rules of conduct can individuals orient themselves
in situations of increasing complexity. Complexity of a fundamental form arises from the
differences in environments which exist at different points in time and space. Gesellschaft-
type societies — a new type of complexity — arose from the interaction of different types
of individuals familiar with different space-time environments. Interaction was made
possible by the adoption of rules of conduct which were effective in guiding conduct across
a range of different and diverse environments. These rules were abstract in that they guided
conduct over the abstract similarities of these environments.
The Hayekian claim, then, is that Gesellschaft-type societies emerged through the
interaction of individuals who had grown up in, and were adapted to, different
environments. These forms of societies were sustained by mechanisms which facilitated the
orientation of individuals in their decentralized interactions. Why decentralized? Because
individuals live in particular space-time environments, because their knowledge is there too,
and because an individual's effective orientation in their environment requires that they use
knowledge which is specific to them, to which they have, in some sense, a privileged
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access.28 The fundamental problem facing centralized forms of governance is the difficulty
of utilizing this person-specific knowledge. If, therefore, one is considering an environment
in which such knowledge is important to individual orientation,29 such forms of governance
may find it difficult to orient individuals as effectively as they could orient themselves.
The Hayekian argument, then, is that decentralized action by individuals underlies social
diversity and complexity (which are in a sense the defining characteristics of a Gesellschaft-
type society) and that it is only through the following of abstract rules of conduct that
decentralized individual action is possible in such environments. Moreover, I would argue
that not only is conduct governance by abstract rules a necessary condition for individuals to
be able to act with the regularity required to sustain a Gesellschaft-type society, but it is also
a pre-condition for the possibility of having conflicts resolved in an objective manner (a
theme that will be examined in some detail in the following chapter). Thus, governance by
abstract rules provides the foundations for the growth of increasing degrees of complexity
and diversity through decentralized individual adaptation, as well as the basis for social
integration through the potentially objective resolution of disputes.
15. The relationship between "individual liberty", "individual responsibility" and
abstract rules of conduct
The second reason for holding that governance by abstract rules is a value is that it is
intimately related to the notions of "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility". The
argument which follows relies to a large extent on the arguments of Hayek. The reason for
this is that his concerns have to some extent been more theoretical than Fuller's, and his
focus has tended to be upon general social analysis rather than upon more specific
institutional details. This is not to say that the discussion that follows is not supportive of
Fuller's view, for I believe that it is, but rather to point out that Fuller did not devote the
bulk of his energies to such an inquiry. In any case, the goal of this chapter is to formulate a
new vision of law based upon, but not merely re-arranging, the insights of these two
thinkers. With that goal in mind, then, I return to the main discussion and restate the
28 This does not imply, of course, that such access will be infallible, or that the truth of an individual's
beliefs are not contestable.
29 This is certainly not to be taken as being true in all environments. Indeed, in certain contexts there are
substantial benefits to be gained by centralization.
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question it seeks to address: why might subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules be a value?
One primary reason why this type of governance is thought to be a value to Hayek30 is
that he claims that subjecting human conduct to the governance of abstract rules is a
necessary condition for what might be called the "fullest flowering" of moral31 virtues. But
of what does this "fullest flowering" consist? Surely Hayek is not arguing that some
societies have no moral notions or that in some types of societies moral action and judgment
would be impossible. But what, then, is Hayek arguing?
There are a variety of issues at play here, and Hayek weaves a complex, interconnected
web of arguments. But what are these arguments? And what lies at their core? To make this
intelligible, I must first state three claims which Hayek asserts at various points in his
writings, and then follow these with one implicit but essential presupposition of these
arguments. First, he argues that a necessary connection exists between "individual liberty"
and "individual responsibility". To Hayek, "[1]iberty and responsibility are inseparable"
(Hayek 1960, 71) since "the sphere of individual freedom is also the sphere of individual
responsibility" (Hayek 1960, 79). Second, he claims that "individual liberty"32 is a pre¬
requisite for the existence of many other moral virtues.33 Third, he states that a necessary
condition for "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility" is the governance of
human conduct by abstract rules.
One element of these claims might be unfamiliar. This is the idea of a "sphere of
conduct". One necessary condition for the existence of "individual liberty" and "individual
responsibility" is the existence of a sphere of actions which are attributed to an individual.
That is, there must be a sphere of conduct which is attributed to the individual and not to
any other. As Hayek puts it, "freedom...presupposes that the individual has some assured
private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in [their] environment with which
others cannot interfere" (Hayek 1960, 13). Note that such a sphere separates the individual
30 To some degree, Fuller makes this argument as well. See, for example, his statements in The Morality of
Taw (1969, 162-167, 181-186).
31 It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that Hayek and Fuller are using the term "morality" in its
specifically modern sense, i.e. in referring to conduct which is attributed to acting individuals. This is, of course,
not the only notion of morality to which one might resort, as both Nietzsche, in both Beyond Good and Evil
(1966) and On the Genealogy ofMorals (1968b), and Maclntyre's A Short History ofEthics (1966), make clear.
32 In the sense of being "free from coercion by other individuals". This is a crucial qualification. See
Hayek's chapter in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 11-21) for his discussion of this point.
33 See, for example, the claim that "[m]oral esteem would be meaningless without [individual] freedom"
(Hayek 1960, 79) and the statement that "[individual] liberty is not merely one particular value but...[rather] the
source and [pre-]condition ofmost moral values (Hayek 1960, 6).
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from the environment in the sense that the environment is defined by that which is not
attributed to the individual. Put another way, a necessary condition for the existence of
"individual liberty" and "individual responsibility" is the existence of the notion of an
individual. This in turn requires that a separation is made between the individual and their
environment, and it is from such a separation that the concept of a "sphere of individual
conduct" emerges.34
The question, then, is how this sphere is delineated. This brings us back to abstract rules
of conduct, for Hayek claims that it is only through a resort to abstract rules that such a
sphere can be delineated. Why would this be the case? Why must mechanisms embedding
abstract rules be used to specify the boundary?
There is one essential element at play here. It is important to keep in mind that Hayek's
focus is on spheres of conduct which are the same for all. Thus, his argument does not apply
to more concrete forms which are context- or subgroup-specific. Hayek's concern is with an
individual sphere of conduct which is the same for everyone capable of conforming to it,
and does not apply to the concept's more concrete forms. One implication of this, which
will be examined in later paragraphs, is that Hayek's argument applies primarily to negative
conceptions of such a sphere (in the sense of being delineated by prohibitions). For the
moment, however, it is sufficient to note that restricting the focus of attention to universal
forms of the individual sphere would imply that individual-specific aspects would be
stripped away from the rules delineating this sphere through the operation of the
mechanisms which support governance by abstract rules. It is this stripping away of
particularity which provides the basis for asserting that these rules are abstract (for such a
filtering in a sense defines what the process of abstraction does). Moreover, it also explains
why the individual sphere is defined by abstract rules, in that it is only if modes of conduct
persist across a wide range of varying particular circumstances that they can be termed rules
of conduct in the performative sense of that term. It is the move to the realm of the abstract,
then, that provides the foundation upon which Hayek builds his argument.
There is one more implication of Hayek's focus which is of some importance. Note that
it is the move to the abstract which supports the (potential) objectivity of the rules of
conduct which delineate the individual's sphere. One upshot of a move to the abstract is that
the use of individual-specific criteria in establishing this sphere would be ruled out, for
34 I will speculate as to why such a sphere arose in a later section of this chapter.
The Mechanism is theMessage • 178
otherwise all individuals would not be capable of being governed by the same set of rules.
This applies with added force in the complexity of a Gesellschaft-type society where the
difficulties of orienting oneself are especially difficult. This consideration implies that the
rules defining the individual's sphere must be known, at least in a performative sense, to the
individuals that obey them and hence that they are commonly-shared (i.e. objective to the
individuals sharing the rules).
Hayek's argument is, then, that the only form of governance mechanism which is
capable of supporting both "individual liberty and responsibility" and the social life of an
abstract, complex, society, is one based on objective, abstract rules of conduct. Moreover, it
is of some importance to note that in the context of a Gesellschaft-type society, it is only by
being surrounded by regular conduct (engendered by other individuals following rules) and
by being oriented by abstract rules, that individuals can act under their own judgment and
ensure that the boundary between the individuals and their environments (which, it is
important to keep in mind, includes other individuals) is preserved.
But what, then, lies at the core of these, and previous, assertions? In the final analysis,
Hayek's argument seems to be based on the idea that being governed by abstract rules of
conduct is a necessary condition for being free. In other words, if we are governed by
abstract rules of conduct, we are free. The argument, then, is "that when we obey...general
abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another
[person's] will and are therefore free" (Hayek 1960, 153). This is, on the face of it, a rather
bizarre argument. What could Hayek mean by it? And how does he come to this view?
Before turning to these questions, we must first turn to a qualification which must be
added to these claims, this being that Hayek is implicitly referring to notions of "individual
freedom and responsibility" which are based on an individual sphere which is the same for
all. As was pointed out above, one implication of this is that Hayek's notions of "individual
freedom and responsibility" would be restricted to those forms which were (potentially)
objective.35 This strand of his argument is often only implicit, but it has some important
consequences. Consider its implication for notions of freedom and responsibility. Earlier
chapters have argued that the mechanisms which support the generation of rules tend to
produce objective rules of conduct which are, for the most part, abstract and predominantly
negative. If one restricts attention to notions of "individual freedom and responsibility"
35 When mapping this onto obligations, this implies that his notion refers to commonly shared obligations
which are owed by all to all others.
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which are based on objective rules of conduct, this implies that these notions will also be
abstract and, in large part, negative. Hayek's argument emphasizes negative conceptions
because his concern is with objective notions of freedom and responsibility. But it should be
stated, in opposition to this, that it would be a mistake to argue that there are no objective
positive minimal obligations underlying social life, or that there are no intelligible notions
of "individual freedom and responsibility" which can be based, at least in part, upon such
positive obligations. The minimal conditions for social life are both conduct-requiring and
prohibitive, and it would be a serious error to assume that notions of freedom (and
responsibility) which are based solely on prohibitive rules of conduct are independent of the
continual fulfilment of positive obligations,36 or are themselves sufficient to ensure that a
social life exists and is sustained. If Hayek does fall into the trap of arguing that "freedom"
is a solely negative concept (i.e. freedom is intelligible only insofar as it refers to what one
is free from)?1 and that such freedom has no dependence upon certain minimal pre¬
conditions being met, some of which are undoubtedly positive, then his argument should be
rejected. This is not to say that there are not some rather serious conceptual difficulties with
notions of freedom which are based primarily on positive rules of conduct (and some of
these difficulties will be addressed in later paragraphs), but rather to argue that (a) there is
an intimate and ongoing interplay between negative and positive obligations underlying
notions of freedom, and that (b) the difficulties one might encounter in basing a notion of
freedom primarily on positive rules does not support the view that minimal positive
obligations have no role to play as pre-conditions for all notions of freedom. The argument
of this thesis is a different one, in that it merely points out that the resort to certain types of
governance mechanisms has the consequence of imposing restrictions upon the type of
positive obligations which can support the notions of "individual freedom and
responsibility". It does not, then, support those views which call for the outright rejection of
positive notions of freedom and responsibility.
36 Such as the positive obligations which exists between parent and child, for example.
37 Hayek does seem to make this argument in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 11-21), and it is possible to
make a case that he would consider the pre-conditions for freedom to be a "separate" topic from the question of
whether one was free. See, for example, his assertions that "[wjhether [one] is free or not does not depend on the
range of choice" and "the range of physical possibilities from which a person can choose at a given moment has
no direct relevance to freedom" (Hayek 1960, 12-13). The problem with each of these claims is that they
implicitly assume that the pre-conditions for choice have been satisfied (i.e. that there are alternatives to choose
between, and that one is capable ofmaking a choice) and hence are subject to the same objections as are raised in
the main text above.
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With this qualification in hand, let us turn then to a consideration of Hayek's notion of
freedom. Why, then, does Hayek claim that conduct governance by abstract rules is a
necessary condition for being free? The answer to this is revealing. As was pointed out
above, Hayek bases his equation on one essential pre-condition which, he argues, a
definition of freedom must satisfy. To Hayek, freedom must be freedom for everyone. This
condition implies that Hayek's notion of freedom must refer to actions which everyone can
perform or to actions which everyone can be free from. This is an important distinction, as it
allows for an objective performative notion of freedom (i.e. one that is shared by everyone
in the sense that they can act under it). Now, if freedom is to be based on objective rules,
then this implies that there must be mechanisms for generating such objective rules of
conduct. This is where the mechanisms described in previous chapters come to the fore, and
it is from the discussions of the previous chapter that we can imply that these rules will be
based on following predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct. The negativity
condition is of special importance, for it implies that freedom must be defined negatively,
i.e. in terms of what others cannot do to you.
Why would this be the case? Consider my freedom to perform some act. Hayek's pre¬
condition imposes a filter over the notion of freedom. "What can I do?" is transformed by
Hayek's filter into the question "what can I do that everyone else can do?". This symmetry
condition restricts the scope of a notion of freedom. Freedom, on this view, is always a
system-quality (a social quality), and this implies that for Hayek it is uninformative to ask
what 7 am free to do in isolation from others.
Assume, for the moment, that this filter is passed and a set of acts emerge which I am
free to perform. Then assume a conflict exists between two individuals performing these
acts, i.e. it is impossible for me to perform one of these acts and for you, at the same time, to
perform your act.38 How is this resolved? How can we both be "free" to perform these acts
when it is impossible for one of us to perform it? If everyone cannot perform their act, is
this not a violation of the symmetry condition?
Does this represent an insuperable difficulty for any concept of freedom? No. The source
of this difficulty flows from an implicit assumption underlying this imagined scenario. The
assumption seems to be that "freedom" is defined in terms of acts which one can perform
rather than in terms of acts which no one is allowed to do to you. Once this is realized, we
38 As an example, consider one's freedom to sit in a particular chair if other individuals have the same desire
at the same time.
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can run through the scenario again from a different perspective. On this way of viewing the
matter, "what am I free to do?" is not the relevant question. Rather, the question of interest
is "what are others not allowed to do to me?" or "what am I free from?".
Will difficulties emerge under this sort of redefinition? Could it be that all individuals
could be free from the same sorts of conduct and, at the same time, for there to be no
conflict between these sets? Yes, this can be the case, but it would depend critically upon
the properties of the actions that one is free from. These cannot be states that one finds
oneself in, for this would imply an obligation on another to change your condition and this
would in turn imply the existence of a non-symmetric rule which does not apply to everyone
in the same way. One must, therefore, be free from certain forms of conduct (as opposed to
freedom from states of affairs) which others can and should not perform, i.e. they must be
capable of not performing it and there must be an obligation upon them not to perform it.
Note the intimate connection with the earlier discussion which argued that it would be a
mistake to jettison the fundamentally important role played by positive notions of freedom
and obligation. The argument about the difficulties surrounding a positive notion of freedom
implicitly presupposes that the performance of actions is a possibility, and hence implicitly
assumes that the minimal conditions for action have already been satisfied. However, if this
were not the case, and some individuals were not, on their own, able to meet these minimal
conditions, then this argument would be inapplicable. The important point, I think, is that
the satisfaction of certain minimal conditions is presupposed by any notion of freedom, and
that if these conditions are not in fact satisfied, it makes very little sense to talk about
whether one was, or was not, free to, "in principle", perform some action. In other words,
when one is considering arguments with implications for conduct governance, there must be
a match between the potential and the actual such that certain minimal conditions are met,
for otherwise, there would be no individual to guide and no conduct to govern.
If one takes it as a given that certain minimal conditions (some of which are no doubt
positive) must be, and have been, met, what can one then say of Hayek's argument against
notions of positive freedom? Consider the following: if I were to complain that my freedom
was worthless because there were certain acts which in principle I was free to perform but in
practice I could not, Hayek could argue that I misunderstood the idea of "freedom". The
error underlying my complaint stems from the implicit assumption that freedom is positive
and refers to acts that I am free to perform. This assumption is an erroneous one. If both you
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and I are free to perform certain acts and a conflict emerges, how is this to be resolved?39
Clearly, one of us is not "free" in the sense of being able to perform the desired act. This
difficulty, however, stems directly from the assumption that freedom is positive. Freedom
defined in positive terms leads directly to the notion of trade-offs between freedoms. My
freedom to act can at the same time be your "unfreedom". My freedom to not be in a
particular state can be your obligation to extricate me from this state. One person's increase
in their ability to act can imply another person's reduction in their ability to act. All of this
stems from adopting a positive definition of freedom, based on the idea that to be free
implies the existence of certain acts which I can perform. But this, I would argue, is the
wrong way to view freedom, especially if one is interested in providing a workable
definition which can guide conduct autonomously and objectively in situations of increasing
social complexity. The Hayekian view is that a better way to view the notion of freedom
would be to answer the question "but what am I free to do?" with the response "you are free
to do anything that does not violate the negative rules which govern other— and your own
— individual spheres".
To summarize, then: the Hayekian argument is that the only notion of freedom which is
the same for all and which is based on objective rules of conduct compatible with the
mechanisms of the previous chapters (which generate objective rules of conduct) is one
based on negative, abstract rules of conduct which delimit individual freedom by
determining what others may not do to others. This is a notion of "individual" freedom
which is necessarily in society, and it is based on negative abstract rules "applicable to
everybody".
Three qualifications to this argument should be made before closing this discussion.
First, and to reiterate the point which is emphasized above, Hayek's argument presupposes
that certain minimal conditions for action have already been satisfied. If these have not been
satisfied, his conclusions regarding the nature of freedom are rendered suspect. Second, this
argument does not specify the content of the individual sphere which constitutes the
39 Clearly, such a positive definition of freedom presupposes some mechanism which resolves such disputes.
This is not problematic. What is problematic is that such a definition implies that the freedom of some directly
implies the "unfreedom" of others. This is a notion of freedom which, if conflicts emerge, cannot be applied in
the same way to everyone. In other words, it is a definition which cannot be universalized to produce the same
rule which everyone could obey in particular situations. It is a definition which calls for the resolution of
freedom-conflicts (which its own definition engenders) by a mechanism which is capable of weighing one
person's freedom to act against another's. This notion of freedom implicitly presupposes trade-offs between
freedoms, and implicitly builds in unfreedom at its core.
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boundary between individuals. It merely states minimal conditions for the establishment of
this sphere. It does not state sufficient conditions. Third, this line of argument refers solely
to social freedom — the same freedom which is shared by all. In particular, it is not
concerned with more concrete notions of freedom which might be applicable only within
particular groups or solely in particular circumstances.
With all of these qualifications in mind, then, return to Hayek's three assertions. Why is
"individual liberty" necessarily connected to "individual responsibility"? Because, Hayek
argues, they are two sides of the same coin. Consider "liberty" (i.e. "freedom"). What am I
free to do? Hayek's answer: anything that does not violate the rules which govern the
individual's sphere. For what actions am I responsible / will I be held responsible / are my
responsibility / am I obliged to perform or not to perform? Hayek's answer: all those that
you can and should control. And how are these defined? Which actions can I and should I
control? Hayek's answer: those actions which will violate the individual sphere of another.
Hayek's other two assertions are also readily intelligible. Governance by abstract rules is
a necessary condition for "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility" because it is
the only way such concepts can be given a meaning which is objective and hence amenable
to individuals guiding their own conduct in similar ways in social situations. "Individual
liberty" is a necessary pre-condition for other moral virtues because as "individual liberty"
is limited, so is the degree of applicability of morality based judgments. In this sense, moral
merit, praise and blame, and other moral concepts lose their applicability as judgment
criteria over those sectors of that society that do not enjoy "individual liberty". Finally, note
the connection between freedom and minimal moral systems: the latter are, in their
objective sense, predominantly defined by rules which set out in negative form the actions
one is free to perform (i.e. in the sense of b&'mg free from the responsibility to refrain from
performing them).40
The conclusions flowing from Hayek's three assertions are thus as follows. First, to
Hayek, the spheres defining "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility" are
identical. Second, these spheres are defined using abstract rules of conduct and this is the
only method which could do so and at the same time retain an objective definition which
40 Once again, it is important to remind the reader that Hayek is implicitly referring to universal forms of
responsibility, i.e. to those forms which are shared by all, and not to more limited forms. Hayek's focus is upon
the commonly shared responsibilities of all individuals, and it is this restricted interest which leads him to claim
that one is responsible only for those acts which violate the individual spheres of others.
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allows individuals to guide their own conduct in the same way. Third, "individual liberty" is
a pre-condition for other moral virtues because it is through the assignment of individual
responsibility, which is in turn based on the idea of "individual liberty", that morality comes
into play as a judgment criterion. Fourth, and finally, social order based on governance by
predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct is a value because it is under this
governance mechanism that as many individuals as possible can have objective forms of
"individual liberty" and "individual responsibility".
This has an interesting implication. If these conclusions are correct, then this implies that
criticisms of Hayek which claim that he bases his arguments for "individual liberty" on
other values41 are, in a sense, wide of the mark, for Hayek is arguing that "individual
liberty" is a necessary pre-condition for the growth of values, moral and otherwise. In this
sense, Hayek does not ground his argument for "individual liberty" on other values, moral
or otherwise, because his theory is in part based on insights into how morality and values are
themselves generated and sustained. In a Hayekian framework, morality does not exist in a
vacuum. Nor do values. They are not something which exist independent of the world, or
"above" the world, but rather are a product of interaction and evolution within the world.
Hayek argues that subjecting conduct to the governance of rules is a value because such a
mechanism allows for the "fullest flowering" of moral virtues. This "fullest flowering"
refers to the possibility of greater and greater numbers ofparticular individuals basing their
action and judgments on moral considerations and, in essence, putting their morality into
effect. The Hayekian argument is that if conduct governance is not based on predominantly
negative abstract rules of conduct, then the possibility of moral action, moral judgment and
moral merit extending to wider and wider classes of individuals also disappears. This
shrinking of the moral sphere to increasingly restricted groups of individuals is, Hayek
argues, an inevitable outcome of rejecting a governance mechanism which makes moral
action an attainable possibility for wider and wider segments of the population. In the final
analysis, Hayek's argument is that for "individual liberty" and "responsibility" to achieve
their widest possible impact in a society (and for larger and larger numbers of individuals to
be "responsible" and have "liberty"), individual conduct must be subject to the governance
of abstract rules. To Hayek, then, "individual liberty", "individual responsibility" and moral
judgment are inseparably intertwined.
41 See, for example, the criticisms ofOgus (1989, 403-406).
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16. Two objections to the connection between governance by abstract rules and
moral virtue
It is important to clearly understand the argument that is being made by the discussion
above. One misunderstanding of this argument can be revealed by examining an objection to
the idea of a necessary relationship between governance by abstract rules and moral virtue.
Consider, for the moment, the argument that there is no necessary relationship between
societies with large degrees of commonality and ones in which conduct is governed by
relatively concrete rules. In Hayek's terminology, this objection claims that there is no
necessary relationship between Gemeinschaft-type societies and organizational forms of
order. This is, I think, quite correct — there is no necessary relationship so long as a
Gemeinschaft-type society is grounded upon the mechanisms supporting governance by
abstract rules and is limited in the diversity that it attempts to govern. There is nothing in the
theory developed in this chapter which implies that Gemeinschaft-type societies will have
less freedom or responsibility than would a Gesellschaft-type society so long as (a) these
societies use the mechanisms outlined in the previous chapters to generate and filter rules
and (b) it is understood that the requirements of commonality presupposed by a
Gemeinschaft-type society will probably be undermined by spatial expansion, temporal
distancing, and, more generally, interaction with that which is different and diverse.42 The
underlying ontological and evolutionary premises underlying this thesis (that space-time
differs at different points, and that organisms adapt to these differences and hence become
diverse) implies that existence at different points in space and time will result in differences
— in biological form, in culture, in knowledge, etc.. It is the growth of diversity which
poses a problem for particular types of concrete social mechanisms. If a Gemeinschaft-type
society were grounded upon social mechanisms capable of generating rules of conduct
which were able to deal with the increases in diversity and complexity, there would
probably be a gradual transition from a Gemeinschaft to a Gesellschaft-type social form. If,
however, the attempt is made to maintain commonality in the face of growing diversity by
an abandonment of these mechanisms, or if these mechanisms were never in place in the
first place, this can lead to the imposition of one group's commonality onto another group's
42 One of the fascinating aspects of the work of Harold Innes was his ground breaking analysis of the
development of various mechanisms of communication and their implications for social interaction and social
structure. See, in particular, Empire and Communications (1950) and some of his essays which elaborate on, and
provide support for, this theme in The Bias ofCommunication (1951).
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differences. Thus, because some forms of mechanisms supporting a Gemeinschaft-type
society have difficulty dealing with emergent diversity, these mechanisms can lead to the
imposition of the commonality of various dominant groups onto other, less dominant groups
who do not share the same commonality.
This brings us to a more general point, an implicit presupposition which Hayek rarely
comments upon. Hayek is implicitly assuming that the contrast of interest is between what
he terms a "spontaneous" and "organizational" order. In the former, individuals order their
own actions by obeying abstract rules of conduct. In an organizational order, on the other
hand, the conduct of some individuals is governed by the goals of others. This distinction is
identical to the one that I employ when contrasting abstract with concrete societies. Abstract
societies are those which are governed by abstract rules of conduct, while concrete forms
are those governed by more concrete goals and methods. An important point to keep in mind
is that while a spontaneous social order is equivalent to our usage of an "abstract" society,
this is not uniquely associated with Gesellschaft-type societies. Both Gesellschaft and
Gemeinschaft social forms can be governed by abstract mechanisms. "Abstract" and
"concrete" societies refer, then, to the mode of governance over that society. Now, I am
arguing that Gesellschaft-type societies are necessarily associated with abstract forms of
governance. But this is not to argue that abstract forms of governance are exclusively
associated with Gesellschaft-type societies. Nor is the argument that organizational social
orders are associated with particular types of Gemeinschaft-type societies, though this might
be an argument one might make. The essential point which I wish to emphasize is that there
is a difference between the degree of commonality of a society (which underlies the
Gesellschaft!Gemeinschaft distinction) and the type of mechanisms which govern a society
(which underlies the abstract/concrete society distinction), and that there is a necessary
relationship between abstract mechanisms and Gesellschaft-type social order.
Thus, the abstract/concrete order distinction is distinguishing between different forms of
conduct governance, while the Gesellschaft!Gemeinschaft social order distinction is
between degrees of commonality. It is important to be clear on this distinction, for
confusion on this point can lead to an implicitly disdainful (or perhaps even contemptuous)
attitude towards Gemeinschaft forms of society, in that these forms of society become
implicitly associated with restrictive forms of conduct governance. This is certainly not the
attitude adopted by this thesis. Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft-type societies are simply
different forms of social order. There is no relationship in "superiority" or "inferiority"
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between the two types of order unless by this one means the ability of each type of order to
satisfy certain goals or values. If this is what is meant, then one can make a case that each
type of order is better-adapted to satisfying different types of goals and values. It is the
argument of this thesis that if one desires a diverse society — one in which individuals
pursue their own goals which might differ across individuals, and one in which individuals
from different cultures, values, backgrounds, histories, etc. co-exist — this is best satisfied
in a Gesellschaft-type society. If, on the other hand, one desires community in the sense of
concrete commonality with others in the community, this is best satisfied in a Gemeinschaft-
type society. The interesting question, from the point of view of this thesis, is whether there
exists a compatible match between individuals' desired degrees of commonality and the
degree of commonality which actually exists. If it is felt that there is not such a match, the
question of even greater interest is how individuals go about trying to change this.
This brings us back to the original question of what Hayek means by the idea of the
"fullest flowering" of moral virtues. Essentially, Hayek's argument is that in environments
of complexity, it is the mechanisms which support abstract societies which are essential to
the widest range of individuals being considered as autonomous moral agents. It is
important to be clear that Hayek is contrasting the differences between governance
structures for societies which range over wide expanses of diverse space-time. Thus, Hayek
contrasts abstract rule-based mechanisms with other, more concrete mechanisms while
presupposing a complexity which is similar to that which one experiences in a complex
society. In essence, then, Hayek is asking the question of whether concrete mechanisms are
capable of supporting moral autonomy for individuals, given that they (the individuals)
exist in the complexity and diversity of a Gesellschaft-type society.
A second, more general, objection to the idea of a necessary relationship between
governance by abstract rules and moral virtue focuses on the relationship between rules of
conduct and autonomy. This argument could run as follows: "Hayek's claim is erroneous
because it conflates the distinction between acting on rules and being able to act
autonomously. An individual might follow rules which have been created by others, and
these rules might embed the purposes of the other, and not of the individual. Thus, one is
not necessarily acting as an autonomous agent when one is following rules". Is this a
persuasive objection? I think not — but it is an important objection nevertheless. To give a
considered response to this requires approaching the objection in two different ways. The
first two comments take the objection on its own terms. The third comment does not,
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however, and argues that it is the implicit presuppositions of this objection which diminish
its force and reveal to the reader one possible misinterpretation of the theory outlined in this
chapter.
The first comment argues that the claim that someone can embed their intentions in rules
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. It can be argued that there are two issues of
importance at play here: the type of intentions which are manifested and how these
intentions are manifested. In particular, it would be (a) the degree ofabstraction and (b) the
degree ofnegativity of (c) a system of rules in which these intentions were manifested which
would be of decisive importance. In other words, whether a rule specifies a concrete action
or a general class of actions is important. Equally pertinent is the question of whether the
rule demands action or prohibits it. And so are the systemic implications of any particular
rule (i.e. the effect on conduct when an individual rule is taken in combination with other
rules in effect). Hayek argues for the use of systems of relatively abstract negative rules.
These systems exclude abstract forms of action. He is not extending his argument into a call
for systems of extremely general negative rules (which might exclude extremely large
classes of action, though this would be counter-balanced by the fact that they would be quite
vague and hence require more individual judgment) nor for systems of very concrete
positive rules (which demand particular forms of behaviour and hence can be very
restrictive of "individual liberty").43
Second, the argument that I am making is not that following abstract rules of social
conduct is a sufficient condition for acting autonomously, but rather that it is a necessary
one. Abstract rules may indeed manifest the intentions of particular individuals, and this
may lead one to act in a way that one would not have chosen if the rule did not exist. But the
function of the different fdters mentioned above is to decrease the latitude one individual
has in controlling another. It is in this sense, then, that universally subjecting conduct to the
governance of rules is a fdter of sorts, in that such governance filters out conduct which is
not sufficiently regular to fall under rules. Restrictions governing these rules — demanding,
for instance, an "adequate" degree of abstraction — perform still more filtering. The
43 There is thus always a balance which must be struck between the relative abstractness and concreteness of
rules. On the one hand, the abstractness (generality of reference) of rules is related to its applicability in a wide
variety of environments. The more abstract, ceteris paribus, the more environments the rule encompasses. On the
other hand, the concreteness of a rule in part determines the certainty of a rule. If a rule is very abstract, it leaves
room for individual judgment. If it is very concrete, it decreases this element of judgment. This decrease in
individual judgment, however, can be one aspect contributing to the increasing certainty of a rule.
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purpose of these filters is to decrease the control one individual can have in directing the
conduct of another. If such direction occurs, it must be (a) "sufficiently" regular, (b)
prohibitive and (c) "sufficiently" abstract (such that I can implement my own goals and, at
the same time, be able to obey the rule without having to make further references to the
particular goals of rule-makers).
Third, and perhaps most important, are a couple of points that will be discussed at
greater length later in the chapter in relation to the legal theory of H.L.A Hart, but which
deserve a brief mention here. The objection that predominantly negative abstract rules of
conduct do not necessarily preserve individual autonomy contains three implicit
assumptions. First, it implicitly presumes that such rules are created by some individuals.
Second is the assumption that some individuals impose rules on others. Third, it assumes
that such rules are articulated. This view, then, simply presupposes that the authority
structure of society is such that one group can create and impose their rules on others. The
assumption that rules are in the form of words seems to flow from this implicit premise.
These presuppositions are utterly incompatible with the notion of conduct governance
mechanisms found in this chapter. Not only does this view simply presuppose a societal
authority structure where individuals can impose their particular rules on others, but it also
conceives of rules primarily in their articulated forms. Both of these assumptions are
rejected by the framework of this chapter. The theory spelled out in this chapter presupposes
a conduct governance mechanism based on rules which must pass through the particularity
filters of the previous chapters, the function of which is to filter out the particular goals of
particular individuals or groups. Under such a theory, rules are not necessarily articulated.
As I shall argue later in this chapter and in the chapters which follow, this implicit vision of
top-down authority, in which some are able to impose articulated rules on others, is based
on a mistaken notion of social order and an equally misconceived belief in the causal
relationship between law and society. Furthermore, such a vision implicitly presupposes that
rules can be alienated and imposed on others and, as pointed out in the previous chapter,
such an idea is only compatible with some, but not all, notions of rules. Such a view, then,
can argue that rules are not necessarily compatible with autonomous action because it
implicitly presupposes the existence of an authority structure and a notion of rules which
makes this a possibility.
All of this leads to one final point. The discussion thus far has focused on the filters of
the previous chapters. A question which has not yet been raised is whether there are any
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further filters which should be considered. The answer to this is that there is one further
filter to be introduced. In the following chapter, which introduces the principle of the Rule
of Law, a minimum coercion filter is introduced. This is based on the idea that legal rules
must be to some degree in conformity with the general rules which individuals are already
following. If one's pre-existing regularity is replaced by rules of conduct from another, one
loses one's autonomy. This is an important argument, and I will give it a more considered
examination in the section examining Hart's legal theory, and in the chapter which follows.
For the moment, though, consider one important point that it highlights. The objection
above does not deal with the relationship between rules which are imposed from outside and
rules which are, in a sense, imposed from "inside". Yet the way that rules govern conduct is
of decisive importance. A Hayekian theory explicitly assumes that individuals are already
following rules which order their conduct. It is important to acknowledge this. If this is not
recognized, one has no way of realizing that the imposition of one set of rules might be
supplanting another set of rules (which exist within individuals, which are perhaps even in
part constitutive of individuals, but which were not designed nor deliberately created by
them). The question is not merely one of whether or not individuals should follow rules in
their social conduct, for to some extent they already do. The question is rather the way in
which rules govern conduct, and this question in turn depends upon the type of rule one is
following (i.e. is it abstract or concrete, positive or negative, and to what degree) and the
authority structure presupposed by those rules (i.e. are the rules imposed from "outside" or
from "inside", are they obeyable using my (internal) judgment or do they require (external)
references to authority and, if so, to what degree and ofwhat type, etc.).
17. Why individuals are governed by abstract rules: the argument from complexity,
part II
This section turns to the question of why individuals are governed by abstract rules, and
approaches it from another angle. The aim here is to summarize some of the evolutionary
foundations of the Hayekian approach, and to investigate some objections which might be
made to these. It should be stressed at the outset that the discussion is necessarily quite
simplified, with its main goal being to lay out the Hayekian position and to examine some of
its implications.
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The Hayekian explanation for the emergence, and importance, of abstract rules of
conduct rests upon a conjectural ontological assumption, and is supplemented with some
general evolutionary arguments which draw from themes present in biological psychology
and evolutionary neurophysiology.44 The ontological assumption is that a fundamental
source of complexity flows from differences in space-time. Because particular points in
space-time are different from others, the world that exists is comprised of fundamentally
different environments. Organisms which evolved and adapted to these different
environments developed differently, depending on the particulars of their environments and
the nature of the organism's adaptations to it. As these organisms spread across space and,
through replication, persisted across time, they encountered different environments to which
they continued to adapt.
The social aspect of complexity arises from the fact that the environment of one
organism might frequently consist of other organisms of the same, or of different, types.
These organisms are themselves complex in that they are capable of generating complicated
action patterns, which are themselves adapted to the particular environments in which the
organisms developed and evolved. Now, for an organism adapted to one particular space-
time environment to be adaptive in another environment, there must be a common
adaptedness to general aspects of these environments. In other words, the adaptability of an
organism to different space-time environments is dependent upon the degree to which the
rules of conduct governing their activities are abstract.
If this story is correct, and if the organisms were faced with an increasing level of
environmental complexity (stemming, in part, from the growing complexity of the actions
of one's cohorts), what are the implications for one particular form of activity that some
complex organisms (and, in particular, humans) can perform, this being the act of
judgment? As the environment facing individuals grows more complex, individuals become
less and less able to judge the particular circumstances governing the conduct, and
influencing the judgments, of others. This increasing lack of a capacity to judge concretes
would necessitate a withdrawal from the particularity of judgment, i.e. there would need to
44 These neurophysiological themes will be revisited at greater length in the final chapter of this work. For
the purposes of this chapter, the essential idea is that mind might be capable of absorbing and, in some senses,
representing aspects of its environment. It might be noted that this does not imply that an environment is
represented within mind in the same form as is present in the environment, nor does it imply that this
representation is "perfect", nor that it is solely of the world external to that mind (as will be discussed in the final
chapter).
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be a move away from conduct and judgments based on particular circumstances and
contexts, and towards those based on general types of situations. The increased degree of
abstraction of rules of conduct and judgment would be more adaptable to a wider range of
environments, but it would bring with it an associated decrease in the ability to judge the
particular circumstances of each particular case.
The argument, then, is that as the environment of individuals becomes more and more
complex, and as it contains an ever increasing number of particulars, individuals will need
to orient themselves to an increasing degree using abstract rules. Moreover, increases in
complexity cannot be overcome by increases in individual concrete knowledge, for
increases in such knowledge by one individual represents increases in complexity to other
individuals (as individuals are part of the environments of other individuals). The effect of
an increase in complexity is, then, interactive and relative; interactive, in that it is the
interplay between different individuals having different knowledge which in part constitutes
the problem of complexity and the difficulties of achieving social order, and relative, for
although knowledge for "the society as a whole" may increase dramatically, an individual's
knowledge relative to this "whole" will represent an ever decreasing proportion, as specific
individuals increasingly know less and less of the "totality" of knowledge of a society.
What are the implications of all of this for conduct governance? One would be that
attention must be paid to an intimate relationship between the degree of particularity which
is manifested in conduct governance mechanisms and the complexity of the environment in
which it operates and to which it is well adapted.45 In particular, governance mechanisms
which strive to govern situations of increasing complexity in the same way for all
individuals under its governance would find that it was increasingly necessary to resort to
abstracts, rather than to particulars, as the grounds for its rules and judgments. This same
shift in the basis of judgment would apply to individuals, but it should be noted that in
relative terms autonomous individual judgment would refer to more particulars. What this
means is that in increasingly complex environments, adaptive judgment based on concretes
9
and particulars would, for reasons of informational and performative complexity, come to
fall more and more under the judgment of particular individuals in particular situations. The
45 It is important to note that at least part of this complexity is related to increases in the number of
individuals who populate other people's environments. Hence, as the size of a particular group increases, the
potential for increasing diversity and complexity increases as well.
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rationale for this is that there exists no conduct governance mechanism which is capable of
simultaneously producing objective judgments whilst taking these concretes into account.
The argument is, then, that individual's judgments46 over their own actions should have
priority over the judgment of others because individuals have, in some respects, a privileged
access to the knowledge of, and control over, their own conduct,47 This prioritization should
occur because the complexity of society makes such an assumption, in certain
circumstances, adaptive. In other words, the implications of individuality, and its privileging
of the judgment of the individual over the judgment of others, becomes, in certain
circumstances, more adaptive as the complexity of society increases.
This is not to argue that particulars have no role to playing in guiding conduct, nor is it to
claim that the judgment of individuals should always be privileged over that of others, for
there are a variety of circumstances in which it should be overridden. Consider for a
moment the latter issue, and the question which it raises concerning the contexts in which
individual judgment should be subordinated to the judgment of others. It is important to
note that what these circumstances share is a concern with the fulfilment of necessary
conditions for action and for social life. As such, and considered in the context of the
operation of governance mechanisms, they are based on both negative and positive
obligations. The Hayekian argument is not that it is only negative obligations which have a
role to play in a complex society, but rather, that the implementation mechanisms which
46 Or control over their own actions. It is important to keep in mind that this chapter, and the work as a
whole, emphasizes the importance of recognizing the role of performative knowledge. This type of knowledge is
in many cases more easily controlled by the individual whose conduct manifests it, and in this sense they can be
considered to have a privileged access to it. This is not to deny that individuals external to another might not be
able to take control of this knowledge in a variety of ways, but rather to merely point out that in many cases it is
reasonable to place the weight of responsibility for controlling certain conduct on those individuals to whom it is
often directly (in a space-time sense) "attached".
47 To quote from the first chapter, this does not imply that this access is "somehow 'transparent',
'unmediated', or infallible. Nor does it imply that there is no interpretation required for one to "figure out" what
one's own beliefs are", nor that individuals are never incorrect in asserting their own beliefs. Rather, the point
being made is that interaction in a complex society tends to lead to more and more individuals knowing each
other solely in an abstract way, and that it is this distancing between individuals which underlies the presumption
that individuals have a prioritized access to their own knowledge, goals, and conduct. The question, then, is not
whether in principle individuals have privileged access or not, but rather whether in practice a complex social
order can be sustained if this is not in fact presupposed. None of the discussion above would deny that increases
in (scientific, psychological, neurophysiological, etc.) knowledge might lead to the possibility of challenging this
privileging presumption in particular instances. The question, however, is whether this exception to the general
rule is of great importance to issues of conduct governance. I would argue that it is not. It can be argued that if
this were to be the standard method of assessing individual claims, there would have to be a concomitant change
in the structure of social relations and authority to accommodate this. From the point of view of this thesis, it is
the degree of compatibility between the change in authority structure and the continuing existence of an ongoing
structure of social relations which is of great importance. This interactive effect can be seen when the focus is put
on society-wide effects which come about when certain methods are applied more generally across society, and
might be overlooked if one focused only on its application in particular cases.
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ensure that these obligations are fulfilled must be the appropriate ones, given the different
nature of obligations based on negative and positive rules of conduct.
Now consider the issue of whether particulars have a role to play in guiding conduct in a
complex society. The Hayekian argument is not that particulars have no role to play in
guiding conduct, but rather that if they are to play a role, they must enter into judgment and
conduct guidance in a well-adapted manner. This is the theme which underlies Hayek's
advocacy of "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility". The argument he makes is
that if one wishes objective conflict resolution to be a possibility in the context of
increasingly complex societies, one must resort to mechanisms which are based on abstract
rules of conduct. The claim is that only by following abstract rules can the individuals of a
complex society orient themselves in a decentralized manner and act "responsibly" and with
"liberty". These abstract rules are also a necessary foundation for a Gesellschaft-type
society, i.e. only by individuals obeying abstract rules of conduct can such a society be
generated and sustained. In a sense, "individual liberty" and "individual responsibility" are
artefacts resulting from the increasing complexity of social interaction. They arise as the
result of an attempt to adapt to an ever-increasing relative ignorance, and are a by-product
of the mechanism which has arisen as an adaptation to this lack of knowledge. This
mechanism consists of following abstract rules.
None of this implies that the concrete is insignificant or unimportant in a complex
society, nor that an individual's judgment must always overrule the judgments of others.
Consider two objections to the above discussion which are based on these implications. The
first objection might be termed the blindness to the concrete objection. This states that the
discussion as stated thus far completely ignores the role of concrete rules of conduct in
guiding people's actions. Furthermore, it passes over intimate relationships, the interaction
of those sharing concrete goals, etc.. Basically, the theory completely ignores the concrete
— concrete interactions, concrete knowledge, concrete rules of conduct and, ultimately,
concrete reality.
This is a serious criticism which is, in a sense, correct. For example, the exclusion of a
detailed consideration of the role concrete rules of conduct play in social life has been quite
deliberate. The emphasis of this chapter is on abstraction and the role abstract rules of
conduct play in orienting behaviour in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. I have focused
on this because it is my view that this relationship is typically ignored, misunderstood or
misinterpreted. This notwithstanding, the argument of this chapter should not be interpreted
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to imply that concretes are unimportant or irrelevant. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Concrete relations are an extremely important and highly valued aspect of social life.
Furthermore, they are an indispensable component of mechanisms of social orientation.
None of this is at issue. What is being called into question is the idea that concrete rules of
conduct are on their own sufficient to guide conduct in a way which could sustain an
abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. This chapter rejects this claim and instead emphasizes
the importance of abstraction and guidance by abstract rules. But this is not to reject the role
the concrete plays in society; rather it is to point out that there exists an essential and
necessary inter-relationship between the concrete and the abstract. The argument of this
chapter is that in a complex society one's knowledge of the concrete must be augmented by
abstract rules of conduct. Such a view does not dismiss guidance by concrete rules of
conduct, but rather expounds the theory that it must be augmented by a framework of
abstract rules. A knowledge of the concrete, and being guided in one's conduct by concrete
rules of conduct, are of course necessary conditions for any social interaction at all. Who
would dispute this? But this is not the question, for the issue is whether guidance by
concrete rules of conduct is sufficient to sustain a Gesellschaft-type society. The argument
made by this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, is that guidance based predominantly on
concrete rules is an insufficient foundation upon which to base the complex interactions of
an abstract society, and hence there must be a resort to governance of conduct by abstract
rules.
A second objection to the line of argument of this chapter goes to the core of the matter.
Call this the ifI'm so ignorant why can't I benefit from outside guidance? objection. It runs
as follows: if, as social complexity increases, individuals become more and more relatively
ignorant, how can individuals be expected to take into account their various social effects
(i.e. their effects on others)? Surely an increase in the complexity of society implies a
shrinkage of the individual sphere of responsibility and (presumably) an increase in the
responsibility assumed by other institutions which attempt to take these factors into account.
This is a telling argument and it goes to the heart of the argument presented here.
Consider issues such as the pollution of the environment, epidemics, or harm which only
manifests itself in the long-term or which has only widely dispersed, marginal, effects, but
rather serious consequences. Are these not difficult to attribute to any one individual's (or
any one sub-group's) conduct? How, then, are these issues to be addressed using abstract
rules of conduct?
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There are a variety of responses to this objection, varying in their degree of generality. I
will consider three of them. First, a general response. It should be emphasized that there is
nothing in the argument of this chapter which implies that group efforts, centralized
institutions or collective decision-making mechanisms have no role to play in a
Gesellschaft-type society, for they obviously do. Rather, this chapter is putting forward the
argument that there must be a more careful consideration of how these institutions achieve
the desired results. The argument of this chapter is that it is the manner in which problems
are dealt with which is of decisive importance if an abstract, Gesellschaft-type form of
society is to be sustained.
Turn now to a more particular response to the objection that an increase in social
complexity calls for an increasing resort to mechanisms other than those based on
individuals following abstract rules. Consider one counter-response, which crudely put
states: "but isn't the objection simply assuming that some other institutions will do a better
job of it?". This does seem to be the case. Consider, for example, the challenges to the idea
of resorting to market mechanisms as an acceptable form of conduct governance. A
considered application of the approach advocated by this chapter would examine (a) the
contexts in which market mechanisms do, and do not, function "properly" and (b) the
properties of alternative mechanisms which are capable of satisfying the ends which are
desired and which are feasible given one's other values (and in particular, the type of
society that is valued). This is the approach recommended by this chapter, but it is not, in
many cases, the typical approach. Instead, it is often the case that a market inadequacy is
identified, i.e. markets do not produce what some group of people want, and then
government action is demanded with the implicit assumption that such action will be an
improvement. But why would this necessarily be the case? The fact that one mechanism
does not live up to one's expectations does not imply that there exists a better mechanism
which is compatible with one's goals. Typically, one does not observe a comparison
between governmental and market mechanisms, but rather the substitution of a
governmental mechanism for a market one. Yet governmental mechanisms have
inadequacies of their own, and are only well-adapted to certain types of decisions and
certain types of environments. In actuality, government mechanisms are simply assumed to
be the best alternative to market mechanisms, without any thought given to the implications
for the structure of interactions, of authority, or whether or not the government can do a
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better job than its competitor. In other words, there is little thought given to a relative
comparison of the different properties of different mechanisms.48
As a third and final response to the objection raised above, turn now to some of its
particular areas of concern (pollution and the environment, epidemics and dispersed or long-
term harm). Can these problems be addressed using mechanisms utilizing only abstract rules
of conduct? Perhaps they can. As was pointed out in the first chapter, one interpretation of
these difficulties emphasizes that they arise through inadequacies in the definition of rules
of conduct. On this view, these difficulties do not support a move away from the use of
abstract rules of conduct but rather imply a shift towards their refinement so that they can be
applied to these particular problems.
But perhaps, in the final analysis, the case can be made that abstract rules addressed to
individuals are simply not capable of addressing these issues. This comes down to a matter
of investigating the properties of different governance mechanisms and their abilities to
perform certain functions in certain environments. To take one example, it is known that
market mechanisms tend to function poorly when faced with certain situations economists
characterize as "market failures". This is not in dispute. What seems to be ignored, however,
is the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms faced with these same circumstances.
This leads to a more general point. From the perspective adopted by this thesis, there is
little to be gained from a dogmatic adherence to any one particular mechanism. Nor are
vague assertions that one mechanism or another is "better" for one reason or another of very
much use without a due consideration of their relative abilities to perform certain functions
in the environment in which they will be embedded. One must constantly be wary of falling
into the trap of judging a mechanism in isolation from its environment, or from its
competitors' performance in that environment. Is the central question, then, whether such
and such problems can be addressed by abstract rules of conduct? It may well be the case
that such a mechanism may be inappropriate in certain circumstances. But the point of this
section is to stress that one will never know unless one considers alternative mechanisms in
these same environments. The important point, in my view, is that one always compares the
relative properties of particular mechanisms in particular environments, examines their
48 This blanket criticism should, of course, be taken with a grain of salt. After all, there is (for example) a
substantial body of work in what is called "public choice" economics which examines, and compares, the
properties of alternative political mechanisms, albeit subject to the rather restricted interpretation of "rationality"
adopted by many economists. For an example of the application of such a perspective in a regulatory context, see
Ogus (1994); for a summary of "public choice" economics, see Mueller (1989).
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compatibility with one's immediate goals and long-term values, and asks the decisive
question of whether one's favoured mechanism is the best one relative to those which are
available for consideration.
18. Summary of the argument and some implications for legal theory
It is time, perhaps, to halt for a moment and summarize the argument thus far. The
chapter began with a consideration of the differences between duties and aspirations. This
led to an examination of the relationship between minimal conditions, duties and Fuller's
"inner morality of law". The idea was then introduced that basing an identification criterion
for law on the presence of "authority" is a mistake, and that it is instead the presence and
operation of certain mechanisms which is determinative of whether or not a "legal quality"
exists. This led to a consideration of the propriety of describing Fuller's principles of
legality as a "morality", and it was argued that for Fuller's practice to make sense, he must
be arguing that subjecting conduct to the governance of abstract rules is a value. The chapter
then turned to an examination ofwhy this might be the case. Three reasons were considered
for why subjecting individual conduct to the governance of rules might be a value. Two of
these — the argument from complexity, and the argument from autonomy — were
examined in some detail and some objections to them were discussed. The third, which
emphasizes the potentially objective conflict-resolution properties flowing from governance
by abstract rules, was briefly considered in its relation to the autonomy argument, but will
be considered in greater depth in the chapter which follows.
All of this leads to three important and sometimes insufficiently appreciated implications
for those who attempt to create legal rules.49 The first implication flowing from the above is
that if individuals are to be guided by their own conduct and their own judgment, there must
be some degree of conformity between the ongoing values and obligations these individuals
observe and the rules law-makers attempt to create. This matching between individual
conduct and rules promulgated by law-makers will be considered in more detail in the
sections which follow.
49 It should be emphasized that nothing in this chapter points to the conclusion that rules cannot or should
not be created; rather, the theme of this chapter is that such creation is subject to a variety of constraints which
have not, in my view, been sufficiently appreciated or which have been labelled as "merely" moral.
The Mechanism is the Message • 199
The second implication of the above is that if individuals are to be guided by rules
created by rule-makers, these rule-makers will themselves have to conduct themselves with
regularity, the reason being that their conduct constitutes part of the environment which
individuals are trying to adjust to, and hence irregularity on their part may increase
complexity for individuals who are attempting to be guided by the rules that they, the rule-
makers, create. This is, I think, one of the most important themes underlying Fuller's
discussions of "the inner morality of law". Subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules is thus a value which Hayek and Fuller intend to be applied universally. The
justification for a restriction on rule-makers behaviour is that unless there is sufficient
regularity on the part of the law-makers, individuals will not be able to act using their own
judgment but will instead have to refer to authorities for instructions on how to act. This
reference to authority is in principle incompatible with the three results which flow from
subjecting individual conduct to the governance of rules: that individuals are able to adjust
to complexity based on their own judgment, that they are able to act autonomously and
responsibly, and that conflicts between individuals are able to be resolved in an objective
manner.
A third implication is perhaps the most intriguing from the point of view of legal theory.
Under the theoretical framework of this thesis, a departure from either of these first two
restrictions on rule-makers50 is incompatible with the existence of the "legal quality", i.e.
that quality which flows from the application of mechanisms which subject conduct to the
governance of abstract rules through the filtering out of particularity. One implication of this
is that it is not that judges are "authorized" in some special way which gives their actions a
"legal quality", but rather how closely they conform to the restrictions implicit in the
mechanisms which support abstract social relations and conduct regularity. On this view,
the specifically "legal quality" of law does not flow from authorization, but rather from
acting in a certain way.51 This is, I would argue, the general theme underlying Fuller's
discussion of the "inner morality of law".
50 Through a failure to create a compatible "enough" match between the values of the governed and the rule-
makers, or though the irregularity on the part of those trying to create rules.
51 The implications of this for theories of legal interpretation which search for "original" authorization, such
as Robert Bork's (1990), should be obvious.
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19. The meaning of Fuller's objection to the managerialist tendencies of legal
positivism: the mechanism is the message
Conduct governance by abstract rules is a value to Fuller and Hayek because of its
intimate relationship to the autonomy of individuals, the ability to adapt to complexity, both
as individuals and as a group, and to objective conflict-resolution and the possibility of
objective justice. I believe Fuller and Hayek's critics err in assigning a low importance to
the implementation mechanism which "subjects human conduct to the governance of rules".
The decisive issue to Hayek and Fuller is the method whereby behaviour is "regularized"
(i.e. made subject to the governance of rules). To them, behaviour is regularized using
mechanisms which generate and support rules which allow individuals to act autonomously
and in accordance with their own judgment. This would be one reason for their emphasis on
the abstractness and negativity of rules of conduct. There are no such similar restrictions
flowing from positivist legal theory. Consider one of Fuller's most important critics, H.L.A.
Hart. On the crucial point of the reason behind subjecting conduct to the governance of
rules, Hart is in profound disagreement with Fuller and Hayek.
As an example of this, consider Fuller's objections to the managerial nature of
positivism, and to H.L.A. Hart's positivist theory in specific. What, if anything, does this
form of positivism have to do with managerialism (i.e. with the one-way imposition of
concrete goals upon individuals)? I would argue that one theme of Fuller's objection to
Hart's theory is that it has no concept of the mechanisms under which legal rules or legal
authority come into existence. Fuller argues that Hart focuses his attention on pre-existing
authority and ignores the mechanism under which such authorization comes into existence
and is sustained. By ignoring the method by which rules are generated and supported, and
by focusing instead on authority which is presupposed to exist, a theory of law emerges
which ignores the functions performed by abstract rules and their relationship to the
formation and preservation of authority.52 This can lead to the creation of rules which
function to undermine their own authority. In a sense, Hart's vision of law and legal
authority is path-independent, for it does not focus on the question of how law and the
"legal quality" come into existence and are supported. Hart's theory simply assumes that the
existence of legal authority is a factual question. So long as "enough" individuals actually
52 This point will be emphasized in those sections of the following chapter which examine the theoretical
underpinning of Hartian legal positivism.
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obey the rules of a "legal system", and so long as legal officials hold and apply certain
authorization criteria, legal authority can be thought to exist. How this conformity actually
comes about is left as a background issue. Authority and order based on conforming to
abstract rules is merely one way of achieving legal order. It does not have any privileged
relationship to law or legal mechanisms. By not prioritizing rule-based methods of
generating authority and social order, and by not recognizing the importance of the
mechanisms which are used to generate and support authority and order, positivism in effect
leaves a mechanism vacuum which can be filled by any method which generates social
order, so long as it is "authorized". By ignoring the differences in types of social order, by
failing to realize that a connection exists between the resultant type of order and the method
by which it was generated, and by not understanding that only certain types of mechanisms
are capable of sustaining certain types of social order, positivism leaves open the door to
any form of "authorized" social control, many of which are incompatible with the
foundations of a society based on autonomous individuals adjusting to complexity based on
their own knowledge and resolving their disputes in an objective manner. Fuller, then, is not
arguing that positivist theories intend to provide support for managerial-style social orders.
On the contrary — many of its representatives are vocal supporters of individual freedom
and the value of autonomous action.53 Fuller is instead arguing that positivist legal theories
cannot rule out the mechanisms which make a managerial-style social order a possibility,
and hence that such theories cannot explain the basis for, nor the differentiating features of,
the legal sphere. In this sense, then, such theories are inadequate representations of that
which is specifically legal.
Fuller's criticism has another aspect which should be explored. Fuller's argument thus
far is based on the idea that Hart's form of positivism shows no recognition of the
importance of the properties of implementation mechanisms. Fuller argues that by ignoring
this, Hart's theory cannot close the door on mechanisms which are not capable of sustaining
a complex form of society. One might call this critique the implementation objection.
One might make a different argument based on a similar idea. This objection to Hart's
form of positivism might be called the elitist objection. This criticizes the positivist belief
that law must be based on the beliefs, knowledge and direction of an elite set of individuals.
Hart's positivist theory — and not only Hart's version of positivism — can be accused of
53 A point emphasized by MacCormick in objecting to Fuller's argument (MacCormick 1981, 157-158).
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being an elitist theory, for it explicitly states that the acceptance of the rule of recognition
can be limited solely to legal actors, implying in a sense a top-down imposition of authority
from those "in-the-know" to those who know little or nothing of the law.
20. A closer look at the elitist objection
Is there anything to this objection? Perhaps there is. One way of seeing this is to consider
Hart's discussion of the concept of the "rule of recognition" and to observe the sources of
the subtle but decisive shift in the meaning of this concept. In what Hart terms "pre-legal"
societies the recognition of authority is at best implicit (Hart 1961, 91). At this stage of a
legal system, authority rests in large part with individuals. If, however, this authority comes
to be manifested in something external to these individuals, however, there comes to exist
what Hart terms a "rule of recognition". This, then is a rule that recognizes that which is
authoritative. In simple societies, the rule of recognition is a rule which is "the proper way
of disposing of doubts as to the existence of a rule" of obligation (Hart 1961, 92). Thus, the
rule of recognition "will specify some feature or features possession of which by a
suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to
be supported by the social pressure it exerts" (Hart 1961, 92). It is, then, "a rule for
conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation" (Hart 1961, 92). In this context,
the rule of recognition is something or someone that manifests the group's sense of
"authoritative".
In more complex societies, however, the rule of recognition becomes something quite
different. In Hart's discussion the rule of recognition subtly transitions from a rule which
manifests the group's sense of what is authoritative to one which manifests a particular
group's sense of authoritative. Thus, although Hart talks of situations where a rule of
recognition is accepted as authoritative being one in which "both private persons and
officials are provided with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation"
(Hart 1961, 97) and in which the rule of recognition is "used by courts, officials and private
persons" (Hart 1961, 104), it soon becomes clear that Hart is referring to a situation in
which only a select group of individuals recognize what is, and what is not, authoritative.
The transition to his final position is a subtle one. First, Hart discounts as a "fiction" (Hart
1961, 111) the factual accuracy of a position which holds that all the individuals in a society
know the rule of recognition of the legal system. Hart's argument here is that modern
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society is too complex for all individuals to know the rule of recognition. In a complex
society, "the reality of the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary citizens — perhaps
a majority — have no general conception of the legal structure or of its criteria of validity"
(Hart 1961, 111). Thus, Hart's focus turns to "legal officials" and their understanding of the
rule of recognition and, once again, there is subtle modification. Hart now claims that the
"ordinary individuals", in
obeying a rule (or an order) need involve no thought on the part of the person
obeying that what [they do] is the right thing both for [themselves] and for others to
do: [they] need have no view of what [they do] as a fulfilment of a standard of
behaviour for others of the social group. [They] need not think of [their]
conforming behaviour as 'right', 'correct', or 'obligatory'". (Hart 1961, 112)
On this view, the rule of recognition is a "public, common standard of correct judicial
decision" (Hart 1961, 112) only in that it is an externally observable standard which is
common to legal officials. It is not necessarily held as authoritative by ordinary individuals.
Thus, Hart's notion of the rule of recognition has become one in which the authority to
recognize obligations as binding no longer resides with ordinary individuals but rather
solely with its officials.54 Hart's argument, then, is that in complex societies
only officials might accept and use the system's criteria of legal validity. The
society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end up
in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking that it could not exist or
for denying it the title of a legal system. (Hart 1961, 114)
What can one say about this vision of law? One point to note is that the idea of
authorization being limited to a select group is a widespread one in positivist circles. Thus,
although they hold to different positivistic theories of law, both Joseph Raz and Neil
MacCormick subscribe to this view.55 If, then, Hart's view is unsound, this would seem to
have implications for other positivist theories as well. The second point to note is that Hart's
view, which restricts the knowledge of the rule of recognition to legal officials, is based
primarily upon an argument concerning the implications of the complexity of a modern
society. That is, the justification given for assuming that large numbers of ordinary
individuals in a complex society could not know the rule of recognition is based on the
argument that the division of knowledge in such a society is of such complexity that
individuals would, in all likelihood, know nothing of this rule. Thus, the argument is that it
54 Hart is quite explicit on this point. For a more detailed discussion, see Hart (Hart 1961, 114).
55 See Raz (1975, 171, 177) and MacCormick (1978, 54-55) for their statements on the matter.
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is the complexity of a modern society which necessitates the restriction of the rule of
recognition to the group of legal officials. The fundamental assumption of this argument is
that ordinary individuals do not (and probably could not without legal training) know the
rule of recognition and hence this specialized area of knowledge and authority must be
vested in a particular group of individuals.
The question which arises from all of this is whether this is correct. Is it the case that the
rule of recognition is for the most part known only to legal actors? The answer to this
question is a factual one, but it is not the one positivists usually give. The answer to this
question is that people for the most part do know aspects of the rule of recognition, and
these aspects are the abstract ones.
The reason they know the abstract elements of the rule of recognition is that these
aspects already govern their lives. In other words, individuals manifest ("act out") these
aspects in regularities which in part constitute their conduct, and which arise from, and are
sustained by, the same mechanisms which support the "legal quality" in its more
institutional manifestations. These abstract regularities (or abstract rules), then, are
manifested in individuals' conduct, and are not necessarily in the form of words or
conceptualizations. But what, then, are these rules? None other than the minimal necessary
pre-conditions for sustainable social interaction; that is, they are abstract, primarily negative
(in the sense of being prohibitive), rules which govern individuals in their day to day lives
and which sustain complex patterns of social interaction.
But why, one might ask, do these rules overlap with aspects of the rule of recognition?
Surely the rule of recognition can contain different sorts of authorization criteria? The short
answer to this is that it cannot. The rule of recognition is itself based upon these same
minimal criteria and the mechanisms which support them, and if the rule of recognition is to
be authoritative it must be, in some of its aspects, the concretization of these pre-existing
minimal obligations and values. The positivist's error, then, lies in presupposing that
people's knowledge of the rule of recognition is a conscious knowledge of its concrete
detail.56 This, however, is not the case. What ordinary individuals do know are the abstract
56 This error is at the base of one of Hans Kelsen's flawed objections to natural law theories. In criticizing
natural law, Kelsen makes a revealing comment. One of his chief criticisms of natural law's notion of justice was
that its content was so variable across individuals. From this Kelsen claims "[t]he usual assertion that there is
indeed such a thing as justice, but that it cannot be clearly defined, is in itself a contradiction" (Kelsen 1941, p.
48-49). I would disagree, for Kelsen seems to be presuming that knowing something implies that one is able to
describe it clearly at all its different levels of abstraction. This is patently false. If it were true, it would be
impossible to say (as one often does) that one knows something at a general level of abstraction but cannot
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and often unarticulated, yet able to be acted upon, aspects of this rule. If one accepts this,
then it becomes obvious that Hart's positivist legal theory begins to unravel.
The justification for Hart's claim that the authorization manifested in the rule of
recognition is restricted to a small subgroup of society is based on a misunderstanding. A
division of knowledge does not imply that there are no shared abstract performative
regularities and hence no shared obligations and values, but rather only that there will be an
increase in particular differentiations and a decrease in one's ability to consciously
ascertain and articulate particulars. This epistemological error is of decisive importance.
Not only does Hart fail to recognize that individuals could know (in a different sense from
"in words" or "conceptually") the abstract aspects of the rule of recognition, but he also fails
to realize that it is this abstract knowledge (of obligations and values) which provides the
foundation for this same rule. It is these abstract performative aspects which provide the
minimal conditions for the existence of any "authority", for without these obligations there
is no group and no society for law to govern. Hart neglects to consider these minimal
conditions and simply presupposes that "authority" exists independent of them. But it does
not— "authority" flows from conforming to these minimal obligations and the mechanisms
which support them. Hart also ignores the form of these minimal conditions, i.e. their being
abstract and predominantly negative. This oversight is an unfortunate by-product of an
emphasis on the "authorization" of acceptable acts, rather than on the negation of
unacceptable ones, and is related to his lack of insight into the properties of conduct
governance mechanisms, in that abstract values and the predominantly negative obligations
which are associated with them are intimately related to mechanisms which filter out and
negate unacceptable conduct, rather than to processes which "authorize" acts. Furthermore,
the very use of the terms "authorized" and "unauthorized" are revealing— both presuppose
the existence of authority. The question of interest, which Hart ignores, is whether this
authority actually exists if one holds that it does not flow from conformity to either the
minimal conditions which govern and preserve a society, or to the mechanisms which
support them. The important question, then, is not what is "authorized" or "unauthorized",
but rather whether there is any authority at all, and, if so, what generates and supports it?
One further objection to the use of the term "authorization" is that by presupposing that
authority exists independent of its own pre-conditions, one effectively ignores authority's
describe its particular details. It is obviously possible for one to know and describe, in general, an area of
mathematics but not know, or to be able to clearly define, some of the detailed theorems of that particular branch.
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dependence on negative rules and hence implicitly manifests a bias towards positive rules of
conduct57 which, so long as they are "authorized", will be presumed to have legal force.58
By referring all questions of the existence of legal obligations solely back to a rule of
recognition, Hart ignores the foundations of authority — the pre-existing, ongoing,
predominantly negative, abstract obligations and the mechanisms which support them, both
of which support the values upon which the authority of the rule of recognition rests. It is
this uncoupling of the rule of recognition from its foundations which detaches Hart's
positivist legal system from its own pre-conditions, and it is this separation which opens the
door to changes in obligations which could undermine the very basis of the authority
embedded in a rule of recognition. There is an inherent incompatibility, in both an
intertemporal and feedback sense, in recognizing certain obligations as legally authoritative
when these very obligations undermine other, more fundamental obligations which provide
the grounds for giving such an undermining obligation legal force in the first place.59
This discussion, then, leads us to two further questions. First, what is the relationship
between the rule of recognition and these minimal and foundational pre-existing
obligations? Second, what is the relationship between obligations created under the rule of
recognition and these minimal pre-existing obligations? Both of these questions can be
given the same answer: both the rule of recognition and obligations created under this rule
are subordinate to, and dependent upon, the satisfaction of certain minimal, pre-existing,
and predominantly negative, obligations which are supported by the operation of certain
fundamental mechanisms. The rule of recognition can recognize as authoritative that which
does not conflict with these minimal obligations and mechanisms, but it cannot extend its
authority beyond this, for its authority derives from conforming to the restrictions they
impose in supporting the abstract values which underlie them. Hence, not all rules of
obligation created under the rule of recognition are rules of law, for they must in some sense
conform to the pre-existing obligations and the restrictions implicit in the mechanisms
which support them, and which provide the foundation for whatever legal authority Hart's
secondary rules might have.
57 a point which was stressed when the presuppositions underlying power-conferring rules were consider in
chapter five.
58 This bias is widespread, and might be one reason why law is sometimes seen as an instrument with the
potential for achieving goals and aspirations, rather than as a mechanism focusing on the prevention of harm.
59 This aspect of positivist thought, and its relationship to the distinction between rules based on
performative regularities and those which are based on authoritative articulations, will be examined in greater
depth in the chapter which follows.
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Contrast, then, Hart's legal theory with the notion of a legal system ("the law", or
simply, "law") and rules of law which underlie this work. Both theories are based on the
notion of a legal system and rules of law. In both, a legal system is comprised of both rules
of obligation and rules of social institutions which govern these obligations.60 Rules of law
refer solely to rules of obligation and not to rules governing the social institutions of law.61
A rule of law, then, is a rule which imposes an obligation on individuals or groups.62 Up to
this point, there might appear to be many similarities between the two theoretical
perspectives. But it is here that the similarities end.
As I have argued at a couple of points in this chapter, Hart's conception of law simply
presupposes that legal authority exists (or does not exist), and treats it as a matter of "fact".
On this view, a legal system and legal authority exist when enough individuals conform to
the rules that a group of legal officials accept as being legally authoritative. This legal
authority is then implemented in a variety of ways, some of which include the promulgation
of general rules in the form of words. These rules are not necessarily considered to be
"authoritative" to individuals that obey them (at least not in the legal officials' sense of that
word), nor are there any necessary restrictions on the content of these rules unless such
restrictions are recognized as binding by the select group of legal officials.
All of this is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. This view implicitly privileges a
notion of law where there exists a pre-existing authority which allows a select group of
individuals to create articulated rules which are then imposed upon others. Yet no mention
is made of the pre-conditions which must be satisfied for such an authority to exist. This
blindness to the foundations of authority leads to a number of substantial errors. First, it
ignores the performative nature of these pre-conditions. Instead, this view emphasizes
60 In Hart's terminology, this is the difference between "primary" and "secondary" rules. Note that I am not
importing Hart's notion of rules as being relatively concrete, nor am I assuming that they are articulated. Thus, in
some societies, both of these forms of rules may be unarticulated and the forms of "social institutions" may be
lacking in formalization.
61 In other words, and using Hayek's terminology, the phrase "a rule of law" refers to a rule which governs
individual or group conduct in a society-wide context, and does not refer to those rules which govern the
specifically institutional sphere occupied by the organizations of law.
62 It is of the utmost importance not to conflate these two terms (though the terms "the law" and "law" seem
to court confusion), as this study focuses both upon rules of obligation— rules of law — and upon some of the
rules of social institutions which govern these rules. Thus, one of the focuses of this study is upon the properties
of rules of obligation, and the argument is that in an abstract society the social rules of conduct governance
would need to be abstract and predominantly negative. The manner by which rules become abstract and negative
is the study of rules of social institutions, as manifested in a variety of what I have termed (selection) filters,
which weed out unacceptable rules. The distinction being made here, then, is between legal rules — rules of
obligation— and rules which are restricted to governing the operation of institutions.
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articulations. Second, this view ignores the abstract and predominantly negative nature of
these pre-conditions. On the positivist view, rules can be of any degree of concreteness, and
they can both oblige one to act or require one to refrain from acting. Neither abstractness
nor negativity is seen as being essential to a rule being a legal rule, nor is it thought to
undermine the "authority" of those officials who the positivists claim recognize acts as
having legal force.
This is a mistake. It is of decisive importance to recognize that not all rules promulgated
by those in "authority" will be legal rules. The theory of this chapter differs from Hart's
theory in its recognition of what is, and is not, a "legal rule". Hart's vision of legal
recognition implicitly emphasizes deliberately and authoritatively created articulated rules.
This is misleading. Not only is performance downgraded in importance, but so also are rules
that have never been "created" (in the sense of deliberately created), nor "authorized" by
anybody. This chapter has emphasized that this bias of legal positivism and its
consequences have not been fully appreciated — one of these consequences being that the
specifically legal character of legal systems has been misunderstood. Under the argument
put forward in this chapter, the specifically legal character of a rule comes from it being
able to pass through a variety of filters which eliminate its particularity. Conduct which
cannot be put into the form of an abstract rule, conduct which is based on the particular will
of a particular individual or group, positive rules, and rules which are too concrete, should
be eliminated by these filters. The reason for this is that such conduct (and such rules of
conduct — if they exist) are incompatible with law's function: to regularize the conduct of
individuals by subjecting them to the governance of abstract rules.
Furthermore, such filters are designed to safeguard the necessary pre-conditions of social
life which exist in the form ofpre-existing, predominantly negative and abstract, values and
obligations. These values exist in people's conduct, and they are instantiated by conduct that
people do not perform. The reason, then, for filtering out particularity and positivity is that
such rules can be in conflict with these fundamental values. The flaw in the view which
stresses "authorization" is that it is not simply a matter of "authorization" whether a conflict
exists between a created rule and these pre-existing obligations and values —
"authorization" does not eliminate conflicts between the conduct engendered by created
rules and these pre-existing obligations. Rather, such a view simply ignores such conflicts
by presupposing that the "authorization" of a select few is sufficient to override them. This
thesis contends that such "authorization" is not sufficient, and would even go so far as to
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question the positivist definition of "authorized". Rules which are created must conform to
these pre-existing obligations because it is these obligations which are the foundation for
any authority, including that to which deliberately created rules have a claim.
The implicit notion of a legal system based on top-down "authority", in which some are
able to impose rules (in the form of words) on others, is based on a mistake — this being
that rules can be "authoritative" when they are in conflict with the sources of authority. This
is false and pernicious: false, because it is not "authority" which underlies such a vision of
law, but rather power which lacks any objective authority whatsoever; and pernicious,
because such a vision of law can lead to particularistic rules being created and enforced
which are incompatible with autonomy, complexity, diversity, and indeed the very
foundations of social life. In the final analysis, all of these (i.e. autonomy, etc.) are based
upon the existence of expectations engendered by pre-existing, predominantly negative and
abstract values and obligations. Only a vision of law with fundamentally misconceived
notions of the foundations of "authority", social order, and the causal relationship between
law and society could come to the view that there could exist legal "authority" for rules
which are incompatible with the pre-existing obligations of social life which are instantiated
in individuals' day to day conduct. And only such a vision of law could fail to realize that it
is their own mistaken notion of "authority" which makes the creation and enforcement of
such incompatible rules, the consequent undermining of individual autonomy, societal
complexity and diversity, and the destruction of the notion of objective justice, a very real
possibility.
21. The conflict between perspectives over the sources of social order and the causal
connection between law and society
I would like to put forward the view that both the filter-failure and elitist objections are
merely two manifestations of a much more fundamental discrepancy between the positivist
and the mechanism approaches. The underlying disagreement between these two theories of
law rests upon their implicit assumptions concerning the causal connection of law to
society. This disagreement in turn rests upon different views on the sources ofsocial order.
One view is based on the assumption that social order does not pre-exist and must be
generated. This view is intimately related to the idea that for social relations to be ordered,
order must be imposed on individuals by other individuals. This, I would argue, is an
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implicit presupposition of Hart's form of legal positivism. The opposing view is that
individuals are already ordered, and that an imposition of external authority might or might
not lead to an individual and/or society being "better" ordered. This is Hayek's view and,
perhaps to a lesser extent, Fuller's. If this argument is correct, then there are two
fundamentally different ways of viewing the nature of social order. This is a very important
difference — perhaps the most important difference between Hayek and Fuller and their
critics. An insight into this difference is essential to understanding the nature of the dispute
between these two rival theories of law.
So important is this difference that it is manifested in a variety of issues, including (1)
their underlying notions of law, (2) the distinction between discovering and creating law, (3)
the differences in the types of knowledge each view emphasizes, (4) the issue of the
autonomy of law and (5) the type of validation (authorization) provided to legal rules by
law-makers, (6) the role of government action in society, (7) the notion of Rule of Law, and
finally, and more generally, (8) the importance of abstraction, (9) the importance of the
negative rule / positive rule distinction and (10) the difference between duties and
aspirations and their relationship to negative and positive rules.
The first manifestation of this difference is in the notion of law itself. The view which
stresses pre-existing order presupposes the existence of rules that individuals are already
following in orienting themselves. The view which stresses imposed order presupposes that
rules must be created and enforced to generate any order at all.
Different perspectives also emerge when one considers the creating/discovering law
distinction. Those that believe that order is discovered claim that there already exists an
ongoing order and that the rules that law-makers propagate must take this into account and
try to accommodate their created rules to this ongoing order. Those that believe that order is
created (imposed) believe that rules can create new patterns of conduct. They do not
emphasize accommodation so much as imposition.
The third instance arises when one considers the types of knowledge which each view
emphasizes. Those who believe that order is pre-existing emphasize the manner by which
ongoing order comes to be generated. This leads to the emphasis of unarticulated rules of
conduct and rule-following, with attention given to performance and how individuals orient
themselves. Those who believe that order must be generated and imposed also focus on the
manner by which ongoing order comes to be generated; however, this view emphasizes
order imposed by one group on another, and hence focuses on the tools of this imposition:
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articulated (verbal, written) knowledge and communication behveen individuals (for how
could I impose a rule upon you without first communicating it to you?).63
This leads to differences of perspective on the issue of the autonomy of law. Those
holding the view that order is pre-existing emphasize that law-makers' rules are merely one
form of rule which might guide conduct, and stress that there must be a mutual
accommodation between rules of law and other pre-existing rules of conduct. On this view,
law is autonomous only insofar as it does not destabilize an already pre-existing order.
Those who hold that order must be generated and imposed stress the autonomy of law, in
that it becomes so specialized that it forms a closed system which interacts mainly with
itself and generates order by imposing rules on unordered social interactions. This view
does not focus on the mutual interaction between different rules of conduct systems, nor
does it emphasize an already existing order to society. The stress instead lies on a one-way
imposition of authority.
These different emphases on the degree of autonomy manifest themselves in differences
in the type of validation (authorization) which is given by law-makers. The view which
emphasizes ongoing, pre-existing order argues that law-makers give legal force to rules by
adhering to certain validating procedures that they (should) follow to discover what the law
is. The emphasis is on generating rules according to these validating procedures which "fit
in" with an already pre-existing and ongoing order. Those that emphasize imposed order
tend to argue that law-makers' rules gain legal force because they are acting in accordance
with certain procedures, but they also emphasize that the law-maker is free to give any
content whatsoever to such rules. They do not, therefore, stress the need for such rules to
"fit into" an ongoing, pre-existing order.
This difference in perspective also accounts for the differing emphasis placed on the role
of government and legislation. Those who hold that there is pre-existing order tend to
advocate a stabilization role for government. Government action, on this view, should
augment an already pre-existing order and ensure that such an order is stabilized. Those who
hold to the view that order must be generated argue that there is a much larger role for
63 At the foundation of this difference in perspectives is perhaps an even more fundamental disagreement
over the nature of thought and mind itself. The latter view seem to be most compatible with the view that the
fundamental basis of thought is propositional, while the former seems to be in accord with thinkers who hold that
propositions are merely approximations — abstractions — to other, more complex and fundamental, processes
constituting thought and mind. This difference might go some way to explaining why the latter view stresses
language, while the former view tends to stress performance. For a balanced view of the debate in this area, see
Dennett (1987), while for a more combative vision, see P.M. Churchland (1989).
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government action. On this view, government action is a creator of order and need not
necessarily mesh with ongoing rules of conduct.
This is intimately related to the different view each perspective has concerning the
principle of the Rule of Law. A view which stresses an ongoing, pre-existing order will
desire a Rule of Law model which can accommodate the rules of conduct which individuals
are already presumed to be obeying. Thus, there is an emphasis on the abstractness and
negativity of rules (so as to accommodate the different particulars that might be present
within the rules of different individuals) and the regularity of rule-makers (so that
individuals are not directed from "above" but rather guide their own conduct using abstract
rules). The underlying idea is that the Rule of Law will facilitate rule-following by
providing an externalized and articulated institutional framework which can be used to
resolve disputes between individuals following different rules. A view which stresses that
order must be generated will desire a Rule of Law which facilitates the generation of order.
It tends to focus on the question of who is authorized to create order and is less concerned
with whether the acts of creating order will cause disorder to individuals following their
own rules of conduct (since, by assumption, this is not the case). Finally, such a vision of
Rule of Law will stress that law-makers are not restricted in their choice of the content of
legal rules.
There are three implications which flow from these differing conceptions of the Rule of
Law. First, this difference in focus leads to a different emphasis on the relative importance
ofabstraction and concreteness. Those that emphasize the existence of a pre-existing order
focus on how this order is generated, and this leads to a stress on the importance of obeying
(often unarticulated) abstract rules of conduct. Those that emphasize that order must be
generated and imposed focus on concretes, on particular details which give the imposed
order its particular character according to the concrete characteristics desired by its
designers.64
64 This is, I would argue, a central element of Dworkin's early criticisms of Hart's theory of positivism
(Dvvorkin 1977). Dworkin was arguing, in effect, that Hart ignored the importance of abstraction in legal
reasoning (which, though not framed in these terms, is a pervasive theme in Dworkin's more recent writings
(Dworkin 1985; 1986)). This might also be used to illuminate Dworkin's distinction between rules and
principles. Dworkin claimed that rules apply to situations in an all-or-nothing fashion, whereas principles apply
by matters of degree. This is, of course, only correct if by a rule Dworkin is referring to a very concrete
articulation. Otherwise, rules can have varying degrees of abstraction. As rules become more abstract, they come
to be based more and more upon matter-of-degree type closures, and hence apply only as a matter-of-degree (a
matter of weight). Hence, unless Dworkin restricts his notion of "rules" to the set of very concrete and detailed
articulations of regularities, he will find that not only principles, but also rules, can have a matter-of-degree
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Second, there is a differing emphasis on the importance of the negative rule /positive
rule distinction. A view which emphasizes a pre-existing order asks the question of which
type of rule is most effective at sustaining this ongoing order. This leads to the insight that
in situations of social complexity negative rules are often a more effective tool for guiding
individual conduct than positive rules, as they allow individuals to continue to decide which
particular conduct they will perform. A view which stresses the generation and imposition
of order, and which is unconcerned with this distinction, does not stress the operation of
mechanisms which are concerned to filter out positive rules of conduct, and hence such a
view is relatively more amenable to the use of positive rules. An additional reason for such a
bias flows from the belief that order cannot be generated solely from prohibiting actions, i.e.
if there is no pre-existing, ongoing order, and order needs to be generated, something must
be done— positive acts must be performed— to create order.
A third and final distinction flows from the difference in emphasis on the importance of
negative rules: the difference between duties and aspirations. The view which recognizes a
pre-existing order, and has an insight into the difference between negative and positive
rules, will place an emphasis upon the distinction between duties and aspirations. Such a
view will argue that legal mechanisms are for the most part concerned with duties in the
form of negative rules which facilitate decentralized individual conduct and sustain an
ongoing order. This view argues that the "narrowing down" role of negative rules is
conducive to the preservation of an ongoing, decentralized, social order. It also argues that
the conduct-prescribing role played by positive rules is more amenable to aspirations than
duties, for positive rules substantially reduce individuals' ability to act on their own
judgment, and hence this view advocates only a minimal role for such positive rules. On the
other hand, the view which believes that order must be generated and imposed does not
recognize the importance of the negative rule / positive rule dichotomy and hence does not
stress the connection between negative rules and duties and positive rules and aspirations.
This view, because its focus is on generating order, can lead to a vision of law in which
positive duties play a central role. Indeed, because this view does not recognize the
existence of an ongoing order, it has an implicit bias towards rules which prescribe conduct
and hence generate "order" (where, by assumption, none existed).
weight. The essential difference between rules and principles, then, is the degree of abstraction of each. As rules
become more abstract, they apply more as a matter-of-degree and to a lesser degree as all-or-nothing.
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To conclude this section, it should be emphasized that the difference in perspective
which I have been elaborating is never as clear cut as the discussion above has perhaps
made out. This distinction is, in practice, a matter of degree and there is certainly an element
of both perspectives in many, if not all, theories of law, positivist and non-positivist alike.
This being the case, it does not change the fact that a discernible difference can be
observed between Hayek and Fuller and their positivist critics. It is of the utmost
importance to understand this distinction and to mull over its numerous implications. It is
especially important to be cognizant of this difference in perspective when turning to a
consideration of a Hayekian and Fullerian vision of law. As that is the task of the next
section, I will reiterate one last time: Hayek and Fuller presuppose and emphasize the
existence of a pre-existing regularity in social interaction. Their aim, then, is to spell out a
vision of law which is compatible with this already existing and ongoing social order.
22. A general overview ofHayek's and Fuller's notions of law
So what, then, are the features of legal mechanisms to Hayek and Fuller? This section
focuses on Hayek's and Fuller's theories of law, and tries to characterize the properties they
believe are typical of legal mechanisms. The discussion then turns to an important element
of Fuller's legal theory — the distinction between moralities based on duties and those
based on aspirations— and ties these into the discussion of this, and previous, chapters.
What, then, are the Fullerian and Hayekian notions of law? To Fuller, law is "the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules" (Fuller 1969, 74). Law
come into existence under two conditions: (a) when acts conform to the general principles
of the "inner morality of law"65 and (b) when acts implement "the interests...of society
generally" (Fuller, 1969, 207). In other words, rules which implement the "specific ends set
by the lawgiver" would not be legal acts but, in Fuller's words, merely the "directives of a
managerial system" (Fuller 1969, 207). Law, "in the...sense of rules of conduct directed
toward the citizen" must be distinguished from "government action generally" (Fuller 1969,
169). Legal acts, then, are solely those which conform to his principles of legality and
65 There are eight conditions to be satisfied by acts claiming to be legal. Such acts must exhibit a "sufficient"
degree of (i) generality of reference, (ii) promulgation, (iii) prospectivity, (iv) intelligibility, (v) lack of conflict
between the actions the rules engender (sometimes somewhat misleadingly termed "non-contradiction"), (vi)
possibility of obedience, (vii) constancy over time, and (viii) congruence between official action and declared
rules (Fuller 1969, 39).
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which implement widely held values.66 On this view, then, an arbitrary dictator who used
rules to implement her/his will would not generate legal acts unless she/he acted regularly
and at the same time implemented widely held values. Rules which do not satisfy the
regularity/value criteria might be, in some sense, authoritative,67 but this is not the same as
being legal in Fuller's sense of the word.
Hayek's distinction is similar. A simplified form68 of Hayek's argument is that legal acts
are those in conformity with principles very similar to Fuller's principles of legality. Legal
acts implement general, abstract values using general, abstract rules. Law is the set of
abstract rules which implement these general values. Which type of acts, then, are
considered legal in a Hayekian framework? Only those acts which conform to Fuller-like
principles of legality and which implement abstract values and not concrete goals. To
Hayek, "the law or the rules of just conduct serve not (concrete or particular) ends but
(abstract and generic) values" (Hayek 1976, 14).69
What, then, underlies Fuller's claim (echoed in many of Hayek's writings) that the "law
furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, not a detailed set of instructions for
accomplishing specific tasks" (Fuller, 210)? Why are Fuller's and Hayek's notions of law
predicated on the implementation of general values? And why would mechanisms which
implement concrete goals necessarily infringe Fuller's principles of legality?
Under Hayek's and Fuller's theories, legal acts are restricted to those that implement
general values. What does this imply? Under a Hayekian notion of law,70 law exists only
66 This second condition also seems to answer the objection to Fuller's theory that his view of law implied
thousands of different legal systems in a single country. If these systems of rules implemented values which were
applicable to limited societies, they would not be legal under the view advanced here. On this view, it is the
properties of goals which are advanced which are used to distinguish legal and other rule-based systems.
67 They might, for instance, have political authority.
68 For a more detailed consideration, one should turn to his discussions in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960,
131-249), and more generally, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973; 1976; 1979).
69 It would be incorrect, then, to claim that Hayek differs from Fuller in that Hayek claims that law has no
purpose, while Fuller is explicit in his claim that such a purpose does exist, for both are claiming that an abstract
purpose does exist. Hayek in effect denies that law has a concrete purpose, but affirms that it does have an
abstract one: "to assist the constant re-formation of a factually existing spontaneous order" (Hayek 1976, 60).
Fuller claims that the purpose of law is to subject human behaviour to the governance of rules, contrasting this
with the governance by arbitrary will which lacks such regularity. Hayek claims that "the law serves, or is the
necessary condition for, the formation of a spontaneous order of actions". It serves "the preservation of an
enduring system of abstract relationships, or...[an] order...with constantly changing content" (Hayek 1973, 112,
my italics) and "in the usual sense of purpose, namely the anticipation of a particular, foreseeable event, the law
indeed does not serve any purpose, but countless different purposes of different individuals....in the ordinary
sense of purpose law is therefore not a means to any purpose, but merely a [precondition for the successful
pursuit ofmost purposes" (Hayek 1973, 113).
70 And many others as well. "Efficacy" is an implicit or explicit pre-condition for the existence of a legal
system in many different theories.
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where there is "sufficient" regularity to sustain it. It is important to emphasize this point, for
this requirement effectively restricts the ability to act in a legal manner. A dictator, if
willing to commit their momentary preferences and desires into regularities which others
could obey, might implement rules which conform to Fuller's principles of legality. Would
this, then, be sufficient to render these acts legal? Not necessarily. Informing Hayek's and
Fuller's notions of law is the insight that the implementation of different types of systems of
rules necessarily presupposes different implementation mechanisms associated with each
type of rule system. Associated with this is the argument that rule systems implementing
general values will require different implementation mechanisms than will ones
implementing concrete goals. The Hayekian contribution to this argument is the claim that
mechanisms implementing concrete goals will not be able to achieve "enough" regularity to
be considered legal in the sense of conforming to the principles of legality. In essence, under
a Hayekian theory legal acts must conform to the principles of legality and implement
general, abstract values. The claim is that if one desires to implement rule systems based on
concrete goals, one will not be able to satisfy the principles of legality. In other words, the
implementation effects of mechanisms which put into effect rule systems based on concrete
goals are in conflict with the principles of legality.
Note that there are at least three different meanings which could be attributed to the term
"general, abstract values". First, one could be referring to the mode of expression of these
values. I would argue that this is not a sufficient condition to express what Hayek and Fuller
have in mind, for expression may be abstract and yet may pick out very concrete space-time
details.71 Second, one could be referring to rules which are abstract and general in the sense
of the inclusiveness of their space-time reference. Under this definition, a rule is abstract if
it refers to a relatively large sector of space-time. Third, one could claim the term "general"
refers to values which are held in common ("generally held") by the individuals of a society.
Hayek argues that in an complex society these values coincide with relatively abstract
values, for in such a society it is abstractions which are held in common (while particulars
71 This argument is similar to that of Leoni (1961, 77-96) in which he argues that the "certainty" of the law
is manifested in two ways: first, in the form of expression (being mainly written or oral), and second, in the
constancy of the governance of the rule. Leoni argues that most jurisprudential arguments which talk of the
certainty of the law are referring to it being as written (or oral), and hence are referring to the precision of
meaning which arises from externalizing knowledge in articulated form. From the perspective of the constancy of
the governance of rules, however, this does not necessarily make law more certain, for written rules, if repealed
soon after enactment and replaced by other written rules, are not certain in the sense that individuals know which
rules are going to govern their affairs.
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differ across individuals).72 Moreover, if the mechanisms described in the previous chapters
for generating and supporting rule-based conduct governance are implemented, the values
which will be embedded in rules will necessarily be abstract.73
After examining the use of these terms, it seems that Hayek is using the second and third
meanings, while Fuller is using the third. But appearances can be deceptive. If Fuller is
arguing that autonomous (decentralized, self-directed) action is an integral part of law, and
this implies that he holds the mechanisms which support such actions as a value, then he
must also be arguing that rules must be abstract in the sense of their space-time reference. In
other words, Fuller must be referring to the second and third definitions above. If this is
correct, how do Hayek and Fuller expect legal mechanisms to filter out values which are not
sufficiently abstract (in the sense of their space-time reference and in terms of being widely
held across society)?
Consider the claim that legal mechanisms are limited to those which implement abstract
values. On this view, legal mechanisms may be seen as filters which attempt to eliminate
the implementation of specific goals. Why would this be the case? Fuller's main argument
for this proposition seems to be that the "purpose" of law is to provide the foundations for
autonomous action. That is, the law should strive to support autonomous moral agents,
whose actions are based on their own decisions and who, in turn, assume responsibility for
their acts. This is an explicitly moral argument. But consider for a moment the grounds of
this belief. If one were to ask why individuals should be autonomous agents, not all the
arguments are explicitly moral. In fact, one of these is Hayek's argument concerning the
informational requirements of governance in a complex society. Hayek and Fuller coincide
on this point: both assume that the law should strive to provide support for regularity
through the governance by abstract rules. If one desires to preserve complexity, one must
adopt the mechanisms which support it. To put it another way: their argument is that if one
desires a complex, Gesellschaft-type society, or if one desires certain aspects of this form of
societal relations, then one must adopt mechanisms compatible with this goal. Hayek's and
Fuller's argument is that for such a society to be achievable and sustainable, their notions of
72 See Hayek (1976, 1-30) for his arguments to this effect. It is of the utmost importance to keep in mind that
the term "abstractions" in the paragraph above refers to performative abstractions, and as such is not merely
referring to a quality of concepts or their articulations. It is the abstract capacities of individuals, as manifested in
their performance, which this thesis argues are shared in common across individuals.
73 Relative to, of course, the degree of shared particularity found in the environment to which these
mechanisms are applied.
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law would have to be accepted. I would argue that the desire to sustain the structure of a
complex society is intimately linked with Fuller's advocacy of his moral view of the
desirability of autonomous moral agents. Furthermore, an argument might be made that,
contrary to the widely held perception of Fuller as primarily concerned with the morality of
law, Fuller is equally interested in the compatibility of competing decision mechanisms in
different performative and informational environments.74
Now turn to Hayek. One of the principle Hayekian justifications for the claim that legal
mechanisms are limited to those which implement abstract values would be that
mechanisms which implement particular goals are not informationally and performatively
capable of sustaining a society where individuals act under their own judgment, nor a
complex, Gesellschaft-type society. The claim would be that mechanisms implementing
particular goals cannot generate objective judgments (in the sense of based on shared
criteria) and hence are not able to guide actions in complex environments75 nor contribute to
the resolution of conflict in an objective way. The attempt, then, to implement particular
goals would, in situations of complexity, be accompanied by a change in the authority
structure of society. Why would this be the case? The fundamental reason for this is that
concrete rules are not, on their own, capable of guiding decentralized individual conduct in
all of the particular environments of a complex society. There would therefore be a need to
make an increased number of references to authorities who would have to dictate the
conduct to be performed in each of these different environments. But such an increase in
authority references would constitute a transformation of the authority structure of society,
and it is this transformation, from abstract social relations capable of supporting a
Gesellschaft-type society, to concrete relations which cannot, which Hayek opposes.
A Hayekian would argue, then, that mechanisms implementing concrete goals cannot
generate justifications which are universalizable, consistent or coherent (UCC) across the
individuals of a society (i.e. commonly shared and, in the usage of this thesis, objective),
and hence that if there is a general desire for action to take place, there will be the need for
smaller, more restricted, groups to supply concrete goals to be implemented. On this view,
restrictions on reasoning are viewed as filters which attempt to eliminate particular, concrete
goals from legal arguments and their justifications. These filters try to ensure that the
74 For the evidence to support this, see for example Fuller (1964, 168-181) and more generally The
Principles ofSocial Order (Fuller, 1981).
75 Basically, in environments in which concrete aims are conflicting.
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makers of the judgment do not implement concrete (person-specific) goals when deciding
cases.
This does not mean, however, that the UCC filters are sufficient to ensure that judges as
a group do not impose their own (group-specific) abstract values on others. But if, in
addition to the UCC filters, judges strive for an impartial spectator perspective (and hence
for abstract rules which can serve as justifications across minds, including individuals who
are obeying the rules) there is a possibility that the justifications might be objective (i.e.
based on shared criteria). It is the combination, then, of the filters for concrete goals (the
UCC criteria) and the filters for group-specific abstractions (i.e. the impartial spectator
criteria) which leads to the possibility of objective abstract judgments.
This discussion has only emphasized some of the general filters associated with legal
mechanisms. There is no doubt that these are manifested in a variety of ways and through a
diversity of institutional structures. One which merits a brief mention is the institutional
structure of a hierarchy of review courts, with an increasing number of jurists contributing
to judgments at each higher level. This merging of a "democratic" principle with judicial
decision-making also attempts to ensure that idiosyncratic, person-specific judgments and
justifications do not emerge in legal decisions by forcing a justification to seek wider
support. One function of this continual check on judicial decisions, a form of error-
correction mechanism, is to produce consistency of decision and filter out idiosyncratic
judgments.76
Flowing from this discussion of legal filters is one further property which has been
discussed at some length in this thesis — the negativity of legal rules. Briefly put, legal
mechanisms generate rules that are primarily negative in the sense that they impose no
duties on anyone, and in the sense that they express for the most part prohibitions on action.
As has been argued in previous chapters, negativity arises as a by-product of the application
of the various filters on reasoning. It should also, however, act as an explicit filter over
potential rules. There are, of course, exceptions to this, and they will be discussed in the
section which follows. For the moment, though, the important point which should be
emphasized is that these restrictions on mechanisms — UCC, the impartial spectator
perspective, and the negativity of legal rules — are in some sense fundamental to the
definition of legal mechanisms. Each of these acts as a filter over particulars, and each
76 How well it does this in practice, or how much wider is this support, are, of course, different questions.
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represents a restriction on the forms of action which can be used to guide individual conduct
and at the same time sustain the complexity of a modern society.
23. Positive obligations and legal mechanisms
The section above noted that legal mechanisms do generate some positive obligations.
This is an important point to address, for the predominant negativity of rules of conduct is
an essential element of a mechanism model of law. Consider, then, the following: if this
theory stresses that the abstract rules of conduct governing an abstract society are for the
most part negative, what role do positive rules, such as some of the rules of contract, play in
this theory? Are they considered not to be a part of law? And, if they are, is it not an
exaggeration to argue that positive obligations do not play an important role in law?
It is of course true that positive obligations do have an important part to play in legal
mechanisms. The goal of this work is, however, to emphasize the abstract elements of the
minimal necessary conditions for the establishment of an abstract society, and the
mechanisms which support such conditions. It is true that some minimal obligations for
social life (and life itself) are conduct-requiring — this is not to be denied — and, in at least
some cases, it should be argued that they are, in this way, necessary conditions for the
advancement of complexity and a division of labour and knowledge. But it is not the aim of
this thesis, nor is it one of its implications, to deny this. Rather, this work calls attention to
the matching which takes place between a form of obligation and the mechanisms which
ensure it is satisfied and sustained over time. The argument of this thesis is that different
forms of obligations can require different mechanisms to support them, and that this should
be taken into account when considering issues of conduct governance. In particular, it
should be acknowledged that in situations of increasing complexity, positive, transfer,
obligations becoming increasingly difficult to fulfil solely under the governance of abstract
rules, and that this implies that the mechanisms which support transfer rules have different
capabilities from the ones which support governance by abstract rules of conduct.
None of this undermines the importance of positive obligations in a Hayekian legal
theory, but it does restrict the role which this type of obligation can play in sustaining a
complex, abstract, society. This thesis argues that the positive obligations which underlie
the minimal conditions for life, and social life, do have an important role to play in
providing a foundation for more abstract forms of social relations. These conditions are
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closely related to obligations which exist where concrete relations between individuals are
presumed to exist. Thus, positive legal obligations might govern situations where (a)
concrete relations exist between intimates (i.e. duties to children, spouses, etc.), (b) concrete
relations have been established by one's previous actions in areas of life and death (i.e.
duties falling upon doctors) or (c) concrete relations have been entered into by agreement,
though the specific obligations may not have been agreed upon or even considered (i.e.
obligations under contract).77 Contractual obligations represent a particularly interesting
example of the limitations placed upon positive obligations by legal mechanisms.78 For an
obligation to exist in contract, there are (generally speaking) a variety of what might be
called formation tests which must be satisfied. These tests specify the forms of conduct and
the states of affairs under which the legal state of contract shall exist. These are bound by a
variety of negative rules which exclude certain forms of obligation (for example, those
which are entered into by those lacking legal capacity). Once the parties have managed to
satisfy (or at least, not violate) these various filters, a state of contract is deemed to exist.
Within this state of affairs, a concrete obligation exists between the various parties. Some
positive obligations do exist once this state exists — omitting to act is considered to be in
many cases contrary to one's assumed obligation. In addition, of course, there exist negative
rules which prohibit certain unacceptable forms of carrying through on one's concrete
obligation.
What limitations, then, do legal mechanisms place on the positive obligations of
contract? First, and most importantly, the positive duties which are established are the result
of the conduct of the parties to that contract. Thus, positive obligations are established
through decentralized acts. Furthermore, one must pass through various formation filters to
enter into this state, and one's ability to assume obligations can be negated by a variety of
pre-conditions. It is the conduct of the parties and an observer's interpretation of that
conduct which determines who desires to be so obliged. Therefore, one is able to in large
part choose whether or not one becomes bound by such obligations (though the particular
obligations one must honour are not necessarily a matter for individual choice, nor are the
accepted forms of conduct which constitute the formation filters). Moreover, even after one
77 There are also, of course, positive obligations which arise under governmental mechanisms. The
relationship between mechanisms of government and positive obligations will be considered in another context
in a later chapter.
78 An excellent reference in this area is Treitel (1987).
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has passed through these filters and assumed a concrete obligation, one still retains the
choice of the manner in which the obligations will be fulfilled (though if the manner
deviates in such a way as to substantively undermine the obligation, a more concrete
specification — a more specific performance, if you like — might be required). Finally,
legal mechanisms only enforce these obligations when they are called upon to do so. The
decision, therefore, to enforce an obligation rests with one of the contracting parties. All of
these restrictions imply that legal mechanisms impose limitations upon positive contractual
obligations with the purpose of ensuring that in the abstract case the obligation has been
entered into through the decentralized choice of individuals. It is the existence of these
implicit, and other more explicit, filters which rule out certain forms of obligations, which
leads this thesis to emphasize the importance of negative rules to legal mechanisms. It is
these negating filters, then, which are central to legal mechanisms and which serve to
promote decentralized individual conduct governance using abstract rules.
24. Conclusion
The central argument of this chapter is that Hayek and Fuller ground their legal theory
on a conception of the sources of social order which is fundamentally different from Haitian
legal positivism. This difference in perspective results in a differing understanding of the
causal relationship between law and society. Hayek and Fuller continually emphasize a pre¬
existing, ongoing social order, in which individuals orient their conduct using abstract rules
of conduct. To these thinkers, law is a mechanism which facilitates individual interaction by
providing an articulated institutional framework for resolving conflicts between the
competing rule-sets that different individuals are obeying. The "purpose" of law, on this
view, is to regularize conduct, and this can only be achieved if it is acknowledged that
individuals are already following rules of conduct. Given that individuals are already
following abstract rules, Hayek further argues that there is an intimate relationship between
individuals being guided by abstract rules of conduct and the resultant form of society
which such conduct is capable of producing. His argument is that individuals — including
law makers — must act regularly by following abstract rules based upon abstract values if
the individuals are to be able to act autonomously and adjust to complexity, and if conflicts
which arise between them are to be resolved in an objective manner.
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Why, then, must law-makers act regularly? The argument is complex, but it can be
distilled into the insight that an individual who must implement someone else's particular
goals cannot act with the regularity required by other autonomous individuals. Individuals
have in some sense a privileged access to their own goals, but not to the goals of others. If
individuals must refer to others to find out which concrete goals are to be implemented, this
means not only that individuals are not acting in conformity with general rules based on
general values79 and hence that they are not obeying rules held in common, but also that the
societal structure within which interactions take place is of a kind different from one based
on abstract rules implementing general values. Put crudely, in a complex society, as the
rules governing interactions become more and more concrete and as they move towards the
implementation of concrete goals, spontaneous order becomes transformed into
organizational order, Gesellschaft becomes a particularly restrictive form of Gemeinschaft,
and decentralized autonomous action is replaced by actions directed by the goals of
particular individuals and groups.
Hayek's argument, then, consists of two strands. The first strand argues that if
"individual freedom" and "individual responsibility" are to have content, and if individuals
are to be facilitated in their adjustments to complexity and in the objective resolution of
disputes, then subjecting individual conduct to the governance of rules must be a value. His
argument is that the only types of mechanisms which can generate and sustain this type of
society are those which implement relatively abstract systems of rules and "goals" (values).
The second strand of his argument focuses on social life within the context of a complex,
abstract society. The claim is that if one desires an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society, or if
one desires some of the properties of this societal type, then one must adopt mechanisms
which are compatible with these goals. Thus, the argument is that there is an intimate
relationship between the degree of abstraction of rules of conduct and the goals they
implement, and the resulting order of society and authority which emerges under these rules.
It is claimed that mechanisms which implement abstract rules are associated with
Gesellschaft-type societies, while mechanisms which implement concrete rules are
associated with particularly restrictive forms ofGemeinschaft-type societies.
This chapter has traced out the outlines of an alternative theory of law based upon the
work of F.A. Hayek and infused with some of the insights of Lon Fuller. This theory focuses
79 For if the values were general enough to allow individuals to pursue their own goals rather than the goals
of others, individuals would not have to refer to others for their goals.
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on the properties of legal mechanisms, and contrasts itself with positivist conceptions which
emphasize the structure of authorization as somehow central to all that is legal. By contrast,
1 argue that the distinguishing feature of legal mechanisms is that they attempt to implement
predominantly negative abstract values using a variety of rule-based filtering mechanisms.
If this is the case, where does this take the discussion? There are three different
directions. First, I turn to a more detailed examination of this mechanism model of law and
its implications for the principle of the Rule of Law. Next comes an examination of the
feasibility of distributive justice. This includes a brief look at Hayek's critique and a re-
evaluation of its consequences. Finally comes a chapter comprised of an analysis and
restatement of Hayek's much neglected and often misunderstood theory of mind. This
theory is strikingly contemporary, and many of its insights anticipated present developments
in the philosophy of mind by a matter of decades. It is a theory based upon the insights into
the process of abstraction and the manner by which abstraction is generated, and as such is
of fundamental importance for a theory which emphasizes the generation, application, and
evolution of abstract rules of conduct. This final chapter, then, focuses on the theory of
mind which provides the foundations for much of the theory of law outlined in this work.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Governance by Abstraction
Law, the Rule of Law, and abstract society
1. Introduction
The arguments of the previous chapter were aimed at demonstrating that governance by
abstract rules of conduct has a crucial role to play in supporting abstract, complex societies.
That chapter sketched the rough outlines of a Hayekian approach to law under what might
be called a mechanism model of law. This chapter extends these arguments, and investigates
the conceptual framework within which legal mechanisms operate. This entails an
investigation into the ideas underlying the principle of the Rule of Law. This chapter
examines the connection between this principle and the concepts of justice and coercion,
and focuses on the roles these concepts play in supporting abstract social relations.
It should be stressed at the outset that the discussion of this chapter will proceed at a very
general level. There is, consequently, very little in the way of a discussion of the concrete
details of how the conceptual analysis of this chapter is actually manifested in institutional
practice. The primary justification for this choice of emphasis' is the chapter's claim that
much of legal theory, and the positivist school of thought, in particular, have ignored the
foundations of institutional practice, and have instead simply assumed that the existence of
some foundation, which allows certain institutional practices to have their specifically
1 A secondary justification for this emphasis would be that there is a substantial literature that focuses on the
institutional aspects of this principle. Dicey's analysis (1959, 183-414) remains a classic, and Hayek's own
conception of the Rule of Law can be viewed, in part, as a restatement of Dicey's earlier work. Hayek's
discussion, in The Constitution of Liberty (1960, 131-249), and the large number of references therein (1960,
449-500), provide a survey of the issues, and includes a theoretical analysis of the principle of the Rule of Law,
an examination of the conceptual framework which this principle presupposes, and some interesting, if
controversial, historical insights into its development. Fuller's discussion of his "inner morality of law" provides
an excellent overview of the fundamental principles underlying the Rule of Law (Fuller 1969). His discussion
focuses on the Rule of Law's theoretical aspects and on the problems involved in its implementation. Of the
numerous contemporary discussions, see, for example, Raz (1979, 210-229) or Walker (1988), although as the
later sections of this chapter point out, the former's examination is dependent upon certain theoretical
presuppositions which render his analysis of questionable value.
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"legal quality", is a matter of "social (or institutional) fact". This indifference to the
foundations of law and legal theory implies that the positivists are interested in a distinctly
different set of issues and questions from the ones addressed in this thesis. Positivists
presuppose the factual nature of the foundations upon which their theorizing rests, and then
proceed to work within the framework that such presuppositions underlie. Simply put, they
are presupposing that a "legal quality" exists as a matter of fact, and then examining how
such a quality manifests itself in practice. This thesis, on the other hand, turns the factual
nature of the foundations of law and legal systems into a question, and examines how the
quality of being legal arises in the first place. Consequently, the central question which this
thesis addresses is not concerned with examining a certain set of institutional practices to
see how they affect law and legal systems, the existence of which (or lack thereof) are
simply presumed to be a matter of fact. Instead, the issue of decisive importance, from the
point of view of this thesis, is how this "matter of fact" is achieved and maintained.
This thesis argues that what it terms the "legal quality" arises from acting in certain
ways, i.e. in ways which are governed by certain fundamental mechanisms, as discussed in
the earlier chapters of this thesis. It is the operation of these mechanisms which provide the
framework upon which law rests, and it is these same mechanisms which are simply
presupposed to exist by much of traditional legal theory, but which are subject to little, or
no, detailed scrutiny. My view is that this blindness to the foundations of law and legal
order can be summarized in two critiques of the implicit presumptions which are manifested
in the Haitian positivist theory of law, both of which are expanded upon in the later sections
of this chapter. First comes the idea that this vision of law has a tendency to assume what
might be termed a "premature factuality". "Social facts" exist, but little attention is paid to
the foundations upon which these "facts" are intimately dependent. Second, and related to
this, comes the argument that the Haitian positivist perspective on law has an
epistemological bias towards the articulated and the concrete, and that it lacks an insight
into the importance of abstraction for issues of conduct governance. This chapter will argue
that both of these predilections lead positivist legal theory, and those theories of law which
base their arguments on similar views, down a path of conceptual analysis which rests on a
comprehensive misunderstanding of the foundations of legal order.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. First, I will consider the ideas which underlie the
principle of the Rule of Law. This will involve an investigation into the way that individuals
govern their own lives. Next comes a discussion of the rationale behind the Rule of Law and
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its implications for social conduct governance. This is followed by the examination of two
concepts which in an abstract society are intimately connected to the principle of the Rule of
Law: the concepts of justice and coercion. Once this is completed, the chapter turns to an
examination of the inter-relationship between the Rule of Law, justice and coercion which
lies at the heart of this chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of what is
probably the dominant theoretical perspective on law and the Rule of Law, the positivist
model, and contrasts it with the theory here developed.
2. A shift of perspective: law as a conflict-resolution mechanism
The last chapter focused on conduct governance by abstract rules and its connection to
the sources of societal order. It also examined one element of the role played by law — the
facilitation of regularity— and looked at various filters over potential rules of conduct. The
previous chapters have argued that these filters aim to restrict the implementation of
concrete goals and eliminate rules of conduct which do not enhance regularity. This chapter
represents a change in perspective, away from the sources of, and pre-conditions for,
abstract order and the role abstract rules play in supporting an ongoing abstract society, and
towards the resolution of conflicts between the actions of different individuals. With this
goal in mind, this chapter also introduces one final filter through which rules conducive to,
and supportive of, an abstract society must pass: the minimum coercion filter.
This shift in perspective might seem to be a rather substantial change of focus. Why, one
might ask, is this necessary? Up to now, the idea that conflict exists has been implicitly
assumed away by the very nature of regularity. The previous chapter in a sense assumed
away the problem of conflict and provisionally assumed that it had either been resolved or
did not exist. It is time, however, to turn the focus of attention to the question of how
regularity is maintained by explicitly assuming that different individuals will be acting in
such way that conflicts arise between them. Law, in its role as a promoter of regularity,
implicitly acts as a mechanism whereby conflicts between different forms of conduct are
resolved. The time has come, then, to emphasize law's role as a conflict-resolution
mechanism.
The idea that law is a mechanism for resolving conflict and hence promoting regularity is
intimately related to an important principle, the concept of the Rule of Law. This principle
imposes two requirements upon acts which make a claim to being specifically legal. First
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are its minimal conditions, which are those conditions which acts must necessarily satisfy to
have a "legal quality". In this work, these are represented by the requirements outlined in
the previous chapter, i.e. the minimal requirements imposed by subjecting individual
conduct to the governance of rules, viewed from the perspective of the minimal necessary
requirements for the existence of law. Second are the aspirational elements of the principle
of the Rule of Law. These are the requirements towards which one ought to strive if one
wishes to improve upon (or perfect) the enterprise of subjecting individual conduct to the
governance of rules.
Thus, in this work the principle of the Rule of Law imposes both a minimal criteria for
the identification of law (i.e. for what the law is), and an aspirational aspect, which governs
the sphere ofwhat the "legal quality" ought to aspire to be. This is quite different from other
studies of this principle. Typically, studies of the principle of the Rule of Law focus solely
on its aspirational aspects.2 In other words, the principle of the Rule of Law is treated solely
as a normative ideal. As I shall argue at greater length towards the end of this chapter, this is
a mistake. Studies which treat the principle of the Rule of Law solely as a normative
principle simply presuppose that legal authority exists, independent of any specifically legal
mechanisms associated with such authority. The principle of the Rule of Law is then treated
as a normative filter over pre-existing legal acts.3 This implies that legal acts are identified
using criteria which are different from the ones manifested in the principle of the Rule of
Law. I will argue that such a separation is based on a mistake, and hence is not the approach
taken in this thesis. The principle of the Rule of Law does provide an ideal towards which
the law should strive, but that is not its only contribution. Instead, this concept also provides
the foundation for the minimal conditions for the existence of law, and the mechanisms
under which acts are identified as specifically legal.
Thus, the normative, aspirational, aspect of this principle is the idea that regularity in
society should be promoted and facilitated using abstract rules which are themselves stable
over time. The minimal conditions aspect of this principle is based on the argument that if
social regularity is to take the form of abstract social relations, then social conduct must be
guided predominantly by relatively unchanging abstract rules. This is an important point.
2 Hayek is not immune to this, for much of his discussion of this principle explicitly focuses on the
specifically moral aspects of this notion. See, in particular, his comments in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960,
205-207).
3 See, for example, Raz's claim that "jhe rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or may
possess to a greater or lesser degree" for a clear statement of this idea (1979, 211).
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Discussions of the Rule of Law which focus on its aspirational aspects often presuppose that
it is only one value among many.4 The argument of this and previous chapters in a sense
contradicts this. The claim of this thesis is that there exists an intimate connection between
the type of mechanism which governs social conduct, the resultant form of society which
such mechanisms can support, and the scope of individual judgment and action in such
societies. Thus, the argument is not that the Rule of Law is merely a useful tool for
achieving social regularity, but also that the Rule of Law is the foundation for, and
necessary pre-condition of, the widespread applicability and relevance ofmany other values
with which the Rule of Law is sometimes assumed to be in competition. If this is correct —
if the Rule of Law is a pre-condition for many other virtues — this not only eliminates the
conflict between it and its supposed competitors, but also heightens its significance and the
importance of clearly spelling out the meaning of this ideal.
3. The analogy with individual conduct governance
What, then, are the foundations which underlie the principle of the Rule of Law? The
route that I will take in discussing this is a somewhat indirect one, though one which by now
should be familiar. The chapter will focus on the general themes underlying the theory of
the Rule of Law using an analogy with individual conduct governance, and only much later
in the chapter turn to a more detailed discussion of the particulars associated with this
principle. This approach has the advantage of providing an insight into the relatively simple
and straightforward idea which underlies the principle of the Rule of Law. As well, it
furthers my goal of avoiding at the initial stages of the discussion the complexity of the
specific details which are associated with this principle.
The discussion begins, therefore, with an examination of how individuals in their
everyday lives govern their own conduct. This governance is based on a mechanism similar
to the principle underlying the Rule of Law, but more appropriately termed (in this context)
"subjecting oneself to the governance of rules of conduct". Consider, then, the analogy
between the principle of the Rule of Law and the way in which individuals govern their own
conduct using rules. Recall, for a moment, the discussion of chapter one, concerning the
difference between conditional goals, ultimate goals, and values. This is an important
4 See Raz (1979, 211, 226-229).
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distinction in individual decision-making, for individuals base their own decisions on
combinations of conditional (short-term) goals and longer-term goals and values. For the
moment, however, I would like to consider only conscious, deliberate, decisions which are
made based on conditional and ultimate goals (decisions involving values will be considered
in due course). Given these types of decisions, what can be said about individual decision¬
making and conduct governance in such situations, and how is this related to the ideas
behind the principle of the Rule of Law?
Perhaps the most important thing to recall from the discussion of chapter one is the
different properties of conditional and ultimate goals. Conditional goals are based to a
greater extent on momentary desires and the particular circumstances of the moment.
Longer-term goals are in a sense more stable, more enduring, and tend to assert themselves
over a wider variety of circumstances.5 If there is little conflict between one's short-term
and longer-term goals, decisions are relatively unproblematic. One simply follows one's
momentary desires, and as these coincide with one's longer-term goals, one achieves both in
a single stroke. The difficulty for individual choice arises when a conflict exists between
short-term and longer-term goals. In these situations, individuals facing choices must
attempt to strike a balance between their competing goals. If one were guided solely by the
impulses of the moment, one might not achieve one's longer-term goals. But, if one follows
only one's longer-term goals, one would miss out on many of the pleasures of the moment.
There is, then, a balance to be struck, and this balance determines how successful one will
be at achieving one's short-term and longer-term plans.
Conduct governance from the perspective of decisions based on goals and values is in
many ways analogous to the decision-making described above, except for one qualification
which is of some importance. It should be pointed out that if one is working under the
distinction between "goals" and "values" stipulated in chapter one, it is perhaps in many
cases a misnomer to speak of "decisions" at all, for it is not necessarily the case that the
values "held" by an individual are consciously known. Rather, they might merely be
manifested in the conduct of the individual. If this is the case, individuals' goals, either
short-term or longer-term, might be in conflict with one's values, even though this may not
5 They are, in this sense, more abstract than conditional, short-term, aims. They refer to situations which are
less concrete in that longer-term values refer to a longer period of the future and to a greater range of space both
of which are, except in their abstract aspects, unknown and indistinct (especially relative to the relatively
concrete present).
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be consciously known to the acting individuals and hence might not be taken into
consideration in their conscious deliberations and choices. This is not to say that in such
situations there is a deliberate choice being made to undermine one's values, but rather that
when individuals pursue their goals they have the potential of undermining the values upon
which such plans of action depend.
How, then, is all of this related to the principle of the Rule of Law? Insofar as individuals
make deliberate choices, they are in some respects self-governing, choosing between
enduring aims (their longer-term goals) and momentary desires (conditional goals). One
effective way of doing this is by following rules. In an important sense, the principle of the
Rule of Law is manifested at an individual level by agents' attempts to govern their own
conduct by abstract rules. The reason for resorting to rules is that one is limited in the
number of aspects one can consider at any given moment. In other words, over the same
time period a more complete consideration of short-term circumstances always implies a
less complete consideration of longer-term goals.6 This "economy of mind" can lead to
short-term desires overwhelming longer-term considerations. If, however, one considered
the situation in abstract (i.e. not in those particular circumstances) one might have desired
the longer-term goals to dominate the desires of the moment. One resorts to rules, then, in
order to build in those elements of longer-term considerations one holds to be important.
Rules are in this sense one manifestation of longer-term goals. A rule which says "as a rule
do x" means that one does not consider all of the circumstances of the particular situation.
The resort to rules excludes consideration of some particular circumstances precisely
because that is one of the reasons for following the rule in the first place (if one felt that
one's momentary judgment were always superior to judgment based on a rule, why resort to
rules at all?). Rules, then, are a tool that one can use to ensure that one's longer-term goals
are respected and given adequate consideration. The underlying idea is that sometimes one's
momentary desires are not always consistent with one's longer-term goals, and that if one
desires these longer-term goals to be implemented, one must sometimes overrule one's
short-term desires.
These considerations hold with even greater force for decisions based on goals and
values. The idea here is that there exist certain fundamental rules of conduct which have
6 This idea is one of the recurring themes of Hayek's work. See, for example, his discussions in Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1973, 55-71; 1976, 1-30).
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evolved to support certain values. This thesis argues that there are evolved rules which
support the fundamental obligations which underlie action and social life, and that these
should be taken into account when one maps out a plan of action, for they are, in a sense, the
pre-conditions for one's ability to make and carry out a plan at all. Individuals might have
no conscious knowledge of the roles such rules play in supporting these values, nor even,
perhaps, of the values themselves. It might even seem to individuals that certain rules are
themselves values, in that they are not means to certain ends but rather seem to be "ends in
themselves" (in the sense that it is the fact that rules are obeyed, and not the effects of this
fact in particular cases, which is held to be of value). Be this as it may, such rules of
conduct, for which the individual might not know the justification, but under which they are
capable of acting, are an essential element of social life.
This leads to one final point which is important to keep in mind. In many cases, short-
term goals, longer-term goals, and even longer-term values are not in conflict. If this is the
case, then there will be no conflict between one's performance based on short-term goals
and one's longer-term interests. Indeed, many short-term acts actively promote one's longer
term goals and values and may in this sense be considered to be manifestations of one's
longer-term interests. It is, then, solely in the case of a conflict between short-term and
longer-term interests that one's longer-term goals or values come into play and potentially
restrict one's conduct which is predicated on short-term goals and desires.7
4. The connection between individual and social conduct governance
The reader might be inclined to think that too much time has been devoted to examining
an individual's difficulties in governing their own conduct. Interesting as individuals' self-
governance might be, it could be argued that there has been too little time spent examining
social governance mechanisms. While this view would be understandable, given the
interests and emphasis of contemporary legal theory, it would also be mistaken, for there is
an intimate relationship between individuals' own conduct governance and social —
institutional — forms. The argument of the previous chapter was that for reasons of
evolutionary adaptivity to increasingly complex environments, individuals have, to an
increasing degree, resorted to abstract rules of conduct to govern their own conduct. These
7 Compare this with Hayek's discussion of the restrictions imposed by the principle of the Rule of Law
(1960,206).
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rules are formed within the individuals' own minds by processes analogous to the filters
described in previous chapters. Such rules can be generated with the active input of
conscious insight, but they can also come to exist without conscious deliberation or design.
It is of some importance to note that such rules assume a rank-ordering (a "weighting")
through a complex interaction between the processes ongoing in the minds of individuals
and their environments. Indeed, this notion of rank-order is intimately related to a crucial
theoretical dichotomy introduced in earlier chapters: the distinction between minimal
conditions, and conditions which presuppose that these minimal conditions have already
been fulfilled. The argument of previous chapters was that rules of conduct pertaining to
minimal conditions have an important role to play in conduct governance, and that the fact
that certain rules of conduct are supportive of minimal conditions through the obligations
they impose is connected to aspects of their governance properties, including their
abstraction and, in situations of increasing complexity, their negativity.
That conduct governance in complex societies must resort increasingly to abstract rules
of conduct based on obligations relating to minimal conditions is intimately related to an
issue which is sometimes passed over in discussions of conduct governance. This is the
question of the severity of the performative requirements of certain mechanisms. Put
crudely, and in the context of autonomous conduct governance, a question the individual
might ask would be "how hard will it be for me to conform to this governance mechanism,
and at the same time retain my autonomy of action?" From the point of view of this thesis,
and with respect to deliberate efforts to govern one's own conduct with rules, conduct
governance by abstract rules is a complex activity, and is fraught with difficulty. It is not a
trivial matter to deliberately subject one's own conduct to the governance of abstract rules
of conduct. Indeed, there are certain minimal conditions which must be satisfied before it
can be said that an individual is acting under the governance of abstract rules. For one to act
under the governance of such rules, one must exhibit regularity in conduct over time, and
respond in a regular manner to a wide variety of particular situations. To do this requires the
exclusion of particulars which do not fall under the general rules which govern one's
conduct. Governance by abstract rules, then, implies both that one's conduct is based upon a
filtered set of aspects,8 and that this filtering is over particulars.9 Filtering occurs under
8 There is an argument which one sometimes encounters which should perhaps be mentioned at this point.
This argument claims that all that we know is necessarily abstract, for our minds must always take in only a part
— select aspects — of the complex environment which surrounds us. On this view, the entire line of argument of
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mechanisms ofmind analogous to filtering mechanisms described in earlier chapters. In this
sense, then, the filtering mechanisms examined in previous chapters support and reinforce
the minimal conditions necessary for conduct governance by abstract rules. To put it another
way, these mechanisms are the means by which one's conduct becomes regular. Conduct
governance by abstract rules, then, presupposes the existence and application of these
mechanisms.
All of this is intimately related to the issue of social conduct governance. If individuals
are attempting to subject their own conduct to the governance of rules, and one aims to
ensure regularity in interactions between individuals, then abstract rule-based social
governance mechanisms should both recognize the ongoing ordering mechanisms of
individuals and aim to facilitate their attempts at conduct governance. Social conduct
mechanisms are thus not fundamentally different from individual methods of conduct
governance, but instead are extensions of this form of governance which have evolved in
specific institutionalized forms to cope with the specifically social aspects of conduct
governance which arise when individuals interact.
Thus, the institutional manifestation of the principle of the Rule of Law is grounded
upon the same foundation as individual conduct governance by abstract rules. The concept
of the Rule of Law is based upon the insight that decisions based on the desires and
knowledge of the moment may not always be in one's longer-term interest. The principle of
the Rule of Law is, in effect, the extension of this insight concerning the limitations
imposed by our longer-term interests on our momentary desires and judgments into the
social sphere. The underlying idea remains the same: momentary judgment must be to some
extent restrained by longer-term interests. It now applies, however, to decision-making
governing relations behveen individuals.
This change of focus leads to a number of differences between judgment over one's own
actions and judgments between individuals. The first difference stems from the more
this thesis is confused, for everything that we know is abstract and filtered, in the sense that what we know is
always less than the totality of that which "could" be known. This argument, though on its own terms a
consistent one, is, from the point of view of being a critique of this thesis, misplaced, for it rests upon a
conflation of different senses of the terms "abstract" and "concrete". In this thesis, a rule would be "abstract" or
"concrete" depending upon how much space-time it referred to. It would, I suspect, be a mistake, and
misunderstanding of the arguments made in this thesis, to dismiss them as being flawed on the grounds that all
thought is abstract, or similarly, because all thought is filtered, for the focus of this thesis is upon relative
abstractness defined in terms of space-time reference.
9 A point Hayek emphasizes throughout his work. See, in particular, his discussions in The Sensory Order
(1952, passim) and his essay "The Primacy of the Abstract" in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics
and the History ofIdeas (1978).
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systemic concerns of inter-personal conduct governance. For an individual deliberately
choosing between alternative paths of action, conflicts can arise between their own short-
term and longer-term goals. These goals in turn rest upon the continuing existence of certain
pre-conditions — certain values — upon which individual plans depend, and about which
individuals may have little or no conscious knowledge. Individual decisions, then, often take
these values as a given, and simply presuppose (either explicitly or implicitly) their
continued existence. Judgment between individuals, on the other hand, should take into
account the more systemic aspects of individual judgment, and should attempt to ensure the
compatibility of the goals of different individuals with the system of pre-conditions (values)
upon which such goals depend.
The second difference which accompanies the change from an individual to a social
perspective is a shift in the sources of authority. The limitations of knowledge imposed by
existence in a particular space-time implies that individuals will have in some ways a
privileged access to some of their own goals. This can lead to difficulties if it results in
individuals privileging their own goals over the goals of others (i.e. to them viewing their
own goals as having a greater "authority" than the goals of others), for if each individual
does this, conflict-resolution between goals can become increasingly difficult. Although it
may be the case that individuals have, in some respects, a privileged access to their own
goals, this privilege does not necessarily extend to the goals of other individuals. Nor does it
extend to more abstract values, about which individuals may not even be consciously aware.
An inter-personal conduct governance system must take all of this into account, and attempt
to integrate the plans of action of various individuals such that these plans are compatible
with each other and with the values which are their pre-conditions. A more systemic view of
conduct governance implies that individuals' privileging of their own goals must be
restricted to some degree, for there is nothing to say that an individual's goals will be
compatible with the goals of others, or with the values which underlie their own conduct and
interaction in a social setting.
The question is how a social conduct governance mechanism can manage to
accommodate these two differences, and at the same time facilitate the efforts of individuals
to govern their own conduct in an autonomous way. The short answer is — by abstracting,
and by resorting to the filtering mechanisms outlined in previous chapters to perform this
task. It is the process of abstraction which distils the common element of individuals'
concrete goals and generates rules which manifest the commonality between these
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differences. And it is by abstracting that insights can be gained into the enduring aspects of
a social system. By filtering out particularity, the various mechanisms of abstraction, some
of which are outlined in previous chapters, can generate rules which are capable both of
governing the conduct of different individuals holding different (individual-specific) goals,
and of supporting the general values upon which individual action, and social life, depend.
Note that none of this implies that individuals' goals and values are unrelated to those
which govern social interactions. But what, then, is the relationship between individuals'
goals and values and the social values embedded in the principle of the Rule of Law? What
is the source of social authority? The argument put forward by this work is that if abstract
social relations are to be maintained, they must be based on abstract rules in the sense of
performative regularities which embed the commonality between different individuals'
specific goals, and which support the value systems upon which such goals condition and
depend. Thus, an abstract society must be based on abstractions which are authoritative to
individuals because they embed commonly shared goals, values and obligations which
individuals instantiate through their conduct. Given the arguments previously presented
concerning the restrictions this implies on the rules which implement these goals and values,
we can state that these rules will be abstract and predominantly negative. They will not
necessarily be articulated or deliberately followed. In an abstract society authority will be
implemented through, and supported by, commonly shared and negative abstract rules of
conduct. The commonality of these rules flows from their being minimal conditions for
social interaction and from their being based on similar (in their abstract aspects) situations
and similar processes across minds. As I have argued in the previous chapter, minimal
conditions — minimal values and their instantiation in conduct — must be satisfied for
individuals to have a social life at all. Social life is not comprised of an accidental throwing
together of pre-formed "individuals". Rather, people grow up and become individuals by
observing minimal rules of conduct which are essential to their continued existence and
ability to interact in society with others.10 As we shall see, these commonly held minimal
obligations are intimately related to the notions of justice and coercion which underlie
10 It should be pointed out that this argument is explicitly evolutionary, in that these rules of conduct and
their associated values have evolved and in a sense embed the results of evolutionary selection. This is not to
argue, of course, that all such rules of conduct and values which have so evolved are necessarily well-adapted,
for such a determination could not be made independent of a historical analysis which takes into account the
environments in which these rules of conduct have operated and hence the roles these rules are capable of
playing. Rather, such an argument is merely pointing out that this evolutionary aspect should not be ignored
when considering the authoritativeness of particular values, or the function and adaptiveness of rules of conduct.
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conduct governance mechanisms that are based on abstract rules of conduct. However,
before turning to an examination of this relationship, it is of some importance to consider
some of the implications flowing from the claim that these minimal obligations are
obligations for everyone, and not merely for select groups in society.
5. The implications of governance by a commonly shared code of conduct
One essential idea flowing from the discussion above is that the rules upon which an
abstract society are based must be abstract enough to govern all persons who are capable of
acting in accordance with them.11 The goal of this section is to trace out one of the
implications of this idea for a theory of law.
The idea that the rules of conduct followed by individuals in an abstract society must
apply to all is a familiar element of Hayek's legal theory.12 This idea is echoed in a more
general way by Fuller in his examination of the definition of a moral community (1969,
181-184). There, he argues that the notion of a moral community should aspire to apply to
all human beings. If these arguments are correct, this implies that social rules of conduct
which do not apply to all people capable of obeying them are not necessarily supportive of
an abstract society and might in some cases be incompatible with the abstractness that it
requires. In other words, rules that govern only specific groups function to support more
concreteness that would be required by an abstract societal structure. Such rules, then, might
be to some degree incompatible with abstract social relations. Note that this does not imply
that concrete rules of conduct are necessarily incompatible with the generation and
preservation of abstract social relations, for indeed such abstract relations implicitly
presuppose the existence of concrete rules of conduct and the existence of concrete
11 This is an important qualification, for the argument is not that these rules must apply to everyone
regardless of their ability to act in accordance with these rules, but rather that anyone who can act in accordance
with them should be governed by these rules. This implies that infants, people without the mental capacity to
follow the rules, etc., fall under such a qualification.
12 Although it must be acknowledged that this idea only emerges gradually in his later legal theorizing, and
is not acknowledged by Hayek as a substantive change from his earlier views. In his preliminary work on legal
theory, The Constitution ofLiberty (1960), Hayek focused on the abstract properties of law. There he argues that
the institutional rules of a legal system can apply differently to different individuals, and that it is not
contradictory to the idea of the Rule of Law that different individuals can be governed by different systems of
rules (1960, 153-154). In Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973; 1976; 1979) however, his perspective has changed
somewhat. This work places a greater emphasis on individual-level regularity, on the minimal foundations of
legal systems, and consequently much of his discussion presupposes the existence of a system of what he terms
"rules of just conduct" which, he implies on numerous occasions, must govern the conduct of all individuals
(1973, 107, 127; 1976, 15-17).
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societies. Rather, the idea is that such concrete rules of conduct are not capable on their own
of sustaining abstract social relations. If, then, such concrete rules are extended to wider and
wider societies, it does make sense to argue that they are incompatible with an abstract form
of society in that such concrete rules are not capable of supporting abstract forms of social
relations.
There is an important point which flows from this argument. If certain abstract rules of
conduct are a necessary condition for the continued existence of social life, then there are
grounds for criticizing other rules of conduct which are incompatible with this general goal.
This idea is, I believe, the basis for some of Hayek's criticisms of rules and mechanisms
which he holds to be incompatible with his vision of the role of legal mechanisms in
sustaining the minimal foundations of social interaction. On this view, then, there would be
grounds for objecting to exemptions from the minimal rules governing conduct in society
(referred to by Hayek as "rules of just conduct") claimed for any individual, group or
organization, including governmental organizations.13
Underlying all of this is the general idea that justifications for action based on some idea
of the "public good" are misplaced when they are used to grant immunity from "rules of just
conduct". Why would this be the case? The claim would be that a proper consideration of
the "public good" would note that the observance of these rules in every applicable case
more than outweighs the good that might be done in any particular case (save, perhaps, in
situations of war and extreme catastrophe).14 Note that this argument does not claim that
only "rules of just conduct" should govern the actions of all individuals, groups and
organizations, for there could be special rules applying to organizational orders, such as
those of government or corporations — although such provisions would be limited to
relations within such bodies, and should not govern relations between these bodies and those
external to them. The argument states only that there should never be exemptions from the
"rules of just conduct", not that there cannot be rules which augment these rules (unless, of
course, they conflict with these rules, in which case the "rules of just conduct" should
typically have an overriding force).
13 As argued in The Constitution ofLiberty (Hayek 1960, 210) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1979, 128-
152).
14 A very similar argument to the one advocated by David Hume (1962, 303-311; 1978, 496-498), and
restated by Hayek on numerous occasions (1973, 55-71; 1976, 15-17).
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If the reader is to properly understand this argument, it is of the utmost importance that
one does not fall into the error of assuming that there is a strict equation between the set of
minimal rules governing social interaction and those which exist in actual institutional
practice. In particular, one must guard against assuming that "rules of just conduct" are
equated with existing rules of law, and in particular, private law. It sometimes seems as if
Hayek falls into this trap, in that he first distinguishes between abstract rules of conduct
(which he terms "rules of just conduct") and more concrete rules embedding concrete goals
(termed "rules of organization"), and then goes one step further and seems to effectively
equate the existing rules of private law with rules of just conduct.15 Such a move would be
objectionable because of its implicit assumption that the present rules of private law already
embed all of the minimal obligations which sustain the necessary conditions for action and
social life. If one were to argue that this is Hayek's position, then it would be a poor one. I
would argue that Hayek does not in fact do this, and that for him "rules ofjust conduct" and
rules of private law, though overlapping, are not identical.16 But regardless of Hayek's
position, the point to be emphasized is that one must be on guard against the uncritical
identification of existing rules of private law and the general system of abstract rules of
conduct necessary to sustain an abstract society. From the point of view of this chapter, the
two are not, nor do they necessarily need to be, identical.
6. Introducing the minimum coercion filter
The discussion above contends that for conduct to be capable of sustaining an abstract
form of society, it must be governed by shared, and predominantly negative, rules which are
abstracted from the commonalities shared by the more particular codes of conduct guiding
the conduct of the different individuals (and groups of individuals) in society. This section
seeks to address the question whether the filters over admissible rules of conduct introduced
thus far in the thesis are sufficient to ensure that abstract societal relations are sustained.
15 He also seems to equate rules of public law with rules governing organizational order. That is, Hayek
takes "the distinction between private and public law as being equivalent to the distinction between rules of just
conduct and rules of organization (and in doing so, in conformity with predominant Anglo-Saxon but contrary to
continental-European practice, place criminal law under private rather than public law)" (Hayek 1973, 132).
16 That Hayek does distinguish between the two types of rules is implicit in much of his discussion in Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1973; 1976; 1979) and in perhaps most obvious in his discussion of the need for legal
reform outlined in the earlier chapter on cultural evolution. For this argument to make sense, Hayek must be
presupposing that one can differentiate between existing institutional rules of law and "rules ofjust conduct".
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The argument which extends over the many sections that follow is that these filters are not
in themselves sufficient to preserve these types of relations. What is required, then, is one
further condition — the implementation of justice through the application of the minimum
coercion filter.
Why, then, do we resort to yet another filter? Why are the previous filters insufficient to
ensure that abstract social relations are supported? And, finally, what is the relationship
between this filter and justice? I will examine this third question in the section which
follows. For the moment, then, consider the first two queries: why introduce another filter,
and why are the filters we have already examined not up to the task of supporting an
abstract society? There are two aspects to consider in answering these questions. First, in
one sense the minimum coercion filter is merely the articulation of a foundational basis of
this work which has been ever present but rarely explicit — the notion of rank-order
importance.17 All of the previous filters simply assumed that there was a background rank-
order which invoked closures and which was used to compare and weigh one possibility
against another. It is now time to explicitly examine the implications of the notion of rank-
order and its application to the concept of coercion.18 Second, the reason for introducing this
filter is that it is of fundamental importance. The reason for this is that although a rule may
be abstract, negative and commonly shared, this is not sufficient to ensure that the ranking
of individuals' priorities is respected. In other words, without a notion of rank-order, it
might be the case that actions of lesser importance override actions of greater importance.
The minimum coercion filter addresses precisely this issue, for it governs conflicts in such a
way that the only justifiable reason for coercing one individual or group is the prevention of
still greater coercion to another.
7. Justice in an abstract society
What, then, is the relationship between justice and the minimum coercion filter? The
answer to this question requires a development and discussion of the concept of justice and
17 Alternatively referred to as an intensity, weight, or strength ordering.
18 As mentioned in a previous chapter, the minimum coercion filter could perhaps be incorporated into a
combination of ucc filters and the test for the consequences of a particular act. The reasons for resorting to a
coercion filter is its more direct connection with the conceptual framework of this chapter and in particular its
connection with justice and coercion. In addition, such a filter is more explicit in its consideration of the concept
of rank-order and the conflict between rules of conduct.
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coercion which underlies this thesis. For the moment, however, I will turn to the more
limited consideration of justice in an abstract society and the relationship between justice,
law, and the role played by abstract rules of conduct. The relationship between abstract rules
and law becomes clearer when one realizes that rules engender expectations. Order flows
from individuals following rules which engender expectations. One of the law's roles is to
resolve conflicts between these expectations (and hence, between rules) and actuality such
that a maximum of what might be called "expectational regularity" is achieved. As Hayek
puts it,
...the central problem [of law] is which expectations must be assured in order to
maximize the possibility of expectations in general being fulfilled. This implies a
distinction between such 'legitimate' expectations which the law must protect and
others which it must allow to be disappointed. And the only method yet discovered
of defining a range of expectations which will be thus protected, and thereby
reducing the mutual interference of people's actions with each other's intentions, is
to demarcate for every individual a range of permitted actions by designating (or
rather by making recognizable by the application of rules to the concrete facts)
ranges of objects over which only particular individuals are allowed to dispose and
from the control of which all others are excluded. The range of actions in which
each will be secured against the interference of others can be determined by rules
equally applicable to all only if these rules make it possible to ascertain which
particular objects each may command for [their] purposes. In other words, rules are
required which make it possible at each moment to ascertain the boundary of the
protected domain of each and thus to distinguish between the meum and the tuum.
(Hayek 1973, 107, my italics)
As was argued in the previous chapter, the task of guiding expectations in an abstract
society falls upon abstract rules. The argument made in earlier chapters was that rule-based
mechanisms are the only ones which can delineate the individual's sphere and at the same
time allow individuals to govern their own conduct in a way which can sustain a complex
society and allow for the possibility of objective conflict resolution. Of course, there could
exist societies in which some commanded and some obeyed, in which case there would not
be a rule-defined sphere for some individuals. The question is, however, whether such a
structure of governance would be capable of allowing individuals to act autonomously in
adjusting their behaviour to complexity in a way which is essential to a complex society, or
whether it could allow for the potentially objective resolutions of conflict. This chapter, and
those which preceded it, have argued that it could not, and that such a change in governance
structure would be incompatible with the existence of abstract social relations and social
complexity.
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Where, then, does justice come into the picture? Justice is based on the idea that conflict
should be reduced to a minimum. Within the framework set out in this thesis, justice is the
principle that conflicts between actions should be resolved by referring to the minimal
shared obligations underlying action and social life. These obligations are supported by
shared abstract rules of conduct and the mechanisms which support them; hence, justice is
the striving to reduce conflict between these rules (or, more accurately, between the conduct
that these rule govern) using these mechanisms.19 To put it differently, justice implies that
conflicts should be resolved by resorting to just rules of conduct and the mechanisms which
support them. But how, then, is one to decide which rules are just and which rules are not?
In conflicts between rules of conduct,20 just rules of conduct are those which are the
highest-ranking of the competing rules. These highest-ranking rules support the minimal
obligations upon which action and social life depend. Thus, in an abstract society conduct is
just if it is governed by abstract, predominantly negative, rules of conduct which support the
minimal obligations of action and social life, and if it implements the rank-ordering over
forms of conduct which these obligations engender. Just conduct, then, is conduct governed
by abstract rules using a shared rank-order, i.e. one ranks conflicts between one's acts using
this ordering.
It might, for the moment, be helpful to consider the more specific question of what is a
just judgment. Under the theoretical framework put forward in this thesis, a just judgment
would be one which does what is "right", regardless of the cost in the concrete case in which
the judgment was made. In other words, just judgments are those which can be independent
of the circumstances one might think desirable. Just judgments are those judgments which
are "correct" independent of one's desires, and are considered "right", but are not
necessarily in accord with what we desire at the particular moment. Just judgments, then,
abstract from the particular desires of the moment and are based on rules which support
longer-term values. From all of this it can be argued that justice is concerned with judgment
19 The Hayekian notion of justice has been controversial, in that it focuses primarily on conduct and only
secondarily on states of affairs. This contrasts markedly with studies ofjustice, such as David Miller's (1976, 17-
51), which focus on states of affairs and distributional issues. The rationale underlying Hayek's focus will be
touched on in the section that follows, and discussed at greater length in chapter eight.
20 Does justice, then, apply to all situations of conflict? No. It applies only to those situations which are
governed by the abstract rules of conduct which support the minimal obligations of action and social life. It does
not apply to an individual's actions insofar as it remains within the individual's sphere established by these rules
and does not violate some other individual's sphere. Justice, therefore, includes a sphere within which the
choices of an individual have priority, and it is the very abstract rules of conduct presupposed by justice which
establish such a sphere.
Governance by abstraction • 243
governed by abstract rules, based on (abstract) values, and not the particular goals of the
moment which depend upon these values. Justice, then, is concerned with maintaining and
protecting the minimal values upon which action and social life depend. Furthermore, it is
the existence of these minimal obligations and values which underlie, and support, the rank-
ordering over actions which allows attributions of justice to take place in the first place.
What, then, is the relationship between the principle of the Rule of Law and justice?
Justice in a sense presupposes the principle of the Rule of Law. Justice is concerned with
minimizing conflict and focuses on the rank-order of rules of conduct (which are
presupposed to govern conduct). The Rule of Law, on the other hand, has two prongs. The
first is its minimal aspect, in which it sets down the minimal conditions for conduct
regularity which are required by social life. The second prong is its aspirational one, in
which it states not only that individuals must subject their conduct to the governance of
rules (if social life it to be sustained), but also that this form of governance should be
perfected. Justice, then, presupposes the "principle of treating all under the same rules"
(Hayek 1976, 39) and strives towards the minimization of conflicts between actions
governed by abstract rules of human conduct,21 and hence between the expectations such
rules engender. On this view, then, justice is striving towards the minimization of conflicts
between expectation and actuality as governed by shared,22 predominantly negative,
abstract, rules and the minimal obligations for action and social life which these support.
This discussion reveals a point which must be emphasized. The argument thus far has
presupposed that justice must be objective. Furthermore, in an abstract society justice must
be based on abstract rules, for they are the sole basis on which objectivity can potentially be
sustained. "Objective" rules are rules that are shared in common, implying individual- and
context-specific detail is stripped off in the process of abstraction which generates such
rules. All of these aspects are held in common by justice and the principle of the Rule of
Law. It is perhaps important to emphasize, however, that justice and the principle of the
Rule of Law are not identical. One might be thinking that the principle of justice in an
21 In Hayek's terms, the test of the "justice of [a] particular act [will be] the compatibility of the rule by
which I judge it with all the other rules in which I also believe" (Hayek 1976, 43).
22 In the sense of objective, implying the same are held by different individuals. This is of decisive
importance, for to quote from Hayek this "whole conception of justice rests on the belief that different views
about particulars are capable of being settled by the discovery of rules that, once they are stated, command
general assent. If it were not for the fact that we often can discover that we do agree on general principles which
are applicable, even though we at first disagree on the merits of the particular case, the very idea ofjustice would
lose its meaning" (Hayek 1976, 15).
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abstract society is remarkably similar to the principle of the Rule of Law. It would seem that
both are based on the idea of resolving disputes through a filtering out of concrete detail by
the process of abstraction. How, then, does justice differ from the principle of the Rule of
Law?
The difference between them might be a subtle one, but there is a significant difference
nevertheless. As mentioned above, justice strives to minimize conflict, and this explicitly
refers to a rank-ordering over rules of conduct. The principle of the Rule of Law, on the
other hand, strives to govern conduct by rules, and in this striving a rank-order of rules
which is used to resolve conflicts is only implicit. As noted above, one could say that in an
abstract society justice presupposes the Rule of Law (in that it presupposes the existence of
abstract rules of conduct) and that the Rule of Law presupposes the principle of justice (in
that if there are conflicts between rules, they must be resolved by resorting to a rank-order
which minimizes conflict). The focus, then, of justice and the principle of the Rule of Law
constitutes the primary difference between the two concepts. The principles of justice and
the Rule of Law are similar and they are interrelated, but they are not the same.
The reader might be reminded of an important qualification to the discussion above. The
content of the concept of justice discussed above can differ in its degree of abstractness
depending upon the degree of concrete commonality present in the group or society under
consideration. The notions of justice within such Gemeinschaft-Xype societies can be based
on rules of a more concrete level of commonality, but as one focuses on larger and more
inclusive groups the content of the rules of justice governing these groups is filtered out by
the requirements of commonality demanded by abstract social relations.23 In other words, as
the notion of society expands, and begins to encompass a wider range of somewhat
heterogeneous groups, only the commonality between the rules of conduct governing these
groups can form the basis of shared — objective — rules of justice. Thus, an abstract
society's rules of justice must necessarily be more abstract and exclude more concreteness
than the subgroup's rules of justice from which they are distilled.24 And how is this filtering
of concretes accomplished? By the process of abstraction, which underlies all of the
mechanisms governing and supporting social life and abstract society.
23 "The applicable rules define the features which are relevant for the decision as to whether an act was just
or unjust. All features of the particular case must be disregarded which cannot be brought under a rule that once
it is stated is accepted as defining just conduct" (Hayek 1976, 16).
24 Indeed, "the possibility ofjustice [in a Gesellschaft-type society] rests on [the] necessary limitation of our
factual knowledge" (Hayek 1973, 13, my italics).
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8. Justice and "states of affairs"
There is one final aspect which must be considered before turning to a consideration of
the relationship between justice, the Rule of Law, and the minimum coercion filter. This is
the question of the range of applicability of the rules ofjustice. As stated above, the rules of
justice are rules applicable to human conduct. What exactly does this imply? Does it, for
example, rule out the application of the concept of justice to "states of affairs" (and hence
exclude consideration ofmany of the issues associated with distributive justice)?
Once again, the short answer to this is that it does not, but once again this response must
be qualified. The argument that justice applies only to human conduct implies that
something which no one could make different cannot be governed by rules of justice. That
is, this thesis uses the term justice to refer to conduct and to states of affairs that someone
could make different. Now, a necessary condition for states of affairs — states of being —
to be governed by rules of justice is that "we hold someone [or some group] responsible for
bringing it about or allowing it to come about" (Hayek 1976, 31) or that we allow it to
continue. Now, is this condition for the applicability of judgments of justice an unduly
restrictive requirement? Some would claim that it is. They would argue that restricting
issues of justice solely to situations where an individual or group can be held responsible is
unnecessarily restrictive and will allow numerous injustices to persist.25 This is an important
point. In fact, it is of such importance that the entire chapter which follows is devoted to it.
For the moment, however, the scope of this inquiry will be narrower. I am interested in
focusing on some minimal necessary conditions for the application of rules of justice, and
not for the more particular issue of whether responsibility-attributions to individuals or
groups are also a necessary condition for questions of justice to arise. The necessary
conditions for holding that a state of affairs is unjust which I want to consider, then, are that
(a) it is governed by rules of justice and (b) that it ought not to be the case. This means that
the state of affairs both could and should be different.26 What this implies is that if we are
making a claim that something ought not to be the case, we must necessarily be claiming
25 As is argued, for example, in Macleod (1983), whose paper is discussed in the chapter which follows,
Sadurski (1985, 22-25), and Miller (1989, ch. 1 sec 2).
26 "To speak of justice always implies that some person or persons ought, or ought not, to have performed
some action; and this "ought" in turn presupposes the recognition of [not necessarily articulated] rules which
define a set of circumstances wherein a certain kind of conduct is prohibited or required" (Hayek 1976, 33). "It
presupposes not only that those whose duty it is thought to be [to perform an action] can actually do so, but that
the means by which they can do so are also just or moral" (Hayek 1976, 32).
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that (a) it is possible for that state of the world to be different, (b) that someone in particular
(though we might not know who inparticular) must have it in their power (though we might
not know how in particular) to make that state of the world different and (c) that there is no
conflicting "ought" rule which overrides the claim that something ought not to be the case.
What is required by such a normative claim, then, is that (a) it is possible for things to be
different and (b) that there does not exist an overriding normative rule supporting that state
of the world.
All of this depends, of course, upon the temporal boundaries underlying a justice claim.27
These boundaries can represent a point of difficulty. To what period of time is one
referring? The particular moment? The next year? A lifetime? A difficulty arises because
whether or not an action is "possible" depends upon the circumstances of the particular
moment and situation, including the knowledge and information of the individuals in
question. What may be impossible given the knowledge present in one set of circumstances
might well be possible in another. This implies that some time horizon must be implicit in
decision-making mechanisms. Assume, for the moment, that one were willing to presuppose
the existence of a mechanism which conditioned on certain forms of knowledge and
information available, at the moment of judgment, to those making the decision (and was
governed by rules of exclusion by which the boundaries of knowledge and information were
closed off). If this were the case, then to show that a state of affairs is governed by the rules
of justice would require only the demonstration that somebody — though not any person in
particular— "could and should [arrange] things differently" (Hayek 1976, 32, my italics).
What, then, are the implications of restricting arguments of justice in this way? Probably
the main implication is that in an argument concerning justice it is not sufficient to point out
that some undesirable state of affairs could be different. Instead, what is required is an
argument that it both could and should be different. This is an important distinction, for at
least two reasons. First, it underlies Hayek's objections to distributive justice. Hayek's
argument, briefly put, is that it is not merely whether distributive justice is possible, but
rather whether individuals should adopt the mechanisms required to put such a concept of
justice into effect. This argument is one that I shall return to in the chapter which follows.
27 This issue is similar to the one underlying the restrictions on universalization which i alluded to in an
earlier chapter. All such normative arguments depend on closures over the temporal horizon. Both the argument
concerning universalization and this discussion are simply manifestations of this more general principle.
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The second reason for the importance of this distinction is that it plays an important role in
the definition of coercion, and it is to this concept that the thesis now turns.
9. Coercion
The notion of coercion is an essential element of a mechanism model of law. It is also
crucial to Hayek's legal theory. For these reasons, it is of decisive importance to be clear as
to what this notion means. There has been a great deal of discussion of, and some confusion
over, Hayek's notion of coercion,28 and it must be said that his statements on the issue have
to some degree contributed to this. What this implies is the need for a clear and concise
restatement of the essential core of the idea, and a critical assessment of Hayek's
contribution. This, then, is the goal of this section.
What is coercion? The essential idea is that one is "forced" to perform some act which
one does not want to perform or that one is "forced" to abandon some path of action one
desires. A voluminous literature29 examines what it means to be "forced". These analyses
examine questions of whether one can be forced by circumstances, of whether coercion
applies only to the actions of other human agents which force one to act in undesired
directions, and of whether there is a substantive difference between being forced by
circumstances or by another human agent. These are questions of obvious importance and
the sections that follow will address them at some length. This thesis will for the most part,
however, focus on Hayek's writings and not at this wider literature. The reason for this is
that Hayek's texts provide, with some modifications, a workable definition of coercion
which itself contributes to this literature. The goal, then, is to spell out Hayek's contribution
and to make the necessary modifications to this conception such that it can fit into the
theoretical framework of this chapter.
My strategy, then, is to examine Hayek's definition of coercion, which asserts that
coercion is limited to forcing by other human agents (or groups of such agents), and then
critically dissect his arguments with the hope of giving some insight into the foundations of
these views. Some of Hayek's errors notwithstanding, it is then asked whether a modified
notion of coercion might be capable of supporting Hayek's assertion. I argue that it is, and
28 The most interesting of these would include the discussions of Hamony (1961), Kukathas (1989), and
Miller (1989).
29 Which is examined in some detail in Wertheimer (1987).
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that this version of the notion of coercion is capable of supporting the general theoretical
perspective elaborated in this thesis. The chapter then turns to an examination of the
implications of such a notion of coercion for the theory ofjustice and Rule of Law presented
in this chapter.
So what, then, is coercion? The concept is based on the idea that in social settings
conflicts between individuals are common. Some of these conflicts will constitute coercive
conflicts, others will not. Coercion occurs when one is turned into a tool used for
implementing the goals of another and one's own goals are overridden. One becomes a
means to their ends, and their ends only, for their manner of conduct eliminates one's ability
to achieve one's own goals. One is not able to follow one's own goals, but instead becomes
a means for the implementation of the goals of another. Coercive conflicts, then, are those
conflicts in which one agent imposes their concrete goals on another in such a way that this
imposition constitutes coercion. What, then, constitutes the coercive way of acting?
Consider Hayek's view on the matter. In his view, coercion occurs "when one [person's]
actions are made to serve another [person's] will, not for his own but for another's purpose"
and that although a choice is made by the agent their "mind is made someone else's tool,
because the alternatives before me have been so manipulated that the conduct that the
coercer wants me to choose becomes for me the least painful one" (Hayek 1960, 133). In
other words coercion "implies both the threat of inflicting harm and the intention thereby to
bring about certain conduct" and the "alternatives are determined for [them] by the coercer
so that [they] will choose what the coercer wants" (Hayek 1960, 134). Hayek also notes that
the "threat of physical force is not the only way in which coercion can be exercised" (Hayek
1960, 135). Coercion, on Hayek's view, occurs when one agent's conduct is such that (a)
my choice of conduct is narrowed by (b) the threat of harm to (c) such a degree that I will
choose to perform (or not to perform) the actions they— and not I — intend.
There are a couple of point to note. First, Hayek does not consider coercion to be
applicable to situations in which another forces me to such a degree that it becomes difficult
to say that I have any choice at all. Hayek terms such forcing "violence" (Hayek 1960, 133).
For example, "if my hand is guided by physical force to trace my signature", this is
"violence" but does not, to Hayek, constitute coercion. On his view, coercion "implies...that
I still choose" (Hayek 1960, 133).
Now, if it were always obvious that Hayek's objections to coercion extended with equal
(and probably greater) force to "violence", and that his arguments implicitly refer to both
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notions of forcing, there is little harm in making such a separation between the two
concepts. But it is precisely because this is not the case that a re-evaluation of this usage
must be considered. It sometimes seems as if Hayek simply ignores his own distinction and
focuses his discussion solely on the minimization of coercion.30 And given that this is the
case, it is not surprising to find this focus on coercion, to the exclusion of any consideration
of violence, is taken up in the discussions of his critics.31 Important as one might believe the
distinction between potential and actual harm to be, I would argue that Hayek's distinction
between "violence" and coercion is unnecessary, for the simple reason that there is nothing
in his theoretical system which demands such a restriction. Nor is there any need for such a
distinction in the theory developed in this thesis. Coercive situations arise when the
alternatives available to one are narrowed in an unacceptable manner by another with the
intention being that the coercer implements their own ends. What is the importance of
distinguishing this from a situation in which one's choice is narrowed by another to such a
degree that one has no alternative action available and hence no choice? I would argue that
there is no important difference.32 If anything, what Hayek terms "violence" is the most
extreme form of coercion.33 It is precisely the fact that one's desired choice is overridden by
another which lies at the core of the idea of coercion. Basing the notion of coercion on a
"voluntarist" interpretation, and restricting it to situations where the coercee continues to
choose adds little to this, for it is precisely the question of whether or not an individual can
be said to "choose" at all which is at stake.
Within this thesis, those situations in which one narrows the alternatives available to
another in an unacceptable way with the intention of implementing one's own goals will be
deemed to be coercive. As this is the case, this thesis does not adopt Hayek's restriction of
30 As in his discussions in The Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 11-21, 133-147).
31 See, for example, Kukathas (1989, 142-165) and Miller (1989, ch. 1 sec. 2), with the latter quite
accurately picking up on some of the inconsistencies which flow from a separation of "violence" from the
concept of coercion.
32 One difference seems to be that while violence actually limits one's alternatives, threats only potentially
do. In this sense, then, violence represents the actuality of limitation over conduct, while threats act upon the
alternatives within mind. Whether this difference is in fact an important one is, of course, another matter. 1 am of
the view that little of consequence for this thesis hangs on the different causal pathways of these distinguishable
forms of limitation.
33 Perhaps it is the "self-evident" nature of this form of forcing which makes it unnecessary to include it
under the definition of coercion. What is important, however, is that this "self-evidence" must not lull one into
forgetting that "violence" is perhaps the most obnoxious form of forcing, and hence it must be the focus of
special attention for those who wish to minimize coercion. Its particularly objectionable quality stems from the
actuality of its force, i.e. one is not merely threatened (in which case it is at least / who act and I who control my
behaviour) but one actually loses control over one's own body. It is of the utmost importance to prevent
violence, then, because there is even less of a chance to hold onto some semblance of control over oneself.
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coercion to situations where a coercee can consciously choose between alternatives, for one
can be the means for someone else's ends whether one can make a conscious choice or
not.34 Instead of restricting coercion solely to those situations in which coercees can choose
to act differently, this way of viewing coercion also extends it to situations in which one
cannot choose one's actions, the decisive point being why one is unable to choose, and not
whether one can, or cannot, choose. In the terms of this thesis, conduct is coerced if
another's unacceptable conduct so limits my alternatives that I become a means for their,
and not my own, ends.35 On this view, then, another agent's conduct could coerce me —
threatened harm is not required — and it might be the case that this conduct puts me in a
situation where I have no choice at all but to fulfil (or to not negate) their ends.
This leads to a second point: what does it mean to say you have affected me to the extent
that I have "no choice" but to act as a means towards your ends? Does it mean that I have no
control over myself, that you are exerting such control that my desires disappear
completely? No, it does not. Though physical violence to another is one method of making
me (or at least my body)36 do your bidding, it is not the only way. There can be a variety of
threats which one can use ("threats" being the differentiated from "offers" in that the former
rely upon the deliverance of harm,37 while the latter do not). "Your money or your life"
34 Such a modification does not constitute a decisive objection to Hayek's theory, for he does argue that
"violence" (i.e. situations in which one has no choice and is forced to be the means for another's ends) is "as bad
as coercion proper and must be prevented for the same reason" (Hayek 1960, 133). The important point, I think,
is that Hayek believes that both "violence" and "coercion" are objectionable, and hence should be prevented.
35 The notion of coercion to which I resort is similar to the one elaborated by Alan Wertheimer's Coercion:
"A coerces B to do X if and only if (1) A's proposal creates a choice situation for B such that B has no
reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is wrong for A to make such a proposal to B" (Wertheimer 1987,
172). The notion of coercion which shall form the basis of the discussion which follows modifies this definition
slightly, and runs as follows: A coerces B to do (or not to do) X if and only if (1) A's actions create a choice
situation for B such that B has no reasonable alternative but to do (or not to do) X and (2) it is wrong for A to
perform such actions to B. This notion differs from Wertheimer's in two directions. First, it makes explicit the
fact that coercion can refer both to situations in which one is forced to perform an act and to those in which one
is forced to abstain from certain conduct. Second, it broadens the definition of coercion to include both proposals
and other forms of action. That is, not only proposals can coerce— other forms of conduct can coerce as well.
36 Note that it becomes difficult to talk of the "self' taking responsibility for the actions of one's own body
when one's body becomes the tool of another. Am "I" coerced when my body is used by somebody else as a
tool? In this sense, then, the act of physical violence seems to negate the connection between the "self' and the
body, and hence makes it difficult to speak of a "self' being coerced. Perhaps this underlies Hayek's point that
one is not being coerced when the "self' ceases to act and the body becomes a tool of another. If this is his point,
it is well taken. In this thesis, however, the important issue is how one's body becomes disconnected from the
"self', and there is little point in excluding from consideration all cases where this in fact happens without first
considering how it was that this came about. It is precisely because some of the ways in which one's "self'
becomes disconnected from one's body are the results of the unacceptable methods of another which makes this
an important issue for notions of coercion.
37 The notion of harm rests, of course, on perspective. The importance of perspective, and in particular the
limitations this imposes on conduct governance in a Gesellschaft-type society, will be discussed at some length
in the sections which follow.
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presents one with a choice (unless they simply take the money, in which case you are being
called upon to not act), but one could probably claim that such a choice was coercive. Why
is this? I would argue that it is because the narrowing of your choice occurred through
unacceptable means.
Which brings me to a third point: what are "unacceptable means"? This depends upon
the society to which one is referring. If one is referring to coercion in an abstract society,
"unacceptable means" are those which violate the abstract negative rules of conduct
governing that society. Thus, in an abstract society I am coerced if you override my choice
of conduct and turn me into a means for achieving your ends by violating one of the
negative rules of conduct which govern social conduct in this type of society. Thus, both the
way in which you go about trying to get me to achieve your ends and the type of social
relations which are presupposed to underlie coercion claims (including the mechanisms
which support them) are of decisive importance in deciding whether or not one has been
coerced. In an abstract society, if you narrow my alternatives, with the intention of having
me implement your goals, by conduct which does not violate these rules, you do not coerce
me. Even if you act in a way which from my perspective makes me worse off, you do not
coerce me unless you violate a shared negative rule which sets out those acts which you
should not perform. Thus, if Hayek's argument that "the action of the coercer [must] put the
coerced in a position which [they] regards as worse than that in which [they] would have
been without that action" (Hayek 1967, 349, my italics) refers to conduct within the
governance structure of an abstract society, it is incorrect. It is not the individual's
perspective that is important — whether they feel worse off is not the decisive issue — but
rather whether or not the conduct of the "coercer" has violated one of the predominantly
negative rules governing conduct in this type of society.38
This insight into the nature of coercion in an abstract society can be used to explain why
Hayek argues that circumstances (as opposed to human conduct) cannot coerce.39 In a social
system, "circumstances" are not merely "givens" but are instead often intimately connected
with the conduct of individuals. To claim that some circumstances should be different
necessarily implies an obligation upon others to make it so. But upon what is this "should"
38 Hayek seems to recognize this point in his later discussion, for he points out that in situations where "a
moral or legal obligation" exists (Hayek 1967, 350), it is coercive to not conform to these. What he does not
seem to realize is that all situations of coercion share this same requirement.
39 To Hayek, coercion "refers solely to a relation of men to other men" and that "the range of physical
possibilities from which a person can choose at any given moment has no direct relevance" (Hayek 1960, 12).
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based? Upon normative arguments, presumably. Do these, then, take into account the
ongoing order of society and the pre-existing abstract rules which govern conduct in this
society? Are these normative arguments based upon these? If so, and one turns to a
consideration of increasingly complex environments, do they mesh with the negative nature
of these rules, which entail that individuals do not perform certain actions but which do not
prescribe particular conduct? This is a crucial point, for it is the type of obligation which
such normative arguments entail that is of decisive importance. For example, are the
obligations abstract? That is, do the obligations extend to all individuals at all times? Or do
they merely extend to subgroups of society over a particular time? And are the obligations
negative?
This last question is, of course, a conditional one, for the degree of commonality of the
society in question is intimately related to the form of the rules which can pass through the
filters supporting an abstract society. If one is considering a Gesellschaft-type society,
which is relatively complex and contains various diverse Gemeinschaft-type societies, then
positive rules will tend to be filtered out to a higher degree than would be the case in
abstract societies containing more commonality. If, then, the argument is that there is an
obligation upon individuals to perform certain acts and make circumstances different from
what they are, then it would seem that this is based more upon a vision of Gemeinschaft
levels of commonality, than upon the more abstract requirements of an abstract,
Gesellschaft-type society. If, on the other hand, the argument is that there are abstract
obligations applying to everyone which impose an obligation to refrain from certain acts
and make circumstances different, this is in principle compatible with the form of rules
which govern a Gesellschaft-type society. It would seem, then, that whether or not
"circumstances" can coerce depends upon the underlying type of social relations which act
as an implicit and essential presupposition for any coercion claim. Thus, the line which is
drawn between human and non-human interference depends intimately upon the question of
who could make "circumstances" different under what governance mechanism, in what type
of social environment.
10. The convergence of expectations under legal mechanisms
There is one further point which must be attended to before turning to a consideration of
the relationship of coercion, justice, and legal mechanisms. It should be kept in mind that a
Governance by abstraction • 253
Hayekian notion of coercion is striving to be an objective one, i.e. based on commonly
shared criteria, these being the negative abstract rules of conduct which govern an abstract
society. Hence, it is not based on the perspective of the individual who is actually in the
situation, but rather upon the perspective of an observer (or, one might say, upon the
perspective of a hypothetical "impartial spectator" to this situation). There are at least three
different aspects which might enter into such a perspective.40 One is statistical: "what is
usually considered to be coercive?". The second is normative: "what ought to be considered
coercive?". The third is subjective: "what does the individual in the situation think is
coercive, or ought to be coercive?". An important point from the perspective of this study is
that if the mechanisms which generate and fdter rules are adopted — are part of the
"normative fabric" of a society — there is the possibility that these three aspects might
converge. That is, if there is a striving to achieve an impartial spectator perspective and the
various filters over particularities in reasoning are continually applied, there is the
possibility that the "is" and the "ought" might converge in their abstract aspects. If this
occurs, then it could be said that what is normally the case is what ought to be the case, and
that individual X's perspective — which would also be striving to achieve such an impartial,
abstract perspective — will be in accord with this. This convergence of expectations and
actuality is of course intimately linked with the Hayekian notion of a well-adapted social
system discussed in the second chapter.
Now, to be accurate, two qualifications should be mentioned. First, under the
mechanisms of the previous chapters, this convergence would only be in abstract aspects,
not in its concretes. The implication of this which must be stressed relates to the type of
normativity which facilitates this convergence. There are two "oughts" at play here. First
there is the "ought" that the mechanisms which sustain an abstract society ought to be
adopted. Second is the "ought" that the commonly shared, minimal and predominantly
negative obligations which sustain this society ought to govern conduct. Note that neither
form of normativity leads to the implication that obligations which are less widely-shared,
or those which cannot pass through the filters sustaining an abstract society, will lead to
such a convergence in environments of increasing complexity. A second and related point is
that this convergence is not, strictly speaking, between the "is" and the "ought", but rather
40 This approach is based on Wertheimer's use of "statistical", "moral" and "phenomenological" baselines
(1987, 207).
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between the "is not" and the "ought not". Most of the mechanisms of this work filter out—
negate — possibilities and do not specify what will be the case but rather only support what
will not be the case. All of this helps one to understand the Hayekian emphasis on the
negativity of justice. Hayek's concept ofjustice is defined negatively as the minimization of
injustice: "we have no positive criteria of justice", only "negative criteria which shows us
what is unjust" (Hayek 1976, 42). In other words, "the pursuit of the ideal of justice...does
not presuppose that it is known what justice...is, but only that we know what we regard as
unjust" (Hayek 1976, 54).41 The purpose, then, of the many filtering mechanisms of this
thesis is to facilitate such a convergence between expectations and actuality,42 or, put
differently, between the "could" and the "is", through the mechanisms adopted to filter out
"ought not" conduct. One of the main goals, then, of Hayek's legal theorizing, and also of
this study, is to provide justifications for why, if one desires to preserve abstract social
relations, one should incorporate such mechanisms into social decision-making and
judgments 43
11. Coercion, justice and legal mechanisms
How, then, is the notion of coercion discussed above related to the concept of justice?
And what is its relationship to law in its role as a conflict-resolution mechanism? Simply
put, the striving for justice is the striving to minimize conflicts, and in an abstract society
this is transformed into the striving towards the minimization of conflicts between abstract
rules of human conduct and hence between the expectations such rules engender. These
conflicts, then, are coercive conflicts, and the law's role as a facilitator of the regularity of
conduct and as a conflict-resolution mechanism is to strive for justice by minimizing
coercive conflicts.
Note that the question is which actions will be filtered out as coercive by legal
mechanisms, and not which actions are coercive. Coercive conduct is defined as such by
pre-existing rank-ordered obligations which individuals manifest in their everyday conduct.
41 This is identical to Fuller's view on the difference between knowing what is right and knowing what is
wrong (Fuller 1969, 10-12).
42 The germ of this idea was first put forward in a different context in 1937 in Hayek's remarkable paper,
"Economics and Knowledge" (Hayek 1948, 33-56). This insight came to dominate Hayek's writings for the next
fifty years. Indeed, it is quite accurate to view his various studies in economics, political and legal philosophy,
and psychology as trying to explain the processes underlying the matching of expectations to actuality.
43 And, if one desires to act within the framework of an abstract society, into one's personal conduct as well.
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It is not, therefore, legal mechanisms which define which conduct is coercive and which is
not, but rather it is these pre-existing obligations and values which are decisive. Legal
mechanisms put into effect these pre-existing obligations — they do not create them. The
notion of justice, then, underlies the notion of coercion, and it is individuals' pre-existing
classifications, as manifested in values and obligations, which determines whether an action
is coercive or not. Whether these same values and obligations are embedded in the actual
manifestations of legal mechanisms is, then, a different matter. The principle of justice
implies that they should be, but whether they actually are is another matter. If this were not
the case, and coercion were defined solely by legal mechanisms, it would be difficult to
discuss which actions legal mechanisms should deem coercive. Coercion classifications,
then, are constituted external to legal mechanisms and are based on pre-existing obligations
and values which are manifested in the shared, predominantly negative, abstract rules of
conduct that individuals follow.
Even on this view of coercion, it might be questioned whether all the conflicts which
come before legal mechanisms are indeed coercive. How, one might ask, are breaches of
contract coercive? Or how are many of the delictual (tortious) actions which are brought
based on coercive conflicts? Are even criminal cases based on the idea that one party has
coerced another? The reader would be well advised to glance back at the idea which
underlies the definition of coercion used in this thesis. Coercive acts are those in which X
uses unacceptable means to turn Y into a means of achieving certain ends. This definition
should allow one to see clearly what is at stake. In many criminal and delictual cases what is
of decisive importance is not the threat of harm but rather the infliction of harm as a
consequence of pursuing the coercer's own aims which, in the process, turns a coercee into
a means for the achievement of the coercer's own ends by overriding the coercee's goals
and values. In situations of violations of contract, what is occurring is that X is turning Y
into a means by which X achieves X's ends, and is doing so in an unacceptable manner (by
violating an obligation recognized as binding).
It might seem, however, that the discussion is contradictory in that it disregards its own
notion of coercion. I have claimed that coercion occurs when X acts in an unacceptable
manner to force Y to implement X's ends. Does this not imply that for Y to do this, Y must
first know X's ends? And, if this is the case, is the discussion not a patently unrealistic
description of the actual types of conflict which are resolved by legal mechanisms? The
answer to this would be in the negative. This objection rests on a mistake, for there is no
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requirement that a coerced individual actually consciously knows the ends which the coercer
is striving to achieve. Nor is it a requirement that the coercer forces the performance of a
particular act of the coercer's choice upon another. What is decisive is that the actions of the
coercer narrow the alternatives of the coercee with the goal being to implement the goals of
the coercer. This means that coercion can take place by either being forced to act or by
having one's goals negated. In other words, coercion can occur where I am forced to not act
in a manner of my choosing. Nothing in the notion of coercion used in this thesis requires
that the coercee consciously know the ends of the coercer, nor is there any requirement that
conduct be prescribed rather than negated. Rather, this notion merely requires that one
becomes a means to someone else's ends by way of unacceptable methods. Thus, the
objections that in most legal conflicts the coercee is not aware of the ends of the coercer and
that typically the coercee is not forced to act in a prescribed manner are irrelevant to the
issue of whether or not one is being coerced under the definition of coercion adopted in this
thesis. The fact that the coercee's alternatives have been narrowed in an unacceptable
manner coupled with the fact that they are forced to do (or not to do) something they would
rather not do (or would rather do) because a path of action (or inaction) has been excluded
in an unacceptable manner are, in the framework of this thesis, sufficient to constitute
coercion.
So what, then, is the nature of coercive conflicts which are resolved by legal
mechanisms? The underlying structure of coercive conflicts is, I think, remarkably similar,
although there is a greatly differing emphasis on different aspects for each type of coercive
conflict. For the purposes of this discussion I shall refer to some existing legal categories of
private law, focusing on contract, delict (tort), and criminal law. There are a variety of
questions, then, which must be answered for a conflict to be recognized as coercive within a
legal mechanism. First, is there a pre-existing obligation between individuals or groups?
Much of the examination of conflicts in contract focuses on precisely this question. As this
is an area in which it is the conduct of individuals which in large part determines whether or
not such an obligation exists, this is perhaps understandable. This question, however, also
plays an important role in both delictual (tortious) and criminal cases. Second comes the
question of the violation of this obligation, i.e. was there a breach of the pre-existing
obligation? Intertwined with these first two questions is the issue of the level of the standard
of conduct which is expected for the obligation in question. This standard is an objective
(observer's) standard, which might, but does not necessarily, take into account subjective
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aspects only when these are, or could be, known by an external observer.44 Third comes the
issue of harm. In some cases, harm to a particular party to the conflict must be
demonstrated. In others, it is not necessary to demonstrate harm in the concrete case. In
general, the greater the importance of maintaining a heightened degree of conformity with
the general rule governing the obligation, the less important will be the particular
consequences in the case at hand. In other words, if it is conformity in general to the rule
which is of heightened importance, the particular consequences in any particular case will
play a less important role in determining the harm done by violations of that rule. This is of
particular importance when considering attempts (in contrast with conduct which was
actually carried out). The fourth question is concerned with limitations on the range of
obligations, using a variety of notions of intentionality, remoteness and causal connectivity,
and a variety of rules governing circumstances in which obligations will be mitigated or
perhaps even nullified. These can include actions on the part of the harmed party to the
conflict if they contributed to a degree to the violation of the obligation in question.
At this point one might well be asking whether the structure just outlined is merely the
abstract framework which governs questions of negligence in delict (tort). In general terms,
this would in fact be correct.45 The reason for calling on such a framework is that it is
familiar to those readers acquainted with law, and that it exemplifies the issues which must
be considered (however implicitly or explicitly) in all conflicts which come before legal
mechanisms. This does not imply that this thesis adopts all of the particular rules and
classifications used in issues of negligence, nor does it imply that each area of legal conflict
has not developed its own particular rules and classifications which differ from those of
delict. Rather, the goal is to point out the abstract similarity which governs each area of
legal conflict, and for this purpose the structure which governs issues of negligence provides
a useful, if provisional, framework. Therefore, the fact that there are concrete differences
between the rules and classifications used in each area of legal conflict does not diminish
the value of placing all legal conflict within a unified abstract framework, consisting as it
does of obligations, breach of obligations, harm and limitations on obligations. This, then,
forms the abstract, conceptual framework of legal mechanisms, within which the Rule of
44 i.e. as generated from an impartial spectator's perspective.
45 For more on this, see Fleming (1977, 102-313).
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Law functions, and through which the striving to achieve justice by minimizing coercion in
an abstract society takes place.
12. Legal mechanisms and the minimum coercion filter
We come, then, to the final stage in the filtering process over the forms of action which
are capable of governing conduct in a manner conducive to abstract social relations. This is
the minimum coercion filter. As was stated previously, the reason for resorting to this final
filter is that although the other filters of legal mechanisms (such as the striving for an
impartial spectator perspective, the requirements of UCC, and the requirement of
abstraction and negativity) attempt to ensure that rules are abstract, negative and commonly
shared, this does not guarantee that the ranking of individuals' priorities is respected.
Without a notion of the priority of rules, it could be the case that conduct of lesser
importance overrides conduct of greater importance. The function of the minimum coercion
filter, then, is to ensure against this.46 Thus, coercive conflicts which come before legal
mechanisms embed conflicts in prioritization. Coercion, in effect, overrides one individual's
prioritization, for their desired rule of conduct is negated by someone else's priorities in an
unacceptable manner. Coercion, therefore, imposes in an unacceptable manner the rank-
order over conduct of one individual onto another. The minimum coercion filter, in
combination with the other filters on reasoning (and in particular, the UCC filter, which
performs a very similar task in a rather less explicit manner), attempts to resolve this
"conflict with some other rule or value which we are not prepared to sacrifice" (Hayek
1976, 28); and it "may either lead to a clear 'yes' or 'no' answer or show that, if the system
of rules is to give definite guidance, some of the rules will have to be modified, or so
arranged into a hierarchy of greater or lesser importance (or superiority or inferiority), that
in the case of conflict we know which is to prevail and which is to give" (Hayek 1976, 29).
The question, then, is which forms of conduct will be deemed coercive by legal mechanisms
and which will not. In other words, the question is which rule of conduct is to be given rank-
order priority over the other.
46 As previously mentioned, the discussion of the consequences of acts is similar to the considerations falling
under this coercion filter. The reasons for resorting to this filter are its close connection with the framework here
established, and its more explicit consideration of rank-order and the concept of conflict between rules.
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What, then, is the minimum coercion filter and how does it function? There are a couple
of aspects to emphasize. The first point is that this filter does not function in isolation.
Rather, it works in concert with the other filters introduced in earlier chapters. Conflict-
resolution under legal mechanisms is not solely a matter of conflict between competing
values. Instead, such conflicts take place within a sphere governed by legal mechanisms
which impose restrictions over both the type and the form of values which enter into
conflict-resolution. These filters impose restrictions on conduct governance such that, in a
conflict between rules, generally applicable, i.e. abstract, rules should prevail over more
concrete rules,47 for the more abstract the rule, the more expectations it will engender in a
wider range of environments. Under this criterion, to claim that a rule of conduct cannot be
justified is to point out the lack of abstractness of the rule in question. This is what the
filters over legal reasoning and justification search out — how widely the principle applies,
and how symmetric it is. In some cases the labels of coercer and coercee seem to be
reversible, i.e. the coercer could claim that it is in fact they who are being coerced. This
reversal property flows from the basic symmetry of some of the rules of conduct which
govern an abstract society (and in particular those which engender positive obligations).
Obligations, then, are in some contexts symmetric. The question of importance is the degree
of symmetry of obligations. The fact that there exists no (or weak) UCC justifications for a
rule of conduct means, essentially, that the rule of conduct in question is not wide "enough"
in its applicability to overrule its competitor.
The important point, from the perspective of the application of the minimum coercion
filter, is the implicit notion of weight which underlies these comparisons. As the more
detailed discussion of these filters in earlier chapters emphasized, the range and scope of a
rule of conduct is itself delimited by its level (or degree) of abstraction. Ceteris paribus,
more general rules should dominate more concrete rules.48 The same holds for negative
rules versus positive rules. The minimum coercion filter, then, makes explicit and tests the
47 As Hayek puts it, "justice, i.e. the generally applicable rule, must prevail over the particular (though
perhaps also generally felt) desire" (Hayek 1976, 41).
48 There are, of course, considerations which push in the opposite direction. These are limits to the degree of
abstraction of rules which are capable of providing guidance in a form amenable to an abstract society. These
rules, then, must allow for the decentralized judgments which form the foundation of such a society, and hence a
rule cannot be "too" general, or it either be of little use in guiding particular forms of conduct or will require
references to authority which can, if taken too far, undermine the ability of individuals to conduct themselves in a
decentralized manner. There is, it seems, always a balance to be struck between rival considerations— an insight
of which Fuller was keenly aware (1969, 44-46).
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weights of the competing rules and their coercive effects. How, then, are these weights to be
determined? And which principles carry the most force?
13. The fundamental importance of prohibitions on physical violence
With one exception, it will not be the goal of this work to examine particular rules of
conduct or the particular values which underlie them. Though the final chapter discusses in
general terms the weights associated with rules of conduct — and in particular, the
interaction between the mechanisms under which these weights are generated and supported
— it is not the goal of this work to argue for a particular set of values but rather to put
forward the argument that the way goals are pursued is in many cases of equal importance to
the particular goals which are pursued. Such a view, however, has been criticized on a
number of occasions. In particular, Hayek has been accused, with some justification, of
being loathe to advocate any particular principles as having any special weight within his
theoretical framework for law.49 This stems in part, I think, from his desire to avoid
imposing his own goals and idiosyncratic values onto pre-existing social orders. It also
coheres with his belief that context and particular facts (as determined by pre-existing
abstract rules) are of fundamental importance in determining the results of legal judgments.
It is, however, a dangerous strategy, for his entire framework presupposes the existence of
certain principles and values which are shared in common. To not state any of these
principles is to leave the door open to the claim that there are, in fact, no such shared
principles at all. This is a claim this thesis emphatically rejects. Hayek's strategy, while
perhaps suited to his predilections, is not one that will be followed in this thesis. What
follows, then, is a brief discussion of one of the values — and, as it is negative, some of the
forms of harm with which it is associated — which the author believes would have to play a
part in any theory of law governing an abstract society. There are a couple of points to note
before turning to the discussion. First, in discussions of systems of rules there will be, in
many cases, an implicit or explicit balancing taking place between competing rules in
different situations. It is not my goal to spell out all of the different trade-offs and conflicts
which could exist between all of the different rules of a particular rule-system. Rather, my
goal is the more limited one of discussing what is perhaps the dominant principle underlying
49 Although he does continually stress the need to prevent "violence" and to minimize coercion in The
Constitution ofLiberty (1960, 133, 135).
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a Gesellschaft-type society. No rule has absolute priority for governance — if only because
it comes to compete with itself (for example, a prohibition on intentional killing is in some
situations balanced against an individual's rights to protect themselves, even if this means
intentionally killing another). The point to emphasize is that rules are limited in their scope
by other rules of responsibility-attribution. The second point to note is that the discussion
that follows implicitly presupposes the existence of a framework of legal mechanisms
similar to the one outlined in section eleven, i.e. based upon a system of rules supporting
obligations, breach of obligations, harm and limitations on obligations.
The goal, then, is briefly to set out some of what is probably the most important
obligation (and its associated forms of harm) which is supported by legal mechanisms and
responsibility-attribution limitation devices. The analysis of coercion, above, argued that
what Hayek terms "violence" is one of the most obnoxious forms of coercion. The
prohibition of intentional physical violence is therefore probably the most important
obligation in an abstract society and the rules forbidding its most important forms must
dominate other competing principles. These are prohibitions of the most fundamental
importance, as the existence of an abstract, and a Gesellschaft-type, society are predicated
upon them. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. If the prohibitions on the most
important forms of physical violence are not a common value to a society — if power and
solely power is the basis of conflict-resolution, with one particularly important power being
the ability to threaten or take the lives of those who oppose you — abstract relations in
society crumble.50 If one is not able to act knowing that abstract negative rules set out a
sphere of action within which one is protected by recourse to social conflict-resolution
mechanisms, one's actions become guided by the more concrete power relations of one's
immediate surroundings — in particular, by threats and acts of physical violence. To
emphasize this point in a different manner: being able to act on your own judgment and
follow your own goals presupposes that conflicts between your goals and the goals of others
are not resolved by physical violence. Arguments that there are no common values in
society ignore this. Claims that there are no common values — none at all — rest upon a
vision of society which is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of abstraction and
50 Why? Because one's judgment would have to be based to a much larger degree on concretes and
knowledge of one's particular environment, and such a restriction would imply a decrease in the complexity of
one's actions and a decrease in the regularity of social action. This in turn would imply a decrease in the certainty
one has about the outcome of one's actions in the present, and the increased necessity of continually being
guided by considerations of particular moment and circumstance.
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Gesellschaft-type social relations. There is commonality in a Gesellschaft-type society, but
there is not concrete commonality. The individuals of a Gesellschaft-type society share
certain minimal and predominantly negative abstract rules in common. Proponents of the
view that there is no commonality are typically focused on relatively concrete articulated
values. But at higher levels of abstraction, and in a performative sense, there is commonality
between individuals in this type of society, even if it is only present in the commonalities of
the conduct that individuals regularly do not perform.
Most other types of intentional coercion which are closely connected to intentional
physical violence should be prevented. Communication, for example, is of great importance.
Rules of conduct restricting communications should be based upon a substantive and direct
connection to the principle prohibiting physical violence. It might be noted that the freedom
to engage in "communicative action" itself rests upon a notion of coercion and implicitly
assumes the prohibition of physical violence. The same would probably hold for
interference with another's thoughts. Prohibitions on interference with another's movement
are also important and violations, such as false imprisonment and arbitrary detention, would
have to be prevented. Indeed, there are probably many more examples that one would have
to add in order to constitute a comprehensive list of "desired" prohibitions in this category.
But it is not the goal of this section to provide a detailed discussion of all of the forms of
harm which should be prevented. The primary goal of this section is, rather, to stress the
importance of keeping in mind the fundamental and primary role of prohibitions on physical
violence, and to mention some of the other categories which are of some importance. There
is no doubt that there are other forms of harm which can undermine the foundations of an
abstract society. Thus, my list of forms of harm does not constitute a complete list (nor even
a relatively complete list) nor is that the aim of this section to provide one. I have
deliberately not considered the wide range of harm associated with lesser degrees of
intentionality (recklessness, negligence, etc.), nor have I looked at all the areas another
person might consider important. My reason for focusing on intentional and relatively
important forms of harm is that I wish to stress the fact that their prohibition seems, in some
senses, to be the necessary conditions for abstract social relations. I did not consider areas of
lesser intentionality because these are areas of conflict where the competition between rules
of conduct becomes more evenly matched and hence problematic (I considered the areas of
intentional harm to be more one-sided, less evenly balanced, and hence easier to discuss
relatively independent of their context — but even here the particular facts of a particular
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case can be of decisive importance). What I do wish to stress is that interference or
prohibitions of that which people consider to be most valuable to them — be it their bodily
integrity, their thoughts, their speech, their religion, their sexual relations or reproduction,
etc. — can undermine abstract social relations in that they can lead to methods of
enforcement, and the discretion to enforce rules which are incompatible with such a societal
form. This is an important point which, hitherto, I have not focused on but which is
intimately connected with the theme of this chapter— that is, that the mechanisms by which
one is governed are of decisive importance. The manner, then, in which social affairs are
governed deserves the same careful attention and debate hitherto reserved for the discussion
of goals and values. Goals and values do not live in a vacuum. Indeed, often times it is the
way in which one strives to achieve them which plays a decisive role in determining
whether one achieves them at all.
14. The background assumptions underlying the notion of coercion
To conclude the constructive aspect of this chapter, mention must be made of four
background issues which impact on the modified definition of coercion at work in the
discussion above. The first of these relates to the perspective adopted by Hayek's — and
this — work. The theory of coercion argued for in this work relates to objective (i.e.
commonly-shared) obligations and does not extend to obligations which are more group-
specific or concrete. Though these are undoubtedly important, they are not the focus of this
study, nor (I believe) ofHayek's own notion of coercion.
The second point to mention is that the theory of this thesis focuses upon conduct which
is connected to situations which are judged coercive. The reason for doing so is that this
study is focusing on the way in which obligations are manifested in conduct. This is not to
argue that "circumstances" cannot coerce. Rather, it is to emphasize that the emphasis of
this study is upon the conduct which is connected to the changes in those "circumstances",
and not to obligations over states of affairs which do not specify (or are vague in specifying)
who will be responsible when the particular state of affairs occurs (or does not occur).
Third, it is important to realize that coercion is defined within a pre-existing order of
conduct and social relations. Thus, coercion as defined in this work is not context-
independent, nor is it independent of the social setting in which individuals find themselves
embedded. In this thesis, the notion of coercion flows from pre-existing obligations upon
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individual conduct which are manifested in individual conduct. As the environments in
which individuals find themselves change, so too do obligations which are applicable in
those environments.
Fourth, one must keep in mind that coercion is a relative concept involving a rank-order
over various alternatives. There are no "absolutely" coercive acts independent of any
circumstances, nor is it sensible to consider an act as "separated off' from all other acts and
alternatives. Coercion must be considered within its social context, and the rank-order of
obligations under examination at any one time depends upon the environments in which
individuals find themselves and upon the other obligations which are presumed to be in
effect.
Connected to each of these qualifications are issues related to the institutionalization of
rules, and in particular, of positive rules. The discussion thus far has focused on the
predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct governing an abstract society and their
relationship to legal mechanisms and concepts. Now, while the discussion has focused on
some general aspects of conflict, there has been no mention made of more specific issues
associated with violations of the predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct governing
society. In particular, there has been no examination of the role of positive rules of conduct
which are associated with such violations. This has been quite deliberate, for before turning
to this more particular issue I have felt it necessary to spell out the general implications and
theoretical structure of the mechanism approach to law taken in this thesis. It would be
remiss, however, to fail to consider, at least briefly, the role of positive rules in such a
system. It is to this task that the chapter now turns.
15. Context and obligations
The first aspect to be discussed relates to the importance of the context of rules of
conduct. Most of the qualifications mentioned above stress the importance of taking into
consideration the complexity of the environment within which rules operate. In particular,
and in a similar argument to one made in the chapter on negative rules, all of these
qualifications contribute to an understanding of why it might be misleading in some cases to
base discussions of coercion, obligations, etc., upon what might be termed extreme social
circumstances. Consider the nature of obligations in such environments. As harsher
environments are considered, and as the "costliness" of conduct increases (in terms of its
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implications for life and death) for a greater proportion of one's acts, obligations upon
conduct within the group change in a subtle way. Negative obligations continue in effect,
but they can come to conflict with positive obligations if some individuals are unable to
themselves fulfd the minimal conditions for their continued existence. Thus, in extreme
circumstances necessary conditions — and in particular, ones which require the
performance of conduct — can come to assume a heightened importance. If the continued
existence of the group is assumed, then the continued existence ofmembers of that group is
also of great importance. There are, then, arguments which can be made (and which I shall
pursue in the chapter which follows) that minimal necessary conditions which require the
performance of conduct have an important role to play. But it is important to emphasize that
the nature of the obligation upon individuals' conduct also changes as the environment
changes. In particular, as the social environment becomes more complex, and as the division
of labour and knowledge grows greater, the effect of different types of obligations upon
individuals' conduct becomes of increasing importance. If individuals are to be facilitated in
their autonomous adaptations to increases in complexity, obligations must become
increasingly abstract. But as previous chapters have argued, this implies that there must be
an increasing resort to negative obligations. All of this implies that conclusions drawn from
analyses of obligations operating in extreme social circumstances must be treated with
caution. Focusing upon such conditions leads one to emphasize the importance of minimal
positive obligations which must be satisfied if conduct is to occur at all. While these are
undoubtedly of importance, it must be kept in mind that the further away individual and
social action moves from a pre-occupation with the fulfilment of such conditions, the more
important becomes an emphasis on the different governance properties of negative and
positive rules.51
5' It might be added that the attribution of justice becomes problematic when minimal conditions are not
fulfilled. Justice, in an important sense, presupposes that minimal conditions have already been fulfilled, in the
sense that it must generally be the case that such minimum standards have been achieved (although not
necessarily in particular cases) before one can talk about justice, which aims at the preservation of these minimal
conditions. As Hume perceptively noted, "the strict laws of justice are suspended...where society is ready to
perish from extreme necessity" (1966, 186). Thus, it does make sense to discuss issues of justice when, in
particular cases, minimal conditions have not been fulfilled, for the function of rules of conduct and justice is to
preserve such conditions generally across society. But if this lack of fulfilment should become more general and
more widespread, it become problematic to attribute justice to acts, when such an attribution presupposes that
minimal conditions are fulfilled when, in fact, they are not.
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16. The definition of coercion and the role of institutionalization
The second aspect to be discussed relates to the definition of the term "coercion" and its
relationship to positive rules of conduct. Each of the background issues mentioned above
points to the conclusion that some of Hayek's usages of this term are incorrect. Probably the
most important example of this occurs when Hayek refers to the acts of legal and
governmental institutions as coercive. Hayek's argument, simply put, is that the only
justification for governmental (and legal) coercion is the prevention of even more serious
coercion (Hayek 1960, 144). The question is, however, whether the enforcement of shared
rules of conduct of an abstract society, put into effect by positive rules of conduct, would
constitute coercion. To do so, this enforcement would have to violate one of the abstract
rules governing social interaction. The question is, then, whether enforcement necessarily
does this. I would argue that the answer to this would have to be in the negative. But why
would this be the case?
Up to now, the chapter has focused for the most part on the abstract notion of coercion in
an abstract society. Consider for the moment a more concrete situation. Imagine there is a
conflict in this society between, say, two individuals. Perhaps it is the case that each of these
individuals views the other as violating what they consider to be their individual sphere. If
the conflict satisfied the criteria which govern entrance to the institutional mechanisms of
conflict-resolution found in the legal sphere, a judgment must be made as to which claim is
valid and which is not. What has to be decided in the particular case, then, is which form of
conduct as governed by shared abstract rules of conduct is of the higher rank and which is of
the lower. Under these rules and mechanisms, higher ranking conduct should dominate
lower ranking conduct, and once a judgment has been made as to the rank-order of the
conduct in the particular case (i.e. once it is decided which individual has performed
conduct of a lower rank than the conduct of the other), a system ofpositive rules come into
play specifying what is to be done. The question of whether or not these positive rules are
coercive depends upon their objectivity to the society in question. As they are positive rules,
it is probable that in a complex society there will be broad agreement at abstract levels, with
increasingly less agreement as concreteness increases. It is, however, not necessarily the
case that these rules will infringe the predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct
governing the individual sphere.
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The key to understanding this claim rests upon an insight into the sequential nature of
coercion. Individuals may perform certain acts which if performed without an antecedent
coercive act would be themselves deemed coercive. Self-defence is one example. In some
situations, once one has been coerced, one is able to act in certain ways to remove that form
of coercion, and these acts, because of the antecedent coercion, do not themselves constitute
coercion. But such self-help solutions are often ineffective in complex social environments.
Moreover, the discretion of the individual as to how, and whether they wish, to pursue
certain forms of harm often becomes restricted in more complex social spheres where one
might find it increasingly difficult to consider the ramifications for others. It is at this stage
that organized institutions of law, and those of the government which support legal
institutions, enter the picture. In complex societies one resorts to centralized legal
institutions to redress coercive violations of obligations, and these institutions typically
depend upon a framework of governmental organization. On this view, the institutions
(organizations) of law, and the governmental bodies which support them, manifest and
instantiate positive obligations upon individuals. In a sense, these institutions are the focal
point — the point of convergence — of various obligations which individuals acting
separately would find difficult, if not impossible, to carry out.
Thus, although it is argued that there exist commonly shared and predominantly negative
abstract rules of conduct which govern individual interactions, this in itself is not sufficient
to explain how violations of these rules are addressed, nor how these rules of conduct are
enforced in day to day life. Once a negative rule of conduct is violated, there must be a
shared view that something should be done about it, and this leads into the realm of positive
obligations and positive rules of conduct. Underlying the legal theory that I have outlined,
then, are positive obligations that stipulate that there must be a resort to certain types of
conflict-resolution mechanisms which are put into effect by particular individuals. In other
words, there must be a general obligation that conflicts which violate the predominantly
abstract rules of conduct be resolved using the mechanisms outlined in previous chapters.
Now, as I have argued previously, and as shall be argued in the later sections of this
chapter, it is important to note that this does not say that there are certain individuals who
are authorized to resolve conflict in any way they see fit, nor that they resolve it in ways that
their peers within the institutional framework view as authorized. What it does say is that
the individuals who are acting in such an institutional capacity should strive to implement
the mechanisms outlined in previous chapters which allow for governance by abstract rules,
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and that they should base their strivings on the minimal and predominantly negative
obligations which underlie social interaction. Thus, it is not simply a matter of whether
these individuals are "authorized" to pass judgment on conflicts which is decisive in
determining whether or not their judgment gains a "legal quality", but rather how
adequately they put into effect, through the mechanisms which sustain abstract rule
governance, the minimal obligations underlying social interaction. Thus, the "legal quality"
flows not from an individual being empowered to resolve a conflict, but rather how closely
their conduct conforms to the restrictions implied by the mechanisms of legality and the
minimal obligations which underlie social life.
All of this goes some way to explaining why this chapter, and the thesis more generally,
has focused upon the mechanisms which underlie conduct regularity, and why there has
been a move away from institutional-level analysis. Moreover, it also points towards the
reason why there is little mention of power-conferring rules, a rule-type that is of great
interest to positivist theories of law. Within this thesis, institutional-level activity is
intimately connected with individual-level activity external to these particular spheres.
Moreover, the authority of such institutions flows from their conformity to the same
mechanisms which govern individual conduct. Though such institutions are autonomous to a
degree in their particular concrete acts, both the abstract governance framework within
which such concrete acts take place, and the minimal obligations underlying action and
social life which such a framework supports, are commonly shared between individuals, and
substantive violations of this foundation will undermine both the autonomy and authority of
any such institutional sphere. As we shall see in the sections that follow, such a vision of
law is not undisputed. In particular, the positivist theory of law represents a strong
competitor to the one presented in this thesis. Examining the foundations of its concept of
law and the Rule of Law is the task of the sections that follow.
17. The questionable foundations of the positivist perspective
Up to this point, the entire discussion has been concerned with the principle of the Rule
of Law. In other words, the discussion has focused on the theory of the Rule of Law. It is
important to distinguish clearly between the principle of the Rule of Law and its
manifestations in practice, for if one is unclear on this point one might confuse theory with
practice. That this is an important consideration can be seen by turning to an examination of
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an alternative theory of the Rule of Law to the one outlined here — that of the Haitian
positivist school of legal thinkers. Thus far in this chapter, I have outlined a framework for a
mechanism model of law, and sketched the notions of the Rule of Law, justice and coercion
which would be compatible with it. One should not assume, however, that such an
interpretation of law remains uncontested. Indeed, what is probably the dominant school of
thought in legal circles, legal positivism, presents a competing and in some ways
incompatible vision of law to the one presented here. In the thesis thus far, this positivist
notion of law — and in particular, the Haitian version of this theory which I focus upon —
has emerged sporadically, in various unfavourable contrasts with the mechanism model of
this thesis. Is it not time, then, to engage in a sustained and detailed examination of the
positivist models of law and to spell out the similarities and differences between their
notions of law and the one presented in this thesis?
However tempting it might be to engage the Hartian positivist models of law in a
sustained critique of their details, this will not be the strategy of this chapter, nor is it the
strategy of this work as a whole. On the contrary — my goal has been to engage not the
details but rather the general themes of the foundational presuppositions which underlie this
particular vision of law. The argument of this chapter will continue along these lines, and
will elaborate the objections made in the last chapter to the legal theory ofH.L.A. Hart. This
argument put forward the view that Hart's theory of the "rule of recognition" was based on a
misunderstanding. Hart's conception of law is flawed because it fails to take into account
widespread, abstract and predominantly prohibitive performative forms of knowledge.
Despite being termed a "practice theory" of law, Hart's theory is flawed because it
emphasizes only the practices of a select group. The argument of the last chapter was that
this is in fact the wrong group to consider, and that "practice" should instead focus upon
longer-term negative regularities which individuals follow in their day to day conduct.
Moreover, the stress should be on the mechanisms which support and generate these
enduring regularities, with much less of an emphasis given to issues of authorization and the
conscious, deliberate creation and application of articulated rules of conduct.
Continuing on this line of investigation, then, requires the highlighting of the foundations
of the differences between the legal theory put forward in this work and the Hartian
positivist vision of these same concepts. The argument of this work is that Hartian positivist
legal theory embodies two implicit presuppositions which lead to its having fundamentally
different properties from the theory presented in this thesis. The first of these
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presuppositions is its view of social facts, while the second is its restricted epistemological
focus. These two aspects are of course interrelated, as should be clear from the discussion
that follows.
18. Positivism's first error: the presumed existence of "social facts"
Haitian positivism is based on a theory of social rules and the authority associated with
these rules. The difference between Haitian theories of law and the one of this thesis is that
the former simply assumes that social rules and authority exist as a "social fact". That is,
social rules and social authority are simply presupposed to exist as a matter of fact. These
phenomena are taken as "given" facts which simply do (or do not) exist, and are the
foundation upon which Hartian legal theory builds its elaborate theoretical structure. Our
work, on the other hand, does not start with these "facts" as the foundation upon which a
legal theory is built. Rather, the question of interest to this study is how these "facts" came
into existence, and how are they are sustained. Hartian legal theory presupposes the
existence of the "social facts" of rules and authority without explaining or investigating how
such rules arose or how they came to be authoritative. Hart's version of law simply
presupposes the existence of "social facts" without considering the mechanisms which led
to their becoming what they are.
Now, this critique of Hartian positivist theory should not be misunderstood. It is not
arguing that this theory does not demonstrate the particular historical circumstances which
have led to the existence ofparticular social rules and authority. Rather, the focus is upon
the lack of any theoretical model which underlies the formation of regularity, social rules
and authority. Simply taking regularity as a "given", and simply presupposing that some
regularity is authoritative, ignores the fundamental question of why there is any regularity or
authority at all. Hartian legal theory by-passes the question of how such regularity arises
simply by assuming that it does. This move provides no insight into how such regularity is
sustained, nor into the possible future consequences of present conduct upon such
regularity. The lack of a mechanism foundation for such regularity and authority is a
trademark of Hartian positivist thought, and produces what might be termed a theoretical
blind spot, within which certain interesting questions remain unaddressed. For instance, how
does behaviour converge into regularity? By what mechanisms? How does authority — in
the sense of authority based on shared rules— come to exist? And how is it sustained? That
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some rules of conduct are shared in common across individuals is a phenomenon which
Haitian legal positivism presupposes to exist, yet Haitian theory seems to have no comment
to make on how diverse rules of conduct might converge into common rules of conduct. In a
sense, Haitian positivism presupposes its own foundations, and lacks an insight into the
interactive effects which occur between these foundations and the structures which are built
upon them.52
Tied up with this critique is an insight into what is sometimes called the "is/ought" split.
From a cursory glance at the literature of legal theory, one could be led to believe that legal
positivism's dominant interest lies in the difference between that which is the case and that
which ought to be (or ought not to be) the case. Positivists seem to assume that this
dichotomy is of decisive importance, and that one of the primary goals of legal theory is to
make a clear distinction between what the law is and what the law ought to be (or ought not
to be). Now, such a distinction is indeed important— there is no denying this. But I would
like to make clear what such a distinction does not address — this being the question of
what I call the "could/is" split. Positivism's focus on the difference between what is the case
and what ought to be the case turns attention away from the question of how, for all of the
potentiality that exists in the world, only some of it becomes actuality. The positivist focus
does not address how the "could" becomes the "is", for positivism simply assumes the "is"
exists. There is no discussion of how potentiality is narrowed down by evolutionary
selection, of how abstract rules evolve as adaptations to complexity, or of the filtering
relationship between normative rules and potentiality. Instead, discussions typically assume
that regularity exists, that there are ongoing orders of authority (for example, legal and
moral), and that these ongoing orders are in competition. No mention is made of the sources
of this regularity, of social rules, or of authority. Nor is the interaction and feedback
between the underlying social regularity and these ongoing orders of authority given a
sustained consideration. Such authority is simply presupposed to exist, seemingly
independent of the mechanisms which generate and support it.
All of this might explain the Haitian positivists' confusion about the concept of law and
the principle of the Rule of Law, about which I shall have more to say in later sections. To
characterize this confusion in general terms, one might say that Haitian legal positivists
52 In a sense, this echoes the complaint made by Fuller in his "A Reply to Critics" concerning positivism's
non-interactive, unilateralist, bias (Fuller 1969, 187-242).
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presuppose that law and legal authority exist when there exists a regular relationship
between the regular conduct of "ordinary" individuals and legal officials.53 They then
assume that an aspirational normative criterion — which they term "the Rule of Law" — is
applied to this pre-existing law and authority. What they do not seem to understand,
however, is that it is their assumption of the existence of "social facts" which leads them to
assume that the principle of the Rule of Law is solely normative and aspirational in nature.
Positivists restrict the principle of the Rule of Law to the aspirational sphere because they
presuppose the factual nature of the regularity which forms the foundation for the existence
of law and legal authority. To Haitians, law and authority pre-exist the principle of the Rule
of Law.54 One issue which these positivists do not address, however, is the existence of pre¬
conditions for regularity which forms the basis for the existence of law and legal authority.
Nor do they consider that these minimal pre-conditions might themselves be associated with
the restrictions which are embodied in the principle of the Rule of Law. Haitian positivism
does not address this question, for it has, in a sense, assumed it away by presupposing the
existence of regularity. Hart's theory does not address the question of how regularity exists,
for within his theory this is not a question at all— it is simply a "fact". It either exists, or it
does not. No notice is taken of the inter-relationship between this "fact" and the mechanisms
which underlie it by transforming chaotic potentiality into regular actuality. Nor is there a
consideration of the feedback effects of the conduct of "legal officials" which might clash
with these mechanisms and this regularity. Regularity is simply a factual question, and its
connection with the mechanisms which support it are outside the scope of this factuality.
Now, it might be argued that this argument claims too much, and that positivists are
indeed interested in the mechanisms which provide the foundation for social regularity and
legal authority. The work of Neil MacCormick, in particular, can be brought forward to
support this view. A wide range of MacCormick's work, most notably Legal Reasoning and
Legal Theory (1978), investigates the processes of legal reasoning and legal argumentation,
and it might be argued that this line of investigation is a positivist contribution to a
mechanism approach to legal theory.
In a sense, this is correct. Neil MacCormick's work is an important contribution to
understanding the mechanisms which support regularity in legal argumentation, and I have
53 For example, see Hart's statement on the "two minimum conditions [which are] necessary and sufficient
for the existence of a legal system" (Hart 1961, 113).
54 See, for example, Raz's comments (1979, 211).
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drawn upon this work in many of the discussions of earlier chapters. Nevertheless, there
remain important differences between MacCormick's view of legal theory and the theory
put forward in this thesis. To see this requires the introduction of the second implicit
presupposition of positivist thought: its implicit epistemological bias and the results which
flow from its adoption.
19. Positivism's second error: the epistemic bias towards the articulated and the
concrete
One of the fundamental differences between the theory put forward in this thesis and that
of Haitian positivists is the stress which each puts upon different types of knowledge. This
difference in epistemic emphasis has important implications for the perspective of the
respective theories of law and the Rule of Law, and also leads to a fundamentally different
notion of rules and what it is to follow a rule. It is important, then, to be clear on this point.
Perhaps the best way of understanding this difference is to turn to an examination of the
notion of a "rule of conduct". Thus far in the thesis, the existence of rules of conduct has for
the most part simply been presupposed. Furthermore, with the earlier chapters of this work
focusing on mechanisms which could generate rules of conduct, one might have gained the
impression that rules of conduct were for the most part articulated, and created in a
deliberate and conscious manner. This would be a misconception. As I shall argue in the
final chapter of this work, while many investigations of these processes have tended to focus
on their conscious and articulated manifestations, these mechanisms also exist in
imarticulated form. Thus, the rules of conduct which these processes produce are in many
cases unarticulated and are manifested solely in the conduct of individuals.55 Moreover, one
should not assume that these processes are restricted to the specifically institutional forms
and legal settings stressed by MacCormick, for I am arguing that they are in widespread use
among "ordinary" individuals.
55 This is a familiar theme in Hayek's work (1973, passim). As mentioned in an earlier chapter, it can be
argued that this difference in approach can be grounded upon a different view of the foundations of knowledge,
with the positivist approach adopting what is very much a propositional approach to knowledge, and with the
Hayekian approach putting the stress on the performative and non-propositional nature of knowledge. Although
this difference, and its consequences, does merit further consideration, this is neither the time nor the place to
undertake it.
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Restricting attention to articulated rules of conduct in institutional settings is a relatively
familiar practice in legal theory. For example, though H.L.A. Hart's theory of law has been
termed a "practice theory" of rules, built around a theory of social rules, this theory — and
theories built up around it — tends to focus on articulated rules and their use in conscious
deliberation and argumentation. The important issue from the point of view of this thesis is
that these discussions stress the authority aspects of rules.56 For example, Neil
MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) tends to focus on the formulation
and application of authoritative articulated rules through legal argumentation. Positivist
legal theory in general tends to be implicitly biased towards the consideration of
authoritative articulated rules formed by conscious deliberation and applied within
institutional settings.
Now, a positivist might argue that once again I am incorrectly interpreting positivist
theory, and that the vision of law and the Rule of Law of this work is not so different from
positivist versions of this principle. After all, it might be argued that positivism focuses on
the acts of recognition of authority by legal officials and experts — on how these
individuals actually recognize that which is authoritative — and not necessarily on the
articulation of these acts of recognition. If this is the case, and an argument can be made that
it is, can Haitian positivist theory be reconciled with the approach taken in this thesis?
I would argue that it cannot. To see why this is the case, consider the question of why
Hart, and Haitians more generally, focus on a restricted sphere of legal officials and experts.
As I have outlined in the previous chapter, Hart restricts his view to this sphere based on an
argument from complexity. This argument, roughly put, is that the division of labour and
knowledge is of such complexity that "ordinary" individuals would not (without legal
training) be able to know the criteria used by legal officials and experts to recognize acts as
having legal authority. As I have argued previously, this argument rests on a
misunderstanding, for it stresses articulated and particularized knowledge, and effectively
ignores abstract, performative knowledge. It is important to realize that Hart focuses on a
restricted group because of his bias towards articulated forms of knowledge (as opposed to
performative forms) and his lack of insight into the fundamental differences between
knowledge's abstract and concrete forms. Both of these points are related to his
56 In fact, Hart's theory goes so far as to characterize rules as being necessarily authoritative (Hart 1961, 54-
59).
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misunderstanding of the sources of social order, and the causal relationship between law and
society, which is based upon the assumption that certain "social facts" are "givens", i.e. are
simply presupposed to exist. On these fundamental aspects, MacCormick does not differ
from Hart. MacCormick also assumes that certain social facts provide the foundation for
legal systems and that the mechanisms of reasoning which he examines operate within this
pre-existing institutional sphere.57 To MacCormick, as with Hart, the legal sphere comes to
exist under the Haitian assumption of a congruence between the regular conduct of
"ordinary" individuals and legal officials.58 Moreover, both Hart and MacCormick assume
the existence of different types of regularity for each of the two groups, i.e. "ordinary"
individuals regularly act in conformity to the rules which the latter group identify as being
legally authoritative.59
The approach of this thesis is somewhat different, for it focuses on the foundations of the
regularity which both Hart and MacCormick presuppose to exist. This change of emphasis is
important, for it allows one to consider the interaction between the regularity of "ordinary"
individuals and legal officials.60 An insight into the sources of regularity which are
presupposed to exist also leads one to appreciate the existence of minimal obligations which
have not been created by the design of any individual or group, but which underlie the
foundations of social interaction. This insight into the existence of a pre-existing order of
obligations is of decisive importance, for it leads to a fundamentally different perspective
from the positivist view. Consider, for a moment, the differences between the two
perspectives.
The positivist vision of law is based on the assumption that regularity exists. From this
foundation of regularity flows both legal authority and normative restrictions over this
authority. Positivists, then, presuppose that moral obligations can conflict with legal
obligations because they presuppose a foundation of regularity which makes authoritative
obligations a possibility. Only after this regularity is assumed to exist can obligations be
differentiated into legal and moral spheres.
What, then, is the basis of this regularity which provides the foundations of all forms of
authority? The argument of this thesis is that it is constituted of specific mechanisms which
57 See MacCormick (1978, 53-65; 1982, 44-59).
58 In MacCormick (1978, 53).
59 As in MacCormick (1978, 54-55).
60 A point of particular importance to Lon Fuller (1969, 187-242) as noted previously.
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are required to be in effect for regularity to exist. The activities of these processes generate
and sustain regularity. Authority which rests upon a foundation of regularity, and the regular
recognition of this authority, must rely upon these same mechanisms. The point of
fundamental importance from the point of view of this thesis is that the mechanisms which
generate and sustain regularity do not allow just any forms of conduct to be authoritative.
Rather, these mechanisms impose pre-conditions on any and all forms of conduct which
make a claim to be authoritative. Conduct which is authoritative and which bases this
authority on the existence of regularity must conform to the restrictions imposed by the
mechanisms which filter out irregularity and particularity. Conduct which claims to have
authority must not be incompatible with these mechanisms, for these mechanisms are the
source of the regularity which this authority presupposes to exist. Furthermore, for the
conscious acts of recognition of authority to occur with regularity, there must be conformity
to these same mechanisms.
20. Hartian positivists' vision of the principle of the Rule of Law
This emphasis on the sources of regularity and authority has important implications for
discussions of the principle of the Rule of Law. In particular, an insight into the foundations
of social order leads on to deviate from positivist theories of this principle in two important
directions. First, positivist theories view the Rule of Law solely as a normative ideal. This is
not the case in this thesis. Rather, this principle is seen as having two aspects: one minimal
and one aspirational. Second, and flowing from this, these theories differ on their notions of
rules and rule-following. Positivist theories stress articulated and deliberately created rules
of conduct, and from this arises a fundamentally different notion of what it is to follow (to
obey) a rule from the one found in this thesis.
The theory of the Rule of Law espoused by this thesis, and based upon certain themes in
the work of F.A. Hayek and Lon Fuller, views the concept of the Rule of Law as consisting
of two aspects: minimal and aspirational. The first prong of the Rule of Law focuses on the
minimal conditions for the existence of law. These minimal conditions have been stressed in
the previous chapters' focus upon various filtering mechanisms which eliminate
particularity and positivity in their selection over rules of conduct. It is these mechanisms,
and the rules of conduct which they generate, which identify acts as having, or more
accurately not having, a "legal quality". The second prong of the Rule of Law consists of an
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aspirational aspect: that is, the striving to perfect these minimal conditions. This is the
explicitly normative aspect of the principle, in that it argues that individual conduct should
be subject to the governance of abstract rules of conduct, and that this governance should be
perfected in the directions specified by this principle.
Haitian positivist theories of the Rule of Law differ from this conception of the Rule of
Law in that they view the principle of the Rule of Law solely as a normative ideal. The
consequences of this are that these positivists use a different criterion for identifying the
minimal conditions for the existence of law. In particular, these legal theories assume that
the criteria which identify the existence of law are different from the criteria manifested in
the principle of the Rule of Law. This means that to positivists the principle of the Rule of
Law is not related to the necessary conditions for the existence of law or the "legal quality"
of certain acts. As Raz puts it, the Rule of Law "is a political ideal which a legal system may
lack or may possess to a greater or lesser degree" (Raz 1979, 211). This implies that law can
exist even though it does not conform in the slightest degree to the principle of the Rule of
Law and the requirement of regularity in conduct which this principle presupposes as law's
minimal pre-conditions. If one pushes this point a bit further, one could argue that Haitian
legal theory seems to assume that law exists independent of the mechanisms which support
it. Haitian positivism assumes that law comes into existence when there exists a regular
relationship between the regularity of conduct by "ordinary individuals" and "legal
officials" (Hart 1961, 113). As was pointed out previously, little mention is made of the
sources of these regularities, nor of the mechanisms which govern their existence or
preserve them. On this view, "authority" is simply asserted as flowing from the "social fact"
that individuals regularly view certain conduct as authoritative, i.e. that certain conduct is
not merely able to override other conduct, but is also in some sense justified in doing so.
The source of this "social fact" remains, however, uninvestigated.
There is an implication of the positivist presupposition, that the principle of the Rule of
Law is solely normative and aspirational, which deserves a comment. This is the fact that
one of the "social facts" which positivism assumes to exist is the criteria for identifying the
existence of legal officials and experts. Under the theory of law outlined in this work, legal
officials would be those who put into practice the institutionalized mechanisms outlined in
previous chapters. But what, then, is the positivist criteria for identifying legal actors? In
other words, how does positivist theory explain the manner by which "legal officials" are
differentiated from "ordinary" individuals? It would seem that positivists simply presume
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that "legal officials" are differentiated from "ordinary" individuals by the simple "social
fact" that this differentiation seems to be so recognized in practice.61 To put this differently,
positivists seem to be arguing that law is based upon the regular acts of authority
recognition by legal officials. They also seem to be arguing that it is these same acts of
authority recognition which differentiate "legal officials" from "ordinary" individuals. But
is this not circular?
Indeed it is. Positivists seem to presuppose that it is a trivial matter to identify the
participants to the practice of law. This, in turn, assumes that the practice of law is known in
advance. But how is this practice identified? It cannot be the case that it is whichever
practices are considered to be the ones under consideration by the group themselves, for the
group has not yet been defined and indeed its very definition is based upon the definition of
"practice". It seems that there must be a core set of actions — a core set of practices —
which must be recognizable if the concept of a "group" is to be defined. And what if there
are different cores in competition with each other? Which is "the" group? How does
positivism answer this question? Once a group is presupposed, practices are attributed to it.
But the underlying question which remains unanswered is how one defines this group in the
first place.
Positivism, then, seems to argue that acts are specifically legal because they are
authoritative within a legal sphere and command obedience. This line of argument has been
extended by Neil MacCormick (1974; 1982), who has argued that law can be distinguished
by the explicitly institutional nature of its authority. The question which this raises,
however, is how one defines the legal sphere, and how one differentiates between legal and
other forms of institutional authority — such as political authority. A difficulty for legal
positivism arises because it does not assume that a particular set of mechanisms are
associated with the "legal quality". Hence, positivists have difficulties differentiating legal
61 None of this is to say that some positivists have not recognized these vicious circles in their theoretical
landscape. Neil MacCormick, for example, is one thinker who recognizes the difficulties the positivist view
engenders (MacCormick 1978, 54-55; 1981, 108-111; 1996, 179-181) and who has tried, in H.L.A. Hart, to set
down criteria by which legal officials could be identified (1981, 108-115), though by his own admission his
attempt to "resolve this circularity through appeal to some kind of a quasi-historical analysis" was not successful
(MacCormick 1996, 179-180). His latest argument, in which he reiterates Hart's stress on the "practice-based, or
customary, character of the validation of the ultimate rule" (MacCormick 1996, 181), might seem more
promising, but it must be pointed out that numerous difficulties remain. These include the fact that (a) there
continues to be little attention paid to the mechanisms which might explain how "custom" comes into existence
and is sustained; (b) there is little insight into the relationship between such mechanisms and the properties they
impart to certain "customs"; and (c), there is no mention made of the properties which distinguish these
"customs" from other "customs" and allow them to produce a specifically legal form of "authorization".
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from non-legal institutional mechanisms, so long as they are both "authoritative". Many of
positivism's difficulties come from this inability to distinguish the specifically legal nature
of governance mechanisms. The view of this chapter is that these difficulties stem from an
inadequate appreciation of the different properties associated with different mechanisms of
conduct governance. Positivist theory has a mechanism vacuum, which is capable of being
filled by whatever means are capable of establishing the regularity of conduct of "ordinary"
individuals which is required as a necessary condition for the existence of law by a positivist
legal theory. Thus, one troubling implication of this mechanism vacuum is that under the
positivist vision of law the manner by which social regularity is generated is a matter of
indifference (so long as this regularity is in conformity with whatever a select group
regularly deems to be authoritative).
It is contended that this emphasis on law as institutionalized authority has two troubling
aspects. First, the positivists' attempts to distinguish the specifically "legal quality" of
institutional authority by pointing to a distinct authority that resides with a specific group is
problematic in that there remains a question as to how this group is identified. Even if one
assumes that this difficulty can be surmounted, there remains a second difficulty which
flows from the positivist notion of what it is that characterizes law. Positivists focus on the
authority of a specific group, and it is important to realize that their notion of the "social
fact" of the "authority" of law is a rather restricted notion. When Hartian positivists discuss
the authority of law, they are concerned only with authority within the restricted sphere of
legal officials. Thus, law need not be authoritative to "ordinary" individuals, nor (under the
positivist definition of "rule") need law consist of "rules" (in the sense of authoritative
regularities) from the perspective of "ordinary" individuals.62 To positivists, law is based
solely on regularities which are authoritative to the select group of legal officials and
experts. From the perspective of "ordinary" individuals, then, the acts which these legal
officials and experts view as authoritative might have no authoritative foundation
whatsoever. The pre-condition for the existence of a legal system for a Hartian positivism
— this being the widespread conformity of conduct to the acts which a select group of
individuals (legal officials and experts) identify as authoritative — is thus based upon the
idea that "ordinary" individuals simply obey certain acts which a select group views as
authoritative. As Hart points out, these identified acts are not necessarily authoritative to
62 Under the definition of a "rule" proposed by Hart (1961, 54-59).
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"ordinary" individuals, but merely to the sphere of officials and experts.63 In other words, to
Hartian legal positivism, legal acts (from the perspective of legal officials) can at the same
time be acts of unjustified power (from the perspective of "ordinary" individuals). Might
this be the reason why both Lon Fuller and F.A. Hayek condemned legal positivism as the
philosophy of managerialism and of elitist authoritarian control — for what is this view but
an elaboration of the direction, by elite groups, of obedient "ordinary" individuals who do
not share the elite group's standards as authoritative in the sense of accepted standards of
conduct which ought to be obeyed?
21. Positivism's notion of a "rule"
Closely connected to this separation between "ordinary" and "official" perspectives is
the next aspect of the positivist notion of the Rule of Law which requires investigation: their
notion of a "rule" and "rule-following". Consider their concept of a "rule". As was implicit
in the discussion above, positivist theory employs two closely related notions of "rules".
First, they refer to authoritative regularities of conduct which are used as standards against
which certain conduct is compared and criticized. This is the notion of a rule as an
authoritative regularity which, within positivist legal theory, applies to the internal
perspective of a legal official. Call this the rules-as-authoritative-regularities notion of rules.
This notion is similar but decisively different from a second one, which refers to
authoritative articulations — authoritative either because they describe authoritative
practice, or because they have been created in an authoritative way. Call this notion the
rules-as-authoritative-articulations conception.
Now, there is a crucial point to note concerning Hartian positivism's notion of a rule.
The rules-as-authoritative-regularities notion presupposes the existence of social regularity
in conduct as a pre-condition for the existence of an authoritative rule.64 This view of rules
is based on Hart's theory of social rules, and is objectionable only insofar as it refers solely
to legal officials and not to "ordinary" individuals. The same holds for the rules-as-
authoritative-articulations notion, insofar as it refers to articulations of pre-existing social
regularities (i.e. insofar as it describes authoritative practices). The problems arise for
positivist theory when one considers rules-as-authoritative-articulations in its second sense,
63 Hart is quite explicit on this point (1961, 112-114).
64 As in Hart's discussion of the "rule of recognition" in "pre-legal" societies (Hart 1961, 91-91).
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i.e. when it refers to articulations which have been created in an authoritative way.65 This is
objectionable for an additional reason. Consider the following. The first two notions of rules
discussed above are based on practice, on existing performative regularities which
individuals recognize as authoritative and upon which they based their criticisms of deviant
conduct. Created articulations, on the other hand, have no such basis in practice. Such rules
gain their authority solely from being created by practices which are themselves
authoritative. The difficulty which arises for this notion of rules is that such rules have no
basis in regular performance. Hence, there is no guarantee that such rules are capable of
generating regular conduct. This is a point of decisive importance. The two other forms of
rules are both based on existing regularities of conduct, and in a sense flow from this pre¬
existing regularity. Though positivism does not focus upon how this regularity comes about,
positivists can at least argue that the fact that people do in fact act in a regular way might be
one ground for assuming that they believe they ought to (this is one way of viewing the
positivist pre-condition of "efficacy").66 Rules which are created without such a
performative basis have no such regularity of conduct to fall back upon. They are, in a
sense, much more conceptually based, and represent a larger distance between the "ought"
and the "is".
Thus, under one notion of "rules" emphasized by positivists, a gap opens up between
theory and practice, i.e. between the realm of the conceptual and its implementation in
performance and practice. This gap is of great importance, for rules-as-created-
authoritative-articulations can conflict with the foundations of authority which positivism
presupposes. That is, these articulations might conflict with the minimal obligations which
underlie the processes which allowed such rules to gain authority in the first place. If it is
forgotten that legal institutions presuppose a foundation of social regularity and social
authority, and if the pre-condition of performance and regularity in conduct has been
removed from the definition of "rule", any particular content can be added to an articulation.
Without subjecting the articulations of potential rules of conduct to the filtering mechanisms
of the previous chapters (which strive towards the elimination of particularity and the
generation of abstraction), the results can be rules of conduct which are neither abstract nor
65 See Hart's evolving notion of the "rule of recognition" examined in the previous chapter (Hart 1961, 111-
112).
66 Or for at least making the "presupposition" that they believe they ought to, if one were to frame this in a
Kelsenian way.
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conducive to the preservation of abstract social relations.67 Thus, a large gap between
potentiality and performance accentuates the importance of being clear about which
mechanisms will be used to put these articulations into effect. If there is a large gap between
what individuals do and what the articulations demand of them, there is a consequent need
for mechanisms which will be used to ensure that a convergence occurs between potential
and actual conduct. It is thus all the more important to specify clearly what precisely the
properties of these mechanisms are which will ensure such a convergence.
Now, while positivists do not emphasize the mechanisms which implement rule
governance, they do seem to recognize that an ever increasing gap between those rules legal
officials recognize as authoritative and "ordinary" individuals' conduct would spell
difficulties for any theory of law. Thus, while they do not directly examine the mechanisms
which ensure such a convergence takes place, they do address this issue in two related ways.
First, they argue that legal rules are subject to the demands of individual morality.68 The
positivists argue that if individuals find legal rules objectionable "enough" on moral
grounds, they might no longer obey them.69 Second, and closely connected to this, is the
positivist presupposition of "efficacy", i.e. that for law to exist individuals' conduct must
predominantly conform to the rules which legal officials recognize as authoritative.70
Hartian positivists argue that such conformity is a necessary condition for the existence of a
legal system and law.71 In a sense, the efficacy pre-condition is an attempt to import
normativity in the guise of factuality. By making efficacy a necessary condition for the
existence of law and legal systems, positivists implicitly presuppose that for law to exist the
rules which are recognized by legal officials as being authoritative are in fact of sufficient
authority to "ordinary" individuals such that they dominate other rules of conduct which
may make a claim to these individuals' obedience. The problem with this assumption— and
more generally, with the positivist notion of law — is that there is no mention made of the
sources of the dominant authority of legal rules over other rules of conduct. Positivists make
no mention of how legal rules could come to dominate other social rules, but instead simply
presume that for law to exist they do in fact dominate these other rules. In this way, then,
67 Especially if the term "abstract" is taken to refer to the mode of expression of a rule, and not its reference.
For more on this, see the discussion of Jackson's implicit notion of the abstract in chapter four.
68 i suspect one would be hard-pressed to deny that this is a familiar theme in Hart (1961; 1983),
MacCormick (1978; 1981; 1982) or Raz (1979; 1994).
69 Hart's eloquent statements on the matter are representative of this view (Hart 1961, 195-207).
70 See Hart (1961, 100-101).
71 As in Hart (1961, 113), MacCormick (1978, 55) and Raz (1975, 125-126; 1979, 102-103).
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positivists assume that legal rules have some sort of dominant normative force to
individuals, but do not say from where this force arises, nor in what ways it is sustained.
All of this is related to positivist arguments which restrict the recognition of legal
authority to a select group of legal officials. As argued above, when a positivist talks of
legal authority, they have two different notions in mind. First, there is a notion which
applies to legal officials. These officials accept legal rules as authoritative in that these rules
constitute standards of criticism when deviations from these rules occur. Second comes a
notion which is different from that of legal officials, and which applies to "ordinary"
individuals. These individuals might view legal rules as simply being the imposition of
power which lacks authority (in the sense of being accepted standards for conduct).
These two different senses of "authority" expose Haitian legal positivism as a theory
which is amenable to top-down direction and to the imposition of unauthorized power of
one group over "ordinary" individuals. This brand of legal positivism cannot exclude such a
scenario, for this theory makes no connection between the authority recognized by legal
officials and that recognized by "ordinary" individuals other than through an efficacy pre¬
condition which simply assumes that for a legal system to exist there must be a mass
conformity to the rules recognized as authoritative by a select group of legal officials.
Hartian legal positivism does not explain how such conformity arises, nor does it specify the
mechanisms by which such conformity is sustained. This mechanism vacuum implies that
Hartian legal positivism cannot close the door on the variety of mechanisms which are
incapable of sustaining abstract social relations or the complexity which abstract and
autonomous governance enables. This is a legal theory which has lost its way, in that so
long as "ordinary" individuals conform to the rules which legal officials recognize to be
authoritative — and independent of why "ordinary" individuals conform to these rules —
law is said to exist. That this is merely the imposition of unjustified power of some over
others, and that there is nothing specifically legal about such an imposition, seems to have
been passed over completely.
As I have mentioned above, the positivist assumption of efficacy can be interpreted as an
attempt to rule out the possibility that a legal system becomes nothing more than a select
group imposing its power over others. Efficacy implicitly imports the idea that legal rules
are in some sense authoritative to individuals, in that these rules as manifested in actual
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conduct which overrides other rules of conduct.72 But this is not the same sense of
"authority" which applies to legal officials. This divergence between notions of authority is
where the problems for their theory emerge, and it is this separation which reveals the
inadequacy of the positivist attempt to use efficacy as a filter over self-undermining
"authoritative" rule-systems. Positivists are not able to rule out select groups wielding non-
authoritative power over others (in the sense that the select group implements standards
which they "accept" as authoritative bases of criticism, but which are not so "accepted' by
those to whom the rules are applied). Instead, positivists can only rule out scenarios in
which legal rules are not authoritative in the sense that "ordinary" individuals do not
conform to them in their conduct. That this is not sufficient to distinguish the legal sphere
from other forms of institutional authority should be obvious by asking the question "and
how is legal order distinguished from the order imposed by a gang of thugs?". Under the
positivist notion of law, there is no distinction to be made — so long as "ordinary"
individuals actually conform to a "sufficient" degree to the rules which a select group (in
this case, a gang of thugs) deems to be authoritative. The question of how such conformity
comes about, be it through the barrel of a gun, or some other means, seems to be completely
ignored.
22. Positivism's notion of "following a rule"
Closely connected to all of this is the positivist notion of what it is to follow a rule. As I
have argued previously, the positivist notion of a rule tends to emphasize authoritative
articulated rules. Under this notion of a rule, individuals are viewed as following rules when
their behaviour conforms to these authoritative articulations. In itself, this might be of little
importance, but combined with two other tendencies, it has significant consequences. The
first tendency is positivism's lack of emphasis on the distinction between rules governing
states of affairs and rules dictating conduct. The second tendency, interconnected to the
first, is the lack of attention paid to the difference between positive and negative rules of
conduct. Taken together, and combined with a focus on authoritative articulated rules, this
view of rules leads to some rather disturbing implications.
72 Positivists do not comment on the sources of this authority, other than to say that they might be manifold
and differ across individuals, as in Hart (1961, 198-199). Nor do they comment on how this authority is
generated or sustained. Instead, such authority is simply assumed to exist (or to not exist) as a matter of "(social)
fact".
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When one considers positivism's emphasis on authoritative articulations which might
have no basis in regular conduct, and the lack of emphasis on both the difference between
rules of conduct and rules governing states of affairs, and positive/negative rule of conduct
distinction, one can make the argument that this view takes very little interest in how rules
are satisfied. Rather, its focus seems to be on whether or not they are satisfied. This bias
towards the factual question of rule-satisfaction, in part based upon an overemphasis on
states of affairs and an underemphasis on the conduct leading to these states, flows from
positivism's general lack of concern over issues of conduct governance. How rules are
satisfied seems to be of much less interest than whether or not such rules are satisfied (or
whether they are "authorized"). Positivism, then, focuses more on what is the case, and less
on how potentiality becomes what is.
This general bias towards issues of actuality and existing authority (and general
disinterest in issues of potentiality and the foundations of authority) manifests itself in other
aspects of rule-following. Positivists focus on whether an authoritative rule is conformed to
in conduct, but they do not ask whether such a rule generates regularities of social conduct.
Nor does positivism inquire as to whether obedience to the authoritative articulated rule is
capable of producing regularity in individual conduct considered as a whole. All that is
considered is whether individuals conform to the particular articulation and whether the
articulation is "authorized"; the effect on conduct regularity more widely considered
remains uninvestigated. Thus, on this "localized" notion of rule-following, an individual
may conform to an articulation which renders much of their other conduct less regular.
Similarly, an articulation may be conformed to by individuals and yet conformity to this
same articulation may decrease social regularity more widely considered. Finally, it may be
the case that regularity of conduct comes about because of a variety of means, some of
which contravene the minimal obligations necessary for social interaction, or which
undermine abstract social relations — and yet so long as individual conduct conforms to the
articulated rules, positivists consider individuals to be "following a rule".
The problem with the positivist notion of rule-following is that there is a decided lack of
insight into how rule-governance actually takes place over time. Rules as authoritative
articulations are emphasized, and the questions of how these articulations come to be
conformed to, and whether such conformity is conducive to the preservation of legal
authority, are considered to be of less interest than the factual question of whether or not
they are conformed to. Yet how individuals come to conform to articulated rules is of
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decisive importance, for the methods by which this comes about are intimately related to the
issue of the authority structure of society. Moreover, some mechanisms for generating
"regularity" are not capable of sustaining the regularity, authority, and complexity which is
often simply presupposed by positivists to be matters of "social fact". "Regularity" from a
positivist perspective is often simply a matter of fact and of authority, with the question
being "are the rules which legal officials recognize as authoritative actually conformed to in
practice?". The question which is not asked by positivists, but which is of critical
importance for their enterprise, is "are the rules which legal official recognize as
authoritative capable of maintaining their authority through sustainable social practice?".
Positivism skirts this issue by focusing on the narrow question of whether certain conduct
conforms to a rule which is presumed to have authority, and avoiding the more general
questions of whether the rule is capable of generating regularity of conduct or of sustaining
the authority which is presumed to underlie the rule. They do this, presumably, to preserve
their interest in keeping the issue of identifying law "factual". In actuality, however, this
interest is undermined by a comprehensive misunderstanding of the nature of factuality in
complex interactive systems of human conduct.
23. The positivist dilemma
Where do the positivist presuppositions lead legal theory? My claim is that the
foundations of positivist legal theory are fundamentally flawed, and that as a consequence
of this the positivist theory of law finds itself in a difficult position. This is perhaps best
illustrated by considering the Hartian positivist answer to a question introduced earlier in
the chapter: what is the difference between the legal order and the order generated by a band
of thugs? The implications of their answer to this question can be spelled out in simple
terms. Hartian positivists argue that legal authority can be restricted to a select group of
individuals — legal officials. The problems with such a view are twofold. First, law ceases
to have the same obligatory nature to legal officials and to "ordinary" individuals. Legal
officials "accept" the authority of the law in that they accept its rules as standards for
conduct which are deserving of criticism if deviations occur. To legal officials, law is
authoritative because its rules should be obeyed and are the accepted standards for the
criticism of deviations. This is not the case for "ordinary" individuals. To them, these acts
might have no obligatory character in that these individuals might not view them as justified
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or accepted standards for conduct. Individuals do obey these acts (the positivist assumption
of efficacy deals with the relationship between this condition and the existence of law) but
they do not necessarily view these acts as authoritative, nor as obligatory in the same sense
as legal officials. The upshot of this is that under the positivist notion of law, law can
become an instrument of non-authoritative power, imposing its acts on "ordinary"
individuals.
The second difficulty with such a view comes when positivists are pushed to distinguish
law from other institutional forms of authority. If positivists do not argue that law is
something more than that which is considered to be authorized by a select group of
individuals, they run into the difficulty of distinguishing the legal from other institutional
forms of authority. How, for instance, are legal actors to be distinguished from non-legal
ones? And how is legal authority to be distinguished from authority's other forms— and in
particular, its political forms? Positivists cannot argue that law must be implemented in
conformity with the principle of the Rule of Law, for as I have already noted, they are quite
explicit in their statements that law can exist even though it does not conform in the
slightest degree to this principle. But what, then, distinguishes the legal from the political?
Now, positivists could argue that legal acts are considered to be authorized by "ordinary"
individuals, in the sense that these individuals accept the rules of law as justified standards
of conduct, but if this is the argument the positivists remove legal authorization from the
exclusive sphere of legal officials and base it on criteria which are more widely held in the
population at large. Positivists decline to do this, and one might guess the motive behind
this is that such a extension renders the "factual" identification of law a much more
daunting task. Such a move also has the potential to expand the set of criteria, which are
used to identify acts as being legal, to encompass moral principles — and positivism's
emphasis on factual criteria, and the separation of the legal from the moral goes against this.
This, then, is the positivist dilemma: by retaining the restriction upon those individuals
who are capable of judging what is legally authoritative, law has the potential to become an
instrument of unjustified power which is difficult to distinguish from other modes of power;
by abandoning the restriction upon those who are capable of identifying a "legal quality",
they potentially undermine their tidy distinction between the legal and the moral, and their
claims that law can have "any sort of content". If law is to be distinguished from the order
generated by a band of thugs, it must have authorization to those whose conduct it guides.
But, if it is to have such authority, it must conform to what those same individuals hold to
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be authoritative. Positivists try and get around this difficulty with their pre-condition of
"efficacy". This pre-condition assumes that individuals do hold legal rules to be
authoritative (because for the most part they obey legal rules when these rules conflict with
other standards the individuals accept), but the point to be noted is that they do not
necessarily accept legal rules as standards of conduct which should be obeyed. In other
words, individuals act as legal officials believe they should, but these same individuals do
not necessarily hold that their own conduct is as it should be. That this is simply an
imposition of unjustified power by some onto others does not seem to bother positivist
theorists. What should be more worrying, however, is how positivists manage to
differentiate such social order from that imposed by a band of thugs. This is part of a more
general question of how positivists manage to identify and distinguish legal actors from
non-legal actors, and how law is to be distinguished from power in its other forms.
24. Conclusion
I have argued in general terms in the later sections of this chapter that Haitian legal
positivism is flawed at its very foundations. Though Haitians begin on the right track by
stressing the internal perspective of individual actors, they are soon derailed by their
untenable epistemological biases and their premature elevation of certain social regularities
to the status of "social facts", both of which lead to their restricting legal authority to a
select group of officials. Though the positivist perspective claims that it is a "practice"
theory of law, the practices which Haitian positivists deem to be most relevant to legal
theory are those of a select group of legal officials. Positivists emphasize "authority", yet
their notion of authority is restricted to the set of legal officials and experts who in their
view constitute the legal sphere. Positivists emphasize rules, yet their notion of rules as
authoritative articulations excludes the consideration of whether or not these articulations
are capable of generating or sustaining the social regularity (and authority) positivists
presuppose to exist. Finally, positivists emphasize an "is/ought" split, yet they ignore the
foundations of actuality and neglect to consider the interaction between fact and value
which is of decisive importance to the generation and preservation of social order.
These errors stem from a comprehensive misunderstanding of the nature of social order
and the epistemological foundations of human conduct. The limitation of the legal sphere to
legal officials and experts and their emphasis on articulations flows from an overemphasis
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on conscious deliberation and creativity. This in turn is based upon a mistaken notion of
how individuals come to conduct themselves with regularity. Positivism simply assumes
that regularity exists, but exhibits little interest or understanding of how such regularity
comes to exist, nor of how it is sustained. Nor does positivism have an insight into the
interaction between its own foundations and the structures which are built up upon this.
Positivist legal theories generally ignore these interactive effects, and more specifically
assume that the legal sphere is autonomous from, or causally imposing upon, the regularity
of "ordinary" individuals. This is one aspect of the oft-repeated positivist claim that "the
existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another" (Austin, quoted in Hart 1961,
203). Positivist theory presupposes that the existence of law depends upon a foundation of
regularity of "ordinary" and official conduct, but provides no explanation of how these
regularities interact or of how what the positivists denote as the legal sphere might lose its
autonomy. It is contended, then, that the claim that law can have "any kind of content"
(Kelsen, quoted in Hart 1961, 203) is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of social
regularity and the causal connection between law and society. That this occurs is a direct
result of the positivist focus upon articulated and conscious knowledge, combined with their
premature elevation of certain forms of conduct to the status of "social fact". This
combination effectively eliminates inquiries into the interaction between the mechanisms
which support the generation and continued existence of these "facts" — including the
factual existence of morality — and more generally stultifies the examination of the inter¬
relationship between fact and value, and between minimal pre-existing obligations and the
existence of social order and authority.
All of this has implications for legal theorizing. The general message of the first segment
of this chapter is that legal theory could profit from examining the foundations upon which
law and legal systems rest. In particular, legal theory could benefit from an increased
awareness and understanding of the foundations of conduct regularity at an individual level.
To this end, the first segment of the chapter focused on how conduct regularity is
maintained through various mechanisms which generate rules and resolve conflicts at the
individual level, and how these mechanisms were related to two concepts which are central
to legal theory —justice and coercion. The argument throughout the chapter has been that
in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society, conduct regularity is based upon individuals
following commonly shared and predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct. It is these
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commonly shared rules of conduct which provide the foundation for objective judgments
and conflict-resolution, and hence for objective notions of coercion and justice.
Such a striving for objective conflict resolution is not without its costs. The argument of
the next chapter investigates the restrictions which a striving for objective judgments
imposes on conduct governance mechanisms. As we shall see, this has important
implications for the notion of distributive justice, and for the forms of action which can
achieve a "legal quality" in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society.
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Moloch ofAbstraction
A Hayekian perspective on distributive justice
1. Introduction
The analysis of previous chapters has emphasized that there exists a wide disparity
between a Hayekian vision of law and what one might term traditional legal theory.
Nowhere is this difference in perspectives more apparent than in discussions of Hayek's
criticisms of social justice. Discussions in this area have generated a lot of heat, but often
times, relatively little light. This might not be surprising, given that the underlying
presuppositions of Hayek's various commentators, compared with Hayek's own, are often
so greatly at odds that there is, in my view, often relatively little to be gained by turning to a
detailed consideration of the critical commentaries in this area.
It is of some importance, then, to spell out what Hayek meant by his various objections
to the notion of social justice. Part of the task undertaken in this chapter is to retrieve at least
some part of this concept from the conceptual flames to which Hayek consigned it. Unlike
Hayek, I am not opposed to the concept of social justice and its realization, nor do I find it
to be unintelligible. This being the case, I believe it is necessary to at least attempt to rescue
aspects of this notion from the jaws of the Moloch of Abstraction. Nevertheless, I expect
that many readers will find the analysis of this chapter objectionable in that it may seem to
demonstrate the opposite. That this might be the view that is taken, however, merely serves
to emphasize once again the gap which exists between the perspective taken in this thesis
and that of traditional legal theory. The idea seems to be that any analysis of social justice
must be focused on the ideal that it represents, and that any restrictions which are placed on
this goal must be contrary to the ideal of achieving social justice. This is, I think, a mistaken
view. This chapter is not interested in questioning the value of social justice (for it simply
takes it as a desirable "given"), but it is interested in stressing the importance of how this
ideal is achieved. This emphasis on a mechanism approach to social justice represents a
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turning away from a consideration of the "good" and the "bad" aspects of this concept, and
a move towards the analysis of how this ideal (however desirable or detestable it may be)
manifests itself in practice. It is precisely this issue which has received little attention in
considerations ofHayek's criticisms of social justice, and hence it is this topic which will be
examined in some detail in this chapter.
2. Some notes on terminology
Before turning to an examination of Hayek's objections to distributive justice, one
should be warned of a potential terminological pitfall. It is very important to note that
Hayek equates "distributive" justice with "social" justice.1 While Hayek does focus on other
aspects of social justice concerned with what he calls simply "justice",2 to him this "justice"
is another, separate concept, equally social3 but not a type of social justice. Consequently,
when Hayek objects to social justice he is only objecting to the distributive forms of that
concept. To emphasize the limited scope of Hayek's objections, the chapter for the most
part uses the term "distributive justice" when reviewing his arguments.4
This is a significant point. At the time of Hayek's earliest ventures into law, legal
positivism in the sense of Kelsenian positivism was at high tide, with the notions of
"objective" justice and positivist notions of legality being effectively equated.5 With this
being the case, it is not surprising that individuals concerned about justice should resort to a
different term to express their belief that objective justice was not to be equated solely with
the workings of an existing legal system, and hence the emergence of a "new" form of
justice: "social" justice.6 The creation of the term social justice, then, might be seen as a
response to the specious equation of positivist notions of legality with "objective" justice. If
this were the case, it is not surprising that many of Hayek's critics — and many of his
1 As is pointed out in his discussion (Hayek 1976, 63).
2 Or, what might be termed "commutative" justice, although as Hayek has commented, there is probably
little to be gained by "[tying] up the discussion with all the difficulties and confusions which in the course of
time have become associated with these traditional concepts" (Hayek 1960, 441).
3 As Hayek puts it when commenting on the phrase "social justice", "one would have thought that all justice
is a social phenomenon" (1967, 83).
4 Though it might be noted that this usage should not be taken as an endorsement of the view that all issues
of social justice are distributional in nature.
5 See, for example, Hayek's somewhat misleading quotation of Kelsen's statement that "just is only another
word for legal or legitimate", (Kelsen 1934, 482, quoted in Hayek (1976, 169).
6 For more on this, see Hayek's own insights concerning the history of this term (Hayek 1967, 237-247;
1976,62-64).
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admirers— have been deeply disappointed with, and angered by, his attacks on the concept,
for to them the elimination of this term might imply a reversion back to the objectionable
view that "objective" justice was equivalent to positivist notions of legality.7
This is perhaps one side of the story, but it is not the whole story. More to the point
would be the fact that Hayek expressed a distaste for the concept of distributive justice
which was associated with social justice, and it was Hayek's attack on this concept that
disappointed some and angered many. At times Hayek seems to argue that the concept of
social justice is superfluous.8 The argument made above is that social justice might have
been a term created to express an objection to the positivist conflation of justice with their
notion of legality. For Hayek, however, the equating of the positivist form of legality with
the notion of objective justice was never valid, and hence the creation of a "new" term
expressing the fundamental idea that objective justice was different from such forms of
legality was not necessary. Because it was unnecessary to create such a term, once such a
term was created, it became a catch-all for a wide variety of concepts and critiques, one of
them being another concept of justice — distributive justice.9 Hayek's objection to
distributive justice is based on the claim that, in a complex society, it is incompatible with
the belief in, and the possibility of, objective justice. To Hayek, if social justice were
conflated with justice, when actually it was identical to distributive justice, people would
come to believe that justice could not be objective (for Hayek believed that in a complex,
abstract society, distributive justice could riot be objective).10
It perhaps might be advisable to argue that the concept of social justice is (at least) two-
pronged: one notion embeds the idea of distributive justice, while another manifests the
opposition to the early positivist equation of objective justice and legality. This would seem
to be a reasonable argument, and it would not be surprising if the second prong contains
elements of objective justice. Be that as it may, and although one may find Hayek's attacks
on the ideal of social justice regrettable (as I do), what must be emphasized here is that
7 As well, many writers have been disappointed that Hayek seems to be ruling out the possibility of
distributive justice. As we shall argue, this is not Hayek's argument. Rather, Hayek is ruling out the use of
particular methods of achieving distributive justice as incompatible with an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society.
He is not, then, ruling out all of its possible forms.
8 He makes his most forceful argument for this position in Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The Mirage
ofSocial Justice (1976).
9 This point is underlined in Hayek (1976, 96-100).
10 See Hayek's comments concerning the loss of belief in the possibility of objective justice in Law,
Legislation and Liberty (1973, 2), and his later discussion of this point (Hayek 1976, 42-44).
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Hayek, in his many critiques on "social" justice, is focusing solely on the distributivist
aspect.
This brings me to a second point. I believe it is a mistake to lump all of the various
notions of distributive justice into a single concept, as one might accuse Hayek of doing.11
Distributive justice comes in a variety of forms. As shall be argued, Hayekian objections to
distributive justice are aimed only at those notions which would entail a repeated resort to
concrete mechanisms of conduct governance and concrete knowledge. More abstract
methods, based on rules which can be applied to all individuals and which do not require the
resort to individual-specific judgments, do not in my view fall under such a critique. In fact,
it can be argued that Hayek does not view such notions as falling under the notion of
distributive justice at all. This is, I think, an error, for the goal of distributive justice is
present, although the means for achieving that goal are not the ones that Hayek, and this
thesis, would find objectionable.
Be that as it may, Hayek's objections to distributive justice do seem to be based on the
idea that such a concept would involve concrete mechanisms of conduct governance. It is to
these forms of governance that his objections are directed, and it is his mistake not to
emphasize this point more clearly. In the text that follows, then, it is important to keep this
point in mind, for although Hayek's criticisms are often directed at the concept more
generally (especially his intelligibility critique which is discussed later in the thesis), it is
only to the mechanisms — the methods — of achieving distributive justice that these
objections actually apply. As I shall argue briefly later in the thesis, this implies that in
some cases more abstract mechanisms for achieving certain conceptions of distributive
justice do not fall under the Hayekian objections to this notion.
3. Hayek's objection is a mechanism objection
Hayek, then, is objecting solely to certain conceptions of distributive justice, and not to
other aspects of social justice. To be more precise, the claim is that for the most part Hayek
is criticizing the mechanism under which schemes of distributive justice are implemented.
His rejection of distributive justice is based on the way in which it is achieved, rather than
11 For a fascinating discussion of the various meanings taken on by the term "equality", and for their impact
on arguments of distributional justice, see Westen (1990).
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upon the goal of distributive justice itself. To Hayek, the "problem here is not so much the
aims as the methods of government action" (Hayek 1960, 258, my italics). Thus,
[t]here is no reason why in a free society government should not assure to all
protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum income, or
a floor below which nobody need to descend. To enter into such an insurance
against extreme misfortune may well be in the interest of all; or it may be felt to be
a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who
cannot help themselves. So long as such a uniform minimum income is provided
outside the market to all those who, for any reason, are unable to earn in the market
an adequate maintenance, this need not lead to a restriction of freedom, or conflict
with the Rule of Law. The problems with which we are here concerned arise only
when the remuneration for services rendered is determined by authority, and the
impersonal mechanism of the market which guides the direction of individual
efforts is thus suspended. (Hayek 1976, 87, my italics)
In other words, there is an
important distinction...to be drawn between two conceptions of security: a limited
security which can be achieved for all and which is, therefore, no privilege, and
absolute security, which in a free society cannot be achieved for all. The first of
these is security against severe physical privation, the assurance of a given
minimum of sustenance for all; and the second is the assurance of a given standard
of life, which is determined by comparing the standard enjoyed by a person or a
group with that of others. The distinction, then, is that between the security of an
equal minimum income for all and the security of a particular income that a person
is thought to deserve. (Hayek 1960, 259)
Hayek is thus concerned with the conflict between mechanisms of distributive justice
and the principle of the Rule of Law. It is important to keep in mind that by the principle of
the Rule of Law, neither Hayek nor this thesis refers to a meta-legal principle whereby any
rules or commands issued by some authority are considered to be rules of law. Such a
version of Rule of Law would be amenable with much wider notions of distributive justice.
In fact, Hayek claims that "[ojnly if one understands by law not the general rules of just
conduct only but any commands issued by authority (or any authorization of such
commands by a legislature), can the measures aimed at distributive justice be represented as
compatible with the rule of law" (Hayek 1976, 87). Neither Hayek nor this thesis subscribes
to the notion of the Rule of Law which is grounded upon a foundation of authorization.
Rather, the principle of the Rule of Law to which we are referring is the one elaborated in
the previous chapter — one based on shared, minimal and mainly negative values and
obligations which are put into effect by the various mechanisms described in the previous
chapters of this work.
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Under this notion of the Rule of Law, the rules of distributive justice cannot be rules of
law if they are "too" concrete, and in turn, that they are "too" concrete if they cannot sustain
abstract social relations which are of particular importance in forming the foundations for a
Gesellschaft-type society (which Hayek refers to as a "Great Society"12). This excessive
particularity is revealed by the fact that these rules cannot pass through the filters embedded
in legal mechanisms which are supportive of an abstract society. Competing notions of the
Rule of Law which are unconcerned with the degree of abstraction of rules, and with the
difference between their being negative or positive or with their conflict with pre-existing
and socially necessary pre-existing values and obligations, are not notions of the Rule of
Law which are compatible with the preservation of an abstract society. A vision of law
composed of detailed, concrete rules governing conduct in a positive way and conflicting
with the pre-existing obligations and minimal conditions for social interaction is at odds
with the Hayekian conception of what law is, and the type of society it is geared to sustain.
It is this definition of law— as one of any degree of concreteness— which Hayek attributes
to the work of Kelsen,13 and hence his insistence that Kelsenian positivism was paving the
way for redistributive policies14 by its very conception of law. I have, in this thesis,
extended this critique to encompass more contemporary versions of positivism as well.
One of Hayek's main concerns is that the mechanisms used to implement schemes of
distributive justice may change the nature of the society in which they are implemented, in a
way which is not desired, nor understood. Hayek is concerned about the type of society
which can be sustained by different types of rules, and he argues that only rules of a
sufficiently abstract nature can be used to sustain a Gesellschaft-type society, which in itself
comprises a multitude of Gemeinschaften. The argument of earlier chapters was that
individuals ought to be subject to the governance of abstract and predominantly negative
rules (and the mechanisms which support them) because it is only in this way that
individuals can (a) act autonomously and adjust to increasing complexity and (b) have their
12 In Hayek (1973,2).
13 See Hayek (1960, 236-239).
14 And not merely these policies. Hayek's argument in The Road to Serfdom (1944) and The Constitution of
Liberty (1960, 239) was that this vision of law paved the way for totalitarian forms of society. This is, to say the
least, uncharitable, and perhaps should be restated as saying that nothing in this vision of law could block such a
result. I would argue, in addition to this, that such a notion of law is only a necessary condition for such societal
forms arising. What is also needed, and what should be stressed as being essential, are the notions of law as
authority being manifested in the conduct of the individuals who work within the institutional framework of law.
For a sustained, though in some ways flawed, argument of this type, see for example Hitler's Justice: The Courts
ofthe Third Reich (Muller 1991).
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conflicts resolved in a potentially objective manner. Furthermore, the argument is that it is
only by being oriented in this way that individuals can orient themselves in a complex
(Gesellschaft-type) society. If one attempted to use mechanisms which implement order by
using more concrete methods or which are based on relatively concrete goals, the
complexity of a Gesellschaft-type society would be transformed, sometimes gradually and
sometimes radically, into more concrete society.15 Furthermore, in an environment of
diversity and complexity, this change would imply that the authority structure of society is
similarly transformed, from one based in part on relatively objective decision-making
mechanisms to ones based primarily on arbitrary (i.e. individual-specific) human judgment.
This transformation would occur because it is the fact that individuals orient themselves
with abstract rules which sustains a complex form of society. Concreteness in rules of
conduct, then, is in a sense incompatible with regularity in social conduct in a complex
society. Concrete goals, goals which depend on context, circumstances and numerous other
space-time specifics, are more variable than more abstract values, which have a larger
space-time reference. Only if individuals follow rules which are applicable across a wide set
of environments will their behaviour be regular.
Another of Hayek's primary concerns is that the attempt to implement notions of
distributive justice will transform individuals' conceptions of what the law is. Consider the
following. Under the Hayekian theory, legal mechanisms are a set of particular techniques
which are used to subject individual conduct to the governance of abstract rules. In other
words, the "purpose" ("function") of legal mechanisms is to regularize conduct. In a
complex society, this function can be carried out only by resorting to rules which are (a)
abstract (in the goals they implement and in their reference), (b) negative, and (c) relatively
stable over time. These rules are, in turn, generated and supported by a system of
mechanisms which filter out particularity and give rules of conduct their general qualities. It
is the functioning of these mechanisms, combined with the way in which they operate to
produce regular conduct (by filtering out particularity, and by being based on minimal
conditions), that generates and sustains a "legal quality". If, however, concrete rules are
introduced into law — and under some theories of law, this cannot be ruled out — law
becomes a mechanism for implementing substantive measures. Law and authority become
synonymous, and the argument that law is not merely authorization is ignored. Additionally,
15 This is the underlying message of Hayek's most (in)famous work, The Road to Serfdom (1944).
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and most importantly, there is nothing that ensures that authorization will produce the
regularity which is necessary to sustain a complex society.
4. The limits of legal mechanisms and the different meanings of "objective"
All of this has implications for arguments concerning distributive justice. On the
Hayekian view, it is important to realize that if legal mechanism have, as one of their
primary functions, the filtering out of particularity, then there are limits to what can be
achieved using legal mechanisms. Legal mechanisms are geared toward supporting the
minimal conditions of social interaction through rules of conduct which are abstract and
predominantly negative. For a variety of reasons outlined in previous chapters, these rules
will be widely shared between individuals. In this sense, then, these rules can form the basis
of objective judgments. It is important to keep in mind that such objectivity is restricted in
its scope, and that the striving for objective judgments under mechanisms which in a sense
presuppose objectivity must be restricted to areas where such commonality exists. If this
restriction is not respected — if law becomes synonymous with authorization, independent
of the mechanisms which support this — the value of objectivity itself could fall into
disrepute. How this could come about is the subject of the discussion that follows.
The Hayekian view is that objective judgments are possible over the minimal shared
values and obligations which underlie social interaction. The argument is that legal
mechanisms are adapted to supporting these obligations, which are governed by abstract and
predominantly negative rules of conduct. "Objectivity", then, refers to judgments which
command wide support because the values and obligations that they support are widely held
across society and manifested in performance (and non-performance).
Now, if law is viewed as a form of authorization, the nature of objectivity can come to be
subtly, but crucially, different. Law viewed as a form of authorization does not consider the
difference between negative, prohibitive, rules and positive rules of conduct to be of great
importance. The reason, however, that this distinction is of some importance, is that in a
complex society, objective rules are abstract and also predominantly negative. Striving for
objective positive rules, on the other hand, becomes more difficult in situations of
complexity.16 Thus, the striving for objectivity in situations where positive rules are not
16 As pointed out by Hayek (1976, 38-56).
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shared between individuals can lead to simply ignoring particularity, and to one dominant
view imposing its "objective" classifications on others. What can occur, then, is a subtle
shift in the meaning of "objective" in order to accommodate the desire for "objectivity".
The striving for an impartial spectator perspective implies that one tries to form judgments
based on rules which would be held by an imaginary spectator viewing one's situation.
Objective judgment in this sense means judgment "based on rules of judgment which could,
in principle, be shared in common across individuals". If there are situations in which the
achievement of this perspective is particularly difficult (if one's knowledge were
intrinsically related to being in a particular time-space location or relationship, for example,
or if one searches for common positive rules when the only commonality was between
negative ones), and one continued to desire an impartial spectator perspective, one might be
forced to resort to allowing judgments to be made by an actual (not imaginary) observer.
Objective judgment in this sense means "judgment which is external to and independent of
the will of the parties to a judgment". This sense of objective is similar to, but not the same
as, that which emerges from an impartial spectator perspective, for an impartial spectator
viewpoint is based upon rules ofjudgment which could be known by an imagined spectator,
while the reason for resorting to an actual spectator is that such rules cannot be generated.
Thus, a gap opens up between the two forms of objectivity based on the nature of the
knowledge and information which is being used in the judgment. The impartial spectator's
objectivity is potentially shared in common across individuals; the shift to an actual
observer's objectivity might imply that this form of objectivity is not possible.
To put it another way, the striving for an impartial spectator position implies that some
of its rules of judgment are independent of the will of the imagining party, for they would
sometimes want to have knowledge and information included in a judgment which must be
excluded from this perspective because it could not be known by an impartial spectator. As
the impartial spectator chapter outlined, this striving can lead to the (relative) overlap of
impartial spectator perspectives (depending, critically, upon the differences in knowledge
and environments of the judging individuals), and hence to objectivity in judgment between
the different individuals of a society. This form of objectivity differs from entrusting
judgment to an actual observer in that its objectivity emerges (if it emerges at all) from the
striving for a shared perspective. That is, this perspective is a result of the desire for
objectivity as mediated through the mutual sympathy mechanism. However, there is no
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similar restriction upon the judgments of an actual external observer, for their rules of
judgment are not necessarily the result of such a search for objectivity. It might be the case
that they are shared (if, for example, the external observer strives for an impartial spectator
perspective, and such a perspective is potentially achievable), but this is not necessarily the
case.
5. Objective justice and the mechanism argument
Hayek's worry, then, is that the attempt to implement concrete measures in environments
in which such concrete commonality of value and obligation are not present can lead to the
subtle transformation of the authority structure of society and law. Moreover, the argument
has been that such an over-extension will lead to a subtle transformation of the meaning of
"objective", with the notion of objectivity shifting from one based on commonly shared
values and obligations to one based on authority. This impacts on the notion of law which
exists in a society. If law is not based upon objective judgments but instead becomes merely
a form of authority — if, then, objectivity and objective judgments have fallen into
disrepute, for they are seen as representing no more than the authority of particular groups
— substantivity which is not widely shared can be easily incorporated into law, for all that
is required is authorization.17 The transformation of society, of law, and of the notion of
objectivity, occurs because of a desire to implement concrete goals where there is no
objective basis to support them. The argument against certain notions of distributive justice
is that they attempt to find objectivity and shared obligations where none exist. One of the
reasons for this is that these notions of justice depend heavily on positive rules of obligation,
and these are, in many cases, unable to pass through the filters which support such objective
obligations because of their level of particularity.
6. The Hayekian view of law and objective justice
The Hayekian view argues that objective judgments — in the sense of being based on
commonly shared values and obligations — are possible. Moreover, they are desirable. It
important, however, to be clear on how and why this is the case. In a complex society,
17 a point emphasized in Hayek's discussion of the matter (Hayek 1976, 38-56).
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objective judgments are possible if justice is restricted to the shared minimal values and
obligations which manifest themselves as abstract and predominantly negative rules. It is
desirable because only in this way can disputes between individuals be resolved in a way
which the parties will accept as justified. Furthermore, only objective justice is based on
judgments which are able to sustain a Gesellschaft-type societal structure.
Given this, the question asked by the Hayekian perspective is which mechanisms are best
able to deliver objective judgments? In other words, if we want decisions that are amenable
to objective judgments and justifications (i.e. based on commonly shared reasons), which
mechanisms can systematically deliver this to the greatest possible degree? The principle
argument made by this work (as a whole) is that the mechanisms which are capable of
generating objective judgments must restrict the type of knowledge which enters decisions.
Simply put, this knowledge must not be concrete.
What restrictions does this place on mechanisms capable of delivering objective
judgments? As has been argued previously, the rules capable of guiding judgment must be
abstract and predominantly negative. These properties are generated by judgments passing
through the various filters which have been discussed in previous chapters.
Is it possible, then, that some set of conflicting goals exist, for which we desire an
objective resolution, but which cannot be governed by an objective decision mechanism?
The answer would be yes, and this is in fact an idea which underlies many of Hayek's
objections to distributive justice. Hayek claims the nature of these notions would require
mechanisms which, to achieve their goals, must produce judgments which are non-
objective, and therefore they cannot be based on general rules capable of passing through
either the impartial spectator or UCC filters.18 This filter failure implies that such
mechanisms cannot form the basis of an abstract, Gesellschaft-type, society. Hayek's
objections to distributive justice, then, are based on the idea that the means chosen to
implement this goal are incompatible with the structure of society and authority which many
individuals hold as a value.
Note the obvious connection with the Hayekian conception of justice (i.e. justice being
blind —justice being, in a word, abstract — and necessarily and intentionally so). In some
18 This is, I believe, the essential point underlying most of Hayek's objections to the notion of distributive
justice in a complex society.
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conceptions of justice, justice is not necessarily blind to particular detail.19 In a Hayekian
theory, on the other hand, it is a necessary feature. To quote Hayek: "the possibility of
justice rests on [the] necessary limitation of our factual knowledge" (Hayek 1973, 13, my
italics). An interesting question raised by these alternative visions of justice is, of course,
whether or not they are epistemologically sound. Hayek's argument, simply put, is that
those espousing notions of distributive justice which would entail governance by concrete
methods are unsound, for they presuppose the existence of objective knowledge which does
not exist and which would exist only by changing the structure of social interactions and
authority to a very large extent. Hayek's argument, simply put, is that in a complex society
this objective knowledge does not exist.20 Moreover, the circumstances in which such
knowledge would exist are quite different from the circumstances which underlie interaction
in a complex society. Hayek's claim, then, is that other theories of justice are erroneous
because they base their theories on an unsound epistemic assumption. These foundational
assumptions in a sense presuppose away the possibility of achieving objective justice by
basing their notion of justice on knowledge which, given a particular form of social
interaction, is necessarily arbitrary (individual-specific, i.e. not shared in common).
The Hayekian critique of certain notions of distributive justice rests upon this argument.
Ifone desires decisions to satisfy an impartiality/objectivity criterion, then certain classes of
information (knowledge) must be excluded as proper grounds for a judgment — and this
knowledge is individual-specific, concrete knowledge.21 The reason for this is that a
demand for the consideration of increasing amounts of particular detail, which in a complex
society would be increasingly person-specific, cannot be accommodated in an objective way
within an authority structure capable of sustaining an abstract society.22 But why would this
be so? Surely Hayek is not claiming that people should not consider particular details? Of
course they must. But in an abstract society, the selection of which particulars to be
considered must fall under shared abstract and predominantly negative rules of conduct if
judgments are to be objective. What Hayek is saying, then, is that not all of the particular
19 In Ravvls' theory of justice (1971), for instance, there is a tension between his original position argument
(which is, essentially, an attempt at abstracting out the common principles binding a society) and the particularity
requirements of his "difference principle" (which would, depending on its level of generality, require an explicit
classification and rank-order over the various forms of being "worse-off').
20 Hayek refers to the belief that such knowledge exists, and is known to one mind, as the "synoptic
delusion" (Hayek 1973, 14).
21 That they have not fulfilled this criteria to this day does not imply that it is not a desired (or desirable)
ideal or that attempts to improve legal systems should not move in this direction.
22 See Hayek (1952, 163).
TheMoloch of abstraction • 303
circumstances which are present in a particular case can be used to arrive at objective
judgments in a particular case, and that not all of the detail known by a particular mind
should be used to decide the outcome of judgments about a particular case if objectivity is
desired. The argument is, then, that only by using judgments based upon abstract and widely
held principles is there the possibility of objective decision making.
7. A consideration of alternative governance mechanisms
The Hayekian position is that the basis of the restriction on the types of knowledge
entering decision-making flows from an increase in the complexity of social life and a
consequent move away from judgments based on particulars and a move towards those
based on more abstract considerations. As knowledge as a "totality" increases — as the
division ofbiowledge23 continually grows — the relative ignorance of particular individuals
also increases relative to this "totality". For aspects to be shared between individuals, they
must be abstracted from the wealth of particulars found in this complexity. The argument is,
then, that social decision-makers must shift their considerations to more abstract aspects in
order to be able to judge the increased amounts of particularity which accompany an
increase in complexity.
This is not, however, the only way to deal with the difficulties engendered by
complexity. Another approach would be to resort to other mechanisms having different
governance properties from the decision-making mechanisms considered to this point. Thus
far, the focus has been on legal mechanisms. What has not been stressed is that these
mechanisms exist alongside a variety of others, and that these other mechanisms have
different properties from legal ones. Consider the contrast between legal and political
mechanisms. Legal mechanisms are geared to supporting the minimal conditions for social
interaction through abstract and predominantly negative rules of conduct. Legal
mechanisms, in other words, are aimed at supporting decentralized conduct governance by
abstract and predominantly negative rules. Political mechanisms, on the other hand, are
geared towards collective choice which in many, though certainly not all, cases are focused
upon positive rules of conduct. In other words, my view is that when compared with legal
mechanisms, political mechanisms are geared towards measuring and implementing
23 a useful concept first mentioned by Hayek in his 1937 paper, "Economics and Knowledge" (Hayek 1948,
33-56).
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measures with a greater degree of concreteness. This should not be taken to argue, however,
that political mechanisms cannot generate more abstract rules of conduct, for they are
certainly capable of doing this. The argument is, rather, that political mechanisms are better
adapted to registering concreteness than are legal mechanisms, and that legal mechanisms
are better adapted to supporting predominantly negative abstract rules of conduct.
The reasons for this are, in part, based on the different closure properties that each
mechanism is well-adapted to governing. Consider situations of conflict. Some mechanisms
are based on all-or-nothing choices, in part based on the need to resolve an issue in an
authoritative fashion. Now, in social situations where individuals' classifications are such
that one side of a conflict has a relatively strong override on the other, this might not be too
problematic. In this case, there is agreement on the relative strength of one side and the
relative weakness of another. Many of the minimal values and obligations which underlie
social life are probably of this form, and it has been an argument of earlier chapters that
legal mechanisms are well-adapted to supporting these insofar as they are abstract and
predominantly negative. If these obligations were positive, however, there would typically
be the need for a resort to additional mechanisms which would be capable of supplying the
concreteness which positive obligations entail. Whether such obligations were fulfilled
through group-oriented decisions or in some more decentralized manner would depend, of
course, on the desired course of action and the performative complexity and consequences it
entails.
Problems arise when the conflict is not based on a social consensus concerning the
strength of different sides of a conflict. In these cases, all-or-nothing governance
mechanisms can produce results which impose the overriding concern of one group onto the
overriding concern of another. For this reason, both legal and political mechanisms which
attempt to deliver objective judgments encounter difficulties when confronted with issues
where there is not a relative consensus on which rule to allow to dominate and which rule to
allow to be dominated. In fact, in such situations, it becomes difficult to talk of the
"objective" nature of a decision at all. What this might imply is that mechanisms which are
well-adapted to delivering judgments in environments in which there is an all-or-nothing
"consensus" (be it conscious, or merely performative) will be mal-adapted to delivering
such judgments in environments in which this is not the case, and in which numerous trade¬
offs have to be made.
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Return for the moment to an issue raised above — that political mechanisms differ from
legal mechanisms in that they are in large part concerned with collective choice which in
many cases is focused upon positive rules and the performance of particular actions. These
positive rules can be divided into two types: those that implement minimal necessary
conditions, and those that build on necessary conditions in an attempt to improve upon
them. Political mechanisms are well-suited to the first type of situation, for while there will
be relatively widespread agreement on what these minimal conditions are, the views over
how they are to be fulfilled are likely to be less so. What is required in such a situation are
mechanisms which allow for trade-offs between competing implementation mechanisms,
and which allow for concretizations of actions to be implemented. Such trade-offs will
occur over time, with some giving up their preferred concrete choice for the abstract
assurance that over time, others will give up their goals for them.
Now, to avoid misunderstandings it is important to emphasize a couple of points
concerning political mechanisms. First, the closure properties of the scenario outlined above
imply that some will be forced to give up their particular choices so that the choices of
others might be achieved. That such a trade-off is necessary is the result of referring choice
to a mechanism which has the property of mutually exclusive choices. This implies that for
issues in which there is agreement, this property will be of lesser importance than in
situations in which there are numerous views of what should be done. The upshot of this is
that political mechanisms will force trade-offs less if they are merely implementing positive
rules based on widely shared views of minimal conditions. If they are used to resolve
conflicts in which there are a variety of different views — none of which has majority
support— these mechanisms will override individual choice to a greater and greater extent.
Second, legal and political mechanisms do not differ substantially in the way in which
they operate in situations of complexity. It is sometimes claimed that politics is about open
dialogue, while law is about closure and authority. This view is, I think, mistaken, for it is
based upon an equivocation concerning the level of complexity of the environment within
which each type of mechanism operates. If political mechanisms are put into situations of
social complexity, they must overcome problems which are similar to those faced by legal
mechanisms. In particular, the problem of communicative complexity assumes an increased
importance, and the various solutions to this problem are all geared towards closing down
channels of communication, filtering out the "extraneous" bits, and standardizing the
TheMoloch of abstraction • 306
discourse that is allowed to impact on decisions. This is achieved through the resort to a
variety of mechanisms which operate in environments of complexity by abstracting out
those aspects which are considered to be "relevant" and hence reducing the channels of
communication.24 Thus, both legal and political mechanisms, when considered within
environments of similar complexity, invoke closure and narrow down the channels of
communication. Moreover, both legal and political mechanisms make a claim to be
governing wide spheres of conduct and to being authoritative, and hence both can override
the choices of particular individuals, both in their not being able to avoid being governed by
these mechanisms, and in their being able to follow their own choice of conduct.
1 might mention at this point one other mechanism which Hayek tends to emphasize: the
market mechanism.25 The Hayekian view is that the market mechanism is a conduct
governance mechanism which has its own specific governance properties. Like other
governance mechanisms operating in environments of complexity, it provides an interaction
structure whereby conflicts are resolved using a minimal information criterion (numbers,
say, in the case of a very abstracted notion of a market). A market mechanism is on this
view a governance structure for interactions with rather minimal informational requirements
demanded of the agents to the interaction.26 The foundation of Hayek's belief in the
necessity of resorting to market mechanisms is the belief that markets are effective in
situations where commonality is lacking and where all-or-nothing collective judgments
would result in one side imposing its rank-ordering on another. By decentralizing
judgments, the "collective" judgment in effect embeds aspects of matter-of-degree
judgments, and hence it can allow for conflicts which an all-or-nothing closure technique
attempts to preclude.
Markets are mechanisms adapted to governance in environments where knowledge is
fragmented, and where complexity has produced a diversity of concrete goals for different
individuals. As knowledge becomes specialized and the division of knowledge grows more
and more complex, the "totality" of knowledge increases. This "totality", however, is known
to no one mind,27 nor to any one group, and in principle it cannot be known by any one
24 For an overview of the some of these mechanisms from a "public choice" economics perspective, see
Mueller (1989).
25 For a fascinating historical overview of market phenomena, and their contextual development alongside
the growth of European society, see Braudel (1981; 1985; 1985a).
26 A point emphasized repeatedly by Hayek (1948, 33-56, 77-91; 1978, 179-190; 1979, 65-77).
27 See Hayek's discussion of the belief to the contrary, under what he terms as the "synoptic delusion"
(Hayek 1973, 14).
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mind or group. Thus, as the "totality" of knowledge increases in size, there is a
corresponding decrease in the ability of any one particular mind to contain this knowledge.
A particular mind can only contain this knowledge at a relatively high level of abstraction.
This limitation is a result of the constitution of mind, the idea being that there is an
"economy of mind", i.e. that mind is limited in the amount of actions which it can contain.
Thus, in complex societies there will be a large increase in the instances of particular
knowledge which, in turn, can only be known at a relatively high level of abstraction.28 The
question this is, if one wants to use particular knowledge, how does one do this? Consider
the following dilemma: one wants to use particular knowledge, but one's mind contains
only very general rules governing that knowledge. Hence, one must depend on the particular
knowledge of another. Particular knowledge must be governed by general rules, yet the
general rules are not capable of resolving particular issues. The Hayekian claim is that what
is needed is a mechanism whereby the particular knowledge of another is imparted to
another— becomes knowable, at a different level of abstraction— in a way in which one is
not forced to rely on the arbitrary (person-specific) aspects of another's judgment.29 What is
needed, in Hayek's view, is a market governed by general legal mechanisms. Under this
combination of mechanisms, one can find interactions governed by abstract rules geared to
the relatively decentralized interaction of self-guided individuals.30
8. Negative rules and objective judgments
The consideration of different types of conduct governance mechanisms and their
relationship to negative and positive rules reintroduces an important element into the
28 A point stressed by Hayek in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976, 11-12).
29 This is not to argue that conduct governance by market mechanisms ensures that coercion does not take
place, for such mechanisms assume that the minimal conditions for action and social life — both negative and
positive — have been satisfied. This condition, which might not be met in specific cases, is one which provides
an argument for (at the least) minimal levels of distributive justice (especially given the complexity of satisfying
positive minimal conditions in complex societies). Nor is it to claim that the existence of a market form of
governance is a necessary condition for "individual freedom", as has been argued by Milton Friedman (1962;
1980), unless by this one implicitly assumes both that legal mechanisms, and the governance by abstract rules
that they support, are necessarily tied to market mechanisms, and that the environment of interest when referring
to "individual freedom" is that of a complex society.
30 This is not to say that all interaction under market mechanisms is decentralized, but only that relatively
speaking, it is decentralized compared to other mechanisms of more collective choice which encompass entire
polities. There is, perhaps, an argument to be made for the decentralization of many of these more encompassing
mechanisms, if what they hope to accomplish can be accomplished more effectively under a variety of
(potentially more diverse) decentralized mechanisms.
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discussion. The previous chapters have emphasized the importance of understanding the
foundations of regularities of conduct at the individual level. The focus of these chapters has
been upon the mechanisms which generate and support such regularity, with a stress placed
upon three distinctions of some significance: the distinction between abstract and concrete
rules of conduct, negative and positive rules of conduct, and necessary and sufficient
conditions associated with rules of conduct. The argument of earlier chapters was that legal
mechanisms are adapted to supporting abstract and predominantly negative rules of conduct
which in part constitute the minimal necessary conditions of social life.
Now, given that up to this point in the thesis an emphasis has been put upon minimal
conditions which can be satisfied by conforming to negative rules of conduct (i.e. by
refraining from certain forms of conduct), one might have formed the impression that the
argument is that all the minimal conditions for social interaction can be satisfied solely by
abstaining from performing certain acts. This would, however, be a false impression. While
some minimal conditions for social interaction can be satisfied by conforming to negative
rules of conduct — and hence are amenable to governance by legal mechanisms — not all
minimal conditions can be satisfied using these mechanisms. In particular, minimal
conditions which demand the performance of certain types of conduct must in some cases
resort to positive rules.
It is important to keep in mind that the minimal obligations which underlie social
interaction are both negative and positive. This thesis has focused on negative obligations
because of their intimate connection with legal mechanisms. This should not be taken to
imply that positive minimal obligations are not important. These obligations are as
significant as negative ones, and it is one of the weaknesses of Hayek's legal theorizing that
positive obligations are granted little attention. From the point of view of this thesis, to
ignore positive obligations is a mistake, not merely because such obligations are of
fundamental concern, but also because such obligations often presuppose different
mechanisms for their fulfilment. As argued previously, negative rules refer to actions that
do not occur, while positive rules refer to actions that do occur. An important aspect of the
difference between the two rule types is the differing degree of abstraction of the actions
which can satisfy these rules. Negative rules of conduct are satisfied by the ongoing lack of
performance of certain acts. Positive rules of conduct, on the other hand, oblige one to
perform acts which exist at particular points in space and time (i.e. a specific number of
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performances, or a particular location for each performance, etc.). In this sense, then,
negative rules of conduct are satisfied by conditions which are more abstract than are the
ones satisfying positive rules of conduct, i.e. negative rules of conduct refer to larger chunks
of space and time.
This leads to two important insights. First, positive rules are satisfied by conditions
which are more concrete than those which satisfy negative rules. The importance of this
point is related to a second insight which assumes a greater significance when one takes into
account the governance properties of rules of conduct in increasingly complex
environments. This is the point that negative rules of conduct are more effective adaptations
to increases in complexity than are positive ones. Why would this be the case?
Negative rules are generated and supported by the mechanisms described in earlier
chapters. These mechanisms deal with complexity by stripping away increasing levels of
particularity. The result of this process are rules of conduct which are abstract and in many
cases negative in the sense of prohibiting certain conduct. The increasing prominence of the
negativity of these rules is directly related to increases in complexity, for their negativity is
related to their abstractness. The more complex the environment one encounters, the more
effective negative rules of conduct become as guides to conduct.
All of this is related to the different ways that negative and positive rules govern
individual conduct. Positive rules of conduct specify acts which are to be performed. Thus,
positive rules of conduct exclude other conduct by eating up the time that is available to
perform any conduct at all. Negative rules of conduct, on the other hand, specify acts which
are not to be performed. Negative rules exclude conduct by specifically prohibiting its
performance, and as this prohibition does not take time to perform, one is not excluded from
performing other acts which one might desire. Now, this difference in the way that each
type of rule governs conduct becomes of heightened importance when one considers the
conjunction of (a) the systemic properties of rules and (b) situations of increasing
complexity. Consider the systemic nature of rules. Systems of negative rules govern conduct
by prohibiting certain forms of conduct. The cumulative effect of adding more and more
prohibitions to a system of negative rules of conduct is to exclude more and more of the
available alternative paths of action which one can perform without violating a negative
rule. Note that such a cumulation does not consume the time of the individual, and hence,
though their paths of action are restricted, they are not restricted on the time that they can
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devote to their chosen plans of action. Systems of positive rules do not have this property.
Adding more and more positive rules of conduct to a system of positive rules results in
individuals having less and less time to devote to their own plans of action, with more and
more time being devoted to the acts which positive rules specify to be performed.
Now consider the relationship to complexity. In relatively simple environments, with
few alternative paths of action being available to individuals, the difference between the
governance properties of rules might not seem too significant. But in situations of increasing
complexity, where the number of alternative plans of actions increases significantly, the
governance properties of each type of rule become more significant. Negative rules specify
acts which are not to be performed, and this prohibition does not impact on the time that one
can devote to alternative paths of action. Positive rules, on the other hand, do specify the
acts to be performed, and this specification does impact on the time that one can devote to
alternatives. In other words, then, positive rules become increasingly restrictive as
complexity increases.
Now, one might argue that either type of rule of conduct is capable of restricting action if
they are defined in a suitably vague manner. If rules are defined in this way, and if
individuals who desire to follow these rules are forced to refer to others to fill in the content
of these rules, then either type of rule can restrict conduct simply by having whatever one
does (or does not do) subject to authorization by another. While this is correct, and points to
an argument that rules should be defined as clearly as possible so that this authority
reference is minimized, it does not take into account the important relationship between
undesirable states of affairs and negative, prohibitive, rules of conduct. In earlier chapters,
an argument was made that for evolutionary reasons, knowledge of harm and undesirable
states of affairs is more commonly-shared among individuals than is knowledge of pleasure
and desired states of affairs. When this is connected to the argument that negative,
prohibitive, rules are often easier for single individuals to follow (in that they do not
presuppose "transfers" of actions between individuals, and hence do not require mechanisms
which can coordinate such "transfers"), one can make the argument that between negative
rules and positive rules, negative rules will be easier for individuals to follow under their
own judgment.
This leads to the implication that as complexity increases, systems of positive rules will
feel the increasing need to resort to mechanisms capable of registering concreteness. The
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reason for this is that the mechanisms of abstraction described in previous chapters deal
with complexity by stripping away increasing degrees of particularity. But with positive
rules, this is precisely the opposite of what is required. As complexity increases, positive
rules which impose obligations to act and to transfer actions must become increasingly
detailed in their specification of when the positive rule is to be satisfied if individuals are to
be able to follow them under their own judgment. My view of this problem is that in large
part it is the role of political mechanisms to supply this concreteness. Political mechanisms
have developed in large part to register concrete decisions (i.e. to register decisions of the
moment applying to concrete circumstances). This concreteness, which is required by
implementations of minimal conditions which require the performance of conduct, can be
supplied by political mechanisms in a relatively objective manner provided that there exists
a foundation of commonality upon which such mechanisms are based. Of course, in
environments of complexity, as the degree of concreteness of the implementation increases,
such commonality will gradually decrease and so enters the possibility of arbitrary, non-
objective governance. This potentiality for non-objective governance should be restricted by
abstract rules of conduct (such as those supported by legal mechanisms) in order for these
rules to continue to govern conduct in a general way, but in some sense such arbitrariness
will be an unavoidable consequence of resorting to mechanisms which require a greater
degree of concreteness than can be supported objectively in a complex society.
There are two, often complementary, solutions to the problem posed by the concreteness
requirements of positive rules to which one might resort if autonomous conduct guidance
remains a priority. First, minimal positive obligations can resort to abstract mechanisms to
mitigate this difficulty. In other words, both the positive obligations and the governance
mechanisms which implement them might become increasingly abstract to accommodate
increases in complexity. Thus, the resort to market mechanisms and general instruments of
taxation (rather than the resort to more concrete methods) represents one solution to this
general problem. Second, another approach would be to specify the state of affairs which are
desired, specify negative rules over these states of affairs, but leave the precise manner in
which they are to be achieved to more decentralized conduct. In this way, the choice of
paths of conduct would be decentralized, and yet a positive obligation would be imposed
without the specific choice of conduct being dictated to the individual.
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It should be stressed that neither of these "solutions" actually address a fundamental
problem: how is it to be decided which activities are to be the subject of positive
obligations? The discussion of this most important question shall be deferred until the final
section of this chapter.
9. The attribution of justice to "states of affairs"
Thus far the chapter has shied away from a detailed examination of the consequences
which would follow if one adopted the theoretical framework set out in this thesis. It has
also avoided confronting the substantial literature on Hayek's critiques of the concept of
distributive justice.31 The sections which follow will try to address these issues by focusing
on two of Hayek's critics who put forward arguments of particular clarity and which are
representative of the types of objections most often directed against Hayek's critiques.
These sections, then, will attempt to illustrate the implications of a Hayekian view of
distributive justice by focusing on a useful summary of Hayek's perspective found in A.M.
Macleod's article, "Justice and the Market" (1983), and by examining some objections
made by Neil MacCormick in his article "Spontaneous Order and the Rule of Law— Some
Problems" (1989) . These articles can be used to illustrate the major points of concern of
those who criticize the views spelled out in this chapter, and to provide a focal point around
which the implications of these views may be explained and scrutinized. My goal, however,
is not so much to criticize the particular author of these objections to the Hayekian view
(many other writers have echoed these complaints) so much as to investigate the degree to
which these types of criticisms are worthy of attention. My strategy, then, is to state these
criticisms, spell out their implications, and point out the implicit presuppositions which on
first glance give these criticisms their apparent force.
Turn, then, to Macleod's summary of the issues concerning Hayek's views on
distributive justice. Macleod admirably distils the major issues into three questions
concerning Hayek's notion ofjustice. He asks
...whether the judgments about the justice of states of affairs...can be derived from
judgments about the justice of the actions which brought about these states of
affairs...
31 The literature dealing with Hayek's critique of social justice is substantial. See, for example, the
references given in Gray (1986) and Kukathas (1989) to discussions of this topic.
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...whether judgments about the justice of states of affairs incorporate or entail
responsibility-imputing judgments...[and]
...whether Hayek's own criterion — according to which states of affairs must be
intended or foreseen upshots of actions if justice or injustice is to be predicated of
them intelligibly — serves to effect the exclusion, as meaningless, of judgments
about the justice or injustice of the distribution typically effected by market forces
in what Hayek calls a 'free' society. (Macleod 1983, 556)
1 shall use these questions as a framework around which Hayek's theory may be
explained. Turn to the first question. Issues of distributive justice typically turn around the
question of whether it is just (or unjust) that "A should have much and B little" (Hayek
1976, 33). Macleod argues that under Hayek's own criterion for justice-attributions, i.e. that
such a state of affairs is "the intended or foreseen result of somebody's action" (Hayek
1976, 33), this can be an issue of justice. Furthermore, the issue of justice turns on the
existence of the state of affairs, and only incidentally on how it arose. As Macleod puts it,
If we examine judgments about an existing state of affairs— the judgment, say, that
the existing situation is unjust in some way — we find our attention focusing on the
features of the situation which make it urgent for the situation to be changed and not
(except incidentally) on the question of how it came about, let alone on the question
[of] who (if anyone) is morally to blame for its having come about. (Macleod 1983,
558-559)
Is this correct? There are a couple of arguments doing the work here, and focusing on
them allows one to see what exactly is at stake in this discussion. First, then, consider the
argument that judgments of how a state of affairs comes about is more fundamental than the
judgment of the justice of the existence of the state of affairs. Is this a sensible argument?
Perhaps it is, but such an argument must be qualified. Is the definition of states of affairs
important to the attribution of justice? Of course it is. Can attributions of justice or injustice
apply to the results of conduct? Of course they can. "Do not kill" or "Do not act in such a
way that death to another results" are not appreciably different rules if the resultant state of
affairs can be defined in advance. The important point is that the performance or non¬
performance of conduct is a necessary condition for an attribution of justice or injustice. It
is not a sufficient condition.
Note a second point brought out by this example. The way in which certain states of
affairs comes about does seem to be of decisive importance when making an attribution of
justice or injustice. Consider the state of affair of being dead. Is it this state of being to
which one attributes justice or injustice, or is it the manner by which one came to be dead
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that is of decisive importance? I would argue it is the latter— deaths resulting from certain
forms of conduct, but not others, are unjust. Or consider the state of affairs of being harmed.
Is it the state of being harmed that is unjust, or is it the way that you were harmed which can
be just or unjust? Again, I would argue that it is the manner in which you were harmed
which is of decisive importance. Discussions which focus on the attribution of justice or
injustice to states of affairs and ignore the conduct which produce these states leave out
some of the most important instances of justice-attribution in society — those instances of
injustice which are governed by legal mechanisms. Are these mechanisms "uninterested" in
how certain states of affairs came about or in who is responsible for a state of affairs coming
into existence? 1 think not. Focusing on the justice or injustice of states of affairs
independent of how they came to exist lacks even a rudimentary insight into the nature of
legal judgments which govern some of the most important instances of injustice in society.
If one fails to take into account this already existing mechanism for determining the justice
or injustice of conduct, one completely misunderstands the backdrop against which
attributions of justice or injustice to states of affairs take place.32
What, then, can one make of Macleod's argument that when examining judgments of
states of affairs the focus is generally on the justice or injustice of aspects of the state of
affairs and not generally upon how, or by whom, they were produced? Is this correct? It
does seem to be for certain cases. Consider the state of having little while others have much.
Is it the state of being which is unjust or is it how you came to be in this state which is of
decisive importance? In this case, it seems that justice is being attributed to the state of
being, and not to the manner by which one came to be in this state. This seems different,
then, from the previous cases. How might this be explained?
The essential difference is that the first two situations are considering the violations of
negative rules of conduct, while the third situation is considering the violation ofpositive
rules of conduct. In other words, in the first two situations, individuals did things they
should not have, while in the third situation, it is the lack of action by others which is
objectionable (for their lack of action leaves others in a state of lacking relative to others, or
of lacking a "just" amount). Macleod's discussion relates, then, to prescribed acts (based on
32 This would apply with equal force to the claim made by Sadurski (1985, 22-23) that there is "no manifest
reason why justice should be applicable primarily to human conduct and can only apply derivatively to states of
affairs".
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governance by positive rules) and not to prohibited acts (based on governance by negative
rules).33 Is this distinction significant?
As I have argued in previous chapters, it is of decisive importance for a variety of
reasons. Negative rules govern conduct in a different way from positive rules. It is for this
reason that the mechanisms governing justice in a Gesellschaft-type society are based
primarily on negative abstract rules of conduct. Furthermore, there are differences in the
notion of "freedom" depending upon which type of governance mechanism is presumed to
govern conduct. Being governed by the same negative rules as everybody else does not
presuppose that concrete obligations are owed to anybody. Instead, abstract obligations not
to perform certain acts exist for everyone. In this sense, then, all individuals can be "free" in
the same way. Positive rules which demand conduct, on the other hand, can manifest
concrete obligations between individuals and might imply that some individuals are obliged
to others. This can lead to some being "free" from certain situations only because others are
"unfree" in the sense that they must aid individuals in these situations. This is, then, a non-
universalizable definition of freedom.
Thus, a fundamental objection to the argument that there is no need to examine how
states of affairs come to exist is that it ignores the mechanism under which such results are
generated. Hayek's claim is that arguments of mechanism are of decisive importance, the
claim being that in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society social interactions and hence social
states of affairs are governed by individuals ordering their own conduct. Hence, if one
ignores the way that undesirable states of affairs arise one would be ignoring the fact that
there is already a pre-existing order to individuals' conduct which might be disrupted by the
introduction of various other "solutions" to the problem — in particular, those "solutions"
based on positive rules of conduct.
The argument that judgments concerning existing states of affairs tend to focus on the
justice of aspects of these states and not on the conduct which produced these states is thus
flawed for two reasons. First, such an argument ignores the fact that legal mechanisms are
very concerned with how certain states of affairs came to exist and with identifying who
produced them. Second, this argument ignores the essential distinction between states of
33 The same holds for Sadurski's discussion (1985, 24-25), and as is argued in the discussion of the main
text that follows, this oversight undermines both his, and Macleod's, argument in exactly the same way.
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affairs which were produced by violations of negative rules and those which were produced
by violations of positive rules.
This lack of concern over the form of conduct governance mechanisms is apparent when
one turns to Macleod's second point, "whether judgments about the justice of states of
affairs incorporate or entail responsibility-imputing judgments" (Macleod 1983, 556). In a
Gesellschaft-type society governed by abstract negative rules of conduct, this is indeed the
case. How, then, can Macleod assert that "[i]f an envisaged state of affairs is deemed to be
unjust, the question of responsibility ascription does not — indeed logically cannot — so
much as arise" (Macleod 1983, 558)? How does this relate to an envisaged state of affairs
where someone has been killed in a brutal manner? Is not the question of responsibility
ascription and indeed the question of whether or not being dead is a matter of justice
dependent upon the ascription of responsibility to someone or some group that acted
unjustly? Indeed it is. And it is the manner by which one becomes dead that is decisive in
deciding whether or not judgments of justice are applicable or not. But how, then, can one
make sense ofMacleod's assertion?
The only conclusion that can be reached is that Macleod completely overlooks the
relationship between justice-attributions, responsibility imputations and the concept of
justice which governs an abstract society. The reason for delimiting justice to situations
where responsibility can be ascribed is the recognition that only such cases are amenable to
the governance of conduct by abstract negative rules. Such governance is essential to the
preservation of an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. It is the failure to recognize the
implications of not specifying the type of governance mechanism which underlies the notion
of justice which allows for a consequent mechanism vacuum to arise. This vacuum is in turn
liable to be filled by methods which are incompatible with Gesellschaft-type social
relations, and which allow for the substantive ends of some to be imposed over top of, and
in conflict with, the substantive ends of others. It is precisely this form of imposition which
the mechanisms of justice supporting a Gesellschaft-Xype society attempt to filter out. Thus,
the separation of attributions of the justice of states of affairs from judgments of
responsibility can lead to incompatibilities with the very notion of justice which underlies
an abstract society. The attempt to separate judgments of the justice of states of affairs from
responsibility-attributions is based upon a blindness to the intimate connection between
justice-attributions and individual responsibility which forms the basis for the concept of
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justice which is capable of supporting an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. Undermining
this connection, then, undermines the very notion of justice upon which an abstract society
is predicated.
10. The connection between justice and responsibility-attributions
This is related to Macleod's third point of "whether Hayek's own criterion — according
to which states of affairs must be intended or foreseen upshots of actions if justice or
injustice is to be predicated of them intelligibly — serves to effect the exclusion, as
meaningless, ofjudgments about the justice or injustice of the distribution typically effected
by market forces in what Hayek calls a 'free' society" (Macleod 1983, 556). The argument
is, basically, that the decision by a government to continue with a "free" society and the
consequent inequality which results is the "foreseen consequence of the decision to maintain
a 'free' society" and hence is amenable to justice-attributions under the criteria argued for
above. Consider an even stronger argument, made by Neil MacCormick. Assume that a
government had superimposed an organizational order upon a spontaneous order
(MacCormick 1989, 48). They then attempt to "roll back" these changes. MacCormick
argues that
[t]o the extent that restoration of a spontaneously self-regulating market order is in
these circumstances an object of deliberate endeavour, it seems obvious that the
outcomes of the working of the market must now cease to fall beyond the realms of
justice. Those who seek to restore the market know that properly working markets
generate considerable ranges of economic inequality. No such inequalities are, nor
need be, intended by any of the market's participants. But those who deliberately set
about restoring a market-based economic order must be deemed to intend just such
inequalities, for such a person is deemed to intend what he knows to be the
foreseeable outcome of his act. That one cannot foresee who will make the gains
and suffer the losses is irrelevant to the issue of responsibility. If I give a hand-
grenade to a madman en route to the theatre and people get killed, I cannot
afterwards excuse myself by saying that I couldn't foresee who would be killed.
(MacCormick 1989,48)
What is one to make of this argument? Is the analogy between the madman scenario and
the rolling back of a regime based on distributive justice an apt one to make? Perhaps not.
One difference between the two scenarios is the difference in the causal connection between
actors' conduct and the consequences which flow from this conduct. This difference in
causal connectivities between the two situations is instructive. In the madman situation there
is a relatively direct connection between the conduct of the madman and the harm which
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results. The connection between the individual who gives a hand-grenade and the harm
which results is more distant still. What, then, limits the responsibility of the hand-grenade
donor? One could come up with a number of principles. For instance, one might argue that
for the donor to be in part responsible for the harm created by the madman, they must have
been aware of the madman's state ofmind (unless one wishes to argue that any handing out
of hand-grenades is wrong, but then that would be a different argument). Otherwise, how
does one individual become responsible for the harms inflicted by another? By providing
some of the necessary conditions for the infliction of this harm? But then surely all those
who contributed to the necessary conditions for the harm taking place would bear
responsibility for the harm caused. Similarly, one could argue that the duration of time
which passed between the giving of the hand-grenade and the madman's harm is of some
importance. If, say, twenty years had passed, might this not contribute to a diminishment of
the responsibility of the donor? Finally, one might be curious to know whether the madman
met anyone along the way who noted that he had a hand-grenade. Perhaps he handed it to
someone while he tied his shoelaces, or walked in clear view of an on-duty police officer
who was not sufficiently attentive, or maybe he went home for supper with his mother who
noticed that he had a hand-grenade. Do these intervening interactions in any way lessen the
responsibility of the giver of the hand-grenade?
Turn now to MacCormick's argument concerning the imputation of responsibility when
a government attempts to roll back programmes of distributive justice and generate a
market-based economic order. There are two possibilities which might be considered: acts
and omissions. I will consider the latter possibility first. Turn then to a situation where a
government refuses to address issues of distributive inequality. Is the causal connection
between this and the madman scenario supposed to be of the same type? Is there supposed
to be as direct a causal connection between the decision not to pursue distributive justice
and the results which accrue to particular individuals? Is the government's inaction, which
allows individuals to act in the manner they see fit (so long as they do not violate the
general negative rules which govern social interaction), supposed to transfer responsibility
from these acting individuals to the government? Or is government simply presupposed to
assume responsibility for individuals' particular situations? What exactly is going on here?
It would seem that there are at least two different responsibility-attribution systems to
which one could resort. One would be the system based upon the mechanisms described in
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this thesis. These would probably be the ones to which MacCormick is implicitly referring
in the madman example. Consider their use in that example. For responsibility to fall upon
the hand-grenade donor, a variety of criteria must first be satisfied. Was the donor aware
that the recipient was in fact a madman? Would it be wrong in any case to hand out hand-
grenades (one would hope so!)? How much time passed between the handing over of the
grenade and the harm inflicted? Was there any intervening conduct which might negative a
responsibility-ascription? And so on. One could make the argument for a variety of criteria
which would have to be met to establish the degree of responsibility the donor would have
in this situation. The point of this is that responsibility-attributions are based on different
rules which set out the degrees of responsibility that individuals will have for certain types
of actions. But what, then, is the purpose of such rules?
The purpose (or function) of these rules is to set out the limitations on responsibility-
attributions. Legal mechanisms, and their more institutionalized forms, also embed such
concepts. The notion of certainty,34 concepts such as intention (as manifested in mens rea,
and differing degrees of intentionality) and the idea of an actus reus are responsibility-
attribution and limitation principles. So too are the various doctrines of foreseeability and
the various rules governing the proximity or remoteness of harm.35 All of these are
distinctions which attribute and limit responsibility. And all of these are tools for
implementing a regime of conduct governance using abstract rules. One should not be
fooled into thinking that these concepts can be defined in any way we please and still
continue to serve this same function. The important point for our discussion is that there
exists a relationship between the content of these distinctions and the type of society which
this content is capable of supporting, //"individuals are to be guided by their own judgment
using abstract negative rules, their spheres of responsibility must be delimited by rules of
responsibility-attribution which make this a possibility. Thus, if rules of responsibility are
extended to include circumstances which are not known by individuals and could not be
known without forcing individuals to substantially deviate from their own goals and values
(either by following those goals which are embedded in the various responsibilities
34 In all of its manifestations, including certainty beyond a reasonable doubt and certainty on the balancing
of probabilities. For a general discussion of the concept of certainty, see Cross on Evidence (Cross and Tapper
1990, 145-159).
35 "The basic problem in negligence litigation is...that of limitation of liability, and no less than four
'control' or 'hedging' devices are employed with this single purpose in view: 'duty of care', 'remoteness of
damage', 'contributory negligence' and 'voluntary assumption of risk' (Fleming 1977, 104).
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manifested by these rules, or by being forced to refer to others as to what their
responsibilities in fact are), they are not capable of governing individual conduct in an
abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. It is, then, the content of these rules which are of
decisive importance for determining the form of society they are capable of supporting.
Suitably restricted, these rules play an essential role in limiting individuals' and groups'
spheres of responsibility and are therefore fundamental to the conduct governance
mechanisms which govern an abstract society. If they are not so restricted, they would
instead form the basis of a much more concrete type of order.
Now, what has all of this to do with MacCormick's discussion of whether a government
which rolls back programmes of distributive justice is responsible for the consequences of
this action and hence can be judged under the rules of justice? The answer to this is that this
is where MacCormick's second responsibility-attribution system comes into play. This is a
scenario which is not based on the mechanisms outlined above, but rather seems to be based
primarily on moral arguments of a different sort— as we shall see.
11. The relationship between justice attributions, conduct governance, and societal
types
I have already alluded to some of the questions for responsibility-attributions which arise
when government omissions lead to a perpetuation of economic inequalities. Turn now,
then, to a consideration of the possibility of attributing justice-judgments to the acts (rather
than the omissions) of a government associated with either rolling back policies of
distributive justice or the passing of legislation which facilitates the generation of market
order. Does the government in so acting assume responsibility for the justice of the
particular circumstances of particular individuals? In at least the first case, it seems that they
do. For such changes do affect particular individuals, and the government might know both
who they are and how they will be affected. But ask oneself the question: what notion of
responsibility-attribution underlies such a claim? Is it not one which imposes positive
obligations — duties to act — on the government? What, then, is the underlying form of
social relations which is presupposed by such an attribution?
What can be said quite clearly is that it is not one where individuals are acting on their
own judgment under the governance of rules. A governance structure under which
responsibility for the acts of individuals are attributed to a collective body and not to the
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individuals themselves (the argument itself presupposes that "[n]o such inequalities are nor
need be intended by any of the market's participants" (MacCormick 1989, 48), and in which
a central obligation lies on these collectives to followpositive rules of obligation, is not one
in which individuals guide their own conduct using shared and predominantly negative
abstract rules of conduct. Under this governance structure, responsibility for combinations
of individuals' actions is shifted from individuals to a collective body. The question that
must be raised, then, is whether this shift in responsibility-attribution is itself compatible
with the notion ofjustice in an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. In other words, does such
a shift undermine the notion of individual responsibility which in turn provides the
foundation for the notion of justice in a Gesellschaft-type society? Is there not, then, a
competition between differing notions of responsibility-attribution, and hence, a conflict
between different notions of justice? Indeed there is. The scenario that MacCormick
imagines is one predicated on shared positive rules of obligation. The question which must
be addressed, however, is whether the degree of commonality which underlies such
obligations exists in a Gesellschaft-type society, and whether such commonality being
implemented is compatible or not with the mechanisms which support such a society.
Thus, the degree of commonality that MacCormick assumes exists and underlies
judgments of justice would seem to be associated with Gemeinschaft-type societies, in
which positive obligations could play a greater role in issues of justice. Yet is it precisely
because of the difficulty of resolving disputes between different Gemeinschaften that the
form of justice associated with a Gesellschaft emerges as important. In such societies,
justice is primarily concerned with abstract commonality, and with supporting minimal
obligations through predominantly negative rules of conduct. To see the difficulties this
brings to MacCormick's position, imagine, as his scenario does, that some members of a
Gemeinschaft-type society attempt to transform its interactions to a more abstract,
Gesellschaft form. If this occurs, the issue ofjustice becomes problematic. A Gemeinschaft-
type society is governed by a notion of justice predicated on a higher degree of commonality
than would be the case in a Gesellschaft-type society. Which form of justice, then, is to be
used in judging whether or not the measures taken to support such a transformation are just?
If one resorts to a Gemeinschaft-type notion of justice, this presupposes the existence of a
higher degree of commonality between individuals than is present in an abstract society.
Presumably, if such commonality existed, it could be used to judge the justice of the
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transformation to a Gesellschaft-type. If, however, there are disagreements and a lack of
substantive commonality between individuals — as seems to be presupposed by the idea of
opposing factions, each supporting through their conduct their own ideal form of society—
then a more abstract form of justice must be resorted to if the notion of justice is to remain
intelligible. However, this move to a more abstract form of justice is a movement towards
the form which is associated with a Gesellschaft-type society, Thus, there is a move to a
Gesellschaft notion of justice in order to keep the notion of justice intelligible, and it is this
notion which is brought to bear on the issue of whether such a transformation is unjust.
MacCormick's argument implicitly presupposes that the changes which are being made are
commonly shared obligations between the members of society, and hence that they are
issues of justice. The questions which must be made explicit, however, are twofold. First,
what is the relationship between these positive obligations and the minimal requirements of
action and social life which, under the mechanisms which support the notion of justice, are
manifested primarily through predominantly prohibitive rules of conduct? Second, by what
mechanisms does MacCormick propose to support the positive obligations he values, and
what are the implications of the operation of these governance types for issues of conduct
governance more generally (such as its ability to support an abstract society, autonomous
action, diversity, etc.)?
In essence, a Gesellschaft form of justice is a reflection of a failure of concrete
commonality and of a lack of shared concrete goals. A concrete society's notion ofjustice is
thus in some senses a special case of the more general form underlying an abstract society
(i.e. it is the case where substantive commonality exists between all of its members). When
substantial commonality exists between members of a society, Gemeinschaft-type justice is
indeed a possibility. When such substantial commonality disappears, however, the only
form that can retain an intelligible meaning is the Gesellschaft form. This type of justice is
abstract and concerned primarily with supporting minimal obligations which are
predominantly negative.
The question, then, of whether such changes in policy can be held to be the responsibility
of the government, and hence can be judged to be unjust, is dependent on the notion of
responsibility-attribution and justice which underlies such an inquiry. If there are
substantive disagreements between the different Gemeinschaften of a society, the only form
ofjustice which can remain intelligible is abstract, Gesellschaft-type justice. The question of
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interest to this study in whether or not a government which abandons programmes of
distributive justice is itself committing an unjust act is not merely whether or not the state of
affairs of economic inequality is just or unjust but rather how we might choose to make it
different. The claim that states of affairs can be unjust even if no individual or group
violated a rule of justice implicitly assumes that conduct is separate from (and independent
of) states of affairs. That is, this claim simply ignores the mechanism by which such states
of affairs come into existence. It is sometimes argued, for example, that it can be
notoriously difficult to determine which individual's or group's conduct contributed to the
state of affairs coming into existence. But why should the fact that it might be impossible to
determine precisely who violated a rule ofjustice determine the justice or injustice of a state
of affairs? The answer to this is that unless some individual or group can be pointed to and
individual or group responsibility attributed, one is simply substituting individual
responsibility for collective responsibility. The question that remains unanswered, however,
is whether such a substitution is compatible with the mechanisms which support an abstract
society. The fact that individual or subgroup conduct cannot be pointed to merely skips over
this difficulty and assumes away the problem. But it does not go away. If the conduct of
particular individuals or groups which are at fault cannot be determined, are we not simply
assuming that some method other than abstract rules of conduct should be adopted? And are
these methods themselves compatible with the mechanisms of justice in an abstract,
Gesellschaft-type society?36 Unless individual spheres can be determined beforehand from
abstract rules, one cannot guide one's own conduct in such society. Thus, the argument for
collective responsibility leads to an undermining of individuals' abilities to act in a
decentralized way. This is, I think, the decisive issue.
Thus, the question of whether the government is responsible for the inequalities which
develop in a Gesellschaft-type society is replaced by a different question — should the
government be responsible for such inequalities and their rectification? This "should" —
this desire to resort to collective responsibility — must not ignore the fact that it is the
notions of responsibility and justice compatible with an abstract society which impose
36 It would seem, then, that MacCormick's argument can be criticized for ignoring the institutional aspects
which are essential for governing and resolving conflict in abstract societies — which is, in fact, an argument
made by MacCormick himself in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978, 123-124) in which he argues, in
essence, that moral notions lead to indeterminate results unless they are embedded in an institutional
environment. That I am focusing on institutional aspects which exist at an individual level, rather than at the
level of organizations, is of course one difference between our respective arguments.
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restrictions on the forms of action which can be considered just or unjust, and that the fact
that concrete individuals or groups cannot be blamed manifests the restrictions which are
implicit in responsibility-attribution in an abstract society. To answer the question of
whether the government should assume collective responsibility, an argument must be made
that there is such a responsibility upon some collective body, and that this responsibility is
compatible with the underlying form of social relations which govern a society where
individuals disagree on many substantive goals and values.37 I will consider just such an
argument in the concluding section which follows.
12. On the intelligibility of the concept of distributive justice
These final sections turn to a more detailed consideration of an issue raised by Macleod's
third question concerning Hayek's objections to the notion of distributive justice. This is the
question of its meaningfulness. Macleod and others have been concerned to deny Hayek's
claim that distributive justice is a meaningless concept, not merely an unrealizable ideal but
rather an unintelligible one.38 Though one might consider this argument to be of limited
relevance (as I do), it can quite usefully serve to spotlight certain aspects of the perspective
on conduct governance which this thesis adopts, and to emphasize the distance between this
perspective and others which are familiar in legal theory. Moreover, it does constitute one of
the recurring elements of objections to Hayek's critique of distributive justice and should,
therefore, be addressed.
37 My view is that this is the meaning behind Hayek's claim that the argument for the possibility of
distributive justice is a demand that "the members of society should organize themselves in a manner which
makes it possible to assign particular shares of the product of society to the different individuals or groups"
(Hayek 1976, 64). The central moral question to Hayek, then, is "whether there exists a moral duty to submit to a
power [i.e. governmental institutions] which can co-ordinate the efforts of the members of society with the aim
of achieving a particular pattern of distribution regarded as just" (Hayek 1976, 64). If the "existence of such a
power is taken for granted, the question of how the available means for the satisfaction of needs ought to be
shared becomes indeed a question ofjustice" (Hayek 1976, 64). To Hayek, the possibility of such power existing
is not the issue. Rather, the question is whether such a power should exist. His argument is that it should not. The
question of interest to Hayek, therefore, is "whether it is moral that men be subjected to the powers of direction
that would have to be exercised in order that the benefits derived by the individuals could meaningfully be
described as just or unjust" (Hayek 1976, 64), and not whether such direction is merely a possibility.
It might be added that Hayek also claims that the moral duty to submit to such power creates a feedback loop
which reinforces itself. That is, he argues that "the more dependent the position of the individuals or groups is
seen to become on the actions of government, the more they will insist that the government aim at some
recognizable scheme of distributive justice; and the more governments try to realize some preconceived pattern
of desirable distribution, the more they must subject the position of the different individuals and groups to their
control" (Hayek 1976, 68).
38 Spelled out in Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, The Mirage ofSocial Justice (1976, xi-xii, 62-100).
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There are two strands to the unintelligibility argument. First, it is argued that the
implementation mechanisms of distributive justice would be incompatible with the
mechanisms which subject individual conduct to the governance of rules and which support
an abstract, Gesellschaft-type society. I will return to this argument after considering its
close cousin: the argument that there are no rules of conduct governing distributive justice.
This claim is not merely that there are no commonly shared rules of conduct governing
distributive justice. Hayek's claim is a stronger claim than this. His argument is that
different individuals do not follow regularities which could be termed rules of distributive
justice, and hence that there are no rules whatsoever of distributive justice.39 On this view,
there are not only no rules of distributive justice shared across individuals, but there are also
no individual-specific rules which, though differing across individuals, govern conduct. This
is a broad and sweeping claim, and one that denies the very existence of rules of distributive
justice, be they objective or subjective. Under Hayek's notion of meaning, if someone refers
to something in which there is no regularity of meaning — implying that the concept cannot
be defined using rules (even individual-specific ones) — then that concept is not merely
context-dependent but also meaningless. It is, then, not merely that individuals know
situations governed by distributive justice when they encounter them in concrete situations,
but rather that they are using different classifications for each of these situations, and hence
they are not governed by the same classifications or the same meaning. If this is the case,
then distributive justice would be a meaningless concept, for there would be no
universalizable, consistent and coherent way of defining it — even to the individuals
themselves. This is, I believe, the criterion of meaningfulness that Hayek refers to when he
describes distributive justice as a meaningless ideal. If true, this would be an extremely
forceful criticism.40
Is there anything to this criticism of meaningfulness? Perhaps there is, for the reader
might recall that one notion of freedom — positive freedom — had a very similar difficulty.
39 As in Hayek (1976, 69-70), where he claims that social justice is a mirage because "the intuitive feeling of
indignation which we undeniably often experience in particular instances proved incapable of being justified by a
general rule such as the conception of justice demands". One must be careful to keep in mind that Hayek is
arguing that "there are no conceivable rules of just individual conduct which would at the same time secure a
functioning order" (Hayek 1976, 69-70), and not merely that distributive justice has no meaning in any type of
social system. Hayek's argument, then, is that the ideal of social justice is incompatible with certain forms of
conduct governance. In other words, his claim is that "no system of rules of just individual conduct, and
therefore no free action of the individuals, could produce results satisfying any principle of distributive justice"
(Hayek 1976, 69-70).
40 Which might also explain why Hayek chose to refer to the notion of social justice as a "mirage".
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This notion turned out to be impossible to universalize because one could not formulate a
general rule which could define positive freedom in all situations in the same way for all
individuals. In other words, while some individuals might be free under this definition,
others would, by the same definition, be unfree. This contradiction within the definition
arises because of the possibility of conflict engendered by the positive nature of the
definition. Under this definition, then, two individuals can be free in theory to perform an
action and yet it would be impossible in practice for both of them to simultaneously perform
that act. This tension between theory and practice implies that in concrete cases it might be
impossible to say who is free and who is not under this definition.41 There are at least three
possible solutions. First, one might turn the definition of freedom into a matter of degree.
Thus, individuals could be free to certain degrees, and unfree to others. Whether this
addresses the question of whether individuals are free to perform particular actions is,
however, doubtful. Second, one might attempt to define all of the circumstances in which
conflicts between the same rule might occur and to define who is free and who is not for
each particular set of circumstances. This, unfortunately, does not resolve the underlying
difficulty, for if each party to a conflict satisfies the same criteria, who then is free? Third,
one might be willing to say that both are free in theory but not in practice. The question this
raises, however, is the intelligibility of a concept of freedom which engenders such
contradictions in its application. This "solution" would entail that in practice the application
of this notion of freedom would depend upon the particular choices of the particular
observer. This is, then, a "solution" which builds in subjectivity at its very foundations.
The question which all of this raises for notions of distributive justice which are based on
positive rules of conduct is whether such subjectivity necessarily implies that there are no
rules of conduct governing distributive justice, including those which differ across
individuals but which are nevertheless regular in their conduct. This brings us back to
Hayek's first objection: that the governance mechanisms of distributive justice are
incompatible with the mechanisms which subject individual conduct to the governance of
abstract rules. Why would this argument be important in determining the intelligibility of
distributive justice?
41 Unless, of course, one defined all of the circumstances in which conflicts between the same rule might
occur and the manner of resolution in such circumstances. Unfortunately, this does not resolve the difficulty, for
if both parties to the conflict satisfy the same criteria, what then is to be done?
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The answer to this depends upon two crucial qualifications which underlie the discussion
that follows. The first qualification is that Hayek's arguments are applicable only if the
minimal conditions for action and social life are fulfilled. As has been argued in the
previous chapter, the notion of freedom and that of justice presuppose that these minimal
conditions have, in general, been fulfilled. This is an important qualification, for arguments
concerning distributive justice can consist of two strands of thought.42 First, there is the
strand which focuses on the obligation upon members of a particular society to ensure that
the minimal conditions for action and social life are fulfilled for each and every member.
This is a strand of thought which Hayek (and I) would support, though it might be argued
that Hayek would not consider such obligations to be a matter ofjustice, but rather a matter
of the pre-conditions for the existence of justice attributions. Be that as it may, this strand
differs from a second thread, which emphasizes the distribution of that which is based upon
minimal conditions which have already been fulfilled. This is the type of distributive justice
which is the focus of Hayek's criticisms.
The second qualification which must be made is that Hayek's arguments concerning
distributive justice presuppose a certain type of environment in which they operate. Hayek's
arguments are implicitly conditioned upon forms of distributive justice which operate in
complex societies. This brings us back to the perspective which underlies this thesis. This
thesis has adopted a notion of rules and rule-following which leads one to examine the
implications for the performance of individuals in their day to day conduct. The emphasis of
the work has been upon how individuals strive to integrate their conduct in such a way as to
produce regularity. The argument of the work is that regularity of conduct comes about
because individuals are governed by certain mechanisms which allow for the integration of
conduct. In effect, these mechanisms form the foundation for governance by abstract rules
of conduct. The crucial issue from this point of view is how certain states of affairs are
brought about — and this is where arguments of distributive justice come under
examination. Many of these notions are based on the idea that certain states of affairs are
unacceptable. This in itself is not objectionable, but when performance is demanded to
eliminate these states of affairs, it becomes of some interest to ask how such states will be
eliminated. An even more pertinent question refers to the governance properties of the rules
42 It should be stressed that this is a simplification for the purposes of emphasis only, and that many notions
of distributive justice emphasize both of these aspects at the same time.
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of conduct which individuals must adopt in order to ensure that notions of distributive
justice are realized. This leads to what is probably the most important question in this vein:
whether there are in fact any rules of conduct which individuals could follow which would
implement ideals of distributive justice, and at the same time sustain the complexity and
regularity required by social life in the society in which they are embedded.
In my view, the answer to this question hinges upon the type of society — the type of
environment— to which one applies such judgments. I would be the last to deny that there
could, and do, exist regularities of conduct manifesting the notion of distributive justice
within concrete groups. It is important to acknowledge this, and to point out that Hayek's
argument, if extended into this realm, is probably incorrect. If Hayek's argument is taken to
mean that the notion of distributive justice is meaningless in such spheres, then it can (and
should) be argued that this is, at the least, not obvious, and that it is, in my view, simply
wrong. I would contend, then, that distributive justice is a meaningful ideal within such
concrete groups. The question of interest from the point of view of this discussion, however,
is whether such regularities can be extended into wider society, and in particular into
complex abstract societies in which an individual might find oneself. I would argue that
there are a couple of factors which go against this. First, and probably most important, is the
fact that many notions of distributive justice refer to system-wide qualities which are not
within the scope of knowledge of individuals guiding their own conduct by following
abstract rules. As well, such qualities are fundamentally relative, depending upon the
relative rank of different individuals within some set of aspects which acts as the criterion
upon which judgments of distributive justice are made. For such judgments to be made at
all, there must be a substantial abstraction which narrows down this set of aspects to a
"manageable" level. It is sometimes forgotten, for example, how abstract the concept of
"income" is — yet it represents a substantial reduction of complexity from the myriad of
different particulars which contribute to its definition. It is the systemic nature of some
conceptions of distributive justice, flowing from the inherently relative nature of
distributive justice, which makes its implementation, through abstract rules of conduct
which presuppose autonomy, seem quite unlikely.
The second factor arguing against the extension of certain forms of distributive justice to
complex societies is that certain forms presuppose the existence of systems of positive rules
which are capable of implementing their notion of distributive justice, while at the same
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time supporting the social structure of a complex, abstract, society. The difficulties
surrounding governance by positive rules have been outlined throughout the work, but at
this point it is probably sufficient to say that their increasing levels of concreteness in
situations of increasing complexity, combined with the knowledge requirements of system-
wide definitions, makes them acceptable as methods of governance only in relatively
familiar concrete situations which are not overly complex.
The essential point, then, is to make a clear distinction between the types of
environments to which one is referring when discussing the notion of distributive justice. In
situations of social complexity, a Hayekian would argue that both of these points imply that
there might in fact be no rules — in the sense of individual-level autonomous performative
regularities— of distributive justice at all. What this means is that in such environments it
may not be possible for individuals to simultaneously act regularly, under their own
judgment, and to follow rules of conduct which allow for distributive justice to emerge as a
result. Note that this notion of rules is distinctly different from one which views rules
merely as articulations or as concepts which are disconnected from conduct. The notion of
rules which leads one to argue that there are no rules of distributive justice is a vision which
views rules from a performative perspective. If a "rule" of conduct cannot produce
regularity of conduct — if a rule cannot be applied by individuals with regularity in
circumstances which can be recognized as being subject to rules (including unarticulated
rules), if a rule builds in a resort to subjectivity and arbitrary judgment based on individual-
specific details, in what sense can these "rules" of conduct be termed rules? The answer is:
in a conceptual sense, as "abstract" expressions, and as hypothetical normative
conceptualizations. Each of these has, however, disconnected rules from regularized
performance.
From the point of view of this thesis, the important question is whether or not a rule is
capable of engendering regularity in a particular type of environment. The interests of this
thesis lead it to focus on the preconditions of regularity where individuals are directing their
own conduct and where they are confronted with situations of complexity. All of this has
implications for views of rule-governance which espouse the creation of articulated rules.
Some questions which arise when one creates rules include (a) whether these rules mesh
with ongoing rules of conduct and hence enhance or undermine regularity, (b) whether the
degree of particularity of these rules is such that regularity is promoted in situations of
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complexity, and (c) whether these rules impose positive obligations which are abstract
enough to allow for adjustments to complexity and yet which are specific enough to allow
for autonomous action. The underlying issue, therefore, is whether a system of rules of
conduct is up to the task of supporting the type of social environment which underlies the
argument for its adoption.
13. Conclusion
One might well be wondering whether this argument comprehends the notion of
distributive justice at all. Surely, it may be argued, such a notion presupposes positive
obligations and hence is not going to be based on the same mechanisms as those which filter
particularity and positivity in an attempt to subject individual conduct to the governance of
rules. On such a view, there is nothing objectionable to establishing collective organizations
which put into practice the concept of distributive justice. Up to a point, I would agree, and
would argue that Hayek is mistaken if he argues that such collective efforts do not represent
implementations of distributive justice. There is nothing in the theory of this work which
would preclude the implementation of notions of distributive justice through organizations
based on positive rules of detailed particularity so long as these organizations were based on
the substantive agreement of individuals on at least the abstract aspects of what they
considered to be their notion of distributive justice. If (a) these organizations operate on a
foundation of substantive agreement, and if (b) they act in such a way that they do not come
into conflict with the mechanisms supporting the principle of the Rule of Law, there is no
difficulty with implementing such measures. As I have stated previously, the only point at
which a notion of distributive justice runs into difficulties under a Hayekian view is when it
conflicts with the mechanisms supporting the principle of the Rule of Law. If there is no
conflict between short-term, more particularistic goals and more long-term values and
obligations, then there will be no incompatibility between whatever individuals term
distributive justice and the principle of the Rule of Law. The difficulties arise when
conditions (a) or (b) are not satisfied. If there is not substantive agreement on at least the
general principles to be followed (implying an abstract agreement on positive principles),
some individuals could end up coercing others. This is where the conflict with the principle
of the Rule of Law emerges, and this is where the problems begin.
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While it might seem like a small price to pay that a small number are coerced while a
greater number are benefited, the difficulty that such conflicts reveal is much more
significant than merely one of trade-offs between coercion and benefits. The difficulty with
coercive measures is that once mechanisms which are based on implementing particularistic
rules are established, there is the potential (but not the certainty) that the substantive goals
of distributive justice can be supplanted by other substantive goals. The mechanisms which
support a Gesellschaft-type society are indiscriminate in their filtering out of particularity
(and the positive rules which are associated with this) because there typically exists no
objective criterion by which to consider such substantivity. Thus, the indiscriminate filtering
of these rules is based on the need to exclude as a rale all forms of particularity and
positivity. These mechanisms work on the premise that it is not simply a question of
whether such mechanisms are in "good" hands or "bad" hands which is of decisive
importance. Rather, the fundamental question is whether there should be arty rules of this
sort allowed to exist and govern the social conduct of all individuals. The implicit
assumption of this view seems to be that what is required is an all-or-nothing exclusion of
such society-wide substantivity, for any attempt to incorporate it into the governance
mechanisms of a Gesellschaft-Xype society would lead to a situation where substantive ends
("good" or "bad") might be imposed on individuals contrary to their own substantive goals.
This argument, then, is based on an explicit admission of ignorance in ranking conflicts
between substantive goals insofar as they do not conflict with the abstract and
predominantly negative rules of conduct which provide the foundations for a complex,
abstract society. These conflicts between substantive goals cannot be resolved in a way that
is objective, and it is for this reason that they are filtered out by the legal mechanisms which
govern a complex, abstract society.
The question from a Hayekian perspective is not, therefore, whether there can be some
body or organization established which acts in a regular way and which implements
something which is termed "distributive justice". This is obviously a possibility. But rather
the question is whether this implementation of "distributive justice" agrees with individuals'
abstract notions of distributive justice. An additional question is raised when one considers
the governance properties of the mechanisms used to produce this "distributive justice" raise
yet another. Do these mechanisms undermine the ability of individuals to act autonomously
and to adjust to complexity by following their own plans of action? Do these mechanisms
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coerce individuals by imposing the substantive goals of some over the substantive goals of
others? And how are coercive "impositions" to be distinguished from positive rule-based
implementations of the common minimal conditions required by social interaction?
These issues represent fundamental problems for which I believe there are no easy
answers. Substantivity is necessary to fill in the content required by systems of positive
rules which aim at implementing some of the minimal necessary conditions for social life,
yet substantivity is filtered out by legal mechanisms which strive for decentralized conduct
governance by abstract and predominantly negative rules. Legal mechanisms in effect
operate on the assumption that the minimal conditions for social interaction have already
been fulfilled, and hence they work to exclude particularity and substantivity from social
governance. Legal mechanisms, then, are geared towards excluding particular forms of
governance. If, however, these forms of governance are allowed to enter the legal sphere
and are not filtered out (for whatever reason), legal mechanisms do a poor job of filtering
out the particular concretes required and presupposed by these governance forms.
The argument that legal mechanisms are capable of supporting shared obligations and
values which entail positive rules of conduct is, in my view, based on an oversight into the
effect of complexity on these rule-systems. The particularity of these rules, and the nature of
positive rules which require evaluations to be made of the relative positions of individuals
(under some set of classifications) are the very properties which, for the most part, exclude
these rules from passing through legal mechanisms. And yet some of the obligations are
crucial to the existence of social interaction for some individuals and, indeed, to the
existence of individuals at all. Legal mechanisms can allow substantivity of certain forms to
pass through, but the difficulty remains that once substantivity is allowed to enter, it
becomes possible for particular substantive ends to be, in effect, hijacked by the particular
interests of particular groups and used for their own particular ends.
All of this points to the importance of distinguishing which substantivity should be
allowed to pass through legal filters, and which should be filtered out. It is not the goal of
this particular chapter, nor of this thesis, to delve into this issue, except to say that there are
certain minimal conditions which must be met by all individuals, and which, in certain
cases, some individuals are not able by their own efforts to meet. This becomes of even
more pressing concern as the complexity of society increases, for one's growing inter¬
dependence on others implies that few individuals are able, on their own, to satisfy these
minimal conditions. In my view, this provides one of the most compelling arguments for the
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forms of distributive justice which strive to ensure that these minimal conditions are met for
all members of society. But where the line is to be drawn between minimal conditions, and
the goals which build upon these, is the subject of another, much more detailed, study which
shall not be undertaken here.
CHAPTER NINE
The Foundations of Conduct Regularity
Rules of conduct, neural networks and the systemic nature of
mind
1. Introduction
That which is most familiar is often least understood. This will be, perhaps, the central
argument of this chapter. Consider abstraction. This familiar, everyday activity is performed
by most individuals, yet the question is — how does it take place? How do we abstract? Or
consider what it means to know something. How is this done? Is it as simple as it seems
from our internal perspective? Or consider conduct regularity. This phenomenon, familiar in
all of our lives, would be considered a most remarkable thing if it were not so
commonplace. The same applies to morality, language, and reasoning. How is it that we
come to have moral concepts? Or the ability to use language? Or to be able to think and
reason?
This chapter turns to an investigation of the commonplace, in an attempt to show that
what is common in practice is actually much more complex in principle. The justification
for such a turn in the thesis rests on the insight that the difficulties that traditional legal
theory encounters stem from a common cause — a lack of understanding of the foundations
upon which all legal theory rests.
Consider the Hartian positivist legal enterprise. This is a theory which represents law as
resting upon a foundation of authority and conduct regularity. Hartian positivists look to see
if these exist as "social facts", yet they consistently fail to examine the foundations of such
"facts". It is as if these thinkers simply assume that there is no relationship between these
so-called "facts" and the foundations upon which they rest. This blindness to the
foundations of authority and conduct regularity can lead one into strange territory. The
previous chapters have argued that the implicit view of these thinkers seems to be that
"authority" is necessary for social order. If this is so (and it is at least plausible), why is
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there no investigation into the mechanisms generating and supporting authority — not at a
particularistic, historical level, but rather from a more theoretical perspective?1
This lack of interest in mechanisms which generate and support regularity, which
provides the basis for the social phenomena of "authority", is perhaps matched only by an
even more comprehensive lack of insight at the individual level. At this level, "facts"
abound — individuals are presumed to be able to think, to follow rules, to articulate, to have
values, etc. — and yet there is short shrift given to the foundations of these remarkable
activities. What is it that allows individuals to be able to follow rules? To think? To reason?
And might these be inter-related?
Now, one might be tempted to argue that the solution to these problems at the individual
level lies in the concept of "socialization". Individuals, so the argument goes, are socialized
into pre-existing patterns of behaviour by the individuals that surround them. But what
exactly does this explain? Does it explain how individuals come to absorb these pre-existing
constructs? Does it explain how they are capable of absorbing and retaining them? And
does it explain where these "pre-existing" constructs come from? It is as if one tried to
explain the growth of a tree by pointing to the soil and saying "this pre-exists the tree, and
the tree grows from it". The question, however, is how this takes place.
All of this relates to the persistent concern of this thesis with the foundations of social
regularity. This thesis, in common with most other studies in legal theory, has simply
presupposed the existence of rules of conduct, morality, reasoning, abstraction and the like
— yet one of the most telling criticisms of alternative views of legal theory is that they do
not understand or investigate their own foundations. It would be disingenuous to claim that
by ignoring the foundations of conduct regularity, other studies have simply presupposed
that certain concepts and abilities exist, while at the same time committing exactly the same
methodological error.
1 As was discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the argument is not that positivists have no interest in
investigating the nature of authority, for much of their enterprise is explicitly concerned with investigations into
authority — what it is, how it operates, etc.. But these are different questions from the concerns of this work.
Positivist theoreticians do focus on the nature of authority, but their investigations are limited by their implicit
assumption that the existence (or lack of existence) of authority is a matter of "social fact". Positivist
investigations take place under this implicit presupposition. This study, on the other hand, turns to an
examination of the foundations of this "social fact", and in essence asks the question of how this "social fact"
could have come into existence. In other words, this study makes a question of how it could be the case that
authority could exist, and does not limit itself to the question of how authority operates once it is assumed to
exist.
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This study has no intention of committing the same error. This thesis has argued that
many of the mistakes of legal theory, and in particular, of the positivist school of thought,
can be traced back to the single fundamental error of not taking into account the foundations
upon which all legal theorizing rests. This chapter represents an attempt to introduce these
foundations.
But what, then, are the foundations of this work? Consider what this thesis has tried to
achieve. Previous chapters have investigated the foundations of rules of conduct. They have
argued that these rules are generated by filtering mechanisms which act as selection
processes over individual conduct. The argument has been, then, that regularity in human
conduct comes in large part from within individuals, and that the mechanisms which
generate and sustain this regularity have an important role to play at the individual level. In
this vein, it has been argued that legal theory should pay more attention to the generation
and preservation of individual-level regularity in conduct, and that proportionally less
emphasis should be put on issues of authority and the conscious and deliberate application
of articulated rules. This argument is in turn based on the idea that the application of
authoritative articulated rules itself presupposes the existence of regularity in conduct, the
sources of which typically go unexamined.
By adopting a different focus one can also see that this argument as to the foundations of
legal theorizing also flows from the different notions of rules and rule-following which
underlie each approach. On the one hand there are theories which emphasize issues of
authority, with an emphasis placed on authorized articulated rules and their deliberate
creation and application. These are theories which stress an externalized notion of authority,
under which articulated rules are "applied" by some individuals to the conduct of others.
The theory of this thesis, on the other hand, emphasizes rules of conduct as they are
manifested in conduct. Such rules are not necessarily the product of deliberate design, nor
are they necessarily articulated or consciously applied. Moreover, such rules need not
presuppose the existence of an externalized authority under which certain authorized
individuals "apply" authoritative rules to the conduct of others. This thesis, then,
emphasizes the role, importance and source of regularities of conduct. On this view, the
term "rules" applies, in large part, to widespread performative regularities and to
articulations of these pre-existing regularities, while the phrase "to follow a rule" refers to
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the ability to manifest that regularity in one's conduct.2 This perspective on rules
emphasizes their performative aspects, and stresses that such rule-following is a widespread
phenomenon, and is not specifically restricted to the legal sphere.
2. What are the questions?
The questions which flow from all of this are twofold. First, where does regularity in
conduct come from? In other words, why is there regularity in conduct? Why not
irregularity? Second, how is this regularity generated and preserved? What are the
mechanisms which sustain regularity?
There are two levels which might be addressed in answering these questions. In the
general attempt to answer the "why", this work has sketched out the view that abstract rules
of conduct are adaptations to complexity. Moreover, it is the following of these rules which
allows for complexity to develop and extend over time and space. Moreover, the work has
argued that such rules provide the foundation for the moral notions which animate an
2 The distinction between rules which are viewed as articulations which are consciously known and obeyed,
and rules which are viewed as performative regularities which might not be articulated nor consciously followed,
is of crucial importance to this thesis. Consider, for example, the distinction between one's conceptual notion of
space-time and its performative cousin. Individuals can and do differ in their conscious and conceptual
knowledge of space-time. But, from the point of view of this thesis, what is essential is the performative notion
of space-time which manifests itself in their conduct. Thus, the notion of time is from the perspective of this
thesis manifested in what might be generally termed memory, while space is manifested in a variety of spatial
abilities. The performative notion of space-time underlying this thesis is made up of a variety of abilities and
activities which have evolved and which manifest themselves in individuals' conduct. The performative notion
of space-time underlying this work may, therefore, differ from or conflict with individuals' attempts to
conceptualize or articulate it.
This is a fundamental distinction, the importance of which cannot be overestimated. This chapter, and the
ones that came before it, focus on how individuals conduct themselves in space-time. This thesis claims that the
"notion" of space-time which underlies different individuals' conduct is similar across individuals. Put
differently, the argument is that it is the way in which an individual's performance relates to her/his environment
(i.e. their performative competence) which is similar across individuals (I suspect that this same degree of
similarity does not necessarily extend to the uses these competences are put towards, nor necessarily to
individuals' conceptualizations or articulations of these competences). The reasons for this performative
similarity are evolutionary. If the conduct of an individual relates to space-time in a substantially different way
from other individuals their survival prospects would be substantially diminished. If memory — relating to
events in the past, even to the immediate past — is substantially different for the notion underlying the conduct
of other individuals, (say, individuals remember objects and events which exist only in their minds), one's
actions can become detached from one's environment, and there is a danger that one's survival prospects might
be in jeopardy, depending, of course, on the degree and importance of any such detachment in determining one's
survival potential. The same would hold for a different notion of space, as manifested in conduct (say, one
continually grasped in the wrong place for various objects). This chapter and the work as a whole focuses on the
performative notion of space-time, and one's abilities reflect the implicit and often times unarticulated notion of
space-time individuals can typically act out but perhaps cannot articulate. It is, then, the common capacity of
individuals to relate to the spatial and temporal aspects of their environments to which this, and previous,
chapters are referring when discussing the "notion" of space and time.
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abstract and complex society. In particular, governance by commonly obeyed rules of
conduct which manifest themselves as that which regularly does not occur, provides the
foundation for objective judgments and hence for the possibility of objective justice.
Turning to the question of how regularity comes to exist, the general argument has been
made that various mechanisms exist to generate and support abstract rules of conduct.
Various chapters have emphasized that these filters on particularity operate both in
institutional settings (where the focus of attention is on articulated rules and their deliberate
creation and application) and at an individual level (where the focus is turned to
unarticulated rules and their manifestations in conduct).
This is not the end of the story, however, for there exist alternative answers to these
questions — answers which in an important way provide the foundations for these
questions. This chapter, then, takes the answers to the questions of the "how" and the "why"
of conduct regularity one step further. To do this, this chapter turns to a theoretical
examination of how regularity comes to exist in the very structure of mind itself, how minds
abstract, how reasoning, morality and language come to be embedded in individual conduct.
It is to these issues that this chapter turns its attention.
To answer these questions, this chapter takes a journey into the challenging territory
occupied by the philosophy of mind, and examines one school of thought among the many
that make a claim to our attention: the neurophilosophical3 point of view. After spelling out
why it is that this perspective is the focus of this chapter, I turn to two inter-related tasks.
The first of these is to outline a neurophilosophical theory of mind which could serve as the
basis of the thesis here presented. The goal will be to provide the outlines of the foundations
for conduct regularity in its many and varied manifestations (including thought, language,
etc.). This theory will draw upon aspects of Hayek's work in this area, but it will not be
restricted exclusively to his insights. The chapter's second goal is to investigate some of the
implications of this theory of mind for the thesis in hand. It should be stressed at the
beginning that my discussion will be quite a general one, with this chapter providing
nothing more than a sketch of the rough outlines of a Hayekian perspective on the
foundations of conduct regularity. This chapter, then, represents the provisional beginnings
of a new line of investigation for legal theory.
3 A term i believe was introduced by p.S. Churchland (1986).
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One further qualification on this study should be noted at the outset. This chapter is in
some senses independent of the chapters that have gone before it, in that the arguments and
conclusions of earlier chapters are not necessarily predicated upon one adopting the
neurophilosophical approach of this chapter. Though this chapter provides one possible
foundation to the investigations of previous chapters, this is not necessarily the only
foundation which is compatible with the arguments there presented. One should keep in
mind, then, that if one rejects the approach of this chapter, one is only rejecting one possible
explanation for the foundations of conduct regularity, and that such a rejection does not
imply that the analyses of previous chapters must be abandoned as well.
3. Why adopt a neurophilosophical approach to mind?
The theory of mind to which this chapter refers is often termed the materialist
perspective on mind, although it is probably more accurately called the nenrophysiological
or neurophilosophical theory of mind. This approach, though speculative, is a familiar one
in psychological, cognitive science, and philosophical circles, and is characterized by being
based on a large body of empirical and theoretical work in physiological psychology, such
as that which is summarized in standard textbooks,4 and popularized in many recent books.5
The investigations of this chapter into the theory of mind will rely on an approach very
similar to the ones spelled out in these works, although it will not go into any level of
physiological detail. Instead, the approach is similar to one introduced by a pioneer in the
neurophysiology of mind literature — F.A. Hayek. The chapter focuses, then, on general
issues and their implications, and tries to provide an overview of some of the issues which
might be of some interest to legal theory and the study of conduct regularity and conflict-
resolution.
The main reason for adopting a theory of mind, and in particular, one having a
neurophysiological perspective, flows from its importance to the enterprise undertaken in
this work. That such an approach is important was also recognized by Hayek, and is
emphasized by his detailed and sustained investigations into the neurophysiological bases of
4 Such as Thompson (1967), Churchland and Sejnowski (1992), Rosenzweig, Leiman and Breedlove (1996)
and Kolb and Whishaw (1996).
5 Such as Hebb (1980), Searle (1984), P.M. Churchland (1988; 1995), Dennett (1992), Edelman (1992),
Flanagan (1992), Humphrey (1992) and Damasio (1994).
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mind.6 Hayek's theorizing is intimately intertwined with and fundamentally dependent upon
such a theory of mind. Moreover, Hayek's focus on the restrictions imposed on mind by its
existence in space and time, his emphasis on performative knowledge, and his stress on the
restrictions that each of these imposes on conduct governance mechanisms simply cannot be
properly understood without at least a minimal understanding of the theory of mind which
underlies them.7
Much of this thesis is in a similar manner dependent upon an underlying theory of mind.
Though I have pointed out above that the reader does not have to adopt the particular
approach outlined in this chapter for the previous chapters to "make sense", it would be
difficult to understand the choice of emphasis in this work without some understanding on
why certain aspects (such as those relating to performative knowledge, and the restrictions
on knowledge imposed by existence in a particular space and time) have been investigated
in intimate detail while others have been granted only a cursory glance. Moreover, it would
be difficult to understand the basis for many of the claims of this work without simply
presupposing the possibility of a more fundamental basis for conduct regularity. The
decision to emphasize mechanisms of conduct governance is based upon an interest in
investigating their relationship to and compatibility with the mechanisms constituting mind.
At its foundation, this thesis represents a sustained investigation into the mechanisms of
abstraction which are the source of rules of conduct which generate and sustain order, both
for individuals and for society more generally.
This being said, I should stress once again that the chapter is not so much interested in
the particulars of a Hayekian theory as in outlining its general themes, and in outlining its
relevance to legal theory and to the chapters which have preceded this one.8 There are two
6 These investigations are found in works such as The Counter-Resolution ofScience: Studies on the Abuse
ofReason (Hayek 1979a) and in particular, the section "Scientism and the Study of Society"; Individualism and
Economic Order (Hayek 1948), especially "The Facts of the Social Sciences"; The Sensory Order: An Inquiry
into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology (Hayek 1952); The Constitution of Liberty, especially Part I;
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Hayek 1967), especially "Degrees of Explanation", "The Theory
of Complex Phenomena", "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility", and "Notes on the Evolution of Systems of
Rules of Conduct"; Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek 1973; 1976; 1979), including all three volumes; New
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Hayek 1978), in particular "The Errors of
Constructivism", "The Primacy of the Abstract", and "The Confusion of Language in Political Thought"; and
finally, The Fatal Conceit (Hayek 1988), especially chapters one to six.
7 A point emphasized in Gray (1986), in his insightful discussion of Hayek's notion of mind.
8 For instance, I do not focus on what might be considered to be the errors in Hayek's analysis, such as his
stress on the "equipotential" nature of mind, when it is a commonplace of contemporary neuropsychology that
some neural networks do in fact seem to be associated with particular activities of mind (Kolb and Whishaw
1996, 551-553), nor do I view some of the philosophical implications Hayek draws from his theory of mind
(Hayek 1952, 165-194) as being necessarily pertinent to this thesis or even necessarily correct.
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themes in particular which deserve special emphasis. First is the idea that mind is a
mechanism of classification, a sphere within which expectations are generated and run
through a process of selection for their compatibility with their environment and with the
other ongoing processes and anticipations of mind. On this view, mind is an anticipation
mechanism.9 Such anticipations are intimately related to conduct in that potential paths of
action are "tested out" in the expectational sphere before manifesting themselves as
actualized performance. This has obvious implications for legal theory, as has been argued
in earlier chapters.
Second is the idea that mind operates as an interconnected system.10 This integrative
approach is important for a number of reasons. First, it emphasizes the dependence of mind
upon its environment. In particular, this implies that under our neurophysiological theory of
mind, the activities of the body — which are a part of mind's environment — are essential
in contributing to the nature of mind. As will be outlined below, the Hayekian view is that
mind is the activities of the central nervous system (as manifested in interconnected
networks of neurons) which are built up by the interaction between this system and their
environment. An integrative approach implies that these activities cannot simply be
detached from their environment, but rather that the environment is fundamentally
intertwined with the existence, configuration, and weighting of the interconnected neural
networks constituting mind. This point serves to emphasize the interactive nature of mind
and its environment, and reinforces the point that the expectations of individuals are
critically dependent on interaction with, and reinforcement from, their environments.11
Another aspect of this integrative approach is that such a view rejects approaches which
attempt to divide mind into separated, compartmentalized systems which do not interact.
9 See Dennett's similar argument that brains are "anticipation machines" (1992, 177).
10 This theme rests upon two implicit assumptions which bear mentioning. The first is what is typically
called the brain hypothesis, which is the view that "the brain is the source of behavior" (Kolb and Whishaw
1996, 3). The second assumption is similar, and relates to the nature of systemic quality of mind. This is the idea
that mind operates as an inter-connected system of neural networks, which are in turn comprised of individual
neurons connected in a variety of ways. While works in neurophilosophy typically adopt what is sometimes
called the neuron hypothesis, which states that the basic building block of neurophysiological theory is the
neuron (Kolb and Whishaw 1996, 3), or less frequently, what might be called a neural network hypothesis (under
which the basic building blocks are networks of interconnected neurons), this is not sufficient for investigations
of mind as examined in this thesis. Instead, what is required is an emphasis on the holistic nature of mind, and
the fact that neurons and neural networks lead to the constitution of mind only in their interactions, both with
each other and with the environment external to the organism.
11 Both from the point of view of the more limited time-span of an individual's life-span, and a more
encompassing perspective, which takes into account the effects of the interaction between organisms and their
environment from a species level over more extended periods of time.
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The perspective of this thesis, however, stresses the interrelationship and fundamental
dependencies between the various systems of mind, and emphasizes the integrated nature of
sensory, motor, linguistic, spatial, emotional, rational, conceptual, and other processes
ongoing within mind.12 Each of these processes has a role to play within mind, and the
effects of each process often depend upon the effects of other ongoing processes of mind.
Moreover, a systemic perspective emphasizes the idea that in their abstract structure the
processes of mind differ more by degree than they do by type. The various processes of
mind — sensory, emotional, rational, conceptual, to list but a few — are based upon the
same types of activities.13 Between these processes, the activities that occur differ more by
matters of degree than by matters of type. All of the processes of mind are viewed as being
based on the interaction between the activation of neural networks by events in the
environment and activities pre-existing within these same networks.
Traditional legal theory could benefit from these insights, for theories such as positivism
which presume a top-down imposition of authority often underestimate, if not totally ignore,
the fundamental inter-relationship between the expectations of some individuals and the
conduct of others (whose actions, in part, constitute the environment of these individuals).
In this vein, positivist legal theory could be called into question for its emphasis on the
separation between fact and value, when what should be stressed is their essential
interdependence via interaction and feedback.
4. The Hayekian theory ofmind
The Hayekian theory of mind to be discussed in this chapter is based in large part on the
extension of certain themes present in the work of F. A. Hayek. Hayek's work on the theory
of mind was an ongoing project throughout his life, but his most definitive statement of it
was presented in 1952 in his somewhat misleadingly titled The Sensory Order: An Inquiry
into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology. Though the title of the work focuses
attention on the sensory order of mind, this is not in fact the focal point of the book. Rather,
Hayek's goal in the book was to set out the framework for a neurophysiological theory of
mind. The Sensory Order, then, represents an extended investigation into the theory of, and
12 This is a point which is receives particular emphasis in Hayek (1952), Hebb (1949; 1972; 1980), Dennett
(1992), Edelman (1992), Humphrey (1992), and Damasio (1994).
13 A theme emphasized by Hayek (1952, 147).
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processes underlying, mind, and it is from some of the themes present in this work that this
chapter draws its inspiration.
A Hayekian theory of mind is based upon three essential ideas. First, it emphasizes an
activities perspective on mind, and stresses the relational nature of these activities and the
interconnectivity of the various activities of mind. Second, it is a theory of the growth and
activities of, and interactions between, biological neural networks.14 Third, it is based upon
the idea of the feedback-based evolutionary selection ofexpectations which are instantiated
in enduring systems of neural network activity.
The activities perspective on mind is perhaps the dominant theme in Hayek's work on
mind. This is the idea that the activities of the central nervous system are identical to the
activities of the mind. In other words, and to put it crudely, the central and probably most
important thesis of this work is its implicit argument that mind is what brain does. In other
words, a human mind is the set of activities of the human nervous system and in particular,
the central nervous system as manifested in the brain. This theory, then, assumes mind— as
a system of activities — exists in space and time. It is in this sense that mind has
"substance"; in other words, the fact that activities take place in space and over time is what
gives mind whatever "substance" it has. The "substance" of mind, then, is made up of
activities.
Now, it is of some importance to keep in mind that these activities are interconnected.
An activity will perform a different task depending upon its connection to other particular
activities. In this sense, then, mind is relational in that its activities and their particular
connections to each other are of decisive importance in determining their effects.15
Furthermore, it is the interaction between activities which determines how these activities
will function within a particular mind. Activities are in this sense dependent on their
environment within mind. They are also, however, dependent upon their connection with
various aspects of the environment external to mind. In this sense, then, mind cannot be
broken down into component parts unless there is some method of reintegrating these parts
into a coherent whole, for such a reduction would exclude the relations between these
components and hence exclude an essential aspect of mind.
14 It should be noted that this is a term of relatively recent coinage (for example, Hebb's pioneering book
The Organization ofBehavior (1949) refers to a similar concept as "cell assemblies"). Hayek tends to refer to the
general systemic quality of neuronal connections, and not so much to the particular neural networks within this
more general system.
15 As stressed by Hebb (1949) and Hayek (1952, 52-53).
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Given that under a Hayekian theory, mind is composed of a variety of activities, what is
it about these activities that give mind its specific characteristics? And what is it about these
activities that provides the foundation for regularity in human conduct? The Hayekian view
is that the activities of mind replicate aspects of the external world through systems of
neural networks and the intensities associated with these networks. Thus, the connections
between events in the world external to mind are to some degree (and always imperfectly16)
reproduced within mind by classifications which are associated with weights that attached to
these particular aspects of the world. How, then, does this replication take place? The
general idea is that simultaneous events in the environment external to mind become
connected to (are capable of initiating the activities of) certain neural activities, and that
certain neural activities which occur simultaneously become connected, and hence in time
tend to occur simultaneously.17 In other words, the simultaneity of events external to mind
becomes replicated in the neural connections of mind when simultaneous external events
initiate simultaneous neural activities which then tend to become connected within mind.18
Thus, simultaneity in external events can lead to the formation of neural simultaneity
(which, when one adopts a system's perspective, form neural networks).19 Moreover, these
causal connections which are replicated to a degree within mind differ from causal
connections external to mind in that there are intensities (weights) attached to events and the
connections between them, with the weights depending on how the external events map onto
the ongoing processes of mind, which in turn depends upon both the quality and quantity of
the processes which enter into each aspect of the internal connections.
16 See Hayek (1952, 108-109) for some of the limitations which might exist on this process.
17 This is one of the most influential insights to be found in Donald Hebb's influential work, The
Organization ofBehavior (1949), a book which Hayek explicitly acknowledges as bearing a striking similarity to
his own. This notion of a relationship between causal and neural connectivity underlies much of the recent
literature on the neurophysiological mechanisms providing the foundations for memory and learning. For a
textbook introduction to this literature, see the corresponding topics in Rosenzweig, Leiman and Breedlove
(1996) and Churchland and Sejnowski (1992).
18 Note that this is merely the first stage in a cascade of connected simultaneous events, some of which
involve events within mind replicating other events within mind. The idea here is that some simultaneous neural
activity can be viewed as forming the environment for still other neural activity; thus, simultaneous events are in
this case replicated by neural connections, but these simultaneous events are themselves neural events. This
process can occur over and over again, resulting in what might be thought of as an enormously complex
"classification" of both the world external to an organism and aspects of its own neural mechanisms. It should be
clear, then, that on this view mind is not merely a "mirror" of the external world. Rather, it is also, to some
degree, a mirror of itself (in the sense that some neural networks replicate events which occur within mind, in the
sense of being a re-classification, and a re-re-classification, and so on to varying degrees of complexity).
19 This is also a dominant theme in the neurophysiological approach to ethology, as in Camhi (1984).
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It should be stressed that although this discussion focuses solely upon events which
occur, this does not imply that events which do not occur are of no importance. In fact, from
the point of view of this work as a whole, the lack of occurrence of simultaneous events are
of equal, if not, greater importance. The reason for this is that simultaneous events in the
environment external to mind which are reproduced within mind form the environment
within mind for events which are unfamiliar; hence, the creation and existence of
connections also at the same time forms the environment in which a mind registers what is
not familiar. Thus, while the replicated connections set the pattern for what is "normal", it
also sets the pattern for what is not normal, and hence for what is discordant with what is
typically taken to be the "norm".
Now, while the question of how these activities come to be joined together is an
interesting one, it is a matter of more physiological detail than I will examine within this
chapter. This is because the precise details of such a replication, while of great interest, are
for the purposes of this study of secondary importance. What is important, however, is the
insight that it might in some cases be possible for simultaneity in events external to mind to
be replicated by simultaneity within mind in the form of neural networks, however
connected.
The reason that this insight assumes such a great importance is its connection with
evolutionary arguments, both biological and cultural, and the origins and development of
mind. This thesis has viewed mind as an expectation-generating and fdtering mechanism.
The Hayekian view is that mind is a system in which various "expectations" (not necessarily
conscious), as manifested in the interaction between neural network activities, their
associated intensities, and their environments, are weeded out or reinforced by complex
evolutionary selection processes of feedback loops.20 This selection process over
expectations (anticipations) is an ongoing activity within mind, and represents a complex
interaction between the environment of an organism and the mechanisms of mind which
generate, reinforce and fdter out expectations.
Now, while this process works within the mind of single individuals, this is not the only
way to view this process. Instead, one can take a more inclusive perspective, and view the
evolution of groups of organisms evolving over time within their interconnected
20 This selectionist interpretation of mind has been developed by a number of authors, including (recently)
Daniel Dennett (1992; 1995) and Gerald Edelman (1992). For further references, see Dennett (1991, 184; 1995,
397).
The Foundations of Conduct Regularity • 346
environments, including social systems. The idea is that regularity ofmind evolved because
there was regularity (stability, persistence, and replicability) at a more micro-level, and that
this persistence came about because there was an evolved matching between the abilities
and needs of the organism and the environments in which they found themselves. The
regularity of mind is, then, a particular form of adaptation, in which the responses of the
organism to its external environment become increasingly complex through both the short-
term formation of individual- and environment-specific neural network growth which takes
place within a framework which has persisted over time and over the lifespans of many
individuals.
All of this is related to the theoretical concerns of this thesis. This entire work has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of taking a more interactive approach to legal theory.
It has stressed that regularities of conduct are grounded at an individual level, and that pre¬
existing cultural features must be integrated into individual conduct using mechanisms
which are capable of generating regularity of conduct. Finally, it has argued that the
implications of autonomous rule-following from an individual's perspective are often
overlooked by legal theorizing, and that there must be a more detailed consideration of the
inter-relationship between regularity at an individual level and the institutional forms whose
operation is often predicated upon the continued existence of such regularity.21
5. Implications of the model
This model, then, attempts to provide an explanation for the regularity in human conduct
which is presupposed by legal theory. On this model, individuals act on the basis of
weighted "maps" which replicate to some degree regularities which occur in their
environments (and within their own minds). These maps are constructed by connections
being formed between activities of mind, and are subjected to evolutionary selection for
their conformity with both the ongoing activities within a particular mind and with events
external to mind which initiate their own activities within mind.
What, then, is the importance of all of this? There are three aspects of primary interest.
First, the sections above have outlined a model of mind which is capable of replicating
elements of the simultaneous causality present in its environment. In other words, such a
21 As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, one can view Fuller's call for an interactionist interpretation
of law as being based upon this insight.
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model provides a framework under which individuals are capable of absorbing
environmental regularity, and of generating and sustaining regularities of conduct. Perhaps
the most important element which can be replicated is the performative-environment of a
developing individual, for this can provide a foundation for the transmission and persistence
of culture within individual minds. It can be argued that many of the elements of culture,
and many of the abstract rules of conduct which govern individuals' performance in their
day to day lives— such as those of language,22 morality,23 and reason24 — were at least in
part transmitted and embedded in individual minds in precisely this way.
This way of viewing mind stresses the inter-dependence between the growth ofmind and
the environment in which it was, and is, embedded. Moreover, the recognition of such an
inter-dependence allows one to gain an insight into two further aspects of mind which are
sometimes underemphasized by less interactive approaches. The first of these might be
termed the issue of perspective. The second of these flows from the insight that mind
embeds, to some extent, a weighted causal map of its environment25 This is in turn
intimately related to issues of closure.
6. The importance of acknowledging the existence of perspective
The above discussion pointed towards the importance of taking into account the
existence of individual perspectives and mechanisms which support their generation and
preservation. The neurophysiological theory presented in rough outlines above sketches out
one way in which such perspectives might develop. It is important to keep in mind that the
existence of perspective within this theoretical framework flows from the existence of
activities of mind in time and space (or, equivalently, and crudely, from the existence of the
22 For more on this, and the interaction between cultural and genetic evolution, see Boyd and Richerson
(1985), Pinker (1995) and Dennett (1992).
23 Kagan and Lamb's The Emergence of Morality in Young Children (1987) is a useful work for its
discussions of the growth of morality in children's early years. That morality is an evolutionary adaptation is a
theme that Hayek stressed more in his later writings, such as Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek 1973; 1976;
1979) and The Fatal Conceit (Hayek 1988).
24 For arguments of this kind, see, for example, Hayek (1979, 153-157; 1988), and, more generally, Millikan
(1984; 1993), though it should be noted that the latter directs most of her attention to the general argument that
reason and rationality are biological adaptations, and does not focus to such an extent on more specific analyses
of the methods of transmission of these adaptations (be they cultural or genetic or, as above, an essential
interaction and interplay of the two forms). One might also be pointed to Margaret Donaldson's Children's
Minds (1978), which stresses the importance of environmental context in reasoning, and highlights the
substantial development of the reasoning abilities of children's minds in their early years.
23 It should be pointed out that this also applies to sub-systems of mind, i.e. they embed a weighted map of
their environments, some of which might be other activities ofmind.
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activities of brains in space-time). In other words, it is the existence of these activities at
different points in space and time which provides the foundation for differences in
perspective. Now, one might think this an obvious point, but that would not in fact be the
case. Instead, its recognition, or lack thereof, has provided the basis for an ongoing debate
taking place within the school of the materialist philosophy of mind. This debate is
important for its illustration of two of the most persistent misunderstandings that one finds
both about and within the neurophilosophical approach to mind.
The debate in question is between two materialist theories of mind: the identity (or
reductive materialist) theory, and the functionalist theory. 26 The identity theory can be
viewed in its most basic form as arguing that mind is identical to brain. On this view, mind
is what brain is (and mind is assumed to be the particular "substances" of brain, implying
that mind is inseparably wedded to the particular "substances" making up the brain). On the
other hand, the theory of functionalism argues that mind is what brain does (implying that
so long as different "substances" can replicate the functioning of the brain, they too would
be considered minds). This theory of mind is in a sense closer to Hayek's own vision, for a
Hayekian theory argues that mind is a set of activities in a similar way to the functionalists.
There is, however, an important difference between functionalist and Hayekian perspectives
which must be pointed out.
The Hayekian perspective is that mind is a set of activities (crudely, the activities of
brain) which occur in time and space. This is an explicit assumption of the theory, and its
implications for a theory of mind are often misunderstood. One of these implications is that
mind always embodies a perspective. The reason for this is that mind exists in space and
time, and hence always knows from the perspective of that space-time (and hence, not from
others). One of the weaknesses of a functionalist approach is that this inherent perspectivism
is sometimes overlooked. Functionalism does not always acknowledge that the activities of
brain must take place in space and over time. This failure to keep in mind that activities
must manifest themselves in particular instantiations existing in time and space can lead to
some rather unfortunate conclusions.
This can be seen by pointing out one of the implications of a typical functionalist
argument. Functionalists argue that so long as one system can function in the same way as
another, they are in this respect the same system, and hence any system that can replicate
2^ For a simple overview of this position, see p.M. Churchland (1988, 26-42).
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the functions of mind would be a mind. The question that arises from this is as follows: to
where does one look to establish a comparison with a system which the functionalists refer
to as mind? Functionalists must be implicitly, if not explicitly, referring to minds which
exist in space-time when they set out the functions which other systems must replicate to be
equivalent to these minds. This is not always clearly acknowledged by functionalists.
Moreover, such an approach must, at least implicitly, presuppose the existence of an
environment in which these functions operate, and have operated, if one hopes to be able to
define these functions, and distinguish between the various capacities of mind and the roles
they play in adapting an organism to its environment.
This failure to acknowledge that the minds to which they are referring exist in time and
space can lead to some rather odd theoretical conclusions. A functionalist view that does not
acknowledge the space-time occurrence of activities can be forced into the position of
arguing that any isomorphic sets of functions are identical, and hence any set of activities
which could duplicate the functions of the brain would be minds. This is relatively
unproblematic. What would represent a problem would be the further assertion that these
sets of isomorphic activities would be the same mind, regardless of their location in space-
time. This can lead to the functionalist position denying the existence or relevance of
subjective activities of mind.27 This denial of the existence or importance of "qualia" (as
they are referred to in the literature) would be based on a misunderstanding, which flows
from the implicit assumption that activities do not manifest a perspective. The difficulties of
the functionalist approach in this area flow from the fact that they do not recognize that the
activities constituting mind are not independent of a perspective, but rather they take place
in different minds in similar or dissimilar ways. Qualia (subjective experiences) exist
because individual minds exist in different points in space and time, and hence individual
experience may be different and personal because space-time existence implies that
different space-time "vantage points" can produce differences in knowing, in knowledge,
and in experience. Hence, the fact that I know my emotions in a way that you (who have a
different space-time relationship to them) do not is merely one manifestation of the much
more general phenomenon of perspectivism.
27 An elementary introduction can be found in P.M. Churchland (1988, 36-42). For a more detailed
discussion of the issues, see Dennett (1992, 369-411), and for an excellent overview and critical analysis of the
state of the debate, see Flanagan (1992, 61-85).
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Note that the recognition of perspectivism does not imply that all knowing, knowledge
and experience is "merely" or solely subjective, unless by this one means that each of these
depends on the existence of a particular space-time perspective. Objective forms of knowing
and knowledge are a possibility, but by "objective" one means not that knowing and
knowledge occur without a perspective, but rather that knowing and knowledge are
activities which occur in similar ways across minds. The space-time existence of mind,
then, does not imply a radical subjectivity to all the activities of mind, but instead implies
that some of the activities of mind are different across mind because they have a different
space-time relation to what is known or to other forms of knowing and knowledge.
How, then, are these two theories of mind related to a Hayekian approach? It could be
said that a Hayekian theory incorporates aspects of each into its own approach, while at the
same time taking care to eliminate those errors which constitute the significant weaknesses
of both the identity and functionalist theories. Thus, a Hayekian approach argues that mind
exists in time and space, and hence that both the particular form in which the activities of
mind manifest themselves, and their relationship to, and function within, their environment
are of decisive importance in defining what mind is. The mistake underlying the identity
theory of mind is that it is too particular and errs in equating mind with the particular
substance in which these activities are realized. A functionalist critique of the identity
theory would argue that another type of substance which could manifest these same
activities would be a mind in exactly the same way as one based on different substances.
Thus, the error of the identity theory is that it is too restricted in its attribution of the concept
of mind to particular substances, and hence that it tends to focus on the state of being of
mind rather than on mind's activities.
Functionalist theories of mind, on the other hand, can err in discussing the isomorphic
nature of different sets of functions (and of different minds) without first specifying which
sets of functions are being compared. The functionalist approach is implicitly arguing that
two systems with the same functions would be the same systems. From this comes the claim
that any system which could replicate the functioning of a mind would itself be a mind. It is
important to note, however, that there then arises the question as to what constitutes the
standard of comparison. In other words, what set of activities actually characterize the mind
which serves as the basis of comparison? This is not the only difficulty. It would seem that
by focusing on the functioning of mind, functionalists sometimes overlook the restrictions
on functioning which arise from existence (or occurrence) being in space and over time. If
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this oversight occurs, functionalist theories of mind can be led into asserting that subjective
events (qualia) do not exist or are irrelevant because of the implicit assumption that the
activities of mind are independent of perspective, i.e. that the functioning of a system is
independent of its space-time location. Essentially, this view of mind simply assumes away
the existence of subjectivity and qualia. This is, in the final analysis, an incorrect view.
Activities must always manifest themselves in particular space-times, and it is this fact
which sets up the possibility that the "same" set of functions ("same" defined by the role
they perform) can be "different" from each other ("different" in their space-time
relationship to their environments, and in their space-time relationship to each other).
7. Intensities and closure
The second aspect of the theory of mind outlined in this chapter which is of some
importance flows from the presence of intensities (weightings) associated with the activities
of mind.28 These are associated with the closure properties of mind, which have been
alluded to at numerous points in this work. Closure within mind arises from conflicts
between different ongoing activities of mind. One activity closes down another in a conflict
when that activity occurs and the other does not. Within mind, then, closures are the
instantiation of the implicit rank-order associated with mind's activities. This rank-order is
embedded in the evolved capacities of mind, and is generated in its particularity by the
interaction between mind and its environment over the life span of the individual. One could
say, then, that there are two aspects of rank-ordering which play a role in mind: at the
species level and at the individual level. The individual aspects are developed during the
lifetime of particular individuals, while the species level rank-ordering manifests itself in
the existence of evolved activities of mind which are transmitted across generations. Species
level activities manifest an evolutionary rank-ordering in that some of these activities have
aided the organism in adapting to its environment in the past. On this way of viewing mind,
28 This stress on the intensity aspects of mind receives what is perhaps its most extensive philosophical
development by Nietzsche (1958; 1968; 1968a; 1974). i would argue that it is not a coincidence that Nietzsche
also stressed the physiological aspects of mind, a point often overlooked, or dismissed as irrelevant, by his
numerous commentators. For an introductory overview ofNietzsche's thought, see the comprehensive, if flawed,
treatment by Kaufmann (1974). As an interesting counter-point to Kaufmann, and for an examination of some of
the more interesting aspects of Nietzsche's thought, see Nehamas (1986); while for an intriguing analysis of the
intensity aspects of Nietzsche's own text which are sometimes overlooked by both Kaufmann and Nehamas, see
Staten (1990).
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one necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for an attribution of evolutionary adaptedness
would be the persistence of capacities over time which have contributed to the persistence
of the organism in which they are presently manifested.
All of this highlights the fundamentally interactive and interconnected nature of mind,
and serves to emphasize the importance of taking into consideration the inter-dependence of
minds and their environments, or put another way, the way that minds grow and adapt to
their environments. At the individual level, the particular regularities and rank-order of the
activities of a mind grow from a variety of sources. Some of them are physiological, others
are cultural. There is an intimate interplay between these two factors, and in a sense the
genetic aspects of mind provide the necessary, but not the sufficient, conditions for the
development of this rank-ordering. Neuropsychology uses the term functional validation to
describe the process whereby certain events external to mind must interact with the genetic
aspects of mind if mind is to develop certain specific capacities.29 This is a useful notion in
that it emphasizes the feedback and interaction between the events in the environment
external to mind and those within mind. The physiological aspects of mind provide a
foundation upon which more particular aspects of mind can grow, depending on the events
which activate particular genetic components. And it is this growth which provides the
foundations for individualized perspectives.
8. Different types of closure, different ways of viewing the world
All of this is related to the issue of closure. The theme of earlier discussions of this
notion was that the type of closure employed in reasoning has an important role to play in
determining how one views the world. The discussion of this chapter will, for the moment,
take a slightly more philosophical bent. To see how each form of closure has different
implications for reasoning, consider for the moment a famous paradox of reasoning, the
liar's paradox. This runs as follows. Epimenides, a Cretan, states "all Cretans are liars". The
paradox arises for the following reason: if in saying this, Epimenides is telling the truth,
then he is a liar (for he is a Cretan). If on the other hand he is lying, then it would follow
that he is telling the truth.
29 See Kolb and Whishavv (1996, 500).
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Now, it can be argued that this statement is, or is not, a paradox depending upon the
approach to reasoning which one takes. Consider an all-or-nothing approach. On this view,
the question is laid down as follows: is Epimenides' statement a lie, or is it not a lie? On this
way of looking at the statement, Epimenides either lies, or does not lie. This is an either/or
way of looking at the world, in which the attempt is made to categorize Epimenides'
statement into two mutually exclusive states of being. This is, in the language of logical
analysis, a bivalent approach to reasoning.
Now consider a matter-of-degree approach. On this way of looking at Epimenides'
statement, the world of possibilities is not divided into two mutually exclusive states of
being (lying or not lying), but is rather composed of a variety of intertwined shades of each.
This is a multivalent approach to reasoning. This view restricts the universality of an all-or-
nothing approach, and attempts to take into account the "fuzziness" which seems to
accompany the complexity of actual (as opposed to theoretical) affairs. In practical life,
would it make sense to claim that all the statements of all Cretans are lies? Or, is it not
much more familiar— and more meaningful — to think of the proposition as meaning that
in many important (i.e. "weighty") cases, Cretans lie? Or that the universal statement is, in
an important sense, an approximation to a much more complex underlying situation?
On a matter-of-degree view, what becomes of great importance is the weighting which is
attached to statements which are made. This is a view dedicated to the balancing of the
different and often competing claims made on our judgment. Now, it is important to keep in
mind some of the implications of such a view, and in particular, the areas of incompatibility
between the all-or-nothing and matter-of-degree approaches to viewing the world. Consider
the liar's paradox: a matter-of-degree perspective classifies the liar's paradox in a different
way from the all-or-nothing perspective. Under the former, it can be said that the Cretan lies
to a degree and does not lie to a degree at the same time. From the perspective of an all-or-
nothing view, this is contradictory, for X and not-X cannot be the case at the same time. But
on a matter-of-degree perspective, however, X and not-X can be the case at the same time. It
would be a confusion, then, to claim that X and not-X being the case at the same time is
somehow inherently contradictory, for this is so only if an all-or-nothing approach is
implicitly privileged as the only one which is suitable to view the world.
There is another aspect to this discussion which should be mentioned, but which seems
to have an elusive quality. As mentioned above, an all-or-nothing approach is a
dichotomization which splits the world into X and not-X, into what is the case and what is
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not the case. What might not be apparent about this bivalent way of looking at the world is
its implicit connection to minimal conditions. That is, an all-or-nothing perspective is better
adapted to (has an evolutionary association with) circumstances in which minimal
conditions are being considered. The reason for this, which has been discussed in earlier
chapters, is that the classifications over such conditions are more likely, for evolutionary
reasons, to have a stronger intensity weighting, and hence to be able to override alternative
classifications to a greater degree. A matter-of-degree approach, on the other hand, is more
likely to be associated with conditions which build upon the presupposition that these
minimal conditions have already been fulfilled. This is an approach which is amenable to
considerations of the overlap between alternatives and to the complexities which have been
built upon a foundation of necessary conditions which have already been fulfilled. An all-
or-nothing approach to the liar's paradox, for example, implicitly focuses on the minimal
conditions of existence or non-existence, while a matter-of-degree perspective implicitly
focuses on the overlap which exists between alternative states of being. The all-or-nothing
perspective, then, is implicitly focused on issues concerning minimal conditions, while the
matter-of-degree perspective emphasizes issues concerning the complexity which builds
upon, and presupposes the satisfaction of, minimal conditions.
It is perhaps obvious that either perspective, if overextended, has the potential to become
a rather misleading window on the world. An all-or-nothing perspective that focuses
exclusively on minimal conditions, which stresses the lack of conflict between necessary
conditions, and which emphasizes the factual nature of analyses (for if there are facts to
consider, they will be defined under the all-or-nothing classifications associated with
necessary conditions), subtly ignores the issues associated with trade-offs, with competing
or conflicting alternatives, and with considerations of alternative, but incompatible,
potentialities. Similarly, a matter-of-degree perspective which focuses exclusively on
potentiality, alternatives and conflict would ignore the necessary conditions which all
potentiality must satisfy if it is to become actuality. In my view, one must combine these
two perspectives. It is important to realize that a focus on the necessary conditions of the
actuality that does exist should not preclude a consideration of the potentiality that such
conditions are capable of supporting. Conflicts between alternatives do exist and should be
taken into account, and it is important to focus on potentiality both for what it must, and for
what it could, become. It is also important to keep in mind, however, that potentiality
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depends intimately on what is the case, and that there might be certain necessary conditions
which must be fulfilled if potentiality is to become actuality.
9. Implications for legal theory: conflict, closure and reasoning
All of this is related to the differences between different forms of reasoning, as was
discussed in an earlier chapter. Turn for the moment, then, to a consideration of deductive
and non-deductive reasoning and their relationship to the issue of closure.
It is especially important to keep the existence of classifications and intensity in mind
when one is considering the different frameworks for reasoning which were considered
earlier in the thesis. As was argued there, one of these forms of reasoning — deductive
reasoning— seems to presume away all conflict and simply assume that conflicts have been
resolved externally to the sphere of reasoning. This is unproblematic so long as it is
understood that the sphere of deductive reasoning is grounded upon a set of conflicts which
have been resolved in setting up the sphere within which deduction is valid. Deduction can
fall into error when it fails to take this into consideration or when it is applied in
environments in which it is inappropriate. In particular, if one attempts to resolve conflict by
appealing to deduction, one must realize that this will only be a useful exercise in certain
situations. If deduction is applied to areas in which the participants to a conflict share
certain classifications and their intensities in common, then there can be a sphere delimited
under which deduction from premises using rules of deduction makes sense. Deduction in
this environment does not resolve conflicts by generating the sphere within which the rules
of deduction may be applied. Rather, it is the application of the rules, based upon a shared
set of classifications, which resolves disputes.30
However, deduction is not always so useful. Deduction is not applicable to environments
where there are equally balanced conflicts among classifications. If a common core of all-
or-nothing classifications does not exist, then deduction would have to generate them, and it
is the act of generation which in effect "resolves" the dispute by imposing all-or-nothing
30 There is, it seems, an uneasy relationship between deductive reasoning and minimal conditions. On the
one hand, rules of conduct which are based on minimal conditions are easier to formalize, as they are based on
all-or-nothing closures, for the reasons outlined in earlier chapters, and above. On the other hand, the
justifications for the functions of these rules is, in many cases, based on values which are abstract, and in many
cases poorly understood or consciously not known. Thus there emerges an essential tension between the ease of
formalizing abstract rules of conduct, and the difficulty in appreciating the roles that they play and the values
they support.
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classifications on a situation where no such commonly held all-or-nothing classifications
were presumed to exist.
The structure of deductive reasoning, then, is that of a two-step procedure. In the first
stage, at which all-or-nothing classifications are presumed to underlie classifications, one
first recognizes a set of rules which delimit the boundaries of the investigation. The closures
at the first stage both constitute the rules of the investigation and close down their reference.
These rules are then rank-ordered in importance, presupposing that rules have been defined
at a first stage. This perspective presupposes that a core of agreement exists, that it can be
used to delimit both the rules which govern an investigation and their scope, and that these
rules are then rank-ordered such that conflicts are resolved. On this view, one can see how
"facts" and "values" become separated — "facts" are first-stage shared classifications, while
"values" are second-stage elements, related to the rank-ordering aspect of reasoning.
Such a vision of reasoning is not without its competitors. As I have argued in a previous
chapter, non-deductive reasoning turns the focus of attention onto the rank-order stage of
judgment, and in particular onto its unarticulated aspects. This change of focus brings to
light an interesting issue concerning the relationship between a rule which is constituted at
the first-stage and the force it carries (its rank-order) at the second stage. Consider the
following. If one assumes that rules are constituted initially by closures of certain weights,
then the question which must be asked is how do these closures (and implicit weighting)
differ from the weightings which are used to rank-order the rules in the second stage?
The answer is, I think, that they do not differ — they are both based on a general
framework of values which generate the force of different rules and hence in a sense
constitute the weights. If one accepts this, then one might also argue that one should
collapse the two-stage division (of formulating rules and then rank-ordering them) into a
single stage. This single stage, then, generates rules by considering the various trade-offs
and conflicts between all potential rules which could govern a situation. A single-stage
perspective, then, focuses on matter-of-degree conflicts and emphasizes the ongoing conflict
embedded in rules. It also stresses the importance of recognizing that balances always have
to be made and that a dominant rule will necessarily restrict a dominated rule.
Is there, then, a conflict between the two ways of viewing reasoning? It is submitted that
the two perspectives are not incompatible, but that they can be if they are overextended. If it
is held that there are no areas of commonality— none at all — then there is unintelligibility
between individuals, for no overlap of perspectives implies no overlap of shared meaning.
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On this view, reasoning can come to be viewed as just another form of power, lacking any
authority over those who do not share its foundational presuppositions. On the other hand, if
it is held that there is commonality, it is important to acknowledge that it will be limited by
actual subjective differences between individuals, and that this implies, in situations of
complexity, that commonality will often be abstract and negative, in the sense of shared
restrictions over different particular perspectives. If this acknowledgment is not made — if
"commonality" is overextended to include those aspects which are not commonly held, but
which are rather individual- or group-specific — then paternalistic arguments might be
made, under which some make judgments for others, based on their "shared" interests, over
areas where no such commonality exists. In such a scenario, the claim of "commonality" is
used as the justification for some controlling others, in that particular individuals have no
privileged relationship to these shared interests (as they do to their more idiosyncratic,
person-specific, interests).
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